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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of Spanish state and society during the 1920s. It 
analyses the official nationalist doctrine developed during the dictatorship of Primo de 
Rivera and its transmission throughout Spanish society. It sets out to explain the 
ideological evolution of conservative Spanish nationalism in the 1920s and the 
process of ‘nationalisation of the masses’ undertaken by the state.
The thesis is divided into two main thematic areas. The first part covers the 
making of the nationalist doctrine by the ideologues of the regime. Following a first 
chapter on Spanish nationalism prior to the dictatorship, Chapter 2 deals with the 
official discourse during the Military Directory (1923-1925) and Chapter 3 focuses on 
the phmorriverista nationalist doctrine during the Civil Directory (1926-1930). The 
second part analyses the state propagation of nationalist ideas throughout society. 
Chapter 4 looks at the role of the army as an agency of nationalisation. Chapter 5 
analyses the educational system as a nationalising agency. Finally, Chapter 6 is 
concerned with showing the nationalising effects of the official party and the national 
militia.
The conclusion is that during the 1920s the regime developed the principles of 
a fascisticised nationalism in line with the European radical Right that eventually 
constituted the ideological principles of Franco’s dictatorship. Nevertheless, the 
phmorriverista bid to carry out a process of nationalisation of the masses from above 
led to a ‘negative nationalisation’, in which increasing opposition to the state agents 
propagating the official canon of the nation was accompanied by the rejection of the 
very idea of nation defended by those agents. Thus the regime policies discredited the 
authoritarian canon of Spain and contributed to the popular consolidation of a 
republican and democratic idea of Spain.
“..the Spanish masses will consent to be shaped, for they are a noble race’ 
(Emilio Rodriguez Tarduchy)
“ ...you keenly personify the most dangerous trend for the preservation of national 
unity, which regionalisms and political autonomies are bound to destroy, for the 
masses’ ideas are simplistic and do not understand the subtleties of sharp minds”
(Primo de Rivera to Cambo)
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INTRODUCTION
FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTRE: STUDIES ON SPANISH NATIONALISM
Any observer of Spain’s history will find the subjects of nationalism and 
national identity at the core of the country’s political discourse throughout the entire 
twentieth century. From the Colonial Wars in the 1890s up to the present, the diverse 
nationalisms of the Iberian Peninsula have remained an essential component of the 
political debate in Spain. And yet, whilst studies on Catalan, Basque and Galician 
nationalisms have been at the centre of research projects in history, political science, 
and sociology departments since the 1970s, Spanish nationalism did not become a 
topic of systematic academic investigation until the 1990s. Only in the last five years 
has a considerable bulk of historiography on Spanish nationalism begun to emerge.
The reason for this ‘delay’ in the study of Spanish nationalism is related to the 
political context of Spain. During the 1940s and 1950s, Francoist historians paid very 
little attention to the development of Spanish nationalism. The few works written on 
the topic were mere propagandist efforts to ‘demonstrate’ the ancient unity of the 
fatherland based on theological and essentialist premises and to prove the ‘false’ 
postulates of Catalan and Basque nationalism.' During the same decades. Republican 
historians in exile addressed the question of the Spanish nation-building in a less 
dogmatic manner. Nevertheless, the well-known controversy between Américo Castro 
and Claudio Sanchez Albomoz on the constituent elements of the Spanish ‘national 
character’ remained within the realms of essentialism. By exploring the historical 
roots of Spain and the factors which contributed to the nation’s formation and 
decadence (the role of Castile, the influence of Jews, Muslims and Christians, the 
conquest of the Americas, etc), Castro and Sanchez Albornoz partially reproduced the 
essentialist arguments of 1898 Generation on the nation’s maladies and their possible 
‘cures’.^
‘ Among those Francoist propagandist works on the topic see Zacarias Garcia Villada, El destino de 
Espana en la Historia Universal [Madrid: 1940]; José Maria Fontana Tarrats, Destino y  construccion de 
Espana [Madrid: 1945]; Pelayo Menéndez y Solâ, Espana y  Cataluna (1892-1939) [Barcelona: 1946]. 
Manuel Garcia Morente, La idea de la Hispanidad [Madrid: 1947].
 ^ A discussion o f both the Francoist historiography and the Castro-Sânchez Albomoz debate in Xosé- 
Manoel Nunez Seixas, Historiographical approaches to nationalism in Spain [Saarbriicken & Fort 
Lauderdale: 1993], 138-139.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s new European historiographical trends 
slowly began to make an impact on Spanish historians. Marxist historiography, 
British ‘new history’ and the French nouvelle histoire, especially the École des 
Annales, led to new analyses of the Spanish nation-building process and the definitive 
abandonment of the essentialist thesis.^ When compared to France and the UK, 
Marxist historians argued, ‘Spain’s problem’ was not spiritual but the very material 
permanence of feudal socio-economic structures in the twentieth century owing to the 
failure of the Spanish bourgeoisie to carry out a complete liberal revolution in the 
nineteenth century."  ^ The same years witnessed the rapid emergence of studies in 
Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalisms - the so-called peripheral nationalisms. 
This fast growth was not so much caused by changing historiographical trends and the 
establishment of the paradigm of the ‘failed bourgeois revolution’, but was rather 
related to the political situation in Spain; that is, studies in peripheral nationalism 
aimed at justifying and legitimising the Francoist opposition movement.^ Against a 
dictatorship that proclaimed the unity of the nation as justification for its own 
existence, many authors emphasised regional diversity as a means of culturally 
undermining the Francoist regime. By the same token, the close association between 
Francoism and Spanish nationalism led many scholars to ignore the study of Spanish 
nationalism and the Spanish nation-building process.^
Francoism cast a long shadow over Spanish historiography and the situation 
remained the same during the 1980s. On the one hand, studies in peripheral
 ^ On the influence o f European historiography in Spain after World War II see Carlos Dardé, La idea 
de Espana en la historiografla del s ig h  XX  [Santander: 1999], 25-32.
 ^ The key works on the subject are Manuel Tufiôn de Lara, Estudios sobre el s ig h  XIX espanol 
[Madrid: 1971]; Josep Fontana, Cambio econômico y  actitudes politicas en la Espana del s ig h  XIX  
[Barcelona: 1973]; and Jordi Nadal, El fracaso de la revoluciôn industrial en Espana, 1814-1913 
[Barcelona: 1975].
 ^ Alfonso Botti, “II nazionalismo spagnolo nella ricerca e nel dibattito storiografico”, in Italia 
Contemporanea, June 1993, n. 191, 317-323. This is not to say that the new studies on peripheral 
nationalisms were not influenced by the new historiographical trends. Many key studies on Catalan 
nationalism took a Marxist approach. See, for example, Jordi Solé Tura, Catalanisme i Revolucio 
burguesa [Barcelona: 1967]; Juan Trias Vejarano, Almirall y  h s  origenes del catalanismo [Madrid: 
1975].
 ^ Nunez Seixas, Historiographical, 138. One should also keep in mind the difficulties for Spanish 
historians to undertake critical research on such topics at Francoist universities. Nonetheless, some 
pioneering studies on Spanish nationalist ideology were undertaken by Antonio Elorza. See “Carâcter 
nacional e ideologfas (1914-1936)” and “El nacionalismo conservador de José Maria Gil Robles” in his 
book La utopia anarquista bajo la Segunda Republica precedido de otros trabajos [Madrid: 1973]. 
Other works on Spanish nationalism and the Spanish nation-building were carried out in American 
universities. See Juan José Linz, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms Against the 
State: The Case o f Spain”, in S. N. Eisenstast and S. Rokkan (eds.). Building States and Nations
nationalism and regionalism grew substantially, as regional governments massively 
funded the official study of their regions’ past in an attempt to justify the very 
existence of the new Autonomous Communities/ On the other hand, research on 
Spanish nationalism and the Spanish nation-building continued to be overlooked. The 
reason for this lack of study on these topics lay in the way in which Francoist rhetoric 
had made abusive use of the term ‘Spain’ for 40 years. This had delegitimised the 
very idea of the Spanish nation. In turn, it led to a sort of “political-historiographical 
short-circuit” the effect of which was paralysis, a collective inhibition by which the 
terms “Spain” and “Spanish nation” were seldom used by politicians, the media or, in 
fact, historians.*
Not surprisingly, the few studies on Spanish nationalism carried out in the 
1980s mainly concentrated on the analysis of those individuals and institutions that 
had played an important role in the ideological formation of Francoism. Thus Martin 
Blinkhom analysed the impact of the imperial past on Spanish nationalists from the 
Generation of 1898 to the Falange. Frances Lannon dealt with the role of Catholic 
Church and the state in the making of the National-Catholic rhetoric before 1936; 
Andrés de Bias studied the nationalist discourse of key intellectual figures who were 
later to have an important ideological impact on the Francoist regime, such as Ortega 
y Gasset and Marceline Menéndez Pelayo; while Fredes Limon Nevado and Eduardo 
Gonzalez Calleja looked at the propagandist use of the idea of Hispanidad by the 
rebels in the Spanish Civil War.^ Additionally, some other scholars focused on the 
nineteenth century as a way to explain the emergence of a Spanish national identity 
during the liberal era. The pioneering works of José Marfa Jover, Paloma Cirujano, 
Teresa Elorriaga and Sisinio Pérez Garzon dealt with nineteenth century 
historiography and the nationalist message it contained.N otw ithstanding the
[Beverly Hills & London; 1973], 32-116 and D. W. Foard, “The Spanish Fichte: Menéndez y Pelayo”, 
Journal o f  Contemporary History, January 1979, vol. 14, n. 1, 83-97.
 ^On the production o f national and regional histories o f the 17 Autonomous Communities see Aurora 
Rivière Gômez, “Envejecimiento del presente y dramatizaciôn del pasado. Una aproximaciôn a las 
sintesis histôricas de las Comunidades Autônomas espafiolas (1975-1995)”, in Juan Sisinio Pérez 
Garzon et al. (eds.). La gestion de la memoria [Barcelona: 2000], 161-219.
® Botti, “II nazionalismo spagnolo”, 317-323.
 ^ Martin Blinkhom, “The ‘Spanish Problem’ and the Imperial Myth”, Journal o f  Contemporary 
History, vol. 15 (1980), 5-25; Andrés de Bias, Sobre el nacionalismo espanol [Madrid: 1989]; Fredes 
Limon Nevado and Eduardo Gonzalez Calleja, La Hispanidad como instrumenta de combate [Madrid: 
1988]; Frances Lannon, “Modem Spain: The project of a National Catholicism”, in Stuart Mews (ed.). 
Religion and National Identity. Studies in Church History [Oxford: 1982].
José Maria Jover, “Caractères del nacionalismo espaflol, 1854-1874”, Zona Abierta, April-June 
1984, n. 31, 1-22; Paloma Cimjano Marin, Teresa Elorriaga Planes and Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzôn,
importance of the contributions, these works were merely “oases in the desert”, to 
borrow Nunez Seixas’ expression/^ By the end of the 1980s, research on Spanish 
nationalism and the Spanish nation-building process remained at the margins of the 
academic agenda.
But the situation changed in the early 1990s. First, the works of Andrés de 
Bias and José Alvarez Junco showed the central role Spanish nationalism had played 
in the ideology of republican, progressive and populist left-wing groups in the 
nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century. By shifting the focus of 
attention to the Left, these works not only expanded the scope of studies in Spanish 
nationalism but also contributed to breaking the equation Spanish Nationalism = 
Francoism. Second, in 1990, Juan Pablo Fusi and Borja de Riquer debated on the 
place studies of peripheral nationalisms and regionalisms should have in Spanish 
historiography.^^ Fusi considered the academic attention paid to peripheral 
nationalism and regionalism since the mid-1970s had been excessive and this 
hampered the possibility of gaining an integral understanding of Spanish history. De 
Riquer, on the contrary, saw the emergence of a vast historiography on peripheral 
nationalisms as a “logical” and “justified” reaction to decades of centralist official 
historiography.^'^ The disagreements went further. In a nutshell, even though both 
historians considered the impact of Spanish nationalism as a cohesive force of social 
integration throughout the nineteenth century to be ‘weak’, they held opposing views 
on the level of national consolidation achieved by the year 1900. De Riquer saw the 
process of nation-building throughout the nineteenth century as a failure due to, first, 
the centralist liberal elites’ lack of ability to integrate pre-existing regional identities 
and, second, the shortcomings of the bourgeois revolution, which had precluded the 
formation of strong state agencies (public administration, educational system, etc)
Historiografla y  nacionalismo espanol, 1834-1868 [Madrid: 1985]; Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzôn, “El 
nacionalismo historiogrâfico: herencia del siglo XIX y dado precedente de la obra de R. Altamira”, in 
Armando Arberola (ed.), Estudios sobre Rafael Altamira [Alicante: 1987], 353-367. See also Pierre 
Vilar, “Estado, nacion, patria en Espafla y en Francia, 1870-1914”, Estudios de Historia Social, n. 28- 
29,(1984), 7-41.
Xosé-Manoel Nufiez Seixas, “Los oasis en el desierto. Perspectivas historiogrâficas sobre el 
nacionalismo espafiol”. Bulletin d'Histoire Contemporanie de l ’Espagne , n. 26 (1997), 483-533.
José Àlvarez Junco, El Emperador del Paralelo. Lerrouxy la demagogia populista [Madrid: 1990]; 
Andrés de Bias Guerrero, Tradiciôn republicanay nacionalismo espanol (1796-1930) [Madrid: 1991].
Borja de Riquer, “Sobre el lugar de los nacionalismos-regionalismos en la historia contemporânea 
espaüola”, Historia Social, n. 7, (1990), 105-126; Juan Pablo Fusi, “Revisionismo critico e historia 
nacionalista (A propôsito de un arti'culo de Borja de Riquer)”, Historia Social, n. 7, (1990), 127-134.
De Riquer, “Sobre el lugar”, 106-117.
capable of nationalising large sectors of the population. Fusi, on the other hand, 
argued Spain was a cohesive national entity by the turn of the century. The Spanish 
nationalist reaction after 1898, he maintained, showed that the process of national 
assimilation and integration was completed by the end of the nineteenth century.
In many ways, the Fusi-De Riquer debate was a turning point in the study of 
Spanish nationalism and Spanish nation-building. It fostered the idea that the study of 
peripheral nationalism had to be undertaken in conjunction with an analysis of the 
establishment and development of the Spanish liberal state, and placed the topic of 
Spanish nationalism at the centre of the academic discussion. The Fusi-De Riquer 
debate also spurred the discussion on the role of the state in the process of 
nationalisation. During the 1990s, the paradigm of the “weak nationalisation of the 
masses” became dominant, as most historians presented the liberal state as unable to 
create effective agencies to integrate socially vast sectors of the population under the 
Spanish national ideal. The success of this line of interpretation should not come as 
a surprise, for it perfectly matched the 1970s paradigm of the failed bourgeois 
revolution and the widespread view that liberal ideas and institutions never took firm 
root in nineteenth-century Spain. However, by the late 1990s, as the paradigm of the 
failed bourgeois revolution began to be seriously challenged, so was the idea of the 
weak nationalisation of the masses. New studies argued that the liberal revolutions of 
the nineteenth century deeply transformed the country and created a state that was not 
substantially different to that of other European neighbours.^* Moreover, these
119-126.
Fusi, “Revisionismo critico", 132.
The thesis o f the weak nationalisation of the masses was first sketched by Linz in “Early State- 
Building”, 32-116. De Riquer further developed the thesis in his article “La débil nacionalizaciôn 
espafiola del siglo XIX”, Historia Social, n. 20 (1994), 97-114, and has maintained the same line up till 
today. His more recent contributions to the thesis o f the weak nationalisation in Identitats 
Contemporànies: Catalunya i Espanya [Vic: 2000]. See also Juan Pablo Fusi, “Centre and Periphery 
1900-1936: National Integration and Regional Nationalism Reconsidered”, in Frances Lannon and Paul 
Preston (eds.) Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain [Oxford: 1990], 33-44. The thesis o f the 
weak nationalisation have also been supported, among others, by Justo Beramendi in “Identidad 
nacional e identidad regional en Espafla entre la guerra del francés y la guerra civil” in Los Ibéricos y  el 
mar, vol. 3, [Madrid-Salamanca: 1998], 187-215; and José Alvarez Junco, “The Nation-Building 
Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain”, in Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith, Nationalism and the 
Nation in the Iberian peninsula [Oxford: 1996]; idem, “The formation o f the Spanish Identity and Its 
Adaptation to the Age o f Nations”, History and Memory. Special Issue. Spanish Memories: Images o f  a 
Contested Past, Raanan Rein (ed.), vol 14, Fall 2002, 13-36; idem, “El nacionalismo espafiol: las 
insuficiencias en la acciôn estatal”, Historia Social n. 40, (2001), 29-51.
See David Ringrose, Spain, Europe and the 'Spanish miracle’: 1700-1900 [Cambridge: 1996]; Juan 
Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, Espana 1808-1996 [Madrid: 1997]; Isabel Burdiel, “Myths o f Failure, 
Myths o f Success: New Perspectives in Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism”, Journal o f  Modern 
History, n. 70, (1998), 892-912.
investigations showed the process of nationalisation as partially successful and the 
acquisition of a Spanish national identity compatible with the creation of regional 
identities. According to this ‘revisionist’ view, Spain would not be an exception 
among other European countries in terms of nation-building but a ‘normal’ country 
with its peculiarities, achievements and shortcomings as any other.
For all the debate on the process of mass nationalisation, it is important to note 
that the vast majority of these works approach the issue from a theoretical point of 
view. Scholars taking part in the debate have constantly pointed out the lack of 
empirical studies of the process of nationalisation in general and the state agencies in 
particular.^® In fact, with the exception of a few very recent works dealing with state
Andrés de Bias was one o f the first critics of the ‘weak nationalisation’ thesis. He argued the 
emergence of Catalan and Basque nationalism at the turn o f the century was not due to a failure o f the 
Spanish nationalist project but rather it was evidence o f the impact Spanish nationalism had made on 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. See “Los nacionalismos espaftoles ante el Estado autonômico”, in 
Justo Beramendi, Ramôn Mâiz, Xosé Niifiez (eds.), Nationalism in Europe. Past and Present [Santiago 
de Compostela: 1994], 39-52. In recent years the most vehement criticism o f the ‘weak nationalisation’ 
thesis has come from the members o f the Contemporary History Department at the Universitat de 
València. See the collective article by Isamael Saz, Ana Maria Aguado, Joan del Alcazar, Isabel 
Burdiel, Manuel Marti, Maria Cruz Romero and Nuria Tabanera, “Normalidad y anormalidad en la 
historia de la Espafla contemporânea” criticising De Riquer’s views and the latter’s réponse in “Un 
debate sobre el estado de la nacionalizaciôn”, Spagna contemporanea (1998), n. 14, 139-148. 
Moreover the ‘ Valencian school’ also questioned the general assumption that the permanence of strong 
regional identities by the turn of the nineteenth century was a sign o f the weak nationalisation o f the 
masses. Rather, they presented regional as compatible with the idea o f a unified nation. See Manuel 
Marti and Ferrân Archilés, “La construcciôn de la Naciôn espaflola durante el siglo XIX: logros y 
limites del caso valenciano” in Anna Garcia Rovira (éd.), Espana, ^Naciôn de naciones?, Ayer, n. 35, 
(1999), 173-190; Archilés, Ferrân and Marti Manuel, “Un pais extraflo como cualquier otro: la 
construcciôn de la identidad espaflola cotemporânea”, in Maria Cruz Romero and Ismael Saz (eds.), El 
siglo XX. Historiografla e historia, [Valencia: 2002] 245-278; idem, “Ethnicity, region and nation: 
Valencian identity and the Spanish Nation-State”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24-25 (2002), 245-278; 
Ferrân Archilés, “^Quién necesita la naciôn débil? La débil nacionalizaciôn espaflola y los 
historiadores”, in Carlos Forcadell (éd.), Uso pûblicos de la historia [Zaragoza: 2002]; Josep Ramôn 
Segarra i Estarelles, “Imaginar la regiôn y naturalizar la naciôn. La obra de Vicente Boix”, in 
Ciudadania y  Naciôn en el mundo hispano contemporânea [Vitoria: 2001], 139-162. On the 
compatibility between the formation o f national and regional identities see also Xosé-Manoel Nùflez 
Seixas, “The Region as Essence o f the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840- 
1936)”, European History Quarterly, 2001, vol. 31 (4), 483-518. The same author also questioned the 
thesis o f the weak nationalisation in “Proyectos altemativos de nacionalizaciôn de masas en Europa 
occidental (1870-1939), y la relativa influencia de lo contingente”, in E. Acton and I. Saz (eds.). La 
transicion a lapolitica de masas [Valencia: 2001], 93-115.
On the lack o f empirical research on the nationalisation of the masses it is telling to compare two 
works by Justo Beramendi. In 1992, he complained about the lack of an “adequate historiography on 
Spanish nationalism and the nationalising endeavours of the Spanish state”. By 2001, Beramendi 
acknowledged some progress had been done in the field of Spanish nationalism in the last decade but 
insisted that the lack o f studies in the process o f nationalisation remained the “major shortcoming in the 
field”. See Justo Beramendi, “La historiografla de los nacionalismos en Espafla”, Historia 
Contemporânea, n. 7 (1992), 152; and José Luis de la Granja, Justo Beramendi and Fere Anguera, La 
Espana de los nacionalismos y  las autonomias [Madrid: 2001], 273. Nuflez Seixas has also pointed out 
the lack o f empirical studies in the process of the nationalisation o f the masses in “Los oasis”, 511-513; 
and “Proyectos altemativos de nacionalizaciôn.”, 94. De Riquer has also noted the sharp contrast 
between the lack o f empirical studies and the abundant number of theoretical generalisations. See “El
educational agencies during the Restoration and the II Republic, the state 
nationalisation of the masses in Spain remains a broadly unexplored field.^' This is 
even more obvious when comparing research undertaken on the process of nation- 
building in other European countries/^ Despite important advances in our knowledge 
of the political, cultural and ideological aspects of Spanish nationalism in the last five 
years, an integral research analysing the role of the state in the process of the 
nationalisation of the masses remains to be undertaken.
This thesis addresses this lack by exploring the official nationalist doctrine 
elaborated during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and its transmission throughout 
Spanish society. The study concentrates on the political aspects of nationalism and 
focuses on the crucial role played by the state in shaping an authoritarian national 
identity, including procedures for developing a political discourse, implementing 
nationalist policies and transferring national ideals into society. It analyses the main
surgimiento de las nuevas identidades contemporâneas: propuesta para una discusiôn”, in Anna Garcia 
Rovira (ed.), Espana, ^Naciôn de naciones?, 21-22.
A general overview on the state’s efforts during the Restoration in Maria del Mar del Pozo and 
Jacques Braster, “The rebirth o f the ‘Spanish Race’: The State Nationalism and Education in Spain, 
1875-1931”, European History Quarterly, Vol. 29 (1), 1999, 75-107. A more detailed study o f the 
educational system and diverse Spanish nationalisms up to the Civil War in Maria del Mar del Pozo 
Andrés, Curriculum e identidad nacional [Madrid: 2000]. The transmission o f nationalist ideas through 
the educational system is also explored in Carolyn P. Boyd Historia Patria [Pricenton, New Jersey: 
1997]. On the nationalising efforts of the Socialist-Republican government during the Second Republic 
see Sandie Holguin, Creating Spaniards. Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain 
[Wisconsin: 2002]. On the army as an agency o f nationalisation see Alejandro Quiroga, “‘Los 
apôstoles de la patria’. El Ejército como instrumento de nacionalizaciôn de masas durante la Dictadura 
de Primo de Rivera’”, Mélanges de la Casa de Velazquez, 34 (1), 2004, 243-272. A revealing study on 
the process o f  assimilation o f the Spanish national identity in the Valencian region in Manuel Marti and 
Ferrân Archilés, “La construcciôn”. For the Catalan case see Josep M. Fradera, Cultura nacional en 
una societat dividida. Patriotisme i cultura a Catalunya (1838-1868) [Barcelona: 1992]. On the state 
administrative apparatus B. Richard, “Notas sobre el reclutamiento del alto personal de la Restauraciôn 
(1874-1923): el origen geogrâfico de los gobemadores civiles y su evoluciôn”, in M. Tunôn de Lara 
(éd.), Sociedad Polîtca y  cultura en la Espana de los siglos XIX-XX [Madrid: 1973], 56-85; B. de 
Riquer and M. Risques, “Participaciô administrativa, professional i politica en l’Estat”, in M. T. Pérez 
Picazo et al. (eds.), Els catalans a Espanya, 1760-1914 [Barcelona: 1996], 83-93.
For the state nationalisation o f the masses in France see the classic work by Eugene Weber, Peasant 
into Frenchmen. Modernization o f  Rural France, 1870-1914 [Stanford, California: 1976]. See also 
Maurice Agulhon, La République au village [Paris: 1970]. The British case has been analysed 
focussing on the empire and the role of the Anglican church as integrating factors rather than the state. 
See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 [New Haven: 1992] and L. Brockliss and D. 
Eastwood (eds.), y4 Union o f  Multiple Identities. The British Isles, c. 1750-c. 1850 [Manchester: 1997]. 
For the German case o f state-building and nationalisation see Hans Ulrich Wehler, German Empire, 
1870-1914 [Leamington Spa: 1985]. George L. Mosse’s The Nationalization o f  the Masses. [New 
York: 1975] focuses more on mass movements than in the actual role o f the state, but remains a key 
work for the understanding o f mass nationalisation in Germany and elsewhere. The Italian 
nationalisation o f  the masses is studied in G. Turi and S. Soldani (eds.). Fare gli italiani [Bologna:
1994]; and Emilio Gentile, 11 mito dello Stato Nuovo [Roma-Bari: 1999]. A recent analysis o f Stalin’s 
policies o f nationalisation in David Branderberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and 
the Formation o f  Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 [Cambridge (Mass): 2002].
agencies that the regime used in the process of mass nationalisation, namely the army, 
the educational system, the official party and the militia. The study of these agencies 
allows us to assess the process of political indoctrination and nationalisation of 
society implemented by the regime.
By ‘nationalisation’ I mean the historical process of homogenising the 
population under a common nationality. This process was closely related to the 
formation of the European liberal nation-states throughout the nineteenth century. As 
a way of legitimation, the emerging nation-states required Ancien Regime identities to 
be supplanted by new collective identities based on the idea of belonging to a political 
nation identified with the state. In other words, liberal elites faced the task of 
transforming ‘subjects’ loyal to their local lord and king into ‘citizens’ loyal to the 
nation-state. The development of a national consciousness -  one in which national 
identifications were strong enough to override or integrate regional and religious 
loyalties - was a long process and required a systematic political education of the 
population. The formation of a strong sense of common belonging was facilitated by 
the creation of state agencies (the ‘national’ educational system, the army, the central 
administration, etc), the emergence of a ‘national public’ (the press, a reading public, 
a cultural domain of theatre and public spectacle), and the development of a more 
comprehensive system of inter-state communication and transportation.^^
While initially large sectors of the population remained outside of this process 
of nationalisation, the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decades of 
the twentieth century witnessed the nationalisation of the masses all around Europe 
coinciding with the coming of mass politics. This second wave of nationalisations 
took place in a time when classical liberal principles were being questioned by many 
intellectuals and anti-liberal nationalisms were on the rise. The authoritarian regimes 
of the inter-war era epitomise the most radical attempts to nationalise the masses in 
anti-democratic principles.^"  ^Wary of the advance of the Left, right-wing dictatorships 
redefined the concept of nation, stripped from it its liberal connotations and sought to 
re-nationalise the population in authoritarian values.
The dissertation argues that during the 1920s Primo de Rivera’s regime 
attempted to implement an authoritarian nationalist political project to construct a
Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny, “Introduction; From the Moment of Social History to the Work of  
Cultural Representation”, in G. Eley and R. Suny (eds.), Becoming National [Oxford: 1996], 8-9.
Ismael Saz Campos, Espana contra Espana. Los nacionalismos franquistas [Madrid: 2003], 42-45.
modem corporative nation-state which could appeal to the majority of Spaniards. In 
order to achieve its goal, the dictatorship carried out a process of nationalisation of the 
masses from above seeking to replace the hegemonic liberal Spanish national identity 
with a new authoritarian one.^  ^At the ideological level, the thesis argues, the organic 
intellectuals of the primorriverista regime outlined the principles of an extreme-right 
nationalism that eventually became the doctrinal bases of Franco’s dictatorship. In my 
view, the primorriverista constmction of a new authoritarian state and the process of 
nationalisation of the masses can only be understood by considering the ideological 
implications of the new National-Catholic doctrine framed by Primo’s official 
ideologues. The new political discourse equated Catholicism with Spanishness and 
started a process of ‘sacralization’ of politics in which the myth of the nation became 
the supreme political value. This new organic canon of Spain had its political 
implications, both in terms of the actions taken against those considered to be 
‘internal enemies’ of the nation (e. g. republicans, anarchists, peripheral nationalists) 
and the reform of state agencies in order to improve their capacity as propagandist 
devices. Thus nationalist policies and the nationalisation of the masses implemented 
by the dictatorship are examined here in direct relation to the official doctrine.
By taking this top-down approach to the process of nationalisation, this study 
focuses on the state as the ‘maker’ of the nation. Thus I do not analyse some other 
autonomous factors, independent of the state, which also intervene in the process of 
nationalisation. The popular culture generated in civil society (literature, theatre, 
bullfighting, zarzuela, flamenco, etc) will not be addressed here. This study does not 
constitute a cultural history of the period in question. Nor will a great deal be said 
about the role of ideologies promoted by political groups and cultural associations 
other than the primorriveristas, even though the former played a part in the process of 
generating ‘alternative nationalisations’ to the official one.
For the liberal identity as the hegemonic one by 1923 see Inman Fox, La invenciôn de Espana 
[Madrid: 1997], 22-23, 193. This is not to say that the liberal canon was not seriously contested by 
different traditionalist groups (Carlists and Catholic Integrists), Catalan and Basque nationalists and 
some sectors o f the working class. For the different concepts o f Spain in the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries see Chapter 1.
THE DICTATORSHIP OF PRIMO DE RIVERA AS A NATIONALIST 
REGIME
During the 1970s, the first studies on the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera 
presented the regime as a mere “parenthesis” between the Restoration and the Second 
Republic, in which no significant political or social changes were carried out. Garcia 
Nieto, Donézar and Lopez Puerta described the period as “a parenthesis in which the 
country lived moments of order and peace.” By the end of Prime’s regime in January 
1930, the argument followed, “the Spanish sociopolitical situation remained 
unaltered.”^^  Along the same lines, Javier Tusell and Genoveva Garcia considered the 
dictatorship as a “parenthesis” in which no important transformation of the 
Restoration state was undertaken.^^ In their view, the dictatorship was merely an 
attempt to ‘regenerate’ a corrupt political system and it was only after Primo’s fall, 
“during General Berenguer’s government, when the real transformations of the 
political life were going to happen.” *^
Marxist historians also drew a line connecting the Restoration and the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera but they provided a more elaborated explanation for 
the regime. The Marxist approach interpreted the Spanish oligarchy’s initial support 
to the dictatorship as the final solution the Restoration upper-classes found to confront 
the challenge of démocratisation and social reform posed by liberals, socialists, 
anarchists and republicans in the years before the coup. Raul Morodo and Pierre 
Malerbe defined the dictatorship as a “Bonapartist regime”.^  ^ The dictatorship, the 
argument went, was the outcome of previous tensions between the dominant classes, 
which, afraid of the fall of the canovista regime, had given “conditional support” to 
Primo in order to preclude the transformation of the Restoration political system.
M.C. Garcia Nieto, J. Donézar and L. Lôpez Puerta, Bases documentales de la Espana
contemporânea, VII: La Dictadura, 1923-1930, [Madrid: 1973], 17.
Javier Tusell and Genoveva Garcia Queipo de Llano, “La dictadura de Primo de Rivera como 
regimen politico. Un intento de interpretaciôn”, Cuadernos del ICE, Madrid, 10, 1979, 37-63. 
Particularly pages 53-57.
For the dictatorship as a regenerationist liberal regime see Ibid, 44-48. For the quotation see Javier 
Tusell, La crisis del caciquismo andaluz (1923-1931) [Madrid: 1979], 11-17. Recently Tusell has 
insisted on the same view, see Carlos Seco Serrano and Javier Tusell, “La Espana de Alfonso XIII. El 
Estado y la Politica”, in Historia de Espana de Ramôn Menéndez Pidal, vol. XXXVIII, [Madrid:
1995], 11-51.
Raul Morodo, “El 18 Brumario espafiol. La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Triunfo, 15-9-1973, 22-
27; Pierre Malerbe, “La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Historia 16, June 1977, 75-87.
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Equally from a Marxist perspective, Manuel Tunon de Lara described the period 
1917-1923 as a “crisis of hegemony”, in which the privileged position of the “social 
dominant bloc” was constantly at risk.^^ The dominant bloc’s reaction to the threat 
posed by democratic forces, such as the working class movement and the republicans, 
was then to expand the power of the state (especially its repressive apparatus) via 
dictatorship.^^
The idea of continuity between the Restoration and the primorriverista regime 
was severely challenged in the 1980s. Shlomo Ben-Ami shared the Marxist view of 
the oligarchic backing of the coup and showed how the socio-economic elites, chiefly 
the Catalan bourgeoisie, the Basque industrialists and the Castilian landovmers, 
supported a coup against the very same political system from which they had 
profited.^^ However, his analysis portrayed the dictatorship as the first attempt in 
modem Spanish history to carry out a revolution from above, in which anti­
democratic traditionalism was elevated to “the status of an official guide-line” and 
“both politics and economy complemented each other as two faces of a dictatorial 
nationalist en te rp rise .T h u s  Primo’s dictatorship was not a “parenthesis” but rather 
the immediate precedent of Francoism, a bid to establish, manu militari, an anti­
liberal New State, based on a Catholic extreme-right ideology attuned to the 
mainstream counterrevolutionary European thought.^"* Another challenge to the idea 
of the regime as a parenthesis is to be found in James Rial’s Revolution from above}^ 
His work concentrates on Primo’s economic, social and, to a lesser extent, political
Manuel Tufiôn de Lara, “En tomo a la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Cuadernos Econômicos del 
ICE, n. 10, (1979), 9-36. See also Colectivo de Historia, “La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera y el bloque 
de poder en Espafia”, Informaciôn Comercial Espanola, n. 6, (1978), 179-216.
The thesis o f Tufiôn de Lara and the Colectivo de Historia was later followed by Jordi Casassas 
Ymbert in his “Introducciôn” to La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923-1930). Textos [Barcelona; 
Anthropos, 1983], 9-39. For a more recent work close to this thesis see Carlos Ernesto Hemândez 
Hemândez, “^Regeneraciôn o reconstrucciôn? Reflexiones sobre el Estado bajo la Dictadura 
primorriverista (1923-1930)”, Historia Contemporânea, 17, (1998), 335-357.
 ^ Shlomo Ben-Ami, Fascism from above. The Dictatorship o f  Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930, 
[Oxford: 1983], 19-52.
Ibid., ix-x.
Ben-Ami had advanced these views in previous works. See “The Dictatorship o f Primo de Rivera: A 
Political Reassessment”, Journal o f  Contemporary History, 12 (1977), 65-84; Los origenes de la 11 
Republica [Madrid: 1990, English ed. 1978]; “Hacia una compresiôn de la Dictadura de Primo de 
Rivera”, Revista del Departamento de Derecho Politico, n. 6, (1980), 107-132; and “La Dictadura de 
Primo de Rivera y el final de la monarquia parlamentaria”, in Historia general de Espana y  América, 
Volume XVI-2 [Madrid: 1981], 523-580.
James Rial Revolution from above. The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship in Spain, 1923-1930 
[Crambury (N.J.): 1986].
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reforms and shows the dictator’s efforts to carry out a “revolution from above”, 
breaking with the liberal traditions.
The idea of rupture with the Restoration political system was also emphasised 
by Maria Teresa Gonzalez Cabet. Like Ben-Ami, Gonzalez Calbet pointed out the 
deep changes operated during the dictatorship, namely the political and ideological 
destruction of the “dynastic parties”, the ideological formulation of a political 
alternative to the old system by members of diverse extreme-right groups and the 
creation of a state-controlled political party during the Military D irectory.Sim ilarly, 
José Luis Gomez Navarro’s works highlighted the profound transformation of the 
political system during the dictatorship and the new political personnel and social 
bases which supported the primorriverista regime.^^ Moreover, Gomez Navarro 
concluded that primorriverismo formulated a political and ideological alternative to 
the Restoration system by the last years of the Civil Directory; an alternative 
eventually adopted by Franco’s regime during its first era.^*
Ben-Ami, Gonzalez Calbet and Gomez-Navarro’s works revolutionised the 
historiography of the dictatorship and debunked all assumptions which presented the 
regime as a mere “parenthesis”. The novelty of these investigations was threefold. 
First, they demonstrated the dictator’s endeavours to create a new authoritarian state, 
which signalled a definitive attempt to end the constitutional system of the 
Restoration.^^ Second, they portrayed a much more complex picture of the
Maria Teresa Gonzâlez Calbet, La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera. El Directorio Militar, [Madrid: 
1987], 12-13. By the same author see also “La destruccion del sistema politico de la Restauraciôn: el 
golpe de septiembre de 1923”, in José Luis Garcia Delgado (ed.). La crisis de la Restauraciôn [Madrid: 
1986], 101-120. Unlike Ben-Ami, however, Gonzâlez Calbet argued that the dictatorship came not as a 
reaction from the Crown and the military against the democratic tendencies o f Sânchez Guerra’s 
government, but rather as the only available solution to cope with the crisis o f  the Restoration’s 
political system from above. In other words, the military dictatorship was nothing but a coup de grace 
of the “terminally sick dynastic parties”. See La Dictadura, 279. Ben-Ami’s views were based on 
Raymond Carr and Carolyn Boyd’s ideas. They argued that the Sânchez Guerra’s government sought a 
démocratisation o f the Restoration. Thus the coup would have been an attempt by the military to stop 
this process o f démocratisation. See Ben-Ami, Fascism, 19-33; Raymond Carr, Espana, 1808-1939, 
[Barcelona, 1969], 504-505; Carolyn Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Spain, [Chapel Hill: 1979].
José Luis Gômez-Navarro, “Uniôn Patriôtica: anâlisis de un partido del poder”, Historia Social, n. 
32-33, January-June 1985, 93-163; El régimen de Primo de Rivera: reyes, dictaduras y  dictadores 
[Madrid: Câtedra, 1991]. Like Gonzâlez Calbet, Gômez Navarro was a former member o f the 
Colectivo de Historia. His early works with Gonzâlez Calbet and Ernesto Portuondo already revealed a 
profound political transformation o f Spain during the dictatorship. See “Aproximaciôn al estudio de las 
élites politicas en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Cuadernos Econômicos de L C. E., 10, 183-208; 
“La Asamblea Nacional Consultiva: poder econômico y poder politico en la Dictadura de Primo de 
Rivera”, Estudios de Historia Social, n. 14, July-September 1980, 157-188.
Gômez-Navarro, El régimen, 8, 518-531.
For a similar interpretation see the works o f Miguel Angel Perfecto, “Corporativismo y catolicismo 
social en al Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Studia Historica, Historia Contemporânea, vol. II, n. 4,
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dictatorship’s social support, which initially included not only the socio-economic 
elites but also large sectors of the urban and rural middle-classes. Finally, these 
investigations understood the primorriverista dictatorship as part of the 1920s general 
trend towards the formation of dictatorial regimes in Eastern and Southern Europe. 
Thus, aiming to gain an understanding of the Spanish case in a European perspective, 
the works of Ben-Ami and Gomez Navarro compared Primo’s regime to other 
dictatorships of the inter-war era, such as those in Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
and Romania.'*®
My investigation takes these works as a starting point and focuses on the 
dictatorship’s attempts to indoctrinate the population and gain mass support in order 
to consolidate itself. The primorriverista regime is understood here as part of the 
European upper-classes and bourgeoisie’s reaction against the increasing growth of 
organised labour and the post-1917 revolutionary upheavals, which led to the 
establishment of a series of dictatorships in the 1920s. Together with pure physical 
repression, these regimes appealed to nationalist ideas in order to gain popular 
support, legitimise themselves and undermine the appeal of the Left. By diverting 
public attention towards external ‘threats’ and the ‘enemy within’, the European 
political elites aimed at producing a “negative integration”, that is, the indoctrination 
of lower and middle-classes in nationalist ideas emphasising foreign and domestic 
foes.'** This was not new. It has been a constant strategy throughout Europe since the 
turn of the century, notoriously in Germany, and the process only intensified after 
WWI.'*  ^ It is not surprising, then, that the biggest efforts to nationalise the masses by 
the European states took place during the first half of the twentieth century, when the
1985, 123-147; “Politica social y regeneracionismo en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, Studia 
Zamorensia, vol. I, 1994. An overview on the historiography o f the Dictatorship Primo de Rivera in 
Ignacio Olabarri, “Principales interpretaciones de la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923-1930)”, 
Hispania, LV/1, n. 189, January-April 1995, 315-325; and Carmen Gonzâlez Martinez, “La Dictadura 
de Primo de Rivera: una propuesta de anâlisis”. Anales de Historia Contemporânea, 16 (2000), 337- 
408.
'‘° Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Las dictaduras de los afios veinte”, in M. Cabrera, S. Juliâ and P. Martin (eds.), 
Europa en crisis, 1919-1939 [Madrid: 1991], 47-64. For a comparative approach to the period see also 
Martin Blinkhom, “The Iberian States” in D. Miilberger (ed.) The Social Bases o f  European Fascist 
Movements [London: 1987], 320-348. A discussion o f the historiography on the similarities between 
Primo and Mussolini’s dictatorships in Juan del Alcâzar Garrido, “Sobre las causas y connotaciones de 
la Dictadura primorriverista. El problema historiogrâfico”, Estudis d ’Historia Contemporànîa del Pais 
Valencià, n. 6, 1985, 349-370.
Paul Preston, “La Guerra Civil Europea, 1914-1945”, in Romero and Saz (eds.), El siglo XX. 
Historiografla e historia [Valencia: 2002], 137-165.
For the concept o f negative integration see Wehler, The German Empire, 100-137.
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continent was in the middle of a ‘European civil war’ between Right and Left/^ As 
the old nineteenth century mechanisms of social control became increasingly useless 
in politically mobilised mass societies, the European dictatorships found mass 
nationalisation as the most useful tool of political indoctrination and a way to 
integrate the masses into politics via an anti-democratic mobilisation.
New trends in the historiography of the Fascist and authoritarian regimes have 
focused on the means by which these dictatorships attempted to gain a certain 
‘consensus’ among the rural and urban middle classes. In order to investigate the 
popular support achieved by the authoritarian regimes, these studies have 
incorporated a series of social, ideological, economic and cultural factors to their 
analysis widening the causality range. As a result of this approach, the processes of 
nationalisation, the role of language and political symbolism have become essential 
factors for the understanding of authoritarian regimes."^  ^The achievement of a certain 
level of social consensus by some dictatorships has been presented in close relation 
with the regimes’ ability to create a patriotic liturgy in which the masses could feel 
their belonging to the national community. Myths, rites, nationalist public ceremonies 
and slogans were the key elements in drawing the people into anti-democratic 
political mobilisation and active participation in the national mystique, as a way to 
accomplish popular consensus and social cohesion."^  ^ My work follows this line of 
investigation and looks at the primorriverista formulation of a sacred concept of 
nation and the dictatorship’s programme of mass mobilisation via the official party, 
the national militia and state-organised patriotic ceremonies.
In recent years, scholars have also returned to ideology as a main analytical 
tool for the study of Fascism and other types of extreme right political thought.^^ 
Ideology is a substantial aspect of the authoritarian regimes not only for what it 
constitutes at a discursive level but also because it is a construct in constant
For the states’ increasing efforts to nationalise the masses in the first half o f the twentieth century see 
Saz, Espana contra Espana, 48. For the concept of the European Civil war see Preston “La Guerra 
Civil Europea”, 137-165.
Eduardo Gonzâlez Calleja, “Sobre el dominio de las masas. Visiones y revisiones en la sociografia 
de los regimenes autoritarios y fascistas del periodo de entreguerras”, in E. Acton and I. Saz (eds.). La 
transicion a la politica de masas [Valencia: 2001], 129-156.
See Mosse, The Nationalization, for the German case and Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization o f  
Politics in Fascist Italy [Cambridge (Mass): 1996], for Italy.
For the regained importance of ideology in the studies of Fascist and authoritarian regimes see Roger 
Griffin, “Introduction”, in Roger Griffin (ed.). International Fascism [London: 1998], 1-20; Marco 
Tarchi, Fascismo. Teorie, interpretazione e modelli [Roma-Bari: 2003].
reformulation deeply linked to social, political and institutional dynamics."^  ^ In the 
Spanish case, the direct ideological and political connection between Primo de Rivera 
and Franco’s regimes has been an important subject of academic study. The fact that 
most of Primo’s ideologues, known as “Alfonsine Monarchists” in the 1930s, 
gathered together after the dictator’s fall in the Union Monarquica Nacional, an 
extreme right-wing political party, and again in Renovacion Espanola during the 
Second Republic, only to become members of the first Franco’s governments at the 
beginning of the Civil War, has led many historians to concentrate their research on 
them in order to shed some light on the attributes of both dictatorships and the nature 
of the Spanish far-right.
To date studies on the Spanish extreme right in the 1920s and 1930s show two 
main currents of interpretation. On the one hand, historians such as Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
Paul Preston and Raul Morodo have portrayed Alfonsine Monarchists as close to 
radical right and fascist European ideologies."^* This approach takes a comprehensive 
view of the fascist phenomenon, in which the Alfonsine Monarchists are presented as 
a particular variety of Spanish Catholic fascists. Some other scholars have argued, on 
the other hand, that the Alfonsine Monarchists were not fascist because their Catholic 
traditionalist ideology impeded a complete shift into a radical modem and 
revolutionary doctrine. This interpretation, defended by historians such as Stanley 
Payne, Javier Tusell and Pedro Gonzalez Cuevas, relies on a less flexible explanation 
of Fascism, stresses the links of Prime’s ideologues with Spanish Catholic 
traditionalist thought, and considers the Falange and the J.O.N.S. as the only real 
fascist groups in 1930s Spain."^  ^Moreover, this current of interpretation considers that 
Primo’s ideologues never broke with liberal principles and European radical right
Saz, Espana, 54.
Ben-Ami, “The Forerunners of Spanish Fascism: Uniôn Patriotica and Uniôn Monârquica”, 
European Studies Review, vol. 9, January 1979; idem. Fascism from above', Raul Morodo, Acciôn 
Espanola. Origenes ideoldgicos del franquismo [Madrid: 1985]; Paul Preston, La politica de la 
venganza. El fascismo y  el militarismo en la Espana del siglo X X  [Madrid: 1997]; Las derechas 
espanolas en el siglo XX: Autoritarismo, fascismo y  golpismo [Madrid: 1986]; “Alfonsine monarchism 
and the coming o f the Spanish Civil War”, in Martin Blinkhom (ed.), Spain in Conflict 1931-1939. 
Democracy and Its Enemies [London: 1986], 160-182.
Stanley Payne, Falange. Historia del fascismo espanol [Madrid: 1985]; idem, “La derecha en Espafia 
y en Italia”, in Payne (ed.) Politica y  sociedad en la Espana del siglo XX, [Madrid: 1978]; idem. 
Fascism in Spain, 1923-1975 [Madison: 1999]; Javier Tusell, “Prefacio” in J. Tusell (ed.). Las 
derechas espafiolas contemporâneas [Madrid: 1996], 9-13; Pedro C. Gonzâlez Cuevas, Acciôn 
Espafiola [Mdidnd, 1998].
thought did not become influential in the Alfonsine Monarchists’ postulates until the 
1930s/°
This study contributes to the debate on the nature of primorriverista ideology 
by analysing the official discourse and the regime’s nationalist policies. It shows the 
discourse of Primo’s ideologues as an attempt to frame a modem authoritarian 
nationalism in which the influence of Fascism becomes paramount. Catholicism 
would not be a handicap for the intellectual formulation of an anti-liberal nationalism 
but the core of a new ideology, which combined traditionalism with European radical 
right political thought to form a new sacred concept of nation. I use the term National 
Catholicism to refer to the primorriverista official ideology. National Catholicism is 
understood here as the ideological formulation of those intellectuals at the 
primorriverista dictatorship’s service who “blended the reactionary cultural values of 
traditional Spanish Catholicism with strident authoritarian nationalism and a 
smattering of corporative ideas of mixed lineage, [and] legitimated the authoritarian 
state as the form of political organisation best equipped to defend the economic 
interest and religious and cultural values associated with national unity and power”.^  ^
In the second half of the 1920s, it is argued here, this ideological formulation became 
the official doctrine of the primorriverista dictatorship.
In order to study National Catholicism as a nationalist doctrine one has to take 
into consideration that this ideology was at first mainly developed by Primo’s 
luminaries from a position of state power, that is, it was created by the state to gain 
support for the dictatorship and produce a controlled mobilisation of the masses. This 
ideology proposed a state-led nationalism, in which state institutions, such as the 
army, the educational system, and the official party were to play a key role in 
fostering the government’s political message. This is what John Breuilly has named 
“governmental nationalism”, Nazism and Italian Fascism being the paradigms of this
For this position see Genoveva Garcia Queipo de Llano, “Los ideôiogos de la Uniôn Patriôtica”, in 
Homenaje a los profesores José M. Jover Zamora y  Vicente Palacio Ataid, [Madrid: 1990], 221-230 
and Julio Gil Pecharromân,“El conservadurismo alfonsino en la Segunda Republica” in J. Tusell (éd.). 
Las derechas, 211-235.
Traditionally National Catholicism has referred to the political ideology o f Franco’s regime. The 
term was coined during the Civil War by one o f the former Primo’s ideologues, José Pemartln, but was 
not broadly used until the early 1960s to define the Francoist dictatorship’s official doctrine. However, 
since the 1980s, scholars have used the term National Catholicism to describe the ideology o f  
Francoism and have traced its origins to the turn of the twentieth century. For the use o f National 
Catholicism to refer to the primorriverista ideologues’ postulates in the 1920s see Alfonso Botti, Cielo 
y  dinero. El nacionalcatolicismo en Espana, 1881-1975 [Madrid: 1992], 59-71, 141-143, 151-158; 
Boyd, Historia Patria, 168.
sort of nationalism. According to Breuilly, one could confine governmental 
nationalism to two situations. Externally, “it refers to policies aimed at extending the 
territory” of the state. Internally, actions are “taken against specific groups and 
justified on the anti -  or not national- character of these groups or individuals” (e. g. 
anti-Semitism of the Third R e i c h ) . I n  addition, this governmental nationalism 
reinforces “when governments conflict with a nationalist opposition claiming to speak 
for another nation”. The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera certainly aimed to extend the 
Spanish territory outside of the Iberian Peninsula -  or at least to control the Moroccan 
protectorate. However, National Catholicism concentrated more on the ‘internal 
enemy’. The demonic official description of Communists, Anarchists, and Basque and 
Catalan nationalists was accompanied by repressive policies against those considered 
enemies of the fatherland. In this case, nationalist ideology went hand to hand with 
nationalist governmental policies.
The significance of ideology in nationalism not only lies in its impact on 
governmental policies, but also in its ability to mobilise people. As Breuilly has 
pointed out, nationalist ideology “matters, not so much because it directly motivates 
most supporters of nationalist movements, but rather because it provides a conceptual 
map which enables people to relate their particular material and moral interests to a 
broader terrain of action.” "^^ In this sense, primorriverista National Catholicism was 
related to the mobilisation of the masses the regime promoted from above. The 
mobilisation centred around the attempts of the official party {Union Patriotica) and 
the primorriverista militia {Somatén NacionaT) to incorporate a large part of the 
population hitherto uninvolved in politics or simply disenchanted Avith the corrupt 
liberal system. This mobilisation had a triple function for a regime aware of the need 
to incorporate the masses into politics. First, it was a means of gaining active popular 
support for itself. Second, it was a method to effectively destroy the oligarchic 
political system and the liberal parties of the Restoration by incorporating their 
political clienteles into the official party. Finally, as in Italy, it was a way to fight left 
and peripheral nationalist movements by including large sectors of the population 
from different classes into a ‘national’ party.
1 6 8 .
53 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State [Manchester: 1993], 8-9. 
^U bid, 13.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FRAMEWORK
The study seeks to answer the following questions:
1. How was the new nationalist doctrine elaborated upon by the ideologues 
of Primo de Rivera? How did counterrevolutionary European doctrines 
influence the creation of this new nationalism? Were the main doctrinal 
principles of Francoism already implied in the 1920s primorriverista 
official discourse?
2. How were nationalist policies implemented by the regime? How was the 
nationalisation of the masses directed by the state?
The dissertation is divided into two thematic parts. The first one focuses on 
official primorriverista discourse and the nationalist policies implemented by the 
regime. The second part concentrates on the process of nationalisation, analysing the 
transmission of the official idea of Spain into society by the state agencies.
Following a first chapter on Spanish nationalism in the nineteenth century and 
the question of the nationalisation of the masses prior to 1923, Chapter 2 deals with 
the official discourse during the Military Directory (1923-1925). It examines the 
Primo’s idea of Spain and the governmental policies seeking to undermine peripheral 
nationalists and regionalists’ power during the first two years of the dictatorship.
Chapter 3 focuses on the primorriverista nationalist doctrine formulated 
during the Civil Directory (1926-1930). It shows how the regime’s ideologues created 
an anti-liberal canon of the nation, combining different alternative conservative 
models of Spanish nationalism and radical right-wing European thought. This chapter 
also analyses National Catholicism within its European context comparing the 
primorriverista nationalist discourse to its Italian and French counterparts.
The second part of the study concentrates on the main agencies used by the 
state to transmit the ideological premises of the regime. Chapter 4 looks at the role of 
the army as an agency of nationalisation. It is beyond question that the political 
significance of the army in the regime was remarkable. During the Military Directory, 
Primo not only formed a cabinet of generals to rule Spain but also replaced civil 
governors by military governors in every province of the country. In addition, military 
government delegates (delegados gubernativos) were ascribed to all Spanish districts 
(partidos judiciales) to control political opposition, organise mass rallies of support 
for the regime, propagate the official doctrine in public ceremonies, and educate the
18
population in ‘patriotic values’. The analysis of the indoctrination of military officers 
into primorriverista values by the regime’s intelligentsia and how these values were 
subsequently transmitted into society sheds some light on the role the army played in 
the indoctrination of the masses.
Chapter 5 studies the primorriverista transformation of the educational system 
and its political consequences. Changes in the national curricula, indoctrination of 
teachers, development of state schools and expansion of Castilian language became 
the hallmarks of a reform aimed at increasing the nationalisation of the masses under 
primorriverista principles. Special attention is paid here to the implementation of 
official linguistic policies and the political implications of the process of 
‘Spanishization’ in Catalonia. The problems the regime had in implementing the 
reform, facing the opposition of liberals, the Left, and, above all, the Catholic Church, 
illustrates how the transmission of the official doctrine was hampered by political and 
social forces that progressively turned against the dictator.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the role of the official party and the militia. 
Created by the government, the Union Patriotica and the Somatén Nacional were 
conceived as a catch-all party and militia respectively. The idea behind their 
formation had a twofold goal. First, it sought a controlled mass mobilisation that 
could channel popular support for the dictatorship and thus legitimise the regime. 
Second, it aimed to ‘educate’ the masses in primorriverista nationalist values. 
Therefore, the official militia and the state-sanctioned party became essential agencies 
in both the transmission of the dictatorship’s nationalist discourse to the masses and 
popular mobilisation through nationalist rituals.
APPROACH AND SOURCES
Contemporary scholarship offers two dominant approaches to understanding 
the appeal of nationalism. These approaches have been labelled instrumentalism and 
constructivism. Instrumentalists depict nationalism primarily as an instrument of 
state-building or socio-economic development.^^ This interpretation de-emphasises 
the internal logic of nationalism. Instead, it stresses the ways in which social elites 
manipulate the national idea to fulfil other objectives. The instrumentalist explanation 
offers a clear sense of the utility of nationalist ideology for members of political and
55 See, for instance, Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism [Oxford: 1983]; Breuilly, Nationalism.
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social eûtes who seek to mobilise popular support. Nevertheless, this approach fails to 
explain why nationalist appeals and rhetoric resonate so strongly in the audience.
Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasises the creative and contingent 
nature of national identity, as well as nationalism’s flexibility to adapt itself to 
countless political and social contexts in the modem world. By linking nationalism to 
processes of communal imagination and to the redefinition of communal identity in 
response to the attenuation of traditional allegiances, constructivists explain the 
powerful attraction of nationalist ideology and its capacity to merge with a wide range 
of political ideologies.^^ However, little attention is paid to the actual national 
mobilisation and the techniques employed to achieve it.
In recent years, historians and political scientists have explored how political 
elites deploy narratives and invent traditions about the nation in order to mobilise 
popular support.^^ These analyses have opened the door to new interpretations which 
merge both instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives to understand nationalism 
in terms of its dynamism and its ‘discursive formation’ for the purpose of nationalist 
mobilisation.^* It hardly needs to be said that the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera is an 
excellent example of nation-state-building from above, in which elites created a new 
nationalist discourse in order to mobilise popular support and defend the 
establishment. The utility of nationalist rhetoric to modernise the state stmcture and 
fight political opponents is beyond doubt; and so is the helpfulness of the 
instrumentalist approach for our case study. The functioning of state agencies in the 
transmission of the official nationalist doctrine is essential in understanding the 
regime’s nationalisation of the masses.
Nevertheless, the importance of the ideological connotations of the discourse 
elaborated by Prime’s ideologues cannot be overlooked. It is in the intersection of 
instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives where one can examine the creation of 
narratives about the nation and its transmission to society. The way in which this 
narrative was created in order to establish a new ‘national imaginary’ and mobilise
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections o f  the Origin and Spread o f  
Nationalism, [London: 1991].
Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations [Oxford: 1986]; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds.). The Invention o f  Tradition [Cambridge: 1983]; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780 [Cambridge: 1990]; Elie Kedurie, Nationalism [Oxford: 1993].
Craig J. Calhoun, Nationalism [Minneapolis: 1997]; Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle, 
“Myth and Mobilisation. The triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric”. Nations and Nationalism, 1 (2), 
(2001), 175-194.
political support can only be fully understood in relation to the ideological 
development of European conservative thought after WWL In the same manner, the 
political principles that led the reforms of the state structures have to be considered in 
the light of the growing anti-liberal ideologies within Spain since the early twentieth 
century. Therefore, the analysis of the discursive formation of the new national 
identity caimot be separated from its political ideology and the role it played in 
gaining social support for the regime.
Two major ideas provide a theoretical framework on which this investigation 
is based. Firstly, Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly’s works on the role 
of the state in shaping nationalism from above establish a theoretical pattern on which 
Primo’s dictatorship can be s tudied.These authors have analysed the ideological 
transmission of nationalist postulates in relation to the expansion of the state and the 
improvement of social communications, as well as the relationship between 
intellectuals and the masses in the process of nationalisation. This is especially 
relevant in our case study since the primorriverista government invested a vast 
amount of public money in expanding the communication and transportation network. 
Moreover, in a time of economic growth, the dictatorship fostered the development of 
the state apparatus seeking to reach the most remote areas of the country.
Secondly, the concept of “political religion” becomes essential in order to 
define the whole socio-political process carried out by the dictatorship. The term 
‘political religion’ in this work defines those particular modem political ideologies 
which incorporate in their discourse a religious rhetoric and symbolism in order to 
endow the nation with a sacred value.^° The key concept in the configuration of 
political religions is the ‘sacramental transference’ (transferencia de sacralidad). This 
concept refers to the process through which the search for new discourses and 
symbols, leads to the creation of a “religion of the fatherland”, substituting 
Catholicism as the political and social agent of cohesion after the French Revolution. 
Historically, French revolutionaries of the late eighteenth century were the first ones 
to realise the importance of replacing the role that traditional Catholicism played in 
politics and society. The need for sacred symbols led to the creation of a new political
Breuilly, Nationalism', Gellner, Nations', Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication 
[Cambridge (Mass): 1966].
Marcela Cristi, From Civil to Political Religion [Waterloo: 2001], 3.
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discourse and symbolism as an alternative to Catholicism endo^ving the nation with 
sacred qualities and liturgies previously reserved for the Church.^^
This process of ‘sacramental transference’ for the creation of a secular religion 
of the fatherland was detected in those romantic nationalists of the nineteenth century, 
such as Mazzini, and acquired special relevance in fascist movements during the 
1920s and 1930s. As George Mosse and Emilio Gentile have shown, Italian, Spanish 
and German fascists elaborated secularized religions, which attempted to draw the 
people into anti-democratic political mobilization and active participation in the 
national mystique, as a way to accomplish popular consensus and social cohesion.^^ In 
these new fascist religions the role of rituals, symbolism and sacralized rhetoric 
became paramount. These were created in a syncretic manner, that is, incorporating 
and overlapping those traditional Christian liturgies and symbols with the fascist 
political discourse to idealise the nation-state.
The creation of political religions in nationalism can also be found in those 
traditionalist ideologies which emerged as a reaction against modem society and 
attempted to return to an idealised past in which the original nation was in its purest 
fomi. Basque nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Western 
Europe, and Russian Orthodox nationalism of nineteenth century, in the East, may be 
considered as two paradigms of this reactionary nationalism. In both cases nationality 
was essentially defined in religious terms and the nation was attached to a religious 
creed.^^ Basque nationalism as a political religion differs from the fascist example in 
the sense that no ‘sacramental transference’ occurred. What did occur was direct 
incorporation of religious principles into the political discourse. The starting point of 
the thinking of Sabino Arana, the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party, was an 
integrist Catholic mentality in which nationalism is inscribed within a religious 
framework. Inside this religious framework, the nationalist discourse was steeped in 
Catholic integrist principles. The nation was portrayed as a sacred entity and the 
figure of the ‘good nationalist’ was equated with the one of the Catholic believer.^ In
Antonio Elorza, La religionpoUtica [San Sebastiân: 1995], 8-10.
Mosse, The Nationalization o f  the Masses, 2-20; Gentile, The Sacralization, ix-x. For the Francoist 
attempt to create a political religion see Elorza, “El franquismo, un proyecto de religion poHtica”, in 
Tusell, Gentile and Di Febo (eds), Fascismo y  franquismo. Cara a cara [Madrid: 2004], 69-82. 
Michael Burleigh has also use the idea o f “political religion” as a guiding notion for his analysis o f the 
Nazi regime in The Third Reich. A New History [London; 2001], 5.
Elorza, La religionpoUtica, 10, 57-87.
^ / W . ,  33-34.
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other words, there is no previous secularization of the nation as in the fascist instance, 
but the Basque nation is conceived since the beginning in religious terms and as co- 
substantial to Catholicism.
The concept of ‘political religion’ applies to my investigation as an analytical 
tool for both the regime’s ideology and the propagation of the official message to the 
masses. First, it allows us to see the ideological similarities and differences with other 
nationalisms, such as French integral nationalism and Italian Fascism. Second, it 
brings into focus the fascist model of propagation of a nationalist doctrine from 
above, and highlights the role of rituals, myths and symbolism in the process of 
sacralization of politics and the use of a ‘religion of the fatherland’ as a political 
element of social cohesion.
A study of this nature requires the analysis of a vast amount of primary 
sources. The analysis of primorriverista discourse relies on the examination of the 
press and the official propaganda machinery. The views of the dictator and the 
regime’s ideologues are found in La Nacion, the regime’s mouthpiece, a series of 
provincial primorriverista-covXxoWQà. newspapers and various propagandist books and 
pamphlets. Also important are the dictator’s ‘official communiqués to the Spanish 
people’ - of compulsory inclusion in all newspapers and used by Primo to publicly 
explain his policies. Non-official press also provides valuable information on the 
primorriverista ideology and the implementation of policies. The issues of 
mobilisation, representation and symbolism can also be traced from the daily press 
insofar as it shows how public holidays and political rallies were celebrated during the 
dictatorship. In addition, military press, educational journals. Union Patriotica, the 
journal of the official party and the Somatén bulletins are used to provide a 
comprehensive picture of those state agencies designed to implement the 
nationalisation of the masses.
However, it is important to be aware that an analysis of the press under Primo 
can provide us with only a part of the picture. Criticism of the regime’s ideological 
principles and policies are rarely found in non-official journals due to the severe press 
censorship Primo imposed since his first day in power. A second group of primary 
sources this study is based on is governmental legislation. Royal Decrees and Royal 
Orders are the essential documents for analysing the regulation of nationalist policies 
and the repression of those groups considered anti-Spanish by the regime. The fact 
that the dictator himself often wrote the preamble of the most important laws
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explaining the reason for their promulgation makes the use of legislation all the more 
significant. In addition, the transformation of state agencies is analysed here with 
consideration to the new legal status they were granted.
Yet tracing legal changes is not enough to measure how far the new legislation 
was implemented on the ground, let alone the impact it had on the population. The 
study of documents of the Bureau of the President (Secretaria Anxiliar de Presidencia 
del Gobierno), the Patriotic Propaganda Junta, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of 
War, the Ministry of Public Instruction and the Diputacion Provincial de Barcelona 
provide us with a vivid picture of the internal workings of the state apparatus and the 
multiple problems state agents faced in implementing the primorriverista nationalist 
legislation. Additionally, correspondence and secret reports between Primo and 
General Martinez Anido, Minister of the Interior and the regime’s number 2, and 
provincial civil governors and governmental delegates show how the policies were 
implemented at a local level, and also the popular response to primorriverista 
attempts to indoctrinate the masses from above. This material is also useful to 
understand how the primorriveristas organised both repression and propaganda in 
every province of Spain.
lA
CHAPTER 1. THE ROOTS OF NATIONAL 
CATHOLICISM (1808-1923)
“Nations are the work of God”
(Antonio Canovas) ^
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it analyses the emergence of diverse 
conservative nationalist tendencies during the Restoration as the ideological 
antecedents of the primorriverista dictatorship. Second, it deals with the process of 
nation-building carried out from above during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century in order to provide an explanation of the achievements and failures the liberal 
state had in the process of mass nationalisation before Primo took power.
Contrary to the view of some scholars, the following pages argue that the 
Restoration was the key period in the ideological construction and social propagation 
of modem conservative nationalism.^ Tme, unlike Italy with the Nationalist 
Association, first, and the Fascists, later, Spanish nationalism was not centred around 
a single party. And yet Spanish nationalism permeated a wide range of elites, political 
movements, institutions and the media at the beginning of the twentieth century. It 
was in the discourse of political groups, such as the Maurists, the Liga de Accion 
Mondrquica, and the National Catholic Association of Propagandist, the writings of 
the traditionalist theoreticians, like Juan Vazquez de Mella and Victor Pradera, the 
pages of conservative newspapers, like ABC and El Debate, and large sectors of the 
army where the ultranationalist concept of Spain that was later to inspire both Primo 
and Franco’s dictatorships was formulated.^ This new nationalist concept presented 
some variations from one group to another, but by 1923 it certainly emphasised the 
three major components of Spanish conservative nationalism in the twentieth century, 
namely militarism, anti-regionalism, and the concept of Catholicism as the spiritual 
essence of the nation.
' Cited in Vilar, “Estado, naciôn, patria en Espafia y en Francia. 1870-1914”, 13.
 ^ For the idea o f Spain lacking a modem nationalism at the beginning o f the twentieth century see 
Stanley Payne, Fascism in Spain, 1922-1977 [Madison, 1999], 3-23; and Pedro Gonzâlez Cuevas, 
Historia de las derechas espanolas [Madrid: 2000], 264.
 ^Fusi, “Centre and Periphery”, 38-39.
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To understand conservative nationalism’s ideological and political 
contribution to Primo’s regime, we need to take into consideration the development of 
a modem nation-state throughout the nineteenth century and the emergence of new 
political alternatives to the Restoration system after 1898. Consequently, this chapter 
is divided into two parts. The first section deals with the two versions of Spanish 
nationalism, the liberal and the conservative, and the obstacles the elites found in the 
nation-building process during the nineteenth century. The second part analyses the 
new visions of the nation-state and Spanish nationalism, which emerged as alternative 
models to those represented by the Restoration system in the aftermath of the 
Spanish-American War. Here it is possible to distinguish between the postulates of 
the regenerationist movement, the military nationalism defended by professional 
officers and those factions which aimed to transform the political system from within, 
namely Maurists and Social Catholics. Finally, this second section deals with the 
increasing role played by the state in the process of nation building during the period 
1898-1923.
THE CREATION OF THE MODERN NATION (1808-1898)
These pages follow a constmctivist approach in analysing the emergence and 
development of Spanish nationalism in the nineteenth century. The nation is 
understood here as an ‘imagined community’ constructed by nationalist ideology in 
the stmggle to define communal identity in response to the attenuation of traditional 
allegiances."^ The construction of the nation as an imagined community is a modem 
historical phenomenon, which began in the late eighteenth century parallel to the 
American and French Revolutions and spread all over Europe together with the 
creation of the liberal state in the early nineteenth century.^ During this process of 
political mobilisation, the nation was endowed with a set of political rights and 
traditions partially invented ad hoc, which considered the community sovereign and 
attempted to consolidate unity among its members.^
In Spain, the co-existence of two opposing concepts of the nation can be 
traced back to the first decades of the nineteenth century, when the liberal and the
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5-7.
 ^Michael Mann, Sources o f  Power [Cambridge: 1993], vol. 2, 214-253.
 ^For the process o f inventing traditions see Eric J Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions” and 
“Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914”, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.). The Invention o f  
Tradition', idem. Nations and nationalism since 1780 [Cambridge: 1990].
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traditionalist models of Spain as an imagined political and cultural community were 
first formulated/ Hence, the confrontation between the liberal-democratic and the 
conservative-traditionalist conceptions of nation was to play an outstanding role 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An extreme manifestation of this 
conflict of identities was the idea of the ‘two antagonist Spains’ promoted by Franco 
during the Civil War and his 40 year-long dictatorship.* It is to the creation and 
development of these concepts of Spain that we turn our attention now.
The liberal version of the nation
The modern liberal concept of Spain was created during the Peninsular War 
(1808-1814). The invasion of Napoleonic troops mobilised an important sector of the 
population in the struggle against the French and triggered the liberal revolution. In 
1810, the National Assembly convened in Cadiz, assumed national sovereignty and 
defended a modem canon of Spain as a political community of citizens endowed with 
equal rights. The constitution, passed by the National Assembly in March 1812, 
established the “Spanish nation” as the utter sovereign and recognized Spain as a 
national, constitutional, parliamentarian, and Catholic body^. Wartime also showed 
the invention of traditions to justify the abandoning of the absolutist regime. Liberals 
recreated and vindicated a medieval popular inheritance to define the national 
community in terms of a common history and cu ltu re .T h u s  Aragon’s medieval 
parliaments and the Castilian Comuneros' opposition to Habsburg new mles were 
highlighted as historical episodes in order to illustrate the ‘traditional’ origins of 
Spanish liberalism. In turn, this new vindication of the ‘popular’ and ‘democratic’ 
institutions justified liberal political views, which intended to create new participatory 
bodies within a modem state.** In other words, from its conception the liberal idea of 
Spain incorporated an important ‘organicist’ perception of the nation as a community 
shaped by history and culture, what implies the need to position liberalism within 
popularly accepted traditions.
’ Fox, La invenciôn, 16.
* Radcliff, “La representacion de la naciôn”, in Rafael Cruz & Manuel Pérez, Cultura y  movilizacion 
social en la Espana contemporànea [Madrid: 1997], 306.
 ^José Marla Portillo, Revolucion de naciôn [Madrid: 2000], 259-492.
Borja de Riquer, “Aproximaciô al nacionaiisme espanyol contemporani”, in Origens i formacid dels 
nacionalismes a Espanya [Reus: 1994], 251.
' ‘ Xosé-Manoel Nuftez Seixas, Los nacionalismos en la Espana contemporànea (siglos XIX y  XX) 
[Barcelona: 1999], 18-19.
T 7
During the Isabeline era (1833-1868) moderate liberals in power elaborated a 
nationalist mythology following the canons established in Cadiz. The fight against the 
French was then named ‘War of Independence’ and became a pillar of national myth 
making. The tens of monuments erected to the struggle’s ‘martyrs’ and the conversion 
of 2 May into a national holiday are two good examples of this.^^ Scholars and artists 
also played a prominent role in the propagation of the moderate nationalist discourse. 
The ‘people’ became the main character in literature and academic books, which 
underlined the historical continuity of the Spanish VolkgeistP The practical goal of 
this production of general histories of Spain was to legitimise the construction of the 
liberal state and the contemporary bourgeois social values. At the political level, the 
moderate discourse defended a uniform centralized state as the best way to cement the 
liberal order, and maintained a strong identification between Catholicism and Spanish 
national identity.
A political alternative to the moderate canon of Spain came from progressive 
liberals and Republicans. They interpreted the medieval cortes,fueros (local charters), 
and religious tolerance as the hallmarks of the Spanish nation’s ‘Golden Age’, 
Conversely, the Habsburg rule, ‘foreign’ absolutism, and religious intolerance had in 
their view paved the way for Spanish decadence. Finally, freedom, democracy, and, in 
some versions, republicanism were the redemptive ideals of the liberal-progressive 
m o d el.U n lik e  the Moderates, progressive liberals supported the construction of a 
decentralized state. They justified this political position by idealizing the medieval 
local statutes and municipalities, as the ‘historical protectors’ of the so-called 
‘regional freedoms’.C o n se q u e n tly , when advocating a decentralized state, 
democrats also claimed to be preserving the ‘traditional’ political structure of the 
nation. But ideological intentions and political realities proved difficult to marry. 
When progressive liberals were in power (1868-1874) the political system remained 
highly unstable and the federal project during the First Republic (1873-1874) could 
never be properly developed.
José Alvarez Junco, “La invenciôn de la Guerra de la Independencia”, Studia Historica, vol. 12 
(1994), 74-99.
Jover, “Caractères del nacionalisrao espanol”, 8-14.
Fox, La invenciôn, 38.
For the Republicans’ nationalist postulates see de Bias, Tradiciôn republicana and José Maria Jover, 
“Federalismo en Espafia. Cara y cruz de una experiencia histôrica”, in G. Cortâzar (éd.), Naciôn y  
Estado en la Espana liberal, [Madrid: 1994], 105-167.
Nünez Seixas, Los nacionalismos, 22-30.
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The Conservative-Traditionalist canon of Spain
A competing concept of the nation is to be found in traditionalist thought. It 
also has its early formulations in the ‘War of Independence’, when defenders of the 
Ancien Régime defined the Spanish nation as intrinsically Catholic and mobilised the 
population to fight the ‘atheist invader’. The Serviles^ Fernando VII supporters, first, 
and the Carlists, later, considered liberal ideas as ‘Anti-Spanish’ and against the 
country’s ‘traditions’. These alleged ‘traditions’ were nothing but a modem invention 
of those reactionary forces. In fact, the Serviles copied the traditionalist discourse 
elaborated in France during the Revolution and used the anti-liberal rhetoric as an 
ideological tool to defend the ‘Altar and the Crown’. B u t  whatever the novelty of 
these postulates, the truth is that the reactionaries of the early nineteenth century laid 
the foundations of traditionalist thought and many of their ideas were used to build the 
Catholic model of Spain fifty years later.
The Serviles and the Carlists, however, did not appeal to the nation in the 
modem sense of the term to mobilise the people but to traditional legitimacies. 
Notwithstanding their idealization of the past, the concept of modem nation as a 
sovereign political community was far too revolutionary to be fully integrated in their 
political discourse. Indeed, traditionalist thought was formulated as a reaction to the 
liberal revolution, and eventually provided traditionalist nationalism of the second 
half of the nineteenth century with a strong anti-modem character.
It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that reactionary 
thinkers realised the potent appeal of nationalist legitimacy and that the traditionalist 
version of the nation was elaborated by Catholic historians. In this model, expressed 
on the works of Victor Gebhart, Antonio Merri y Colon and, above all, Marcelino 
Menéndez Pelayo, Catholic unity was the common denominator of the foundation of 
the Spanish nationality and legitimised the monarchy as the national political 
institution par excellence.^^ Traditionalist historians explained the pinnacle of Spanish 
power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a consequence of the stmggle 
against foreign heresy in Europe and the evangelisation of the Americas. They also
Javier Herrero, Los origenes delpensamiento reaccionario [Madrid: 1971], 14.
Antonio Elorza, “Las Ideologlas de Resistencia a la Modemizaciôn y el Nacionalismo”, Historia 
Contemporànea, n. 4, (1990), 341-353.
José Alvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa. La idea de Espafia en el s ig h  XIX  [Madrid: 2001], 405-464; 
Foard, “The Spanish Fichte”, 83-97.
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held French rationalism and German Krausism responsible for the artificial 
introduction of revolutionary ideas that had supposedly destroyed the unity of Spanish 
culture.^^ Contrary to the liberal-progressive model, traditionalists found the Spanish 
Golden Age in the times of the first Habsburgs and blamed Bourbon reformism for 
the nation’s decadence. Their redemptive ideal was a community politically and 
religiously united, led by a strong Crown and an independent Catholic Church.
It hardly needs to be said that this theocratic and romantic conception of the 
nation was adopted by all those traditionalist groups opposed to the liberal state, such 
as the Carlists, the Catholic Integrists, and significant sectors of the Catholic 
hierarchy. Concerning the state structure, the traditionalist advocated a decentralised 
Spain, where regions would maintain their medieval privileges. Then the restoration 
of the Ancien Régime would entail the reinstatement of old territorial statutes. This in 
turn would signal the return to the nation’s ‘Golden Era’.^  ^ Against liberal 
centralisation and throughout the nineteenth century, the defence of the fueros 
increasingly became a propagandist tool to mobilise support for the traditionalist 
cause, gaining significant success in the rural areas of Navarre, the Basque region, and 
Catalonia.
During the Restoration, the right of the Conservative party and some dissident 
Integrists groups, most notably the Catholic Union of Alejandro Pidal y Mon, 
defended a very similar pattern of the Spanish nation, within the liberal monarchic 
system. Antonio Canovas, the architect of the Restoration system and Conservative 
leader, conceived of nations as biological organisms with their own ‘national 
character’ shaped through the centuries by tradition and culture. This historicist- 
romantic conception did not completely rule out the liberal idea of a shared will and 
communal consciousness in the formation of nations, but it certainly gave more 
importance to divine intervention. Beyond all geographical, cultural, racial and 
linguistic aspects, “nations were the work of God”, Canovas stated in a conference in 
1882.^  ^The ‘sacralization’ of the fatherland was also present in the Conservative idea 
of Spain.
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Unlike the traditionalists, however, these sectors of the Right were intensely 
centralist. Following the moderate-liberals’ route, they bid for the end of medieval 
regional privileges and attempted to unify legislation and the state administration 
during the last quarter of the century. This process of centralisation ran parallel to the 
emergence of a Castilian-centred interpretation of Spanish history, which became 
dominant at the turn of the century. According to this view, Castile had been the 
leading region in the formation of Spain and, therefore, the ‘national psychology’ was 
of Castilian origin. Also detectable in art and literature, the historical centrality of 
Castile in the nation-building process became a cultural artefact at the service of 
political nationalism.^"^
THE NATIONALISATION OF THE MASSES IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY
In recent years scholars have discussed the weaknesses and strengths of the 
process of nationalisation of the masses in nineteenth-century Spain. Today the 
original perception of the process as weak and unsuccessful has been partially revised 
and the Spanish case does not seem so exceptional within the European context.^^ As 
in many other academic debates, the question of whether the Spanish nationalisation 
of the masses was successful or not very much depends on the countries Spain is 
compared to. When compared to the most accomplished case, France, the Spanish 
process of nationalising the country’s population seems weak in the nineteenth 
century. If compared to the United Kingdom or Germany, where regional identities 
have proved durable, then the Spanish case is not so exceptional. And if the 
comparison is undertaken considering multi-national empires 'with uneven industrial 
developments and a plethora of ethnic groups within its borders, such as the Austro- 
Hungarian empire, then the conclusion would be that the Spanish case was a 
su ccess .F o r the purpose of this investigation it is important to notice the different 
factors that intervened in the process of the nationalisation of the masses in Spain, 
namely socio-economic, state-structural, political, cultural and symbolic. The
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achievements and shortcomings of the Restoration state set the stage in which the 
primorriverista regime had to operate.
Throughout the nineteenth century the Spanish economy was transformed, a 
capitalist system firmly consolidated and a powerful bourgeoisie emerged.^^ 
Nevertheless, the transition from an agrarian society to a capitalist one was gradual 
and territorially uneven. Industrialisation took place slowly in Catalonia and rapidly in 
Vizcaya and Asturias in the last decades of the century - all peripheral regions far 
from the geographical centre of political power: Madrid. As a result, the creation of a 
‘national market’, a by-product of the industrial revolution, was incomplete until the 
last quarter of the century and internal customs and taxation privileges remained in 
use until 1876 in the Basque provinces and Navarre. Moreover, Spain lacked an 
integrated system of social communications, which made the spread of modem values 
and the transmission of a common national identity more difficult. Regional and local 
identities, which had developed during the Ancien Régime, remained important 
throughout the entire century.^* The improvement in the structure of communications 
that would have made possible the transmission of ideas and standardisation of a 
‘national culture’ had to wait until the turn of the century.
The liberal revolutions, however, led to profound social and political 
transformations during the nineteenth century.^^ One of the main outcomes of the 
revolutions was the creation of the liberal state -  a pillar in the development of 
capitalism and a shaper of a national culture at the same time. On the one hand, the 
liberal state nationalised basic wealth (lands, mines, railways, etc) and immediately 
afterwards privatised it, creating a class of property owners. Hence, it was through the 
state that the speculative wealth of early capitalism was forged and the new economic 
development legally adapted to serve the interests of the ruling classes.^^ 
Additionally, liberals promoted the idea of a bourgeois citizenry via new state 
agencies, such as the military, the educational system, the judicial system and the civil
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administration, which led to the consolidation of a civic political nationalism among 
the middle classes.^'
Nevertheless, the liberal state was chronically in debt during the nineteenth 
century. This precluded the formation of powerful state agencies and therefore 
allowed the subsistence of old forms of legitimacies and local identities. The national 
educational system, for example, was not created until 1857 and suffered an endemic 
shortage of resources. This explains the high level of illiteracy in Spain compared to 
other Western European states (59% of the population was illiterate in 1900) and the 
persistence of regional languages throughout the nineteenth century. In addition, the 
strong involvement of the Catholic Church in the contents of state education hindered 
the promotion of civic values associated with the preponderance of the nation as the 
ultimate source of state legitimacy.^^
The army did not obtain better results than the educational system as a state 
agency of nationalisation. The Spanish army was not national, in the revolutionary 
sense of the ‘nation in arms’, but deeply divided the privileged and lower classes. An 
exception-riddled conscription system, in which the upper and middle classes paid 
members of the lower classes ‘to substitute’ for them in compulsory enlistment, could 
not promote the idea of national integration. Conversely, monetary redemption 
showed the lower classes that service to the fatherland was not an honour but a burden 
and ultimately alienated them from this type of patriotic integration.^^ Moreover, the 
absence of foreign threat after the Napoleonic wars and the fact that Spain was not 
involved in any major international war from 1814 to 1898 prevented massive 
numbers of people from being called to arms and instilled with patriotic fervour. 
Nonetheless, in the second half of the century, diverse colonial adventures were 
partially supported by the lower classes and liberals and traditionalists united in their 
support of the Moroccan campaign (1859-1861) in the name of national grandeur. In 
1898, the outbreak of the Spanish-American war was greeted with popular jingoism 
by thousands in the streets, which shows a national identity had also been acquired by 
many in the lower-classes.
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Finally, the centralist administrative system defended first by the moderates 
and later by the conservatives proved difficult to implement. The division of the 
country into 49 provinces and the unification of local governments in 1833, the 
creation of the Civil Governors as state representatives in every province in 1844, the 
creation of the Civil Guard (1844) to ensure the monopoly of violence, and the 
compilations of the Penal Code (1848) and Civil Code (1889) slowly set the 
administrative and legal bases of the state. Nonetheless, centralism took long to 
overcome the secular fragmentation of Spain’s territory and the unity of the state 
remained highly artificial until well into the nineteenth century. The political and 
economic problems the liberal state faced led to a progressive but inefficient building 
of the modern administration and the province remained the centre of political and 
social life.^ "* In fact, the state throughout the nineteenth century was characterised by a 
profound contrast between legal centralism and real localism.^^
At the political level, there can be few doubts that the civil wars between 
Liberals and Carlists did little for the propagation of a uniform idea of Spain. 
However, while liberals and traditionalists defended antagonistic views, what was at 
stake was not the existence of the Spanish nation, something that both sides never 
questioned, but the political organisation of the state.^^ In fact, the Carlist Wars had a 
significant mobilising effect among the popular classes. For years, thousands of 
Spaniards were called to arms to fight in the name of the nation (whether liberal or 
traditionalist) against the ‘enemy within’.
Yet it was the very oligarchic nature of the liberal system which mostly 
precluded a more effective nationalisation of the masses. Moderate and conservative 
liberals framed elitist political systems, in which electoral participation was kept to a 
minimum -or it was openly fraudulent when the franchise was enlarged. A system like 
the Restoration, based on the manipulation of the electoral machine from Madrid but 
giving local bosses {caciques) a great deal of autonomy in regional matters, could 
hardly encouraged popular identification with the official idea of the nation-state. On 
the contrary, liberal governments, usually oligarchies of landowners and enriched 
bourgeoisie were reluctant to encourage patriotic mobilisations and, in fact, attempted
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to demobilise the masses.^^ Nor was the bourgeoisie of the industrialised periphery 
willing to challenge the state by mobilising the lower classes. Always dependent on 
the state for the protection of their economic interests, the peripheral bourgeoisie had 
close links with the ruling elite in Madrid and shared a common culture.^* Therefore, 
the oligarchic liberal state had a twofold effect in terms of nationalisation. First, the 
lack of political representation led to a widespread political apathy among the masses, 
which could hardly identify with the official concept of nation. Second, the oligarchic 
political practices deepened the gap between what was perceived to be the ‘legal 
country’, as represented by the liberal constitutions, and the ‘real country’, 
represented by the people.
At the cultural level, the process of symbolization used by groups to construct 
their (national) identities illustrated in the Spanish case, first, the different political 
conceptions of the nation and, second, the separation between state elites and the 
masses. In opposition to the symbols of the Ancien Régime, liberals introduced the 
most visible symbols of the state, the flag and the anthem. In 1843, the national flag 
was adopted but the national anthem would only be introduced in 1908. Moreover, 
Republicans challenged these symbols. They changed the flag and banned the 
‘royalist’ anthem when in government, leading to a longstanding conflict only 
resolved in the late 1970s. This competing symbolism was in line with the lack of 
consensus on national myths and Golden Ages. As the century progressed, democrats 
and republicans emphasised the civic and secular symbols of the nation, while, more 
successfully, conservatives and traditionalists adopted the Catholic symbolic universe 
to represent the national identity.^^
Regarding role of cultural processes in the construction of national identity, 
the liberal state promoted its vision of Spain in various fields, the ‘national’ prizes on 
historic paintings and patriotic writings being two good examples of this. As in other 
Western European countries, in the last decades of the century the Spanish state 
structured public life around national symbols."^ ® Ceremonies, rituals, and symbols, 
such as the cult to the ‘patriotic martyrs’, became a fundamental part of the official 
representation of the nation state. However, the popular classes remained absent from 
these civic state ceremonies more often than not. More importantly, this detachment
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from the ‘official nation’ sometimes turned into hostility and the masses developed 
popular counter-rituals. Alternative anthems, such as the International and the liberal 
Himno de Riego, and popular culture, exemplified in bullfighting, religious parades, 
and zarzuelas, challenged the symbols imposed from above."^ *
The gap between the elites and the popular classes in the symbolic and 
ceremonial construction of the nation shows the difficulties Spanish liberals faced in 
the nationalisation of the masses from above. However, this should not lead us to 
conclude that the process of nationalisation as a whole was a failure. The invention of 
alternative popular ceremonials and symbolism, popular support for war in 1895- 
1898, expressions of Spanish nationalism in languages other than Castilian in Catalan, 
Galician, and Basque newspapers, and the discussion in the political arena about the 
structure of the Spanish nation-state illustrate that other mechanisms of nationalisation 
different than the state’s, such as ideologies, the press and the Church, had made an 
impact on the creation of a national community throughout the nineteenth century.
Additionally, one should take into consideration that the problems the Spanish 
liberal state faced were not exceptional in Western Europe. In France and Italy the 
idea of the existence of two antagonistic nations within one state (the two Frances and 
the two Italys) remained well into the twentieth century;"^  ^the conflict between local- 
provincial powers versus national representatives was common all around Europe as 
the liberal state developed;"*  ^monetary redemption of the military service lasted until 
the 1880s in France;' '^  ^ educational systems were unable to impose the official 
language in many French, Italian and German regions and vernacular dialects were 
widely used until WWI; nor were regional political movements seeking home rule or 
independence unusual in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany or France at the turn of 
the twentieth century."^^
The Spanish case in the nineteenth century shows the development of a 
national political language and a national political culture but not the reality of a 
modem mass political nationalist movement."^^ Yet things changed dramatically at the
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turn of the century. The acceleration of the socio-economic transformations and the 
‘politicisation’ of broad sectors of society hitherto uninvolved deepened into the 
process of nationalisation in the first two decades of the twentieth century. As a result, 
many in the middle and lower classes became much more receptive to nationalist 
messages. At the same time, the Spanish defeat against the United States and the loss 
of the empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific in 1898 led to a profound reformulation 
of Spanish nationalism by intellectuals and politicians, which was eventually 
integrated as the ideological bases of Primo’s dictatorship.
FROM MILITARY DISASTER TO MILITARY RULE (1898-1923)
The reformulation of Spanish Nationalism
During the month of April 1898, jingoism was strongly felt throughout most of 
the Spanish society. As the war v i^th the United States approached, newspapers 
speculated on the possibility of a rapid Spanish victory, the urban masses patriotically 
gathered to support the struggle and political parties united in their defence of the 
military."^  ^By early May, the Spanish fleet lay at the bottom of the sea and Spain had 
lost the remains of her once great empire to the USA. The ‘Disaster’ of 1898, as it 
came to be knovm, signals a turning point in the development of modem Spanish 
nationalism. As in the Italian case after the defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians at 
Adowa (1896), the loss led to a crisis of national identity. An entire generation of 
intellectuals, the so-called ‘Generation of 1898’, devoted its work to searching for the 
essences of the nation and thereby solve the ‘problem of Spain’. Political groups 
presented diverse alternatives to ‘regenerate’ the ‘sick’ nation. Disaffection with the 
nation-state became paramount. The lower classes radicalised and demanded deep 
social and political changes, while Catalan regionalism and Basque nationalism 
increased their social support.
Sebastian Balfour has differentiated three new visions of the nation-state and 
Spanish nationalism, which emerged in the aftermath of the ‘Disaster’ as alternative
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models to those represented by the Restoration."^* First, the Catalan bourgeoisie 
promoted a neo-colonial policy to replace the markets lost in the Caribbean and the 
modernisation of the whole of Spain based on the industrial Catalan model. It also 
aimed to invigorate regional autonomy as a way of regenerating Spain. Second, the 
regenerationist movement, supported by disaffected sections of the middle classes, 
sought the creation of a modem secular state. Lastly, military nationalism emerged 
amongst professional officers. It combined plans for state modernisation with the 
postulates of conservative nationalism. It was profoundly centralist and sought to 
modernise the country via an authoritarian state. It is in the military and 
regenerationist models that one can find the immediate ideological origins of Primo’s 
dictatorship and where we turn our attention now.
The idea of national regeneration was certainly not invented at the turn of the 
century but during the 1890s, and especially after the military defeat in Cuba and the 
Philippines, cultural elites steadily propagated the need for ‘national rebirth’. During 
the 25 years that followed the loss of the Empire, the Generation of 1898, which 
includes figures such as Miguel Unamuno, Joaquin Costa, Azorin, Ramiro de Maeztu, 
Pio Baroja and Angel Ganivet, and later the Generation of 1914, led by the 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, sought to identify the essences of the Spanish 
national character. Their goal was to explain contemporary reality through an 
understanding of the national character and ultimately provide practical solutions for 
Spanish regeneration. Despite the diversity of analyses, it is possible to draw some 
common traits in the regenerationist discourse. First, it conceived the nation as an 
organic whole that had to be understood as an evolutionary process. This view 
combined romantic German historicism and new currents of vitalism, but it was also 
steeped in Social-Darwinist postulates and geographical determinism, so much in 
vogue in fin-de-siècle Europe."'^
Second, it highlighted the centrality of Castile in the historical formation of the 
nation and Castilian as the national language; and yet it also advocated the 
regeneration of the municipalities and local life as the starting point of national 
reconstruction. On the one hand, these postulates challenged the Restoration centralist
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system, which was considered inefficient and guilty of destroying ‘popular national 
life’. On the other, regenerationists criticised the emerging Catalan and Basque 
nationalism as artificial, bourgeois, and backward looking. They denounced the 
peripheral middle-classes turning into regionalist movements as selfish and suicidal, 
but hold the oligarchic system of the Restoration ultimately responsible for the 
emergence of the ‘separatist’ ideas.^° In doing so, the Regenerationists importantly 
contributed to the growth of a new Spanish nationalism, as well as to the nascent 
dialectic between Spanish and peripheral nationalism, which dominated the twentieth 
century.
In the political arena, the regenerationist movement proposed practical reforms 
to achieve the ‘Europeanisation’ (i.e. modernisation) of the country. Its leading figure, 
Joaquin Costa, demanded the end of the oligarchic political system and advocated a 
state-led agrarian reform as the best manner in which to modernise the country. The 
movement first crystallized soon after the ‘Disaster’ in the creation of the Union 
Nacional, which gathered together small farmers and merchants of Castile and 
Aragon, led by Joaquin Costa, and representatives of the chambers of commerce from 
all over Spain, led by Basilio Paraiso. However, this petty-bourgeois alliance, with 
contradictory economic and ideological interests, was unable to form a political party 
to challenge the establishment, and the movement rapidly faded away in the early 
1900s. Increasingly disappointed by the lack of success of the regenerationist 
movement, Costa turned towards the republicans and called for a radical change. It 
was then that he appealed to a hazily defined providential figure, an “iron surgeon”, 
who would lead the national revolution and operate on the “sick body” of Spain. 
Costa’s notion of the “iron surgeon” was in fact related to the ideas of nineteenth 
century praetorian liberalism and sought a leading figure that could overcome the 
ruling oligarchies to bring a real democracy to Spain.Nevertheless, two decades 
later, Miguel Primo de Rivera would seize power claiming to be the very “iron 
surgeon” Costa had called for.
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The second political attempt based on the postulates of the regenerationist 
movement was the creation of the Reformist Party (1913) and the Spanish League of 
Political Action (1914) by the members of the Generation of 1914. Ortega y Gasset, 
Gumersindo Azcarate, Melquiades Alvarez, and Manuel Azana promulgated a new 
liberalism steeped in democratic socialism, similar to that developed by the Liberal 
Party in Britain and the Radicals in France. The reformist aim was to transform the 
oligarchic liberal regime into a real democracy and provide Spaniards with social 
reform in the same manner as their western neighbours.^^ The importance of 
education in building a new nation was clearly seen by the Generation of 1914. 
Reformists steadily propagated their ideas of national regeneration among the middle 
classes in an attempt to educate those sectors of Spanish society called to realise the 
peaceful revolution.^^ But, as in the previous decade, the Restoration system proved 
rigid enough as to resist any kind of transformation from the outside.
A second new version of Spanish nationalism came out of the military barracks 
at the turn of the century. Military nationalism aimed to transform the nation-state and 
combined the requirement of modernisation with conservative postulates.^"* After 
1898, professional officers openly advocated modernising the nation via authoritarian 
state.^^ In their view, Spain needed a strong economy, a regimented society, and an up 
to date army ready for new imperialist expansions to solve the post-colonial crisis. To 
achieve these aims the military demanded internal state reforms, including gearing 
industry towards arms production, a better educational system, an honest public 
administration and restructuring the relationship state-Catholic Church.^^ For the 
military, these transformations could not be carried out by the inefficient two-party 
system of the Restoration. They would rather require a strong government led by a 
general and not subordinated to parliamentary control.
Whilst military nationalism shared some features with regenerationism and the 
call for a temporary dictatorship could somehow resemble the figure of the ‘iron 
surgeon’, the truth is that the professional officers had little sympathy for the 
movement led by Paraiso and Costa. Military press steadily attacked the Union
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Nacional, which it saw as an egoist petit-bourgeois movement, and defended a vague 
mixture of nascent corporatism and populism/^ The army not only felt it was the 
guarantor of the nation state but, moreover, saw itself as the interpreter of the popular 
will.^^ In a corrupt political system in which male universal suffrage was little more 
than a charade, army officers often presented themselves as the ‘real’ voice of the 
masses. Despite the decline of left-wing republican officers and the clear turn 
rightwards of the army since 1898, the rhetoric of populism remained well into the 
twentieth century.
However, this populism should not lead us to consider the military as the 
champions of democratic reforms. Almost invariably, the army sided with the 
Restoration civilian elites and was steadily used for internal repression. In reality, 
there was nothing democratic in this populist rhetoric. Scorn for the working classes 
was manifest in the military press and most officials feared the inclusion of the 
masses in the political arena. When using the populist discourse the army was indeed 
appealing to certain sectors of the population, mostly the middle-classes, or, to put it 
in military terms, “the healthy segments” of society.^^ Moreover, this new military 
nationalism shared many of the myths of the conservative-traditionalist canon of the 
second half of the nineteenth century. It saw in the martial spirit of the Reconquest, 
the colonization of America, the fight against Protestants, and the ‘War of 
Independence’ the real ‘soul’ of the nation.^ ^
Ideologically military nationalism gained momentum after the war due to the 
growing strength of Catalan regionalism and, to a lesser extent, Basque nationalism, 
as well as the latent anti-militarism of the working class. In defining itself as the 
repository of the quintessential qualities of the fatherland, the army considered 
criticism of the military as an attack on the patria and regionalism and peripheral 
nationalism as mere treason to the nation. According to this logic, political violence to 
punish enemies of national unity became a patriotic duty.^^ In 1902, on three different
Ibid., 171.
Gonzâlez Calbet, La Dictadura, 49.
For the Republicans relationship with the army see, José Alvarez Junco, “Leftist Militarism and 
Anti-Militarism, 1875-1936” in Baflôn and Barker (eds.). Armed Forces and Society in Spain [New 
York: 1988], 149- 175.
Francisco Clocha, “Military Press o f the Restoration”, in Armed Forces and Society in Spain, 199. 
Sebastian Balfour and Pablo La Porte, “Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars”, 
European History Quarterly, 2000, Vol. 30 (3), 314.
Carolyn Boyd, “Violencia pretoriana: del Cu-cut! al 23-F” in Santos Juliâ (ed.) Violencia poUtica en 
la Espana del 5ig/o XY [Madrid: 2000], 300-301.
41
occasions, officers attacked Catalan and Basque nationalist demonstrators.^^ On the 
evening of 25 November 1905, after a series of satirical cartoons mocking the army 
appeared in the journal Cu-Cut, junior officers assaulted the editorial offices of the 
publication and then moved on to destroy the plant of the Catalanist newspaper La 
Veu de Catalunya.
The reactions to the assault showed how deep anti-Catalanist sentiments were in 
many sectors of the establishment. The action was applauded almost unanimously in 
garrisons throughout Spain, crowds of officers gathered at stations to greet military 
delegates sent to Catalonia, while junior officers in Madrid and Barcelona prepared an 
ultimatum for the king requiring action against the Catalanists and the closure of the 
Cortes. The officers also formed commissions and demanded all crimes against the 
army, the nation, and the state to be tried by military tribunals. As had been the norm 
in the past, the government took no action against the aggressors. On the contrary, on 
29 November it declared martial law in Barcelona, enforced the closure of 
newspapers, and arrested Catalanist sympathizers.^"* In March 1906, the bill for the 
“Repression of Crimes Against the Fatherland and the Army” (popularly known as the 
“Law of Jurisdictions”) was passed in Parliament. Although the new law retained 
offences against the nation and the state under civilian jurisdiction, it allowed military 
jurisdiction over verbal and written offences against the army and, therefore, showed 
the military that political violence and insubordination paid off in the short term.^^
If the Law of Jurisdictions confirmed the military belief that the army was the 
only genuine guardian of the fatherland and made ‘official’ the military idea of Spain, 
the consequences in the long term proved to be disastrous. Republicans, the left-wing 
of the Liberal Party, Socialists and Carlists opposed the law and its repeal became 
central to the political debate. In Catalonia, Solidaritat Catalana, gathered Carlists, 
Republicans and Catalanists in a political alliance whose main goals were the 
abolition of the Law of Jurisdictions and the creation of Catalan regional institutions. 
The action-reaction spiral sparked off by the Cu-cut affair seems clear: the military 
gained even more control of the state apparatus and regionalism gained more social 
support.
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The subsequent crises of Spanish society only widened the gap between the 
military and the popular classes. When in 1909 an anti-war demonstration sparked off 
the events of the ‘Tragic Week’ in Barcelona another episode of the action-reaction 
spiral was set in motion.^^ The working class challenge to the imperial adventure 
‘confirmed’ to the military that leftist ideologies worked against ‘national grandeur’. 
In turn, the brutal repression ordered by the Maura government and executed by the 
army logically amplified the bitterness and mistrust of the working class towards the 
military. During the period 1917-1920 this very same pattern was to be repeated on a 
regular basis. What began as a military revolt to defend the army’s privileges in 1917 
with the formation of the Juntas of junior officers ended up as harsh military 
repression of the working class, military control of public services and continual 
declarations of martial law in the following three years. Obviously, these actions only 
radicalised popular anti-militarism, while contributed to the strengthening of 
conservative military mentality. Moreover, after the “Disaster of Aimual” (1921) and 
the abolition of the Juntas (1922), the army adopted a unified stand in the face of 
social tensions and peripheral nationalism, which was to crystallize in Prime’s coup in 
September 1923.^  ^It is hardly surprising that the day after the united demonstration of 
Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists in Barcelona on September 11, 1923, the 
military press complained of the “separatist riffraff’ and demanded the strict 
enforcement of the laws of crimes against the fatherland. “If impunity continued, 
good Spaniards should intervene to correct such grievances”, the military 
threatened.^* The following day, the Captain General of Catalonia, launched a coup. 
In his manifesto. Primo justified his action claiming the nation had to be saved from 
the “shameless separatist propaganda” and from the “impunity of communist 
propaganda”. The military press unanimously welcomed the coup.^^
The military nationalism that emerged at the turn of the century was an 
authoritarian ideology shaped by the confrontation with peripheral nationalists and the 
working class. Its main ideas, the creation of a strong, imperial and modem state, the
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concept of the nation as a unitary and sacred entity not subject to criticism, and the 
understanding of the armed forces as the interpreter of the national will, were not yet 
highly developed but would prove long-lasting. Military nationalism was to be the 
ideological driving force of the Military Directory and one of the main pillars in the 
creation of National Catholicism during the Civil Directory.
A third key element in the reformulation of Spanish nationalism during the 
first quarter of the twentieth century was the emergence and consolidation of a new 
radical Right. Either from inside the system, as in the case of Maurists, Social 
Catholics, and the monarchist leagues of Barcelona and Bilbao, or in direct opposition 
to the Restoration, as for the Traditionalists, these groups proposed diverse 
alternatives to the political structure in an attempt to ‘regenerate’ the nation from an 
authoritarian perspective. In doing so, they further developed the nineteenth century 
Conservative-Traditionalist canon of Spain and anticipated many of the ideas and 
rhetoric Prime’s dictatorship would eventually adopt. Not surprisingly, most of the 
civilian political personnel of Primo’s regime came from these authoritarian right 
groups. Furthermore, as the participation of the masses in the political system seemed 
to become inevitable if revolution was to be avoided, these groups represented the 
first real attempt from the Right to gain popular support outside the oligarchic circles 
of the Restoration. This new approach to the masses was based on a genuine effort to 
produce a social mobilisation - via political parties. Catholic trade unions, religious 
pilgrimages and civil militias - which paved the way for the model of ‘national’ 
mobilisation later tried under the Union Patriotica.
To be sure, it was Maurism, the movement formed around the conservative 
leader, Antonio Maura, that represented the first real attempt to organize a modem 
political party and regenerate the country ‘from above’. In a speech in parliament in 
1899, Maura had already warned of the need to go through a “revolution from above”, 
in order to avoid a revolution “made in the streets”.^ ® From then on, Maura’s 
discourse would be one of national regeneration and active counterrevolution. Deeply 
influenced by the thoughts of his friend Charles Maurras, Maura’s idea of Spain was 
based on the Conservative-Traditionalist canon, and monarchy and Catholicism were
Cited in Balfour, The End, 188.
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much emphasized as the keystones of the nation/^ Whether in government or in 
opposition, Maura proposed a program of local administrative reforms to undermine 
the power-base of the caciques, and the reconstruction of the Navy -  this latter idea 
much in tune with the desire of the military and considered by the conservative leader 
as essential step to “rebuild [Spanish] nationality”/^
To avoid revolution from below, the Maurist movement took to the streets. 
The aim was to mobilize the so-called ‘neutral mass’, the ‘living forces’ of the nation, 
and to create an educated ‘citizenry’ to change the system from within. In other 
words, Maurism intended to attract the middle-classes hitherto not involved in the 
oligarchic system to transform the Restoration and ultimately combat revolution. 
Achieving these goals involved the creation of a modem propaganda machinery, the 
organization of mass rallies, the formation of a Maurist Youth and the creation of 
Maurist Centres all around Spain, something until then unknown to the monarchist 
parties. With a propaganda machine ready, a nationalist rhetoric, and a paternalistic 
approach to the ‘social question’, Maurism felt confident to fight the working class 
parties on their home ground. Since early 1915, Maurists opened ‘social centres’ in 
working class neighbourhoods to compete with Socialist, Anarchist and Republican 
popular houses. The aim was to ‘educate’ the lower-classes in patriotic, Catholic, 
corporative, and monarchist values and separate the proletariat from the left-wing 
parties.^^
The fact that the first Spanish attempts to form fascist-type groups emerged 
around Maurists should not come as a surprise. Since the years of WWI, an important 
sector of Maurism, and particularly the Maurist Youth, was convinced that 
parliamentary politics had failed and advocated a strong government to save the 
nation. For many Maurists the only way to stop the left was physical confrontation, 
either via bourgeois militias or military-led repression. As early as March 1919, the
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Maurist daily La Acciôn had called for a military dictatorship/"^ When Mussolini 
reached power in Italy in October 1922, La Acciôn enthusiastically welcomed fascism 
as the solution to sweep away the political parties, and called Spaniards to follow the 
Italian example and form a national legion. A few months later in December 1922, the 
Maurist Joaquin Santos Ecay, the director of La Acciôn, Manuel Delgado Barreto, and 
the president of National Employers’ Confederation, Tomas Benot, attempted to form 
the first fascist organization around the newspaper La Camisa NegraP  In the summer 
of 1923, another pro-fascist organization, La Traza, was founded by a group of army 
officers in Barcelona. The new party blamed politicians for the loss of the colonies, 
the Moroccan disaster of 1921, and the caciques’ destruction of the “popular will” 
which was leading the fatherland to internal disintegration. In their foundational 
manifesto. La Traza called for a “sacred union of Spaniards”, beyond their 
“monarchic or republican, aristocratic or democratic” ideas, to save the nation and 
proclaimed violence against the internal enemies of the fatherland was a valid option 
to redeem Spain .A lthough the lives of both La Camisa Negra and La Traza were 
ephemeral, their appearance proves that the ground was fertile for the growth of 
authoritarian nationalist alternatives to the Restoration. If they did not develop further 
it was because the military dictatorship, an option much wanted by the Maurists, 
albeit not by Maura himself, was to integrate all these extreme-right groups into the 
regime.
The growth of Spanish nationalism can also be detected in the formation of 
new coalitions of the dynastic parties to confront peripheral nationalism. In Catalonia, 
the offensive was led by the former liberal Alfonso Sala, who founded Uniôn 
Monarquica Nacional (UMN) in 1919. The coalition of liberals and conservatives 
attracted some important members of Catalan high society aiming to “annul the work 
of the Lliga Regionalista''P This reaction of the monarchic parties was not 
accidental. The international recognition of the right of self determination of national 
minorities after WWI fuelled the emergence of more radical Catalanist opinions
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which pushed for full ‘home rule’ (political autonomy)/^ In 1919, the moderate Lliga 
also launched a campaign to gain home rule for Catalonia. Against home rule, the 
UMN proposed monarchism, corporatism and regionalism -the latter understood in 
the Maurist sense of local and regional regeneration of the whole of Spain. In January 
1919, conservatives, liberals, and Mauristas gathered in the Maurist Circle of Bilbao 
and formed the League of Monarchic Action {Liga de Acciôn Monarquica) to fight 
‘separatism’. In the same years, the Bilbao daily El Pueblo Vasco gathered an 
important number of intellectuals, who first formulated an ultra-nationalist notion of 
Spain. Among these writers and politicians were Ramiro de Maeztu, Victor Bradera, 
José Calvo Sotelo, Eduardo Aunos, Rafael Sanchez Mazas, and the Count of 
Rodezno.^^ All of them were later to collaborate, in one way or the other, with Primo 
de Rivera. Although neither peripheral nationalism nor the labour movement was as 
strong as in Catalonia, the logic behind the League of Monarchist Action was the 
same as in the National Monarchic Union: a dual defensive reaction of Spanish 
conservative nationalism to fight the challenges from below and the periphery. The 
immediate outcome was nothing but the consolidation of Spanish nationalism in 
Barcelona and Bilbao, with the monarchist parties increasing their votes in both cities.
While Maurism and the unions of dynastic parties were bom in the big cities, 
another conservative movement proposing national regeneration that was to have a 
key influence in the ideological and political arrangement of Prime’s dictatorship 
found its strength in the towns and villages of Old Castile and the northern provinces. 
Since the publication in 1891 of Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, the interest of the 
Catholic hierarchy in the social situation of the lower classes had increased. The 
intense diffusion of social Catholic doctrines in the press, congresses, and collective 
pilgrimages was complemented in fin-de-siècle Spain with the opening of Catholic 
centres and, eventually, with the creation of Catholic trade unions in order to deal 
with the ‘social question’.*® As left-wing ideas spread throughout mral Spain, the 
Catholic Church launched a multiple-front offensive seeking a complete ‘re- 
clericalization of society’.*^
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This process of ‘re-clericalization of society’ grew intensively first in 1898 
and then in 1909, as a reaction to the anti-clericalism showed by the popular classes 
and liberal intellectuals after the loss of the colonies and during the ‘Tragic Week’.^  ^
It was precisely in 1909 when the Jesuit Angel Ayala tried to create an homogeneous 
Catholic movement, founding the National Catholic Association of Propagandists 
(Asociacon Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas, ACNP). Regarding the concept of 
Spain, the Propagandists’ views were heavily indebted to the historic romanticism and 
Neo-Thomist thought that had framed the nineteenth-century Conservative- 
Traditionalist canon of Spain. Following the ideas of Canovas and Menéndez Pelayo, 
Angel Herrera, the Propagandists’ leader, considered nations to be the work of God in 
History. In his view, Spain was a ‘moral unity’ historically framed by the Monarchy 
and the Church under providential supervision. Equally, Herrera considered liberal 
democracy not to suit Spain. First, because sovereignty was believed to lie ultimately 
in God, and, second, due to the fact that Spain’s social and territorial disparities were 
thought to be too big for implementing a real universal suffrage without dangers. As 
an alternative, the Propagandists defended an “organic democracy” based on the 
family, municipalities and corporations that would eventually rejuvenate “the people’s 
sap”.*^
From the beginning, the ACNP realised the importance of propaganda to 
obtain Catholics’ social and doctrinal cohesion. The famous ‘Propaganda Campaigns’ 
orchestrated by the ACNP mouthpiece, El Debate, sought to indoctrinate and mobilise 
followers in a militant social Catholicism in an unprecedented manner. In addition. 
Social Catholics created trade unions and Centres of Social Defence to compete with 
the Left, yet with very limited success.*"  ^ In fact, it was in the rural areas of Old 
Castile, Navarre, and Aragon where Catholic propaganda paid off. The diverse 
agrarian unions created during the first years of World War I finally came together in 
1917 and formed the National Catholic Agrarian Confederation (Confederacion 
Nacional Catolica Agraria, CNCA). A genuine interclass organisation, the CNCA
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was made up of smallholders and directed by big landow ners.It was no coincidence 
that one of the first groups to promote the creation of the primorriverista Union 
Patriotica in 1924 emerged from this social basis of Castilian militant Catholics.
Changes also occurred in those reactionary groups that openly opposed the 
Restoration political establishment. After 1898, the complex world of the 
Traditionalists (Carlists and Catholic Integrists) was to retain its customary influence 
in areas of Navarre, the Basque Country and Catalonia.How ever, political unity 
amongst these groups was never achieved during the Restoration. Quite the contrary, 
in 1919 a major split in the Carlists ranks occurred, when the main ideologue of the 
party, Juan Vazquez de Mella, walked out to form the Traditionalist Party. Despite the 
schism, or perhaps because of it, thinkers such as Vazquez de Mella, Salvador 
Minguijon and Victor Pradera attempted to revitalise Traditionalist doctrine during 
the first decades of the twentieth century. Always within the narrow margins of 
integrist thought, they incorporated ideas from thinkers outside Spanish 
Traditionalism such as Charles Maurras and Joaquin Costa. This new Traditionalism 
focused on social questions in an attempt to gain mass political support and 
simultaneously sought to attract the most conservative political and ecclesiastical 
forces of the Alfonsine regime.*^ Thus Traditionalists intensified their propaganda 
campaigns, participated in mass pilgrimages and even opened social centres for 
workers in Barcelona and Bilbao.**
At the turn of the century. Traditionalists accentuated the patriotic tones of 
their political discourse in response to the emergence of Basque nationalism and 
Catalan regionalism. These movements competed with Traditionalism for the same 
political market and seriously damaged Carlist popular support in two of its key 
areas.*^ As mentioned above. Traditionalists fiercely defended the fueros and 
proposed a decentralized Spain based on medieval laws. However, it is also important 
to notice that this Habsburg conception of the nation, for all its emphasis on regional 
liberties, did not preclude an imperial idea of Spain in the Traditionalist discourse. 
After all, the Traditionalists argued, it had been during the sixteenth century when
Juan José Castillo, Propietarios mity pobres: sobre la subordinaciôn political del pequeno 
campesinado [Madrid: 1979].
Benavides, Democracia y  cristianismo, 143.
Juan Ramôn Andrés Martin, El cisma mellista [Madrid, 2000], 25.
** Montero, El primer catolicismo, 120-121; Colin Winston, “Carlist Worker Groups in Catalonia, 
1900-1923”, in S. Payne (ed.), El Carlismo, 1833-1975 [Madrid: 1996], 85-101.
Martin Blinkhom, Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939 [Cambridge: 1975], 33-35
49
Spain had created her world empire and maintained an internal division of kingdoms 
at the same time. Since the 1890s, all Traditionalist factions ardently supported the 
Spanish struggle in the colonies and, when war with the USA was looming in early 
1898 the Carlist pretender, Carlos VII, declared his loyalty to the “sacred traditions of 
the Spanish army”.^ ° The military humiliation was no discouragement for the 
Traditionalists. Just three months after the defeats in Cavite and Santiago, the Integrist 
daily, El Sigh  Futuro, demanded the creation of a new Spanish colony in Morocco.^^ 
Soon after the intervention in Northern Africa was accomplished, Vazquez de Mella 
required in 1911 the revocation of the international agreements with France and Great 
Britain in order to strengthen the Spanish position in the protectorate. According to 
this logic, if Spain was to have a “moral empire” over the Hispanic American 
countries as Mella wished, she needed a more powerful expansion in Morocco.^^ 
Territorial gains were thus linked to ‘spiritual expansion’ in the imperial destiny 
Traditionalists foresaw for Spain. Finally, the beginning of the First World War did 
nothing to placate Mella’s imperial desires. In his book El ideal de Espafia, Mella 
explicitly declared himself imperialist and insisted in the need to claim Spanish total 
sovereignty over the Straits of Gibraltar, the federation with Portugal, (the Spain 
irredenta) and a loose union with the Spanish American republics which would 
contemplate a common foreign policy under Spanish direction.^^
This Pan-Hispanismo, which Mella confessed should imitate aggressive Pan- 
Germanism, was not without roots in the Spanish Right. Hispanismo, the belief that 
Spaniards and Spanish Americans are members of the of the same ‘race’, had been an 
essential element in the discourse of Spanish politicians since the late nineteenth 
century.^"  ^ Both the Right and the Left had used the idea of a transatlantic spiritual 
community as an external projection of the Spanish nation. On the Right, Menéndez 
Pelayo had framed the intellectual bases of Hispanismo during the 1890s stressing the 
Catholic, linguistic, and cultural ties between Spain and its former colonies.^^ After 
the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico, this conservative Hispanismo gained a new impulse
Vilar, “Naciôn y Estado”, 14.
El S ig h  Futuro, 4-11-1898 and 5-11-1898 
Andrés, El cisma, 58.
Juan Vâzquez de Mella, El ideal de Espana [Madrid: 1915], 73-75, 85-95
94 This concept o f race was a cultural one. Race is understood here as being shaped more by common 
culture, historical experiences, tradition and language, than by blood. Fredrick Pike Hispanismo, 1898- 
/P id  [Notre Dame: 1971], 1-2.
39-41.
50
and a wider audience with the writings of Julian Juderias and José Maria Salaverrfa, 
who emphasised the Spanish concept of mission in America. The most popular work 
of these writes was Juderias’ La Leyenda Negra, a book acclaimed by both press and 
public. A disciple of Menéndez Pelayo, Juderias denounced foreign powers for 
inventing the ‘Black Legend’ to diminish Spanish influence in the world and 
complained of the good reception this interpretation of history had had amongst 
Spaniards themselves.^^
This new drive towards conservative Hispanismo has to be understood, first of 
all, as an optimistic nationalist response against the pessimism that invaded 
regenerationist writers after 1898. A good example of this patriotic optimism can be 
found in the writings of Salaverria, which angrily attacked the negative image of 
Spain portrayed by the artists of the Generation of 1898 and those foreigners that had 
invented the Black Legend.^^ To overcome this “masochism” that in Salaverria’s view 
many Spaniards were suffering, the Basque journalist proposed the creation of “a new 
Spaniard” proud of the nation’s imperial history, advocated a rapprochement "with the 
Spanish American countries and supported the occupation of the Rif.^^ Secondly, the 
imperial rhetoric and the promotion of Hispanismo has to be considered as reaction to 
peripheral nationalism. Conservative newspapers like ABC, El Debate, and La 
Vanguardia developed a deep anti-peripheral nationalist discourse in which the 
imperial past played the positive pole versus the ‘mutilated’ Spain wanted by Catalan 
and Basque nationalists.^^ The more peripheral nationalism grew at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the more Spanish nationalism found in Hispanismo the sense of 
unity of the Spanish race, which implied the negation of Catalan and Basque 
nationalists’ claims.
There can be no doubt that in the 25 years that followed the ‘Disaster’ of 1898, 
a new authoritarian Right emerged in the political arena turning nationalism into a key
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element of its discourse and modernising the political attitudes of the conservatives. 
In this process, the Conservative-Traditionalist canon of Spain continued to develop. 
It invigorated its Catholic, imperial, corporative, and anti-democratic character and 
incorporated new features such as radical militarism and anti-peripheral nationalism. 
As in other European countries, the new Right showed a genuine will to gain mass 
support but in Spain, despite all its organisational and propagandist efforts, it failed 
both to reform the Restoration system and to attract great popular backing. By 1923 
the authoritarian route of the military dictatorship was welcomed by all the new Right 
groups. They hoped the army would impose on the masses their authoritarian view of 
Spain and implement their political agendas. It was something of an 
acknowledgement of their ovm failure to rally mass support.
The intensification of the nationalisation of the masses
The emergence of the new Right and the incorporation of nationalism as one way 
of coping politically vvdth mass mobilisation was the reflection of a changing society. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century social and economic 
transformations accelerated and the state was partially modernised. These changes 
were to have a direct impact on the process of mass nationalisation from the state, to 
the extent that some historians consider that during this period the complete 
nationalisation of the Spanish political and cultural life was accomplished. In other 
words, these were the years when the nation, and not the region or the town, became 
dominant in the field of social and political preoccupations.
To begin with, the loss of the colonies had the effect of increasing the integration 
of the national market. Catalan textile industry lost its profitable market in Cuba and 
soon sought to gain new customers inside Spain. The political pressures of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie in Madrid proved fruitful and Spain significantly raised its already high 
tariffs to protect its products, which in turn led to the growth of the national markets. 
Secondly, during the two decades that followed 1898, the system of national 
education developed, urbanization proceeded and the transport system was enlarged, 
increasing the mobility of the population within Spain, On top of this, illiteracy was 
severely reduced, albeit it still remained high on western European standards, and
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mass press expanded creating a national market and invigorating the idea of an 
imagined national community.
Some of the state institutions also improved their performance as agents in the 
process of nation-building. Newly regulated, the public administration grew important 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and state officers, such as magistrates 
and functionaries, became more predominant in provincial towns and villages. More 
to the point, the liberal state attempted to develop a real national education system, 
which would include the entire population. Led by proposals of educational and social 
regeneration, the Ministry of Public Instruction was created in 1900, and diverse 
official institutions, such as the Escuela de Estudios Superiores de Magisterio (1909), 
the Centro de Estudios Historicos (1910), the Instituto-Escuela (1918), followed. In 
addition, a massive corpus of legislation regulated state educational intervention, 
which led to serious improvements, especially in primary education, and confirmed 
public instruction as the agent of controlled social modernization.^®^
This state intervention has to be understood not only as an attempt to improve the 
appalling illiteracy rates, but as a conscious means of nationalising the masses in 
patriotic and bourgeois values. As a Royal Decree plainly put it in October 1911, the 
curricula for adult education sought to put “even more emphasis [than in primary 
education] in the formation of Fatherland loving citizens [...] respectful of the Law, 
Property, and other citizens”.*®"^ It is worth observing here that in this role of 
educational nationalisation, both Conservative and Liberal governments played a key 
part. For all their rhetoric on the right of the Church to educate without state 
interference, the Conservatives under Maura promoted the role of state-controlled 
education and imposed compulsory universal primary schooling in 1909.^ ®^  
Moreover, they were fully aware of the need to “produce” a new patriotic youth that 
would “place love for the Fatherland beyond all interest and conveniences”.^ ®® To 
achieve a complete “national pedagogy”, the Maurist minister of education César 
Silio argued, it was necessary to fight all those “humanitarian, pacifist, anti-militarist.
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and anti-patriotic” doctrines taught in schools. He claimed these ideas were merely a 
“hypocritical cover” of the Left that sought to “destroy those armed organizations that 
impeded the triumph of revolution”. O n c e  again, nationalisation went hand in hand 
with counterrevolution. No wonder that during Maurist rule several governmental 
initiatives aimed to transmit nationalist values. In 1921, for instance, Silio promoted a 
Royal Decree creating a patriotic prize awarded to the children’s book that most 
inspired love for the nation. And three weeks later, a Royal Decree stated that there 
must be a portrait of the king, “as the head of the power that represented the unity of 
the Fatherland”, in a visible place in all public schools.
With regard to those new institutions, the Centro de Estudios Historicos 
(Centre for Historical Studies) was doubtless the keystone in the formation of an 
official academic ‘national’ history and culture. Founded to modernise Spanish 
culture by introducing European standards into historical research, the Centre for 
Historical Studies gathered together most of the liberal intelligentsia, which, in the 
search of Spanish national identity’s historical formation, emphasised the leading role 
of Castile and the Castilian language.'®^ More importantly, the Centre took good care 
of the propagation of this historical and cultural ‘national legacy’. Together with the 
hundreds of teachers, journalists, and even politicians educated at the Centre, the 
official institution created journals for a non-specialised audience, as the Revista de 
Filologia Espanola, and published the popular book collection of Clasicos 
Castellanos to transmit to the wider public its perception of the national culture.'*®
However, not all state agencies were to improve their role in the process of social 
nationalisation. The army proved unable to be a competent agency in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. As shown above, the mounting military intervention in 
politics and the steady use of the army in social repression did nothing but increase 
popular anti-militarism through the period 1898-1923. Neither did the continuity of 
the unfair conscription system make matters better. In spite of the legislation reducing 
monetary redemptions introduced by Prime Minister Eduardo Dato in 1911, the 
system remained basically unchanged until 1921, and so did the understandable 
alienation of the popular classes from the army. Furthermore, in the countryside, the
181-182.
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lower-classes’ contempt for the armed forces was emphasised by the actions of the 
Civil Guard, a militarised force created to defend proprietors’ interests in rural 
areas/
At the political level, the dynastic parties did little to generate a cohesive national 
identity. For all the rhetoric of ‘revolution from above’ and national regeneration that 
followed the ‘Disaster’, electoral falsification and patronage continued to be the rule, 
hence hampering popular identification with the political system. Moreover, as 
economy and society modernised, the system proved too rigid to absorb political 
o ppo sitio n .'T h e  best alternative that the Restoration politicians found to confront 
political challenges was to increase the already intense military intervention in socio­
political repression, which in turn led to a higher popular alienation from the political 
system. And one should not forget that the steady growth of socialist and anarchist 
proletariat, republican-leaning middle classes and Catalan regionalists meant not only 
an increasing challenge to the political system but also the social expansion of 
alternative identities to the official idea of Spain.
Yet the dynastic parties seem to have realised the importance of the symbolic 
order in the formation of popular national identity. During the decades that preceded 
Primo’s dictatorship, the creation of national symbols was completed. It was then that 
Maura governments promoted the “Marcha Real” to the rank of national anthem 
(1908) and the national flag was made compulsory in every public building (1908). 
Again under Maura in 1918, October the 12'*’, the ‘Day of the Race’ {Dia de la Raza) 
was officially declared a national holiday in commemoration of the ‘Discovery of 
America’ by Columbus. The ‘Day of the Race’ had been previously celebrated since 
1892 and in the years before WWI some Latin American countries also began to 
commemorate the ‘Discovery’ on the other side of the Atlantic. However, in 1918, the 
promotion of the ‘Day of the Race’ to the rank of official national holiday has to be 
understood not only as a step further in the endorsement of Hispanismo by the state, 
but also as the attempt to promote political patriotism and nationalist exaltation in the 
context of a serious institutional crisis in Spain. In other words, stirring nationalist
Fox, La invenciôn, 97-104.
Nufiez Seixas, Los nacionalismos, 24-25.
Romero Salvadô, “The failure”, 119-121.
Serrano, El nacimiento, 318-321.
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feelings among the population was thought to be the internal panacea for a seriously 
sick political system.
As in France and Germany, the ‘monumentalist fever’ of the 1880s and 1890s was 
to rise from the turn of century o n w a r d s . ' I t  was then that a group of artists 
connected to the Royal Academy of San Fernando built the monuments celebrating 
the nation’s dead heroes, and the Crown as the symbolic personification of the 
fatherland, best examples of which were the sculpture of Eloy Gonzalo Garcia, the 
‘hero of Cascorro’ (Madrid, 1902), and the monumental complex to Alfonso XII, in 
El Retiro park (Madrid, 1902). By an official directive, the same artists were active in 
the provinces, where all sorts of ‘national’ fighters were commemorated, from the 
Celtiiberian resistance against the Romans (Numancia, 1905), through the sixteenth- 
century imperial commander-in-chief El Gran Capitân (Cordoba, 1909), to the heroine 
of the ‘War of Independence’ Agustina de Aragon (Zaragoza, 1908). All of them were 
manifestations of the process of creating from above a historical national identity that 
was gaining momentum precisely after the loss of the last colonies. These 
monuments, together with the ever-increasing construction of ‘national’ museums, 
libraries, theatres, and archives, created ‘sacred places’ in which the national history 
and culture were venerated. After the turn of the century, the whole process of 
‘inventing traditions’ was set in full motion in Spain. By 1923, an official image of 
the nation, as perceived by the state-elites, had been consolidated."^
It is worth noticing here that the creation of a national ‘civic religion’ from above, 
with its symbols, holidays, and shrines, often emerged with associations to Catholic 
symbols, rites and traditions. As mentioned above, Catholicism was a pivotal element 
in the conservative-traditionalist canon of the nation and even the moderate liberals 
maintained a strong identification between Catholicism and Spanish national identity. 
The 1876 Constitution declared Catholicism the official religion of Spain and 
Canovas soon accommodated the Church within the Restoration establishment, which 
meant ecclesiastical representation in almost every single public event. Thus it was no 
coincidence that one of the most notorious public ceremonies during the reign of
Carlos Reyero, La escultura conmemorativa en Espana. La edad de oro del monumento publico, 
1820-1914 [Madrid: 1999]. For the French case see Pierre Nora (ed.), Les lieux de mémorie, 3 vols. 
[Paris: 1984-1992]. For Germany see Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces. Artifacts o f German 
Memory, 1870-1990 [Berkeley: 2000].
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Alfonso the XIII was the king’s consecration of the patria to the Sagrado Corazon de 
Jesus, in the opening of a huge monument devoted to its cult in El Cerro de los 
Angeles (Madrid, 1902)/^^ Neither was it by chance that some memorials 
commemorating the ‘War of Independence’ were considered monuments “to the 
martyrs of Religion and the Fatherland” at the same time, such as the one inaugurated 
in Zaragoza in 1904.^^  ^ This overlapping of the national and Catholic symbolism 
became even more obvious with the creation of the Fiesta de la Raza, for October the 
12^ ’’ coincided with the popular religious celebration of the Virgin Pilar, which had 
already gained a strong nationalist flavour throughout the nineteenth century. The 
establishment of the Restoration seems to have realised that representing and 
celebrating the nation intermingled with religion in a country overwhelmingly 
Catholic was a good way to obtain popular support for the official patriotic ideal, 
without having to pay the toll of a real démocratisation of the political system.
On the other hand, the Church also realised the utility of embracing the myth of 
the nation and saw how it could be brought into play to ensure Catholic social 
mobilisation. Thus Leo XIII and the Spanish Church supported from its inception the 
celebration of the ‘Day of the Race’, which they interpreted as the remembrance of 
the successful Christianisation of America.*^* Another example of interwoven 
Catholic and nationalist sentiments were the popular pilgrimages to Rome, where the 
participants combined appeals to Catholic unity with prayers for the “salvation of 
Spain”. A f t e r  all in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Catholic schools, 
congresses and associations under ecclesiastical control had been stressing imperial 
Spanish history as the hallmarks of national grandeur, following the works of Merri y 
Colom and Menéndez Pelayo. This endeavour of popular indoctrination ultimately 
proves the Church found no contradiction in promoting simultaneously nationalist and 
Christian doctrines. In this sense, the process of ‘re-clericalization’ of Spanish society 
carried out by the Church in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
equivalent to the nationalisation of Spaniards.
Serrano, El nacimiento, 199.
Del Pozo and Braster, “The Rebirth”, 85. 
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CONCLUSION: A NEW SPANISH NATIONALISM IN A STATE OF SIEGE
The two decades that followed the ‘Disaster’ of 1898 definitively changed 
Spanish nationalism in terms of discourse and social scope. Ideologically, both the 
Conservative-Traditionalist and the Liberal-Democratic canons were reformulated. 
The former became increasingly martial, clerical, Pan-Hispanic and anti-liberal, and 
developed a deep hostility towards peripheral nationalism and the organised working 
class. Political parties, intellectuals, the armed forces, conservative newspapers, and a 
plethora of organisations generally related to the Church constructed a new Spanish 
nationalism in a siege situation. The fact that these groups were unable to come 
together into a single party should not lead us to assume the absence of a Spanish 
political nationalism in the years that preceded Primo’s dictatorship. Indeed, most of 
the ideas that would eventually constitute the official ultra-nationalist discourse of the 
primorriverista regime were first formulated during the last years of the Restoration.
The endurance and centrality of Catholicism as a key factor in the Conservative- 
Traditionalist concept of nation and an element of social and political mobilisation 
during the nineteenth and twentieth century debunks the assumption that Catholicism 
was a handicap for the development of a modem nationalism.^^' As explained, all the 
groups of the new nationalist Right emphasised Catholicism as the constituent 
element of Spanish nationality and gained popular support in those mral areas in 
which the social influence of the Church was stronger. Furthermore, in the process of 
mass nationalisation the state overlapped civic and religious symbols, holidays, and 
ceremonies to create collective memories and loyalties, with the active collaboration 
of a Catholic Church integrated into the establishment. Catholicism, far from being 
incompatible with the development of a modem nationalism, was rather an 
appropriate ideological, discursive and symbolic element for the creation of a national 
identity and the mobilisation of social support.
In the field of nation-building, the first decades of the twentieth century signalled 
an important development in the political nationalisation of Spain. Socio-economic 
transformations and a partial modemisation of the state were essential in the process 
of mass nationalisation, in which Spain began to catch up with other European
For the thesis o f Catholicism as an exclusive mutual identity that hampered to develop a modem 
nationalism in Spain see Payne, Fascism in Spain, 14.
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countries. It was somehow too late. At the turn of the century alternative national and 
class identities were already challenging the official idea of Spain. Hence, the more 
repressive and counterrevolutionary the establishment became in the following years, 
the less attached the popular classes and peripheral regionalists felt towards the 
nation-state. The gap between the ‘official’ and the ‘real’ Spain was at its greatest 
when the Restoration finally collapsed in September 1923.
The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera inaugurated a new chapter in the development 
of Spanish nationalism. The heady ideological legacy of the regenerationists, military 
nationalism, and the new Right was then used to formulate a National-Catholic 
discourse that openly challenged the liberal canon of Spain. Imposing this new canon 
on the masses required the modemisation of state, so the perceived nationalising 
deficiencies of the past could be rectified. Doctrinal elaboration and the creation of a 
new state were to go hand in hand in the primorriverista ‘regeneration’ of Spain.
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CHAPTER 2. THE MILITARY DIRECTORY (1923-1925). 
THE MAKING OF THE PRIMORRIVERISTA 
DISCOURSE
“ ...OUT greatest eagerness is that the Spanish sentiment crystallises in Catalonia for its 
own good” (Primo de Rivera)^
INTRODUCTION. TOWARDS THE MONOPOLISATION OF THE 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE
This chapter analyses the primorriverista discourse and the nationalist policies 
implemented by the government during the Military Directory. It argues that during 
his first two years in power Primo de Rivera delivered an official discourse 
interweaving ideas from four of the main nationalist movements that had emerged 
after 1898, namely military nationalism, regenerationism. Social Catholicism and 
Maurism. The dictatorship set off a process of ideological amalgamation of the main 
nationalist currents of the Right, in which secular and religious myths were integrated 
to form a sacred concept of Spain. By the end of 1925, the bases of National 
Catholicism had been laid down and the first steps towards the creation of a political 
religion taken.
The following pages trace the different ideological influences incorporated 
into the discourse of the regime and how these beliefs were transformed to construct 
a new political message and implement nationalist legislation by the Military 
Directory. Secondly, the chapter analyses the discourse focusing on the scientific 
and religious language used by Primo and its strategic functions, that is, the social 
functions of the discourse. The approach chosen here combines a classical historical 
analysis of the nature and development of political ideas with the analytical frame of 
current discourse analysis studies. Following the thesis developed by the Vienna 
School of Discourse Analysis, it is assumed here that “national identities, as special
Cited in Manuel Rubio Cabeza, Cronica de la Dictadura [Barcelona: 1974], 126.
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forms of social identities, are produced and reproduced as well as transformed and 
dismantled, discursively'?
Methodologically this approach distinguishes between two closely interwoven 
dimensions: contents and strategies. Contents refer to the topics most frequently 
addressed by Primo\  discourse. Here it is possible to differentiate between those 
related to the concept of nation, the idea of regeneration, the attacks against 
peripheral nationalisms and the reforms in the state structure. Strategies correspond 
to the main social functions of the discourse, that is, the socio-political goals 
pursued with the official discourse. According to Wodak, the social functions of the 
discourse are those contributing “to the restoration, legitimation or relativisation of a 
social status quo”. In view of these social functions, it is possible to differentiate 
“between constructive, perpetuating and/or justifying discursive strategies as well as 
strategies of transformation and dismantlement or disparagement”.^  In the case of 
the Military Directory one can see all three strategies in the official discourse. First, 
strategies of justification are to be found in the steady defence of the military coup 
and the illegal (on constitutional grounds) regime established by Primo. Second, a 
strategy of transformation underlies the regime’s attempt to destroy the liberal 
political classes and to reform the state structures, most notably with the 
promulgation of the Municipal and Provincial Statutes. Third, constructive strategies 
can be detected in the formation of a new political party by the government, the 
Union Patriotica, and the extension of the Somatén to the whole country.
This approach to the official discourse allows us to inquire not only into the 
nature of the Military Directory’s political ideas but also into the dictatorship’s socio­
political goals, the audience the regime sought to reach, and the reciprocal 
relationship between discursive and political action. The chapter is divided into four 
parts according to the four main contents of Primo’s discourse. The first section 
discusses the meaning of patria in the primorriverista discourse and its association 
with the secular myths of the ‘Iron Surgeon’, ‘national regeneration’ and ‘citizenship’. 
The second part deals with the sacred connotations of the idea of Spain and its 
representation in public ceremonies. A third section addresses the measures taken to 
reform the state structure during the Military Directory. The chapter concludes with
 ^Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigland and Karin Liebhart, The Discursive Construction o f  
National Identity [Edinburgh: 1999], 3-4.
 ^Ibid., 8, 30.
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an analysis of the dictator’s strategy to combat peripheral nationalism, focusing on the 
policies of nationalisation implemented by the regime. First of all, a brief view of the 
official propaganda machine will help us to contextualise the dimensions in where the 
primorriverista message operated.
Since the very first moment Primo seized power, the dictator was fully aware of 
the need to maintain a steady communication with public opinion. If the regime was 
to survive without a parliament it would need some sort of support from the masses. 
This backing was sought via political propaganda and popular mobilisation following 
the Italian example."  ^ In the field of propaganda, Primo initially sought to transmit his 
ideas and governing plans through ‘official notes’ {notas oficiosas\ press conferences 
and articles he wrote for friendly newspapers. Given as often as twice per week, these 
press communiqués were declared of mandatory inclusion in all newspapers and 
represented the monologue that the dictator would maintain with the public for the 
entire dictatorship.
As the regime was consolidated and Primo made it clear that he was in power to 
stay, the propaganda machinery improved. Primo’s speeches and notes were collected 
in diverse books and leaflets, the Oficina de Informacion y  Censura was created to co­
ordinate the regime line information both in Spain and abroad, and the government 
paid foreign newspapers to ensure international press gave a positive impression of 
the dictatorship.^ More importantly, the government showed itself especially keen in 
using state resources to promote the official message and seized control of over 60
 ^Rosa Martinez Segarra, “La Uniôn Patriôtica”, in Javier Tusell, Feliciano Montero, José Maria Marin 
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regional newspapers. On 19 October 1925, the regime’s daily mouthpiece, La Naciôn, 
was launched after a huge subscription campaign conducted by the civil governors in 
all the provinces and orchestrated by the Minister of the Interior {Subsecretario de 
Gobernacion), General Martinez Anido.^ The journalist chosen by Primo to direct the 
newspaper was Manuel Delgado Barreto, former editor of the Maurist daily La 
Acciôn, the first man in charge of the Censorship Cabinet created by the dictatorship 
and one of the most virulent enemies of the parliamentary system in Spain. The 
following year, the journal of the regime’s political party, Uniôn Patriôtica, made its 
first appearance as a bi-monthly publication. Both publications soon claimed to have a 
circulation of 55,000 and 15,000 copies respectively.^
If the regime was anxious to provide itself with a propaganda apparatus hitherto 
unseen in Spain, Primo showed himself even more zealous when it came to silencing 
potential political critics. After the coup, the Military Directory made an extraordinary 
effort to preclude any sort of criticism from the press or, in fact, elsewhere. Martial 
law was declared in the whole country and was in force for eighteenth months. High 
ranking military officers replaced all civil governors and were instructed to punish 
“with the most severe measures” all those questioning the directory “in the press or in 
conversations”.* Fully aware of the formative political role of the press. Primo 
declared that the freedom of speech was a decadent right and that the media had to be 
controlled to avoid the people getting “harmful ideas’’.^  In his view, the role of the 
media had to be the promotion of patriotic ideas, and any newspaper publishing 
otherwise should be banned.
With the 1876 Constitution in suspension since 13 September 1923, the dictator 
established a prior censorship for all publications and, from January 1924 on, the 
Directory implemented a telephone and telegraphic censorship. The novelty of this 
censorship was its unprecedented scope and duration. Censorship had been often 
imposed during the Restoration whenever the government declared a state of war, but
 ^ For the campaign directed by Martinez Anido see, for instance, Civil Governor o f Alicante to 
Subsecretario de Gobemaciôn, 23-11-1925; Civil Governor of Barcelona to Subsecretario de 
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with Primo it reached a permanent status. The dictator personally created a censorship 
cabinet with the specific aim of banning “every single rebel and opposition 
manifestation”.*^  Strongly centralized and responsible only to Primo, the cabinet was 
endowed with exceptional powers. It could cut paragraphs from articles, introduce 
official comments and corrections in editorials, ban entire pieces, impose economic 
sanctions, and even close down publications. It had authority over all public 
manifestations, including those made by the king and the dictator himself. The 
censorship cabinet also functioned as a press office, reviewing Primo’s official notes 
before they were handed to the press and advising the President of the directory on 
how to publicise political issues.
Censorship became the negative complement of the propaganda machine. 
Extended throughout the whole country and indiscriminately used by the government 
in Diputaciones (provincial councils) and municipalities, the regime provided itself 
with an essential device to control public discourse and, therefore, to manipulate 
public opinion. The concentration of power in the figure of Primo de Rivera allowed 
him to put in place the machinery necessary to reduce political debate to a minimum. 
Thus he moved towards the governmental monopolisation of public political 
discourse. It is within this context that we have to analyse the contents and strategies 
of Prime’s nationalist discourse.
THE SECULAR NATION
One of the most significant changes introduced by the dictatorship was to bring 
the nation to the centre of the political discourse. From the manifesto of September 
the 13**^ until the last day of the regime. Primo used a patriotic language in which the 
salvation and the regeneration of the nation became both the political aim and the 
justification of the dictatorship. Therefore, it is essential to start our analysis by 
understanding the primorriverista concept of nation and the myths associated with it.
" Manuel Rubio Cabeza, Cronica de la Dictadura [Madrid: 1986], 124.
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The idea of the Spanish nation that Primo de Rivera promoted heavily relied on 
the Conservative-Traditionalist canon. The dictator defined the nation as a “supreme 
spiritual entity” forged by religion and h i s t o r y . I n  his view of the historical 
formation of Spain, the different “nationalities” of the Iberian Peninsula had unified 
into a single nation during Middle Ages and crystallized in a “sacred union” during 
the reign of the Catholic Kings and the conquest of America. By the turn of the 
sixteenth century, a “providential unity” had been achieved via the military struggles 
and “civilizing” missions in the New World, and the “Spanish race” was created. 
Nevertheless, Prime’s conception of the fatherland also integrated principles from the 
Liberal vision of Spain. He considered the nation as composed by a community of 
citizens with equal rights and duties and the state was understood as the sovereign 
representation of the nation. Indeed, during the first two years of the regime. Primo 
capitalized upon the secular ideological legacy of regenerationism, Maurism and, 
above all, military nationalism. The myths of the ‘Iron Surgeon’, the ‘regeneration of 
the nation’, and the empire became the essential points in the official discourse. In 
turn, these themes were used in the discourse as strategies of justification of the 
military dictatorship and the destruction of the Restoration political class.
The discourse of national salvation delivered by the Military Directory was based 
on the organic conception of Spain popularised by the regenerationists. In his 
manifesto of the 13* of September Primo declared that the patria had been close to a 
“tragic and dishonourable end” due to the actions of professional politicians, 
separatists and communists, and justified the coup as the response to the demands of 
the “healthy people”. In taking power, the military believed they were saving a 
moribund Spain while they arrogate to themselves the interpretation of the will of the 
‘real’ nation represented by the people. The manifesto and the subsequent declarations 
of the dictator also showed that Primo considered himself Costa’s ‘Iron Surgeon’. 
During the initial stages of the dictatorship. Primo declared his rule as a “brief 
parenthesis” in the constitutional order to operate on the ‘sick body of the nation’. The 
cure required extreme measures but would eventually extirpate the cancer represented 
by the old oligarchies. Once the surgical work was done, the argument followed, the
Primo de Rivera, Disertacion, 12.
Ibid., 14. Some other Primo's comments on the Catholic Kings as the founders o f the Spanish nation 
see La Naciôn 18-10-1925 and 22-10-1925.
Primo de Rivera, Disertacion, 12-14; El Pensamiento, 109.
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gap between the ‘real Spain’ and the ‘official Spain’ denounced by the 
regenerationists would cease to exist.
The regenerationist discourse adopted by the Military Directory employed a 
profuse scientific vocabulary. Flamboyant medical metaphors illustrated an official 
rhetoric in which old political elites were represented as “worms eating the nation”, 
Catalan separatists portrayed as “sick people” who needed to be cured, and some 
Spaniards’ psychology considered “lethargic” {ahulicd)}^ In adopting on 
regenerationist discourse, the Military Directory sought the backing of many different 
sectors of Spanish society. Regenerationist topics and vocabulary had penetrated deep 
into the Spaniards consciousness, most notably among the middle classes, during the 
final years of the Restoration and the popularization of these ideas as expressed in 
Primo’s manifesto had a large potential audience. The fact that Primo at first found a 
firm support not only from all groups of the new right but also from the conservative 
and liberal press shows to what extent the myth of the Iron Surgeon had deeply 
infiltrated Spanish society in the years prior to 1923.** It also indicates that the 
strategy of incorporating the regenerationist discourse initially paid off in terms of 
political support.
The revitalisation of the fatherland demanded two essential and complementary 
achievements: the destruction of the ruling political class and the creation of a new 
type of ‘patriotic citizenry’. Several policies were soon put into practice towards these 
ends. The destruction of the old oligarchies had begun with the coup itself and the 
substitution of civil governors by military governors, which deprived the caciquil 
network of the essential provincial connection with Madrid. During the first days of 
the dictatorship, the directory issued new anti-caciquil legislation designed to 
undermine further the old politicians’ power base and to repair the public 
administration. The Royal Decrees of 18 September and 1 October 1923 reorganized 
the central administration following the criteria of efficiency, simplification and
For the portrait o f politicians as worms see Primo’s official note of August 1925 in Rubio, Cronica 
[1974], 154. For some Spaniards suffering abulia see Primo de Rivera, Disertacion, 23. Some other 
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economic austerity so important to the military mentality. These decrees established 
the immediate removal of those functionaries who simultaneously held two posts and 
contemplated strong sanctions for those unjustified absences from work. Although 
these measures did not wipe out caciquismo, there can be little doubt that they were a 
propaganda success for the government. The wave of denunciations against 
politicians and municipal officials from the public and the good reception this 
legislation found in the press show how many sectors of society felt more than happy 
to see the old political elite dismissed and sometimes jailed.^^
The creation of a new type of patriotic citizen was certainly a more ambitious task 
within the goal of national regeneration. Here Primo’s ideas heavily relied on the 
Maurist concept of citizenry, as an interclass conservative conglomerate tantamount 
to the ‘real Spain’. The idea of nation behind this concept of citizen was essentially 
civic. The fatherland, as one of the apologists of the regime put it, was “composed by 
equal Spanish citizens with the same rights and duties”.^  ^ Primo was certainly more 
interested in obligations than in rights, and when describing his idea of citizenry he 
linked it to the “fulfilment of four duties”, namely military service, paying taxes, 
publicly supporting the regime, and working.^^ First, and foremost, the good citizen 
had to fulfil his military duty for the patria. Primo was fully aware of the importance 
that serving in the army had in inculcating the population with military and nationalist 
values and demanded that all citizens must join. Secondly, citizens should contribute 
to the regeneration of the nation not just by paying taxes to the state but also by taking 
active part in the national “collective work”. According to Primo, no citizen could 
neglect his “collective duties”, namely expressing support for the dictatorship in 
public demonstrations and filling public posts without partisan spirit. Interestingly, 
Primo added voting to the list of citizen’s duties, but he did not specify in which sort 
of elections citizens would cast their votes.^^
The second main influence in the formation of the primorriverista concept of 
citizen came from the army barracks. Military nationalist literature had popularised a 
series of authoritarian, irrational and militarist ideas among the officers in the years
La Gaceta, 19-9-1923 and 2-10-1923.
For tens o f  denunciations from the public in the first three months of the dictatorship see Archivo 
Histôrico Nacional (hereafter AHN), Circulares, varios y provincias, folders 1 and 2, Gobemaciôn 
Serie A, Bundle 18 A.
Mask (pseudonymous o f Enrique Diaz Retg) , Hacia la Espana nueva [Madrid: 1925], 268.
Primo de Rivera, Disertaciôn, 19-23.
Ibid., 22-23.
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prior to 1923 and the primorriveristas seemed happy to incorporate them into the 
regime’s discourse?"^ Notorious among the new ideas of the primorriverista military 
was the need to shape a “New Man”, a new Spaniard, in the form of the “Citizen- 
Soldier”.^  ^The concept of Citizen-Soldier can be traced back to the writings of liberal 
officers in the 1890s.^^ However, thirty years on the idea had been transformed from a 
democratic educational ideal based on the French Revolution and the writings of 
Toqueville into a romantic nationalist concept in which the goal was the formation of 
a permanent soldier, as part of the organic nation, acting in civil society/^ This is not 
to suggest that the primorriveristas' view of the Citizen-Soldier was completely 
stripped of liberal ideas. The French Revolution concept of the army as the ‘nation in 
arms’ and the idea of citizen’s rights and duties was still present in the primorriverista 
literature of the 1920s. And yet the importance of romantic and irrational ideas was 
paramount in a discourse that constantly emphasised historic military deeds, religious 
vocabulary and patriotic symbolism over Enlightenment views. In fact, this concept of 
the Citizen-Soldier bore a close resemblance to the Fascist cittadini soldati, which 
also took the French revolutionary myth of moral regeneration of the masses and 
transformed it into a policy of state-led moral indoctrination of the entire population. 
As in the Spanish case, the ultimate goal for Mussolini was the creation of a uomo 
nuovo.
The idea behind the creation of a new citizen, a new patriotic Spaniard, was to co­
opt the lower-classes via nationalist indoctrination. As early as 1916, Primo wrote that 
the Great War would lead to “key moral transformations” and called for propagating 
patriotic and military postulates not only in schools but also among adults in working 
class areas.^^ In the period 1917-1923, the socio-political tensions in Spain and the 
post-WWI revolutionary upheavals across Europe only hardened Primo’s belief in the 
need to use nationalism as a cure for revolution. Once in power, the formation of a 
new politically mobilised and militarised citizen became a priority to Primo. It was 
evident to the dictator that the emergence of patriotic citizens needed all the help
See Chapter 4.
^ Teodoro de Iradier y Herrero, Catecismo del ciudadano [Madrid: 1924], 18-19.
Pedro A. Berenguer, Prologue to Ruiz Fomells, Educacion moral del soldado [Toledo: 1894], iii-iv. 
Iradier, Catecismo, 4-5, 8, 15, 17-19.
Gentile, The sacralization, 96.
The would-be dictator proposed the use of modem propaganda means such as cinema to reach a 
bigger audience. Primo de Rivera, prologue to Garcia and de la Matta, Elementos de educacion moral 
del soldado  [Sevilla: 1916], xi-xv.
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possible from the state. The creation of the delegados gubernativos, the Somatén 
Nacional and the Union Patriotica (UP) responded to different necessities, but they 
all have in common a role as ‘educators’ in nationalist values. The delegados 
gubernativos, military officers assigned to all judicial districts (cabezas de partido) in 
the country to ‘supervise’ local life, aimed at the destruction of the caciquil provincial 
network. But the Military Directory also wanted the delegados to create “a new 
citizenry in towns and villages”.^ ® This led to the organisation of patriotic mass rallies 
and military parades in support of the regime together with the promotion of 
governmental campaigns on morals and patriotic duties. For this educational mission, 
the delegados were instructed to organise patriotic conferences, which should 
promote the virtues of the “Spanish race” and emphasise the duties of defending the 
Fatherland, respecting authority and paying taxes.^*
The delegados were also regimented to organise the local Somatén in their 
districts, under the supervision of the Captain General of the region. The extension of 
the Catalan institution to the whole country three days after the coup was an initial 
defensive measure to endow the regime with a civilian militia capable of backing the 
military government in case it came under pressure.^^ Combined with the idea of 
mobilising the population to maintain social order, the Military Directory conceived 
the Somatén as an organisation devoted “to strengthen the spirit of citizenry” .^  ^ As 
Primo de Rivera stated in a meeting in front of 8,000 ‘provincial leaders’ of the UP, 
the Somatén was a “school of citizenry” that was propagating the ideas of patriotic 
sacrifices and duties all around Spain. '^^
The dictator also had great pedagogical plans for the UP. The members of the 
official party were encouraged to aid the directory in “shaping the soul of the Spanish 
youth” with nationalist values, and in 1925 the Youth Sections of the UP were formed
RD creating the delegados gubernativos in La Gaceta 21-10-1923.
Instructions to the delegados in RD 20-10-10, RO 9-12-1923, RD 20-3-1924. See also Primo’s 
letters to the delegados 5-4-1924; 24-4-1924. For the instruction from the Minister o f the Interior see, 
for instance, “Prevenciones que para el mejor desempefio de sus cargos deben tener présentes los 
Delegados Gubernativos”, 7-12-1923, Archivo General de la Administraciôn del Estado (hereafter 
AGA), Subsecretarla Seccion de Orden Publico, Interior, Box 149. See also Martinez Anido’s letter to 
the delegados, 1-1-1924; Martinez Anido’s telegram to the delegados, 4-1-1924 in AHN, Presidencia 
del Gobiemo, Bundle 331, Box 1.
Eduardo Gozâlez Calleja, “La defensa armada del orden social durante la dictadura de Primo de 
Rivera, 1923-1930”, in Espana entre dos sighs, 85.
RD creating the Somatén, 17-9-1923 in La Gaceta, 18-9-1923.
Primo’s speech in the Palacio del Hielo in LaNacion, 19-10-1925.
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with that particular aim.^  ^ Moreover, showing his belief that even the poorest classes 
should be educated on nationalist principles, the dictator demanded that the party 
affiliates participate in the government’s campaign for the eradication of illiteracy by 
creating an educational network in urban areas and the countryside. The network 
should reach every single family and its members would teach not only reading and 
writing skills but also patriotic values.^^
There can be no doubt that the “revolution from above”, which Primo vowed the 
Military Directory was undertaking, aimed to impregnate many sectors of society with 
nationalist ideas.^^ The ‘awakening of the neutral masses’ that Maurists had advocated 
was attempted by the regime in the first years of the dictatorship. However, under 
Primo the idea of citizenry gained a strong militaristic character. This was not just due 
to a slightly different conception of citizenry to Maura’s defended by the dictator. As 
the whole framework set up to promote the ideas of citizenry and nation (via 
delegados, Somatenes, and UP) was ultimately controlled by the military governors, 
the patriotic values transmitted became inevitably militarised. This re-elaboration of 
the Maurist message in militarist terms potentially had a wide audience. In the years 
prior to 1923 under a state of shock produced by the Bolshevik Revolution and the 
numerous industrial actions in Spain, many middle-class citizens had joined urban and 
rural militias to defend the status quo and confront the leftist challenge in the streets. 
National salvation, invigorating patriotic feelings, and the strengthening of the 
Spanish race, became the main ideological tenets of these para-military groups which 
had sprung up all around Spain before September 1923.^* The primorriverista 
emphasis on authority, patriotism, property and social order was thus music to the 
ears of many in the bourgeoisie. The rapid militancy growth of the Somatén and the 
UP during the Military Directory can be partially explained by the positive reception 
of the primorriverista message among a sector of society that had itself been 
demanding social order and authority.
Finally, let us turn our attention to the imperial myth as an integral part of the 
nationalist discourse promoted by the Military Directory. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the harsh contrast between Spain’s imperial past and the Disaster of 1898 had
Primo’s speech at the national assembly o f the UP provincial and local leaders in December 1925, in 
Pérez, La dictadura, 73-74.
LaNacion, 3-11-1925.
Primo de Rivera’s official note 21-1-1924, in Primo de Rivera, Elpensamiento, 26,
70
haunted the nationalist Right during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It 
was no coincidence that Primo mentioned in his manifesto “the picture of misfortunes 
and immorality which began in 1898 and threaten Spain with an early, tragic and 
dishonourable end”. For the dictator, who had served in Cuba and the Philippines in 
the 1890s, the loss of the empire was due to the incompetence of civilian rule and 
parliamentary politics. What followed the Disaster was just a deepening of the 
progress leading towards national disintegration - whose most dangerous 
manifestation was the growth of Catalan nationalism - that the army had to put an end 
to in 1923. In other words, it was a distorted interpretation of the loss of the empire 
which nourished the ideological justification of authoritarian rule.^^
The use of the imperial myth as discursive tool to justify the dictatorship should 
not come as a surprise since the idea of empire lay at the very core of the military’s 
concept of Spain. As explained by Primo, the nation’s historical identity had been 
forged in the battlefields during the Reconquest, and the American empire was the 
extension of the Spanish military spirit to the New World. For the army, the empire of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represented the peak of national grandeur, 
when Spaniards had successfully defended European Christianity against the 
Ottomans and expanded civilisation to the Americas. Spain was then both the sentinel 
of Europe and the first civilising nation in history. It was this imperial rhetoric of 
Spain as protector of civilisation that the Military Directory used to justify the 
persistence of the colonial adventure in Northern Africa. True, when Primo seized 
power he was well-known for his ‘abandonist’ postures. In the years before 1923, he 
had stated repeatedly that the future of Spain did not lie in Africa, and proposed to 
swap Gibraltar for Ceuta with the British."*® And yet, soon after seizing power. Primo 
realised that the survival of his regime was inevitably linked to finding a solution to 
the Moroccan problem. The Rifian offensive in March 1924 and the pressures from 
the ‘Africanist’ officers of the Spanish army convinced the dictator that a withdrawal 
from the protectorate would be a betrayal of the nation’s heroic past, with very serious
Fernando del Rey, “Ciudadanos honrados y somatenistas”, Estudios de Historia Social, n. 42-43 
(1987), 99, 130.
Balfour, The End, 230-231.
Miguel Primo de Rivera, La Question del dia. Gibraltar y  Africa [Câdiz: 1917].
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political costs at home/^ The dictator then opted for a complete military invasion of 
the protectorate.
It was no coincidence that in the months that preceded the landing in the 
Alhucemas Bay on 5 September 1925, Primo rehashed the old imperial rhetoric. In 
early July, an official note to the nation alerted that “a wormhole in the Rif would be a 
grave illness for Western peace and civilization”. Here, Primo argued that “the figure 
of Abd-el-Krim and his unborn kingdom could be the axes of a social-religious 
movement with a decisive influence in the West”, since Morocco was becoming the 
place in where “all the rebels of the universe [...] look for a field to cultivate their 
morbid microbes”."^  ^The following month, when explaining why he had switched his 
policy on the Moroccan question. Primo alleged that the Communists had inflamed 
the rebellion and were about to create an Islamic-Bolshevik republic, which posed a 
real danger for Spanish national security."^^
In portraying such a picture of the Rifian tribes Primo was following a long­
standing Spanish tradition of depicting Moors as barbaric sub-humans, a view shared 
by middle and lower classes alike.'^ '^  Nineteenth-century Spanish culture was imbued 
with myths about Moroccans, who represented the archetypal Other of Spanish 
national identity."^  ^At the turn of the century a layer of pseudo-scientific rhetoric and 
civilising zeal was added to the traditional romantic vision of Moroccans fostering the 
process of ‘orientalisation’."^  ^ By the 1920s, the primorriveristas added a new 
dimension to this process and presented the Moor as Communist - a feature that 
increased the alien nature of the external enemy and potential threat to western 
civilisation. A month after the landing of Alhucemas, Primo’s second in command, 
Martinez Anido, exposed the supposed Communist nature of the African tribes and 
declared Europe and America should be grateful to Spain for saving the civilized 
world from the Islamic-Bolshevist menace. Martinez Anido, who in the summer of
For Primo’s tactics in Morocco and the role o f the Africanistas see Sebastian Balfour, Deadly 
Embrace. Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War [Oxford: 2002], 93-120.
Official note, 11-7-1925, in El pensamiento, 144.
Primo’s article in Revista de Tropas Coloniales, 31-8-1925. For the alleged Communist connections 
with the Rifian rebels see also Primo in La Naciôn, 19-10-1925; and Primo to Sanjurjo, 4-5-1925, in 
Armiflân, Epistolario, 125.
^  Aurora Rivière Gômez, Orientalisme y  nacionalismo espahol [Madrid: 2000]; Maria Rosa de 
Maradiaga, “Imagen del moro en la memoria colectiva del pueblo espahol y retomo del moro en la 
Guerra Civil de 1936”, Revista Internacional de Sociologia, n. 46 (1988), 577-599.
Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 194.
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1923 had proposed a massive blitz of the rebel villages and corps with toxic and 
incendiary bombs, was also keen to proclaim the benefits of civilisation and 
emphasised “the numerous gains the Spanish protectorate [would] bring to the 
indigenous peoples”."^  ^ It is quite evident that in promoting the colonial adventure in 
these terms the government presented a modem reinterpretation of imperial Spain, in 
which Rifians became the substitutes for the American Indians and Islamic- 
Bolsheviks for the Ottoman menace. The novelty of the discourse lay in the 
introduction of the Communist threat and the biological vocabulary, but the main 
ideas of Spain as the sentinel of the West and a civiliser remained at the core of the 
imperial myth.
The practical use of imperial discourse was the justification for an extremely 
unpopular war in Spain. The Military Directory wasted no time in capitalising on the 
victory over the Rifians and used it for internal nationalist propaganda. Although the 
war in Morocco was far from being over, a Royal Decree of 6 October, 1925, 
described the landing in Alhucemas as “the most arduous enterprise ever to be carried 
out by a colonial army" and awarded Primo the highest distinction of the Spanish 
military, the Gran Cmz Laureada de San Femando."^  ^ If before the invasion of 
Alhucemas, Primo had been linked to Mussolini, Mustafa Kemal and even Lenin for 
his revolutionary zeal and his role as ‘saviour of the fatherland’, in the autumn of 
1925 the primorriverista press compared Primo’s military talents to those of 
Napoleon’s."^  ^ The dictator himself considered it was a good moment for patriotic 
exaltation. When returning from Africa he delayed his arrival to Madrid in order to 
visit some towns in Andalusia and participate in public celebrations organised in his 
honour. Once in the capital, the dictator was awarded the title of ‘Adoptive Son’ by 
all the majors of the province of Madrid. Military parades were celebrated all around 
Spain to commemorate the conquest and the repatriated troops received a heroes’ 
welcome in a tour organised by the regime in early October 1925. The final 
destination of the tour was Madrid, where the troops marched on the crowed streets of
For the European process o f ‘orientalisation’ see Edward Said classic book Orientalism: Western 
Conceptions o f  the Orient [Harmondsworth: 1995]. For the colonial construction of the ‘other’ see 
Homi K. Bhabha, The location o f  culture [London; 1994], 66-84.
Cited in Casassas, La Dictadura, 156-157. For the plans for a massive bombardment of rebel 
territory in August 1923 see Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 138.
The award was a petition o f the Military Directory accepted by the king, RD 6-10-1925.
For the comparisons to Mussolini and Mustafa Kemal see, El Somatén, August 1924. The exaltation 
o f Primo’s military talent and the comparison to Napoleon and Lenin in Mask, Hacia, 189.
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the capital in a parade presided over by the King and military, civil and religious 
authorities.^® Eager to mobilise the population, the regime ordered the delegados to 
organise “patriotic acts” in their districts in memory of those fallen for the patria. The 
reports of the delegados and the civil governors confirm that dozens of these ‘patriotic 
acts’ were successfully organised by the military. Some towns and villages even 
renamed their streets and plazas with the name of the dictator or the anniversary of the 
military coup as a part of the celebration.^^
At a discursive level, the Moroccan War allowed the primorriveristas to foster the 
imperial myth in order to instil patriotic feelings among Spaniards. By emphasising 
the “barbaric” nature of the “external enemy” the government played a safe 
xenophobic card of great resonance in the Spanish public. For decades Spaniards of 
all classes had been educated in the belief that Moroccans represented danger and the 
primorriverista reinforced the threat by presenting the Rifian rebellion as Communist- 
inspired. By presenting the Moroccan War as a problem of national security, the 
primorriverista discourse displayed a justifying strategy, in which the very existence 
of the dictatorship at home became ‘legitimised’ by the alleged threat posed to the 
fatherland. Furthermore, victory in Alhucemas was a key propaganda success for the 
dictatorship. It not only offered the regime the possibility to portray the ‘Iron 
Surgeon’ as a military genius and natural leader, but it also provided a chance to 
mobilise the population and, therefore, to indoctrinate citizens in nationalist 
ceremonies. No less importantly, victory in Alhucemas paved the way for ending a 
conflict deeply unpopular in Spain. Here was the promise of a great change to come.
THE SACRED NATION
Primo’s regime pushed the identification of the nation with Catholicism 
further than any other previous government. As mentioned above, the primorriverista 
concept of nation had a strong religious component, for Catholicism was perceived to 
be an essential element in the historical formation of Spain and Spaniards as 
essentially Cathol ics .This  religious concept of the nation was associated with the 
prolific use of a Catholic vocabulary integrated into the primorriverista patriotic 
discourse. As some contemporary writers rightly observed, Primo’s speeches and
Rubio, Crônica [1974], 161-162.
For the instructions to the delegados and the celebration o f ‘patriotic acts’, AHN, Presidencia del
Gobiemo, Bundle 331, Box 2.
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notes were soaked in a religious rhetoric, in which patriotism was considered a 
“faith”, its propagation defined as “preaching” and the members of the official party 
urged to become “apostles” of Spanish nationalism/^ For the dictator, adoring the 
patria was “sacrosanct”, the national union “holy”, and talking against the fatherland 
“a civic sin”/"^  His own role as the ‘saviour’ of Spain was repeatedly presented as 
God’s will and Primo seems to have believed that the Providence had chosen him to 
save the nation/^ Put it in another way, the civic myth of the ‘Iron Surgeon’ was 
sanctified as a divine figure by the regime’s propaganda.
One of the biggest promoters of the religious-military concept of Spain was 
Alfonso XIII. The monarch, who had been educated under the tutelage of an Integrist 
priest, made his ultramontane views very clear when visiting Italy in November 1923. 
At the Vatican, the king affirmed that Spain had been and still was “the soldier of 
religion” and offered the Pope the utmost assistance should he declare a new 
crusade.^^ In return, Alfonso XIII expressed the hope that the Pope would use its 
influence to foster patriotic unity among the different regions and peoples of Spain. 
The idea was simple: nationalism and Catholicism were highly compatible and the 
promotion of the former had to be concomitant to the strengthening of the latter. The 
Vatican should promote the cult of the nation among its Spanish flock and the newly 
established military government would support Catholicism at home and abroad.
Such clericalist speaking truly shocked liberal newspapers, but the 
conservative press and the Catholic hierarchy warmly welcomed the speech. Rafael 
Sanchez Mazas, then the ABC correspondent in Rome and eventually one of the 
founders of Falange Espanola, wrote that the “petition for a Papal contribution to the 
union of all Spanish Catholics in faith and patriotism -  both signs of the most elevated 
citizenry - constituted one of the essential points of what could be called our policy in 
the Vatican”. T h e  pro-fascist journalist urged the episcopate to assist the state “in
See, for example, Primo’s speech at the Fiesta del Somatén, El Somatén, May 1924.
Among the many examples see the discourse o f Primo in Barcelona in October 1923, in Rubio 
Crônica [1974], 77-78.
Miguel Primo de Rivera, Disertaciôn, 13-14, 36.
On 26 May, 1924, in a discourse at the Fiesta del Somatén in Zaragoza, later published as an oficial 
note. Primo declared that “God had reserved” him the role of dictator and savoir o f Spain. Primo, El 
pensamiento, 214. More Primo’s comments on national salvation and providential intervention in 
Pérez, La dictadura, 76,209-211.
The king’s speech in ABC, 22-11-1923.
ABC, 22-11-1923. Sânchez Mazas had had the chance to interview Mussolini on November the 16*. 
Interestingly, the Italian dictator defended the merging o f religious and national identities stating the 
need to achieve a “union between the good Italian and the good Catholic” -a sort o f argument used later
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the civil and political life” and, quoting Mussolini, demanded a new state legislation 
to “harmonise civic and religious duties”. The Catholic hierarchy was also delighted. 
From the first, it had supported Primo and instructed parishioners to fulfil their duties 
as “Christian citizens” praying for the patria, the king and the dictator. After the royal 
visit to Italy, the Spanish prelates ordered the king’s speech to be read in all the 
churches across the country.^* Even the Vatican seemed to have felt happy with the 
promotion of a sacred Spain. The Pope publicly blessed the “Spanish nation” in 
various occasions and the nuncio in Madrid consecrated Alfonso XIII as the new 
“Catholic King”, while praising the Lord for the Christian victory of the Spanish army 
in Africa.
The use of the Catholic Church to indoctrinate the population on nationalist 
dogmas was one of the central strategies of Primo throughout the entire dictatorship. 
Primo wanted the priests to get involve in the regeneration of the nation and 
demanded active ecclesiastical cooperation with UP members in their ‘educational’ 
campaigns.^^ The idea, the dictator confessed in a letter to Admiral Magaz, was to use 
the Church politically and socially to propagate the unity of the fatherland and to 
combat Catalanism.^^ At first, the strategy seems to have worked and the Catholic 
hierarchy openly co-operated with the regime. For instance, when in late 1924 the 
government launched a propaganda campaign against its critics in exile, the dictator 
was pleased to find the Church gave its full support and mobilised its flock to 
demonstrate in opposition to some “wrongly called Spaniards abroad”.^ ^
The Military Directory also fostered the equation of the nation with the 
Catholic legacy of Spain in the field of representations and ceremonies. Various 
incarnations of the Virgin Mary served as guiders and protectors of Spain 
complementing the long-standing representation of the nation as ‘Mother’. A  very 
common image in the Catholic nationalist literature at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was the figure of the Virgin as a protective ‘Mother Spain’. Primo’s
by the primorriverista  ideologues. The interview o f Sânchez Mazas with Mussolini is reviewed in the 
British Ambassador to Madrid’s report on the King and Primo de Rivera visit to Italy, see “Italo- 
Spanish Relations”, Dossiers from 1920-1923, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, 185/1743. 
^*Rubio, Crônica [1974], 83.
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Primo to Magaz, 2-6-1925, in Armiflân, Epistolario.. 141-142.
Ben-Ami, Fascism, 102. For the relationships between the primorriverista state and the Catholic 
Church see Chapter 5.
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propaganda often used it linked to the concepts of unity, sacrifice and natural love.^ "* 
Special attention was devoted to the Virgin Pilar, Patron Saint of the Spanish armies, 
whose image was already extremely popular among the public. In the king’s words, 
she had been “the people’s driving force” in the fight for independence against 
Napoleon’s troops and her image represented the “essence of patriotism”.^  ^Related to 
the Spaniards’ deeds in the past, the Virgin was apparently also ‘helpful’ in more 
recent triumphs. Primo himself declared that in the hours before the landing in 
Alhucemas he had entrusted victory to the Virgin and that she had responded 
positively.
Primo and Alfonso XIII’s official visits to Spanish cities regularly included 
public religious ceremonies as part of the events organised for the occasion.^^ These 
ceremonies were conceived as a means of mass mobilisation to show support for the 
regime, and were fully backed by the Catholic hierarchy always ready to praise the 
Lord for national salvation. It was the Church’s support for the Spanish “civilising 
mission” in Morocco which pushed even further the identification of Catholicism with 
the nation. Masses for those fallen in Africa or to commemorate Spanish victory over 
the Moroccan rebels became a central part of the nationalist rallies and military 
parades presided over by Primo. The consecration of the national flag and the blessing 
of the troops became paramount in these nationalist rituals, in which thousands of 
ordinary citizens took part.^^ Thus the sacralization of the nation went beyond 
political speeches and became performed as a Christian ritual.
The religious character of nationalist ceremonies was not limited to the visits 
of the dictator and the king. One of the major contributions of the dictatorship to the 
expansion of patriotic ceremonies was their propagation to tovms and villages all 
around Spain. Together with the ceremonies for those fallen in Africa, the Fiesta of 
the Sanctification of the Somatén flag was the most widely celebrated. Co-ordinated 
by Martinez Anido from the Minister of the Interior and organised by provincial
For the representation o f Spain as ‘Mother’ see Primo’s public letter to Francisco Puig i Alfonso, 6- 
12-1923, in Casassas, La dictadura, 113-116.
For example, El Somatén, May 1924 and May 1925.
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[Madrid: 1928], 148. Sqq dXso La Naciôn, 19-10-1925.
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military authorities, the celebration usually followed a similar pattern everywhere. It 
begun with a military parade by the members of the army and the local Somatén, 
followed by a open-air military mass {misa de campana). Once the mass was over, the 
ecclesiastical authorities blessed the Somatén and the Spanish flags and delivered 
short speeches supporting the war in Africa and the dictatorship at home. Then 
military authorities reproduced the official primorriverista discourse of blood, 
heroism and patriotic sacrifice in the African fields, while emphasising the role divine 
intervention played in ‘national deeds’ from Covadonga to Alhucemas. Frequently, 
the ceremony concluded with the official unveiling of a plaque devoted to the Spanish 
army or Primo de Rivera.
Whether in huge urban ceremonies or in modest villages the Military 
Directory promoted a new type of nationalist discourse and ritual interweaving 
religious and secular elements. At the discursive level, the dictatorship interlaced 
scientific vocabulary with religious rhetoric and carried out a process of sacralization 
of the secular myths of the ‘Iron Surgeon’ and the ‘regeneration of the nation’ by 
linking them to divine intervention. The nation was endorsed with the Christian 
symbolism of death and resurrection, and the mystical connotations of blood and 
sacrifice of those fallen in Africa became part of the public ‘communion’ of the 
dictator with his people. Like Fascist Italy, all these elements became essential 
ingredients for a new ‘patriotic religion’, which placed the nation on the main altar.^® 
Unlike Mussolini, Primo’s patriotic religion had the initial blessings and active 
participation of the Catholic Church. In the Spanish case, the new connotations of 
primorriverista official discourse was to pave the way for the ideological formulation 
of National Catholicism as a political religion during the Civil Directory.
THE STATE AS PROTECTOR OF THE NATION
The dictatorship amounted to a fundamental breach with the Restoration 
system in terms of the role assigned to the state. The military, more than any other 
nationalist group, identified the state with the nation and stressed the function of the 
former in defending the latter. As Primo blatantly put it, the “state and its laws” were
Documents o f the Minister o f the Interior show how the celebrations of the Fiesta o f the Santification 
o f the Somatén Flag took place in cities, towns, and villages alike. For the account o f the celebration o f  
nationalist ceremonies in 1924 see the dozens of letters and telegraphs from the civil governors and the 
delegados to Martinez Anido in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 331, Box 1. For a further 
analysis o f these ceremonies see Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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the representation of the nation and the authorities had the duty to punish every single 
attack on the unity of the fatherland/^ Moreover, the idea of constructing a modem, 
efficient and authoritarian state as a tool to regenerate the nation was in the very 
nature of military nationalism/^ The implications of this military concern towards the 
state were soon felt after Primo seized power.
Although Primo did not proclaim his new vision of a strongly centralised 
authoritarian state until 1926, the tmth is that its constmction had already begun 
during the Military Directory. With regard to the territorial division of Spain, Primo 
came to power as a defender of regional administrative autonomy. In the early hours 
of 14 September 1923, the Captain General of Catalonia drew his first programme 
which included “a new administrative, governmental, and judicial [...] division of 
Spain”.^  ^ Much in the same manner Maurism had proposed. Primo advocated the 
creation of regional departments with administrative functions in the whole country. 
This new state division should lead to the emergence of “strong regions” but. Primo 
warned, never “to the loosening, or even the questioning, of patriotic ties”.^ "^  The 
initial option was the creation of regional departments to cmsh to provincial networks 
of the caciques, but also to give equal status of administrative autonomy to all regions 
in Spain, since Primo clearly resented the “special character” the Catalan 
Mancomunitat had gained.^^ Primo’s initial regionalism was not so much concerned 
with regional liberties but with unification of regional legislation and minimisation of 
Catalan particularities within the state structure. During his first months in power. 
Primo considered different options for a territorial re-organization, including the 
formation of 10 or 12 regional administrations matching the military r e g io n s . I t  is 
telling that among the plans were proposals for dividing Catalonia by creating a 
Valencian region including Tarragona and an Aragonese region with Lérida inside its 
borders.^^
70 For the Italian case see Maurizio Ridolfi, Le feste nazionali [Bologna: 2003], 72-92,
Primo de Rivera, Disertaciôn, 13-14.
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Yet the dictator soon abandoned these plans for regional division all together 
and begun his re-structuring of the state at the municipal level. Maurists and 
progressive regenerationists had consistently denounced caciquil control of town halls 
as the key problem that hampered national regeneration from the bottom-up. Primo 
was determined to remove that burden. A Royal Decree of 30 September 1923 
dissolved all town councils and put them under military control. The decree also 
reserved to the government the right to choose the mayor of those tovms with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants.^^ Immediately after, the Directory encouraged members of 
the public to anonymously denounce caciques to the military authorities, something 
that proved immensely popula r .Dur ing  the following months, the wave of 
anonymous accusations was of such magnitude that the army found difficult to cope 
with it. In January, Martinez Anido wrote to all Civil Governors and delegates urging 
them to curb the number of detentions, for he feared many of those arrested would be
eventually released by the judges and this could damage the public’s support for the
80regime.
The creation of a new municipal statute was commanded to the young Maurist 
José Calvo Sotelo, then Director General of Administration, who formed a work team 
with Social Catholics, such as Gil Robles and the Count of Vallellano. After some 
weeks of deliberations and the direct ‘advice’ of Martinez Anido, the Military 
Directory approved the statute on 8 March 1924. The new law reflected an organic 
conception of Spain in which the municipality was described as a “complete human 
society” that in turn formed “natural base” of the state.*  ^ By stating that one third of 
the tovm council members had to be elected by corporations, the municipal statute 
also introduced for the first time since the Ancien Régime the principle of corporate 
representation. This aimed to filter the “natural” character of the locality and 
ultimately reaffirmed the organic dimension of the nation.*^
According to Calvo Sotelo, the new legislation was far more “democratic” 
than the liberal one, for it recognised the right to vote to widows and single women.
El Debate, 2-10-1923.
RD in La Gaceta, 1-10-1923. For the denunciations see AHN, Gobemaciôn Serie A, Bundle ISA, 
folders 1 and 2.
Martinez Anido to the Civil Governors, “Instrucciones reservadas que los Sres. Gobemadores civiles 
y Delegados gubernativos deberân tener présentes en sus misiones inspectoras de los Ayuntamientos”, 
1-1-1924. AGA, Interior, Box 149.
See preamble to the statute in La Gaceta, 9-3-1924.
William Genieys, Les Élites Espagnoles Face à L 'État [Paris: 1997], 108-109.
80
and gave a higher level to autonomy to the municipalities. It also meant the 
suppression of medieval privileges that had remained in the liberal municipal laws. In 
this sense, the government claimed, the statute signified a step forward in the process 
of state decentralization along the Maurist lines and was a modem substitute to the 
“archaic” legislation of 1877.*  ^ Yet for all Calvo’s claims, the tmth was that the new 
regulation included authoritarian features, such as the possibility to mle the 
municipality by governmental commission, and a strong state interventionism 
illustrated by the excessive legislation which attempted to regulate every single aspect 
of local life.^ "^
Based himself on an organic conception of the nation, Primo considered the 
municipality as the fatherland’s “primary cell” on which vigour partially depended the 
“health of the national body”.*^  The province came next in the primorriverista 
endeavour to regenerate the nation. The second step towards the transformation of the 
liberal state was taken with the promulgation of the Provincial Statute on 21 March 
1925. Calvo Sotelo and his team were again responsible for the work. As in the case 
of the Municipal Statute, they claimed to be following principles of démocratisation 
and decentralisation and, yet again, they introduced corporative representation and 
reinforced the power of the s t a t e . T h e  statute emphasised the province as an 
historical reality and the perfect link between the municipality and the state. 
Considered the natural bases of the state, the municipalities were represented at the 
provincial level by the diputaciones, which in turn were responsible to, and in fact 
controlled by, the civil govemors.^^ Since the civil governors were directly appointed 
from Madrid, it hardly needs to be said that this state stmcture gave an indisputable 
power to the central government. The authoritarian political practices of the regime 
only confirmed the centralist character of the statute, for the civil governors formed, 
dissolved, and renewed both diputaciones and town councils as they pleased during 
the whole dictatorship.^^
The preamble o f the statute acknowledge the influence of Maura’s ideas in the text. For a defence o f  
the modernising, democratic and decentralising principles o f statute see Calvo Sotelo, L ’Autonomie 
Municipale, 11-12, 20-27,48-51; M/s servicios al Estado [Madrid: 1974], 35-46.
Calbet, La dictadura, 241-242.
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This territorial and administrative conception of Spain had obvious ideological 
and political implications. In presenting the province as the direct link with the state, 
the statute eliminated the region as an intermediate bond. In fact, the new legislation 
specifically forbade the creation of any sort of association among provinces and, 
consequently, the Mancomunitat was abolished the same day the Provincial Statute 
was implemented. Primo’s conversion to ‘provincialism’ was only a means of 
discarding his initial regionalism and creating a centralised state. In an official note 
coinciding vdth the promulgation of the Provincial Statute, the dictator explained his 
abandonment of “historical regionalism”. He acknowledge that in 1923 he had 
believed that regional decentralisation was a good way of “strengthening the ties of 
national union in Spain”, but the functioning of the Mancomunitat had forced him to 
change his mind. He argued the Catalan institution had promoted anti-Spanish 
sentiments and exalted pro-Catalanist feelings, which in turn were spreading pro­
independence ambitions among the population. According to this logic, the creation 
of a regional administrative division of the state would lead to the glorification of 
regional particularities and, therefore, “contribute to ruin the great work of the 
national unity”.*^  As Primo crudely put it in a letter to Cambo, the masses’ 
conceptions were “simplistic” and could not understand subtle differentiations 
between the promotion of love for the region and the fostering of love for the nation.^^ 
Thus, the idea of region. Primo insisted throughout 1925, had to be silenced for a 
quarter of a century so that the Catalanist problem would disappear.^^
In portraying regionalism as the path to separatism, the regime opted for the 
identification of Spain with centralisation as defended by military nationalism and, 
hence, the old Maurist and traditionalist idea of a regional Spain compatible with a 
great nation was jettisoned. When in the summer of 1926 the dictator announced his 
vision of a new state structure, the implications of the hierarchical, organic, and anti- 
regionalist concept of the nation-state elaborated during the Military Directory 
became evident. In a new manifesto to the nation. Primo described the “family, with 
its ancient virtues and its modem concept of citizenry,” as “the cell of the 
municipality”. The latter in turn constituted the basic unit of the nation and the 
province became “the nucleus” of the patria. On top of them, “the main vertebra in
Official note, 21-3-1925, in Prime de Rivera, El Pensamiento, 102-105. 
The letter is partially reproduced in ibid., 30.
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charge of directing the whole system” was the state.^^ It is worth observing that this 
concept of the nation as a hierarchical sequence of family, municipality, province and 
state not only put an end to whatever hopes of ‘régionalisation’ the Spanish nationalist 
right may have, but clearly anticipated the Unitarian views defended by Falange in the 
1930s and implemented by Franco for 40 years.
In the short term, Primo’s anti-regionalist drive was politically explosive, for it 
constituted a frontal ideological attack on many groups which had originally 
supported the dictatorship. Regional decentralisation had been on the agenda of 
almost every single right-wing political group in the years prior 1923. As explained in 
Chapter 1, Traditionalists, Maurists, Social Catholics and lliguistas demanded diverse 
forms of regional devolution.^^ Furthermore, in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, regionalist movements emerged all around Spain, gaining a wide audience as 
a reaction to the pro Catalan autonomy campaign launched by the Lliga in 1917. 
Pretty much within the ideological lines of the Conservative-Traditionalist canon of 
Spain, these movements presented the region as the essence of the Spanish nation and 
proclaimed the need to politically strengthen the former as a necessary step in the 
“healthy regeneration” of the latter. '^* By presenting regionalism as the road to 
national dissolution Primo was not just challenging the ideological postulates of 
regionalists but also potentially undermining the social bases of his ovm regime.
The political backlash did not take long to materialise. On 1 April 1925, Don 
Jaime, the Carlist pretender, addressed a manifesto to the Spanish people denouncing 
the Miliatry Directory’s centralist policies. Among his main grievances Don Jaime 
listed Primo’s attack against “regionalist aspirations [and] very especially, against the 
feelings of Catalonia”.^  ^ The initial political truce between the dictatorship and the 
Carlists was finally over. As a result the Miliatry Directory forbade all Carlist 
propaganda and increased the pressure on Traditionalist militants, arresting dozens of 
them and closing down Carlist centres around the country.*^
For Primo’s attacks against the Mancomunitat and the “quarantine” needed in Catalonia see official 
notes 21-3-1925 and 2-6-1925 in ibid., 100-103; and LaNacion, 22-10-1925.
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Social Catholics found themselves in a difficult position. When founding the 
first UP sections in Valladolid in December 1923 they had made clear their regionalist 
aspirations.^^ However, when Primo changed his mind about regionalism, some 
cracks emerged among Social Catholics with regard to their support for the 
dictatorship. In Zaragoza, for instance, the formation of the UP was delayed for some 
months due to the obstructions posed by the Social Catholics of the Union 
Regionalista Aragonesa, extremely reluctant to support what increasingly seemed a 
centralist dictatorship.^^ In the following months, as the regime intensified its attacks 
on regionalism. Social Catholics remained silent on the issue. This was part of the 
political price Social Catholics had to pay for their co-operation with the dictatorship.
Yet the most important primorriverista loss in terms of political support was 
the Catalan regionalist movement. The Lliga had welcomed the coup and during the 
first months of the Military Directory co-operated with the regime in Catalonia.^^ 
However, in January 1924, after a series of meetings with the dictator in Barcelona, 
the leaders of the Lliga realised Primo was not going to increase Catalan home rule.^°° 
On the contrary, he handpicked Sala, a man from the espanolista UMN to direct the 
Mancomunitat seeking to curb the influence the Lliga had in the regional institution. 
The following year the Mancomunitat was dissolved. The Lliga had not only failed to 
improve the level of Catalan autonomy but had lost the regional institution which it 
had controlled since its foundation in 1914. This could only alienate the regionalist 
faction of the Catalan bourgeoisie from a dictatorship it had been so eager to support. 
More dramatically, by 1925 the lliguistas, like all Catalan regionalists and peripheral 
nationalists, were officially labelled “dissolving forces” working against the national 
unity. In the eyes of the primorriveristas, they had become the “enemy within”.
El Debate, 2-12-1923; 7-12-1923.
Gômez-Navarro, “La Uniôn Patriôtica”, 101.
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THE ENEMY WITHIN
Peripheral nationalism constituted the negative pole in the primorriverista 
conception of Spain. It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that the army 
perceived Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists as the ‘internal enemy’ aiming to 
destroy the sacred union of Spain and advocated a complete ban of ‘separatist 
propaganda’. Primo wholly shared the views of his comrades in arms. Already in 
1918, the would-be dictator had demanded the government take tough actions against 
those “enemies of the patria”. I n d e e d ,  the date of the military coup was brought 
forward a few days due to anger felt amongst the Barcelona garrison after the united 
demonstration of Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalists on 11 September 1923.^^  ^
And, it should be remembered here, in his first manifesto. Primo denounced the 
“shameless separatist propaganda” as one of the main reasons to justify the coup.
Unsurprisingly, the Military Directory sought to combat peripheral 
nationalism through repression. Only five days after the coup, the government 
promulgated the “Royal Decree against separatism”, which aimed to put an “urgent 
and severe remedy” against the peripheral nationalist “virus”. I n  the preamble, the 
decree described the actions and propaganda of separatists as a one of the biggest 
problems of the patria that challenged the “state and people’s security”. Article 1 put 
under military jurisdiction all crimes against the security and unity of the Fatherland, 
whether verbal or written. Article 2 detailed a series of prison sentences for those 
propagating separatist doctrines in school and political meetings, and regulated death 
penalties for insurgent uprisings. In other words, in less than a week after seizing 
power. Primo had modified the ‘Law of Jurisdictions’ and, as demanded by the army 
in 1906, crimes against the nation were finally under military jurisdiction. In this, the 
idea of the army as the protector of the nation reached full legal status.
The “Decree against separatism” not only targeted those small groups 
claiming independence for Catalonia and the Basque Country. It also began a process 
of ‘Spanishization’ of Catalan and Basque provinces via cultural and linguistic 
assimilation. The decree made the use of Spanish, “the official language of the state”.
Ben-Ami, Fascism, 50.
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compulsory in all public ceremonies of national and international character and 
declared it obligatory to keep the records of all provincial and municipal institutions 
in Castilian. Also concerned with symbolism and ceremonies, the new legislation 
forbade the display of regional and local flags in all public buildings and vessels, 
while it made compulsory the exhibition of the Spanish banner. Moreover, display of 
regional flags considered ‘anti-Spanish’, namely the Catalan, Basque and Galician 
ensigns, was outlawed, both in public meetings and private properties. The idea 
behind this legislation was not only to deprive peripheral nationalists and regionalists 
of their symbolism and propaganda. In effect, it granted a symbolic monopoly to 
Spanish nationalism in the public sphere, much in the same manner Mussolini had 
done by imposing the Italian national flag in all provincial and communal public 
offices.
Of all the Spanish regions with alternative nationalist movements, Catalonia 
was by far the regime’s main concern. For the primorriveristas Catalonia was sick 
with separatism and syndicalism and it needed to be c u r e d . A s  the self-styled Iron 
Surgeon put it, the regime’s “greatest eagerness [was] that the Spanish sentiment 
crystallise[d] in Catalonia for its own good”.^ °^  In order to fulfil this task the 
primorriveristas tried a combination of legislation, repression and nationalising 
policies. It is telling that just 48 hours after the coup. General Carlos Losada, Civil 
Governor of Barcelona, had already issued an edict ordering the display of the 
Spanish flag in communal public buildings and forbidding all regional and local 
ensigns. On 19 September 1923, General Barrera, Captain General of Catalonia, 
issued yet another edict reminding the public that Spain was under martial law, which 
meant all crimes against national security were under military jurisdiction. Among the 
crimes against the fatherland the proclamation included oral or written attacks on 
Spain, its flag, anthem and any other national emblem, as well as mockery or 
disobedience of army officers and somatenistas}^^ Additionally, police officers 
visited bars, cafes and theatres informing managers and the public that singing Els 
Segadors, the Catalan anthem, was forbidden. In the following months Losada and 
Barrera launched an indiscriminate repressive campaign against all those they
For the Italian case see Gentile, The Sacralization, 34-35. 
Villanueva, La dictadura, 114-115.
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considered were Catalanists. Tens of cultural associations were closed down, public 
officers accused of being Catalanists were dismissed or jailed, and municipalities, the 
Mancomunitat and the educational system were purged by the military/
Despite its support for the coup, the Catalan Church was considered a 
propagator of Catalan nationalist ideas and therefore targeted by the primorriveristas. 
After returning from his visit to Italy in December 1923, the dictator warned all those 
priests propagating ideas against the principles of authority and patriotism would pay 
a high price as they did under the Fascist government. The state. Primo threatened, 
would not show any weakness in dealing with these aspects.'^* General Emilio 
Barrera, a close friend of the dictator, developed the official discourse in Catalonia. 
He publicly warned clerics that propagating Catalanist ideas constituted a “very big 
sin” and called upon parishioners to manifest their contempt for those “traitors to 
Spain”, who “worked against the Fatherland from the pulpit”. ^ I n  fact, actions 
preceded Barrera’s words. On the 21 September, 1923, the Pomells de Joventut, 
Catholic youth groups of regionalist ideology controlled by the Church, were 
dissolved all around Catalonia. During the first weeks that followed the coup, many 
regionalist priests were jailed and, by the end of 1923, the dictatorship closed down 
the Catholic Academy of Sabadell.^^^ In 1924, primorriverista actions against the 
Church continued apace: in February, the Capuchins of Barcelona were fined 500 
pesetas for letting children hear mass with a white hood, symbol of the Pomells de 
Joventut', in June, Father Carreras, from the Catholic Academy of Sabadell, was sent 
into exile; in July, Father Fuster, was arrested in Gerona and fined 500 pesetas for 
“exceeding his religious duties”; the same month, the procession (romerla) to 
Montserrat, the shrine of Catalanism, was forbidden by the primorriveristas}^^ 
During the following years, the dictatorship kept up the pressure on ecclesiastical 
institutions and personnel, as priests continued to be arrested and exiled, ecclesiastical
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publications censored, processions forbidden, Catholic associations closed, and 
teachers purged for teaching in Catalan.^
The repression of Catalan priests demonstrates the regime was determined to 
use the state apparatus to curb the social influence of all those it deemed “enemies of 
the fatherland”; even if this meant imprisonment and exile of clerics and potentially 
alienating the Catholic Church’s support for the Military Directory. As shown above, 
the primorriveristas developed a sacred concept of nation and welcomed the help of 
the Church in propagating patriotic ideas, but when the nation was perceived to be 
under threat from members of the clergy, then confrontation and repression became 
acceptable. For the primorriveristas, the nation was the main deity and the state the 
supreme political institution. The Church could co-operate in the process of 
nationalisation but always under the leadership and ultimate control of the state.
The supremacy of the state can also be detected in the “Decree against 
separatism” and the polemic that followed. The political reactions to the decree were 
illustrative of the dialectic between Spanish and peripheral nationalisms. Spanish 
nationalist groups applauded the law. El Ejército Espanol considered it showed 
Primo’s talent as a state leader and predicted that the decree would lead to the end of 
the Mancomunitat, as “a state within the state”. '^  ^ Some sectors of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie became alarmed. On 30 November 1923, the President of the Sociedad 
Economica Barcelonesa de Amigos del Pais, Francisco Puig i Alfonso, and Catalan 
entrepreneurs wrote a letter to the king demanding the abolition of the decree. Puig 
argued that Catalan was as Spanish tongue as Castilian and, quoting Menéndez 
Pelayo, reminded Alfonso XIII of the futility of imposing some languages and 
prohibiting others. The dictator took the matter personally and answered Puig with 
a public letter six days l a t e r . I n  his response. Primo strongly denied that the state 
was persecuting the Catalan language. Moreover, he accused Catalan regionalists of 
discriminating against Castilian in Catalonia, especially since 1898 when “the 
nonsense of preaching that the Catalans had a different character than the rest of the 
Spaniards worsened”. It was the duty of the state, the dictator argued, to protect the
Roig, La Dictadura, 373-432; Joan Bonet i Baltà, “L’Eglèsia catalana perseguida per la Dictadura 
de Primo de Rivera” in Joan Bonet (ed.), L 'Eglèsia catalana [Barcelona: 1984], 335-352,
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“common language’” from those attacks and to assure that Castilian was known by all 
citizens. The state, the letter continued, had also the obligation of defending the 
symbolic representation of the nation and the indoctrination of its inhabitants. Hence, 
it must ban all symbols and education hostile to the nation as a way to protect the 
unity of the fatherland.
The promotion of Castilian as the only official tongue of the state illustrates 
the central role language had in Primo’s conception of Spain. In April 1924, following 
the publication of a letter in which Madrid intellectuals expressed their support for the 
Catalan language. Primo was to insist in the “sovereignty of the state” to defend 
Castilian language from been discriminated against by Catalan institutions. For the 
dictator, the duty of the “national leaders” was to make the Spanish race more 
homogeneous and expand the “central language”. Regional traditions should be 
confined to “museums and archives” insofar they were a “burden in the great unifying 
work of the Catholic Kings”. Primo was resolute to fulfil his ‘mission’ and 
nationalise those areas of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in where 
Castilian was not the first language. Shortly after the promulgation of the “Decree 
against separatism”, the directory transmitted a Royal Order imposing compulsory 
education in Castilian without exceptions in the whole Spain and forbidding 
Catalanist schools and t e x t b o o k s . I n  October 1925, and again in June 1926, royal 
orders appeared with sanctions against teachers who propagated “antisocial and anti- 
Spanish doctrines in the classrooms” and taught in a language other than Castilian. 
The idea behind these laws was that the promotion of regional languages led to the 
expansion of peripheral nationalism in an indirect way. Hence, the state had to 
promote education in Castilian only, so peripheral nationalists would lose the 
potential support of new generations. The reaction from peripheral nationalists and 
regionalists was hardly surprising. They took refuge in cultural activities and 
concentrated their efforts on the promotion of the regional languages. The teaching in 
Catalan, Basque, Galician became the main political demand made by the nationalist
Official note on regional languages, 11-4-1924, in Casa Ramos, Dos anas, 532-533.
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movements, which found in their opposition to Primo’s educational policies a
123common cause.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF NEGATIVE DISCOURSE
When in December 1925 Primo formed the Civil Directory, the ideological 
bases of National Catholicism had been laid. During his first two years in power, the 
dictator drew selectively from the principles of regenerationism, Maurism, Social 
Catholicism, and military nationalism to formulate a synthesising discourse, which 
turned increasingly authoritarian and centralist. In the contents of official discourse, 
the patria gained an unprecedented religious connotation not only at a conceptual 
level but also in the fields of rhetoric, public ceremonies and symbolism. This 
identification between fatherland and Catholicism has to be understood as part of a 
process of the sacralization of the nation, in which secular myths and celebrations 
acquired religious connotations. In an attempt to mobilise the masses on its behalf, the 
regime sought to monopolise patriotism and took the firsts steps towards the creation 
of a ‘religion of the fatherland’.
This was not, as sometimes has been suggested, a liberal discourse nor was the 
Military Directory a liberal conservative dictatorship.*^"  ^ True, the primorriverista 
discourse incorporated some elements from nineteenth-century liberalism, such as the 
term ‘citizen’ or regenerationist rhetoric. And yet Primo took the most antidemocratic 
ideas of the regenerationists (the ‘Iron Surgeon’) and transformed the concept of 
citizen into a militarised patriot similar to the Fascist cittadini soldati. In addition to 
this, Primo’s anti-liberal record was impressive. He declared the 1876 Constitution 
suspended sine die; closed down Parliament; declared it the duty of the state to 
politically indoctrinate citizens; banned political opposition; censored all criticism of 
the regime (it is worth remembering here that censorship was introduced in 1926 in 
Italy); unleashed an unprecedented and arbitrary repression which saw the 
imprisonment of hundreds of political opponents; left the authority of the judiciary in 
limbo due to the continuous personal interventions of the dictator and his political
Pozo & Braster, “The Rebirth”, 88.
For the alleged liberal postulates in Primo’s discourse see Clive Beadman, “Official nationalism o f  
the Primo de Rivera Regime: Some findings from the pages of Union Patriotica and Somatén", 
International Journa o f  Iberian Studies, 11 (2), (1998), 74. The identification o f  the primorriverista 
dictatorship with conservative liberalism in Tusell and Garcia, “La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera como 
regimen politico”, 56. See also Tusell, Radiografia, 270.
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servants; and purged the civil service, the municipal administration and the 
educational system.
In terms of strategies the primorriverista discourse was essentially designed to 
justify the dictatorship. By insisting on the various dangers threatening the fatherland, 
whether internal or external. Primo sought to legitimise the exceptional and illegal 
nature of his regime. The contents of official discourse (patriotism, social order and 
regeneration) had a potentially vast audience and the religious and populist tones of 
the discourse were designed to reach many different sectors of society. Catholic rural 
middle classes could easily identify with the clerical rhetoric and the religious 
character of the nationalist ceremony and so could non-politicised members of the 
lower classes well familiarised with Catholic festivals and rhetoric. Yet this close 
identification of Spain with Catholicism could not attract those secular urban middle 
classes, as proven by the outrage caused in the liberal press by the King’s clerical 
speech in the Vatican. For these secular middle classes, the official discourse sought 
to offer an ‘Iron Surgeon’ and social order, steeped in scientific and regenerationist 
rhetoric. Nor could the religious tones of the primorriverista discourse satisfy the 
working class, traditionally anti-clerical and all too often repressed by the military. 
The best Primo could do with regard to the working class during the Military 
Directory was uttering a series of populist discourses that could not conceal a 
paternalist approach to the social question.
By December 1925, the alliance of industrialists and landowners, the Social 
Catholics and the Maurists, who formed the rank and file of the UP and the Somatén, 
still fully supported the d i c t a t or s h i p .Ye t  Primo’s discourse and policies had 
alienated some of the political groups which initially backed the coup. Traditionalists 
opposed the regime’s centralist policies. Intellectuals and the liberal press resented the 
regime’s repressive measures and the perpetuation of a dictatorship which had 
originally claimed to be a three-month brief parenthesis.
As for the working class, those groups which in September 1923, had 
remained passive after the coup, by May 1925 were demanding the return to the 
constitutional system. In April 1925, the civil governors conducted a survey among 
workers’ associations in all Spanish provinces enquiring about workers’ demands to
For the repression o f political opponents and the purges in the judiciary see Chapter 4. For the 
purges in the educational system see Chapter 5.
126 Primo’s manifestos to the working class in Casassas, La dictadura, 122,243-268.
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the government. Well co-ordinated all associations presented a similar list of petitions 
demanding three things in this order: first, the return to the constitutional order; 
second, the end of the war in Morocco; and third judicial and political accountability 
for those responsible for the military failures in Morocco.
But the biggest damage in terms of the regime’s popularity was felt in 
Catalonia where the primorriverista anti-Catalanist campaign was having 
counterproductive effects. In 1924, Calvo Sotelo observed the situation in Catalonia 
was worse than ever. Not only was ‘separatism’ on the increase but many social 
sectors which previously had shown contempt for the pro-independence movement 
were now sympathetic to Catalan nationalism. Repressive policies, Calvo Sotelo 
warned, were useless against “the problem of collective psychology and popular 
feelings”.
As many other nationalist discourses, the primorriverista rhetoric was 
intentionally vague and ill-defined seeking to reach a wide audience familiar with a 
series of popularised topics. This populist strategy, based on Primo’s belief that the 
masses’ understanding was essentially simplistic, was framed as a ‘negative 
discourse’ seeking to integrate different political groups in opposition to common 
enemies {caciques, peripheral nationalists, anarchists, Rifian rebels and so on). Most 
of Primo’s discursive strategies were devoted to legitimising the dictatorship while 
transforming the state structure via municipal and provincial reforms. Nevertheless, 
during the Military Directory the dictator maintained that the country would 
eventually return in one way or another to the constitutional system of 1876 -  even if 
the creation of the state-controlled UP and the destruction of the dynastic parties 
indicated otherwise. The creation of the Civil Directory, characterised as a 
government of the UP, meant that the regime had to develop further its ideological 
bases. The creation of a new state required the formulation of a new ideology.
See Chapter 6.
Over 100 o f these petitions in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 353.
Calvo Sotelo, Mis servicios [1931], 68-69. 
Ben-Ami, Fascism, 162-164.
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CHAPTER 3. THE CIVIL DIRECTORY (1926-1930). 
NATIONAL CATHOLICISM AND THE NEW STATE
"... the issue now is Fatherland or Soviets, the nation is attacked by communism, 
separatism and terrorism [...]peoples are now in the Communist destructive bloc or 
the National constructive bloc. In Spain the latter is the Union Patriotica neither 
Liberal nor Conservative, but Patriotic "
(José Maria Peman)^
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the primorriverista discourse during the Civil Directory. 
It focuses on the counterrevolutionary political message and the anti-liberal canon of 
Spain formulated by the UP essayists. It argues that the regime’s ideologues 
elaborated upon the discourse of the Military Directory to create a new nationalist 
ideology. National Catholicism. This ideology blended vitalist and elitist 
philosophical principles with the myth of Catholicism as the spiritual cement of the 
Spanish nation. In doing this, the ideologues contributed to the creation of a 
National-Catholic ‘political religion’, in which the nation became the supreme 
sacred political value.
In order to gain a complete understanding of National Catholicism as a 
nationalist ideology, the following pages trace the various influences incorporated 
into the discourse of the leading figures of the regime and analyse how these beliefs 
were transformed to construct a new political message. The chapter explores the 
discourse focussing on the conceptual language used by the UP essayists, that is, the 
accretion of irrational meanings in their discourse, and its strategic social functions. 
The task of this chapter is to show how the ideologues of the regime dismantled the 
old liberal canon of Spanish national identity and produced a new authoritarian 
canon.
As in the previous chapter, methodologically this approach distinguishes 
between two closely interwoven dimensions: contents and strategies. Contents refer 
to the topics most frequently addressed by the ideologues in their discourse. Here 
one can make a distinction between those related to the Spanish nation (counting the
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organic concept of the nation, their interpretation of history, the myth of the ‘Anti- 
Spain’, and the idea of national regeneration) and those of counterrevolutionary 
political nature (including the construction of the ‘new state’ and the role of the UP). 
Strategies correspond to the main social functions of the discourse, that is, the socio­
political goals pursued with the official discourse. In the case of the Civil Directory 
it is possible to identify all three strategies in the official discourse. First, strategies 
of justification are to be found in the steady defence of the dictatorial rule as the 
only possible manner to govern Spain. Second, a strategy of transformation 
underlies the leading figures of the regime’s attempt to transcend the liberal state 
structure and to construct a new authoritarian and corporative one. Third, 
constructive strategies can be detected in the attempt to establish a new national 
identity based on the Conservative-Traditionalist canon.
As in Chapter 2, this approach to the official discourse allows us to inquire 
not only about the regime’s political ideas but also the audience the ideologues 
sought to reach, and the reciprocal relationship between discourse and policies. The 
chapter is divided into four parts. First, it discusses the emergence of the UP 
ideologues during the second half of the 1920s, their main doctrinal influences, and 
their intellectual critique of liberal principles. The second part deals with the sacred 
concept of the nation promoted by the regime and its ideological connotations 
regarding the regeneration of the fatherland, the myth of ‘Anti-Spain’ and peripheral 
nationalisms. A third section focuses on Primo’s attempt to create a corporative state 
and the role the UP was to play in the ‘new Spain’. The final section addresses the 
academic debate on the ideological nature of UP discourse, its position within the 
new European conservative thought of the 1920s and its ideological legacy to the 
Spanish extreme right and Franco’s dictatorship.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE UP IDEOLOGUES AND THE ASSAULT ON 
LIBERALISM
When in December 1925 Primo de Rivera formed the Civil Directory a 
definitive step towards the perpetuation of the dictatorship was taken. The dictator, 
who had announced in early November his will to change the constitutional 
framework and replace parliamentary democracy with a unicameral system based on
* Union Patriotica, 15-11-1929, 29.
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corporative suffrage, openly oriented his regime towards an authoritarian model. 
The transition to civilian rule was accompanied by an attempt to reinforce the role of 
the UP and to endow the official party with a well-defined political doctrine. After a 
period of recruitment and organization, explained one of the dictatorship 
propagandists, the time had come “to elaborate an ideology just as Gentile did in 
Italy years after Mussolini had seized power.”  ^ Thus, the emergence into the 
political arena of the UP ideologues in 1926 was essentially related to the 
dictatorship’s needs to provide the regime with a solid doctrinal base on which 
justify its political actions and gain mass support for the official party.
José Maria Peman, José Pemartin, and Ramiro de Maeztu were the three 
main writers to develop the ideological tenets of the regime, both in the pages of La 
Nacion and in their ovm books. Peman and Pemartin were newcomers to politics and 
played an outstanding role in the dictatorship’s organisation and propaganda. They 
became what could be called the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the regime and eventually 
would hold key positions in Franco’s government in the late 1930s and early 1940s.^ 
By contrast, Maeztu, a well-known journalist and intellectual, already had a well- 
established political career by the mid-1920s. He was a member of the Generation of 
98, defended socialist views in his youth, and had turned into an authoritarian 
conservative during the WWI years."  ^During the Second Republic, all three, Peman, 
Pemartin and Maeztu, were to be leading members of the extreme-right monarchist 
party Renovacion Espanola and became regular contributors to Accion Espanola, 
the journal that was to play a main role in establishing the ideological bases of 
Francoism.
Admittedly, Prime’s ideologues did not represent the vanguard of European 
conservative thought in the 1920s. The central importance of late nineteenth and
 ^Manuel Bueno in La Nacion, 17-11-1925.
 ^ On Pemân see Gonzalo Alvarez Chillida, José Maria Pemdn. Pensamiento y  trayectoria de un 
monàrquico (1897-1941) [Câdiz: 1996]. On Pemartin see Alejandro Quiroga, “La idea de Espafla en 
los ideologos de Primo de Rivera. El discurso catôlico-fascista de José Pemartin”, in Revista de 
Estudios Politicos, n. 108, April-June 2000, 197-224. On both, Pemân and Pemartin, see Genoveva 
Garcia Queipo de Llano, “Los ideôlogos de la Uniôn Patriôtica”, Estudios Histôricos [Madrid; 1990], 
vol. 1,221-230.
 ^On Maeztu see José Luis Villacafias, Ramiro de Maeztu y  el ideal de la burguesia espanola [Madrid: 
2000]; Pedro Carlos Gonzalez Cuevas, La tradiciôn bloqueada. Très ideas politicas en Espana: el 
primer Ramiro de Maeztu, Charles Maurras, Cari Schmitt [Madrid: 2002]; idem, Maeztu [Madrid: 
2003]; Alistair Hennessy, “Ramiro de Maeztu: Hispanidad and the search for a surrogate imperialism”, 
in Joseph Harrison and Alan Hoyle (eds.), Spain's 1898 crisis [Manchester: 2000], 105-117; Andrés de 
Bias, “La ambigüedad nacionalista de Ramiro de Maeztu”, Working Papers, n. 71 [Barcelona: 1993],
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early twentieth century Catholic traditionalism heavily conditioned their concept of 
the Spanish nation and the political postulates derived from it. The ideas of 
Menéndez Pelayo, Vazquez de Mella, Donoso Cortés and Jaime Balmes are 
constantly found in the writings of UP essayists. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
differentiate a second main current of influence in their political thought, which 
endowed the regime’s discourse with a touch of modernity. This second trend came 
from the European radical right, including Italian Fascism, the monarchist Action 
Française, Portuguese Integralismo, and the emerging currents of irrationalist and 
vitalist philosophers, such as Oswald Spengler, Hippolyte Taine, Henri Bergson, 
and, above all, José Ortega y Gasset. It also incorporated the views of the 
regenerationists and those Spanish right-wing groups, which attempted to create a 
modem conservatism in the immediate years following WWI, such as Maurists and 
Social Catholics.
Both ideological streams were going to show a constant dialectic between 
the Avill to preserve ‘traditional’ values and the need to formulate a modem 
authoritarian doctrine according to what the UP essayists thought was the new 
European Zeitgeist, the spirit of the age.^ Both currents were also going to endow the 
official discourse with a idiosyncratic language. On the one hand, the 
primorriverista was a ‘baroque’ discourse, passionate and powerful, designed to 
reach the whole society and modify actions and attitudes of every individual. This 
discourse was based on what some scholars have called the three ‘Ps of baroquism’: 
Poetry, Purity and Patria.^ The primorriverista discourse showed a poetic style in the 
sentimentalism and the hyperbole of the lyrics of texts, in which Catholic concepts 
of salvation, purity and redemption conveyed a sense of exclusivity and unity in the 
idea of the Spanish nation. This baroque discourse, in tum, appeared frequently 
blended with a medical vocabulary used to explain the ‘illness’ of Spain and the way 
to ‘regenerate’ the fatherland. This was a scientific rhetoric directly bequeathed from 
Social-Darwinist thought, which had often been used by both the European Right 
and the regenerationists in Spain and later incorporated by Primo to the 
dictatorship’s official discourse during the Military Directory. In the period 1926-
3-28; E. Inman Fox, “Ramiro de Maeztu y la regeneraciôn hacia otra Espana”, in En torno at 98, vol. 1, 
147-159.
 ^On the new Zeitgeist see Pemartin in La Nacion, 26-8-1926; 28-1-1927.
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1930, Primo de Rivera’s political lieutenants presented in their message an 
amalgamation of sacred and scientific ‘truths’, very similar to that found in the 
writings of Charles Maurras/ As in the French integral nationalism, this 
combination of religious and pseudo-scientific principles made the existence of 
contradictions in the primorriverista ideology unavoidable and endowed the official 
discourse with a dogmatic connotation which left little, if any, room for political 
discussion.
The First World War and the Russian Revolution had a profound ideological, 
social and economic impact in Spain.^ The ideologues of the regime correctly 
realised Spain was not an exception to the European political convulsions of the 
post-war era. In their view, the main lesson of the Great War was the end of 
liberalism as a valid political system and the necessity to formulate a modem 
political doctrine.^ The group of ideas, beliefs, values, and images that constitute 
National Catholicism was the UP essayists ideological response to the 1920s 
European socio-political crisis of modernisation. National Catholicism, it vdll be 
argued here, was not a purely anti-modem ideology, but rather one in a constant 
dialogue with modemity which attempted to filter those aspects of the new times 
considered positive.
Discrediting liberalism was the major contribution of the regime’s 
ideologues to Spanish right-wing thought. Philosophically, Prime’s propagandists 
argued, the twentieth century had brought to an end “rationalism, individualism, and 
all those universalistic perceptions of human equality” that had guided liberal 
political postulates in the nineteenth century. Pemartin, who had been a pupil of the 
vitalist philosopher Henry Bergson in Paris, considered that Kantian rationalism and 
liberal individualism symbolised “the past, the era that, whether we wanted or not, 
has ended.” The new stream in philosophy was in his view represented by Oswald 
Spengler, José Ortega y Gasset and, of course, Bergson, whose works showed the 
world was entering into “the field of intuition, action, and vitalism”. Maeztu was
 ^ For the concept o f ‘baroque’ discourse used by Falange during the Second Republic and Franco’s 
regime see Mercedes Carbayo-Abengôzar, “Shaping women: national identity through the use of  
language in Franco’s Spain”, Nations and Nationalism, 7 (1), 2001, 77-78.
’ For this combination see Andrés de Bias, Nacionalismos y  naciones en Europa [Madrid: 1994], 57.
® On the impact o f WWI in Spain see Francisco J. Romero Salvadô, Spain 1914-1918. Between War 
and Revolution [London: 1999].
 ^Pemartin in La Nacion, 28-1-1927.
La Nacion, 14-6-1927.
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on a par with this philosophical approach. He considered valour and discipline as 
fundamental values in the modem man and, based on Nietzsche’s ideas, advocated 
complementing “rationalist activities” with “sentimental and intuitive ones.”^^
This philosophical critique of rationalism had a clear political goal. 
According to Pemartin, the importance of the new philosophy lay in the fact that it 
had paved the way for a “new political ideology.” The first principle of this ideology 
was “a great and universal negation; the negation of nineteenth-century general and 
abstract political forms: Universal suffrage. Parliamentarism.”^^  Maeztu also saw 
contemporary French and German philosophy was leading to new political 
doctrines. In La Nacion he wrote: “A new philosophy requires the renovation of 
political ideas. Liberalism is leaving. Collectivism is accompanying it. Something 
different is beginning to take shape.”’^  The Basque intellectual identified Fascism, 
the works of Charles Maurras, Henri Massis, Antonio Sardinha (the father of 
Portuguese Integralismo)^ Corradini and, not very modestly, his own writings as the 
vanguard of the 1920s political thought.
Liberalism was not only a senile creed; it also opened the gates to the 
establishment of a communist society, according to the National-Catholic theorists. 
In their bipolar conception of the world, liberal democracy aligned with socialism, 
communism, and anarchism. Maeztu held liberalism “responsible” for the rise of 
class struggle (and “separatism” in the Spanish case), because, in the name of 
individual liberty, it had tolerated the destruction of national “social unity”. This, he 
predicted, would eventually “lead to social revolution and civil war”.^  ^ Pemartin 
pushed the argument further and tried to prove that liberal democracy “logically” 
and “inevitably” led to communism, via universal suffrage. The Andalusian 
philosopher sustained that after the French Revolution established the “dogmas” of 
the Rights of Man and universal franchise the people was empowered to overthrow 
“traditional, historical, social, and economic values, which were qualitative” by 
de f i n i t i on . I f  free elections were to be held in Spain, the triumph of the left
" E / %  29-4-1924.
La Nacion, 28-1-1927; 31-1-1927. 
" La Nacion, 28-4-1927.
La Nacion, 28-4-1927; 5-5-1927; 28-7-1927; 3-11-1927; 8-12-1927. 
La Nacion, 12-7-1927.
La Nacion, 11-3-1927.
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ultimately would impose a communist regime. After all, the Russian Revolution was 
just a “direct descendant” of the French one.*^
In presenting democracy as the route to communism Pemartin anticipated 
one of the favourite arguments of all groups of the Spanish extreme right in the 
1930s.*^ This stance also means a turning point for the Spanish right. While 
conservative groups, like the Social Catholics, had attacked the corrupt 
implementation of liberal principles and the low level of democratic representation 
during the Restoration, here these very principles were at stake from a doctrinal 
viewpoint. According to the primorriverista view, the return to the constitutional 
framework of 1876 that many in the Right were demanding of the dictator would 
ultimately lead to the destruction of the nation.
DOGMAS OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC CANON
The sacred concept of the nation and the interpretation of history
Primo’s ideologues propagated an organic concept of the nation based on the 
traditionalist theory of society and proclaimed Catholicism to be intrinsic to the 
Spanish soul or ‘race’. According to Peman, who acknowledged that Vazquez de 
Mella had inspired his model, the nation was “the live organism formed by men 
when they gather in society.” The creation of the nation was considered the last 
step in a historical process of cohesion in which “natural societies”, like the family, 
the municipality, and the region had evolved and congregated to bring into being the 
fatherland.^® From its very conception the National Catholic idea of nation was 
endowed with an organic character and directly confronted nineteenth century 
liberal individualism, which, in Peman’s view, represented society as a “shapeless 
aggregation of individuals.”^^
The specific character in the formation of nations was found in the key role 
played by religion in European history. Pemartin also argued that the nation was “a 
creation of Christianity” and the Ancient world had not witnessed them because it 
“lacked the moral unity of beliefs that would have allowed their emergence”. 
Nations, he explained, need a “moral unity”, a spiritual element above “all the
La Nacion, 5-7-1927.
Garcia Queipo de Llano, “Los ideôlogos de la Uniôn Patriôtica”, 229.
José Maria Pemân, El hecho y  la idea de la Uniôn Patriôtica [Madrid: 1929], 71-72.
20 Ibid, 72.
LaNaciôn, 19-9-1928.
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geographical, ethnic, philosophical, and historical factors [...] to be unified.”^^  
Historically Spain had been the best example of that creative influence and 
Catholicism was portrayed as the core of the nation and the element that defined 
Spanish identity. The reign of the Catholic Kings at the end of the fifteenth century 
was pointed out as the era in which religion had completed the formation of the 
Spanish nation.^^
Primo’s ideologues’ interpretation of the Spanish nation was heavily 
influenced by the Catholic traditionalist historiography of the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Traditionalist historians explained the pinnacle of Spanish power 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a consequence of the struggle against 
foreign heresy in Europe and the evangelisation of the Americas. They also blamed 
French rationalism and German Krausism for the artificial introduction of 
revolutionary ideas that had supposedly destroyed the unity of Spanish culture. In 
the same vein, the luminaries of the regime argued that the penetration of “foreign” 
enlightened and liberal ideas had clashed with the “intimate social essence” of Spain 
and had led to a “shameful decadence.” "^* Their providential view of Spanish history 
exalted the same historical characters, facts, and periods as .the Traditionalists. The 
Catholic Kings, the discovery and colonisation of the Americas, the European 
empire of the Habsburgs and the battle of Lepanto against the Ottomans were 
portrayed as the supreme expression of the Spanish Volkgeist in a extremely 
oversimplified way. These historical characters and events were presented in a 
mythological manner as absolute ‘good’, without negative aspects. Historical 
characters and events were turned into non-temporal constants, the pure incarnation 
of the national character, as opposed to the Reformation, the Enlightenment and 
liberal revolutions, all of them considered intrinsically anti-Catholic and, therefore, 
anti-Spanish.^^ As was the case in pre-fascist and fascist ideologies during the first 
two decades of the century, myths were to play a dominant role in the UP discourse.
The primorriverista view of history was saturated by religious concepts of 
purity, sin and redemption, which reinforced the nation’s sacred value. Studies of 
extreme right discourse have shovm that the function of this language is to endow
Pemartin, Los valores, 42-43.
Ibid., 43-44.
Pemartin in La Nacion, 30-9-1927.
25 Some examples o f this mythological views of history in Péman, El hecho, 331-332, 350-351; and La 
Nacion, 31-8-1928; Pemartin, m La Nacion, 16-5-1928; and Z,o5 valores, 70-71.
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the message with an authority that cannot be challenged. Thus religious arguments 
in political discourse turn into ‘evidence’. They are presented to the audience as if 
they were intrinsically true, with no need to verify them.^^ In the same way, the 
regime’s propagandists presented the religious interpretation of Spanish history as 
unquestionable ‘proof of the Catholic nature of the nation. The ideas were not new 
but the targeted audience was wider than ever before. This religious language and 
sacred view of Spanish history was familiar not only to those supporters of 
traditionalist groups but also to a broad spectrum of the Right, including Social 
Catholics and important sectors of the Conservative party who had incorporated 
these ideological premises during the revival of Catholic movements of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.^^ Thus the audience that could identify with 
the official interpretation of history embraced all the most relevant groups of the 
Right.
Traditionalist interpretations were complemented with vitalist views of 
history and the Generation of 1898’s idea of the existence of a Spanish ‘national 
essence’ developed through the centuries. Prime’s ideologues were deeply 
influenced by Oswald Spengler’s understanding of history as “a whole of enormous 
vital cycles based on a series of constants.” *^ The German philosopher argued in The 
Decline o f the West that this series of constants could be dravm out of analogies of 
the diverse historical periods which ultimately elucidated the rise and fall of 
civilisations.^^ Moreover, Spengler interpreted the crisis of liberalism and WWI as a 
turning point for western civilisation. He explained western decadence by stressing 
the lack of aristocratic and heroic values in the liberal system and foresaw a new era 
of strong political leaders as the only solution to save Europe from barbarism.
This irrational interpretation of history and the crisis of liberalism became 
extremely influential among Nazi theorists and was eventually extensively 
supported by the Spanish extreme right in the 1930s.^^ Primo’s ideologues
Maryse Souchard et al., Le Pen. Les mots. Analyse d ’un discours d ’extrême-droite [Paris: 1997], 22- 
25.
Maria Victoria Lôpez-Cordôn, “La mentalidad conservadora durante la Restauracion”, in Garcia 
Delgado (ed.). La Espana de la Restauracion [Madrid: 1985], 71-108.
Spengler's work first volume was published in 1918 and the second volume came in 1922. In Spain, 
the first translation of the two volumes was published in 1923 including a preface by Ortega. I quote 
from the Spanish edition La decadencia de Occidente [Madrid: 1976], 25.
Ibid., 18-28.
For the influence o f Spengler in the Spanish extreme right in the 1930s see Morodo, Accion 
Espanola, 114-116.
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anticipated the use of Spengler’s views and provided an explanation of both the 
“essences” of the Spanish nation and the authoritarian regimes of the 1920s based on 
the ideas of the German philosopher. Pemartin directly applied Spengler’s 
interpretation of history to explore, via similes and comparisons, those outstanding 
“essences” in the Spanish past and, consequently, the sum and substance of the 
nation. He resolved that religion and monarchy had been the constant “traditional 
essences” in Spanish history.^' The latter represented the political institution on 
which the nation had been constructed and its value lay in its role as saviour during 
political crisis. Religion was considered the “barometer” of what was genuinely 
Spanish. In other words, religion was able to tell “the substantial from the 
superficial, what will succeed in our historical evolution from what will remain as 
something parasitical.”^^  From this basis the reading of Spanish history was made in 
a simplistic way. Those periods of national grandeur were due to the pre-eminence 
of national essences, while the decadence of Spain was blamed on the introduction 
of “foreign ideas”, such as liberalism.^^
The UP essayist added to this view the definition of a Spanish spiritual 
character put forward by the Generation of 1898 the previous decades. They mainly 
relied on Angel Ganivet’s Idearium Espanol to define a particular Spanish collective 
psychology. Ganivet, a diplomat and journalist, had published Idearium Espanol in 
1896. The book was a regenerationist study concerned with ‘the problem of Spain’. 
Like many other authors of the 1890s, Ganivet believed that the understanding of 
Spanish decadence lay in the discovery of the “natural constitution of the race.” "^^ 
Unlike many of his Europeanist contemporaries, Ganivet insisted that regeneration 
lay in purification of the national essence and adherence to tradition.^^ Although 
Idearium was a complex book. Primo’s ideologues managed to present it in a 
simplistic way and stressed those aspects of the work that defined the spiritual 
character of Spaniards as essentially Catholic.^^
Pemartin, Los valores, 27-28.
Ibid., 320.
Spengler's interpretation o f history was also heavily influential in Pemân‘s explanation o f European 
civilization. See El hecho, 331-332, 350-351. The influence of Spengler in Pemân, via his mentor 
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But the use of Ganivet’s ideas went far beyond mere similarities with the 
traditionalists. The primorriveristas shared Ganivet’s determinist assertion of the 
existence of a “territorial spirit”, consequence of the peninsular geography of Spain 
and its history, which endowed Spaniards with an “independent character” and 
differentiated them from the rest of Europe.^^ This pseudo-scientific concept of 
“territorial spirit”, based on the works of Henry Buckle and Hippolyte Taine, 
emphasized the relationship between history of civilizations and their environments 
and had been influential in France at the tum of the century to define national 
characters.^^ Ganivet considered Spanish character as a martial, stoical, intuitive, 
bellicose and spiritual one, but also depicted the Spaniards’ psychology as 
“lethargic” (abulica) and claimed that national regeneration lay in the purification of 
the Spanish essence.^^ Peman and Pemartin went, however, a step beyond Ganivet’s 
geographical determinism and presented a Spanish individualist psychology with 
some negative connotations of particularism, which acted in opposition to national 
consolidation. Hence, they argued the necessity of a strong government, a 
dictatorship, for the regeneration of the nation and, once again, attacked liberalism 
and democracy as unsuitable to the Spanish character."^°
It is easy to discern here the importance of the Social-Darwinist thought in 
Primo’s ideologues. Linked to the use of a religious rhetoric, the application of 
pseudo-scientific analysis and psycho-medical language to describe the nation as a 
living organism shows that there was a need to present the concept of Spain on 
natural science and deterministic grounds. In doing so the UP luminaries endowed 
their discourse vdth a ‘scientific-religious’ dogmatism, similar to that found in their 
much-admired Charles Maurras."^  ^ The political implications of the discourse were 
also akin. Like the French monarchist, using providentialist, idealist and vitalist 
interpretations of history. Primo’s leading ideologues framed an organic concept of 
the fatherland in which the ‘people’ played no significant role in the formation and 
development of the nation. Unlike the liberal canon of the fatherland, Spaniards 
became a passive object on whom the ‘national essences’ were projected throughout 
history. Individuals were shown as merely part of an integral organic whole guided
Ganivet, Idearium, 56.
Fox, La Invencion, 125.
GaniwQt, Idearium, 139, 142-143.
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by superior and divine historical forces. As was the case in Gentile’s Fascist political 
philosophy, and earlier in the writings of Maurice Barrés, the Primo luminaries’ 
approach to the nation led to the absolute subordination of the individual to the 
collective spiritual body."^  ^ Like French integral nationalism and Italian Fascism, 
National Catholicism attacked the idea of a plural society as a handicap to the 
spiritual union of the nation. Like its European counterparts. National Catholicism 
would tum against the ‘enemy within’ as the main element to define itself.
The myth of Anti-Spain
The connotations of the official concept of the nation as a living organism 
has to be understood within Primo’s ideologues’ tendency to present all political 
stmggles as bipolar fights. In their view, the 1920s were witnessing “the great world 
revolution” against liberalism and communism led by the principles of “nation” and 
“order”."^  ^ Fascist Italy, Spain under the UP, and Germany with the emergence of 
nationalist groups were different manifestations of the same phenomenon of 
formation of “national blocs against communism”.'^ '* In the new contest the world 
was divided into “national alliances and soviet alliances”."^  ^The duality of the 1920s 
was clearly underlined by Maeztu: “Civilization on the one hand; Bolshevism on the 
other. This is question of the present time”."^  ^ In the future, Peman foresaw, the 
masses would be either “Christian or Anarchic”, different liberal political nuances 
were out of question, it was time to choose “between Jesus and Barabbas”"^^
This dualistic vision of the world political situation had its domestic version 
in the myth of the two Spains. The UP essayist defended the existence of a “real 
Spain”, represented by the Catholic working masses “as the nerve of the Nation”, 
opposed to the ‘Anti-Spain’, a miscellany of liberals, socialists, republicans, 
communists, anarchists, regionalists and Catalan and Basque nationalists, who 
continuously threatened the essences of the nation. To be sure, the theory of the ‘two
On Maurras’ see Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France [Paris: 1990], 
21-23.
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Spains’ was not invented by the dictatorship’s ideologues, yet the primorriverista 
treatment of the concept integrated its different versions transforming and 
renovating the myth into its modem form.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the myth of the two Spains can be traced back to 
the early nineteenth century. Then reactionary priests identified the fatherland with 
orthodox Catholicism and absolutist traditions, while they considered enlightened 
and liberal ideas as anti-Spanish."^* These postulates were consistent with an 
Augustinian conception of history in which the forces of Good (the “real Spain”) 
fought an eternal battle against the forces of Evil (Anti-Spain) and showed the 
essential appeal of mythical rather than rational argumentation for the ultramontane 
right."^  ^The idea of the two Spains is present throughout the nineteenth century both 
in historiography and political discourses. By the end of the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth the works of Menéndez Pelayo had renewed the division of Spain 
between ‘foreign’ and ‘traditional’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’, historical legacies; 
while the doctrine of Carlists and Catholic Integrists had also kept alive the myths of 
‘Anti-Spain’ and the ‘internal enemy’ in the political arena.
The second depiction of a divided nation came from a very different political 
field. As a consequence of the Restoration political system, based on the planned 
alternation in power of the two dynastic parties, the dissociation between 
‘representatives’ and ‘represented’ soon emerged. This caused a conceptual 
separation between the ‘real’ and the ‘official’ Spain.^  ^ By the 1880s, republicans 
and Catalan regionalists distinguished an “official” from a “working” Spain in their 
political discourses. But it was not until 1898 when the Costa brought to the public 
opinion the image of a “real” Spain confronting the “official” one and the concept 
became widely known. As had been the case in France and Italy, he used the image 
of the “real” versus the “official” nation to denounce the manipulation of the 
electoral system and demanded an iron surgeon “to equate the legal with the real
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Spain”.^  ^ In the 1910s, the philosopher Ortega y Gasset went a step beyond, 
declaring the existence of “two non-communicating and incompatible Spains”. His 
vitalist approach distinguished then a “new Spain”, which had the power to 
transform society confronting a “decrepit Spain” represented by the political 
oligarchy.^^
Primo's ideologues’ main contribution to the theory of the “two Spains” was 
to blend the traditionalist and the regenerationist currents, albeit in a very 
approximate manner. The primorriveristas represented the “real” Spain as 
traditional and modem at the same time, whilst Anti-Spain became both the 
“heterodox” and “foreign” ideologies and the “decrepit” and oligarchic Restoration 
system. On the one hand, the “real” Spain was the “historic Spain” that was defined 
by religious and monarchical values, as in the case of the nineteenth century 
reactionaries. On the other, the real Spain was the “vital Spain”, depicted as the great 
masses of working, modem Spaniards who made the country progress. Vital Spain 
was the “vast majority of the common people” who had stayed away from the old 
political system. They symbolised nothing less than the “nerve of the nation”.^ "^  
Consequently, the “real” Spain acquired a modem, regenerationist, inter-class 
connotation. The primorriverista discourse gained clear populist tones seeking 
support from those middle and lower-middle classes which had felt alienated from 
the oligarchic Restoration system: the dictatorship followed the search for the 
“neutral mass” that the Maurists had began in the 1910s.
It is in the metaphorical stmggle between the “real Spain” and “Anti-Spain” 
where the influence of a medical language and the strategic functions of the official 
discourse can be best detected. Firstly, the political parties of the Restoration were 
presented as the “vims” that had infected the nation. Inside the same living 
organism, Pemartin diagnosed quoting Ortega, was the “cancer” of that “false and 
usurper nation [...] that was killing the real and genuine nation.” In 1923, he added, 
the Army, “led by the Marquis of Estella but supported and encouraged by the 
whole people, in a bottom up movement of national extension,” acted as the “anti­
fiction, the anti-toxin of that fictitious and official Spain [...], which usurped and
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dominate the rest of the nation.” The Army was thus depicted as the saviour of the 
patria and the destruction of the Anti-Spain presented as vital for the regeneration of 
the real nation.^^ Therefore, this sort of discourse performed the function of 
legitimising both the coup and the dictatorship by linking the army to the national 
will and portraying the military as the last resort for the salvation of the nation.
Secondly, the official message was to be governed by what analysts of 
political discourses have named the principle of the “ideological square”, that is, of 
positive self-presentation and negative other-representation.Language determined 
here the concept of the “internal enemy” in pathological terms to contribute to the 
legitimisation of the regime and the de-legitimisation of the political opponents. The 
UP essayists blurred the ideological distinctions among liberals, republicans, 
socialists, communists, anarchists and peripheral nationalists and portrayed all 
political adversaries as a united whole: the Anti-Spain. This mythological figure not 
only opposed to the “national essences” and worked to destroy the fatherland, but 
was also described as conglomerate of incurable ill people. From Pemartin’s 
viewpoint those supporting democratic and leftwing ideas were “drugged 
dogmatics”, “mentally sick people, [who] had no cure.”^^  To Maeztu, who also liked 
to use the “cancer” metaphor to refer to the “enemies of the fatherland”, socialists 
had “turbulent and confused minds which prefer passion to truth and step by step 
were incubating a profound hatred against intelligence” *^
This characterisation of the “internal enemy” in such terms was mainly a 
process of de-humanisation of the political opponents. In doing so, the official 
discourse aimed to legitimate coercion and violence against all those opposed to the 
dictatorship. The discourse directly connected here with the political repression that 
the regime was carrying on those years.^^ Maeztu put it in a crude and blatant way: 
the nature of Bolshevism was nothing but “the revolt of the sub-human being against 
civilisation”. Hence, it made no sense to negotiate with Bolsheviks because their 
“resentful and sick souls” would not understand the reality of the world. The
Pemartin, Los valores, 105-106.
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solutions were plain: “Against Bolshevism, the Dictatorship! Against subversion, 
the bayonets!”
The myth of Anti-Spain was often presented together with the idea of a 
universal plot against Spain. Behind the internal and external opponents to the 
dictatorship, the official press insisted, there were obscure forces conspiring against 
the fatherland. The Soviet government was ultimately held responsible for the 
actions anti-Spaniards of all types, according to the regime’s propagandists.^' The 
social protests of the years 1917-1920, Rifian resistance, peripheral nationalists and 
anarchist actions... virtually every movement of opposition was regarded as 
controlled in the shadows by Moscow, in what has to be considered as the 
institutionalisation of the “Bolshevik threat” by the primorriverista regime.^^ As in 
French integral nationalism, the resort to a Masonic-Marxist-democratic plot was 
wrapped in providential vocabulary and presented an apocalyptic picture of the 
world.^^ In providing this threatening vision of the global political situation, the aim 
of this sort of discourse was to create a sensation of insecurity in the audience. At 
the same time, the discourse allowed the representation of the dictatorship as the 
only possible solution for Spain. Just as Mussolini had done in Italy before seizing 
power in 1922, the primorriverista discourse portrayed all political parties as 
incompetent, unable to stop the working class and responsible for the social unrest; 
whilst the UP was meant to aggregate the “real” national forces and prevent the rise 
of the Left.
The function of political myths is to offer simplistic and therefore distorted, 
but also a readily, easy-to-assimilate version, of complex social and political 
realities, avoiding rational explanations and drawing a neat division between two 
sides. Like many other extreme right European theoreticians when dealing with 
“internal enemies”, the regime’s spokesmen delivered a simplified, mythical, bipolar 
message, which facilitated an easy assimilation by the masses of a more complex 
world.^"' Since the negative symbol of Anti-Spain portrayed the enemy as a whole 
ultimately controlled by obscure forces in Moscow, the middle classes were then
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provided with a simple explanation in religious and pathological terms about the 
deep socio-political changes in Europe since WWI.
The use of political myths also aims to integrate the audience into a certain 
political community and to mobilise supporters. Political myths are especially 
powerful in times of socio-political crises when they become dominant in popular 
mentalities and occasionally even among intellectuals.^^ In this sense, the regime’s 
employment of the mythological figure of Anti-Spain and its parallel legend of the 
Masonic-Communist international plot clearly sought to mobilise support for the 
dictatorship. However, the regime faced a serious paradox that certainly diminished 
the impact of the utilization of the myth of Anti-Spain in the audience. On the one 
hand, the institutionalisation of the “Bolshevist threat” and the idea of the “enemy 
within” could have potentially appealed to a large section of the middle and upper 
classes, which had been terrified of the social unrest that preceded the dictatorship. 
On the other hand, the official discourse steadily emphasized that the main 
achievement of the new regime had precisely been to end that social unrest and to 
deliver “order” and discipline to the country. The “success” of the dictatorship in 
dismantling and repressing organised labour seems to have convinced the 
bourgeoisie that the military were the proper instrument to control the working class 
and that the crisis of the years 1917-1923 was finally over. Under the dictatorship, 
the bourgeoisie did not feel the country was suffering a socio-political crisis and, 
therefore, the appeal of the myths of Anti-Spain and the Masonic-democratic- 
Marxist conspiracy was severely reduced and their ability to politically mobilise 
sectors of the middle and upper classes decreased. The lack of perception of a 
political crisis and the economic boom of the 1920s would partially explain the 
failure of the myth of Anti-Spain had to gather together larger sectors of the 
population around the UP, as opposed to the power of mobilisation the same myth 
would eventually have during the Second Republic and the Civil War.^^
The nation and the regionalist question
National-Catholicism gained momentum when confronted with Catalan and 
Basque nationalism. The peripheral challenge to the official concept of Spain turned
65 Manuel Garcia Pelayo, Los mitos politicos [Madrid: 1981], 18-23.
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Catalonian and Basque nationalists into the paradigmatic representation of the 
‘internal enemy’ and the ideologues of the regime raised the question of the unity of 
Spain as a core principle in their political discourse. Their centralist, Unitarian and 
repressive position towards regionalism and peripheral nationalism has to be 
understood within the context of a dialectical relationship established between 
Spanish nationalism, on the one hand, and peripheral nationalisms on the other. In 
addition, the ideologues’ postulates can be seen as an ad hoc attempt to elaborate an 
ideological cover for the repressive policies against peripheral nationalists and 
regionalists that the dictatorship had been implemented since September 1923.
The primorriverista intelligentsia (a term that I use in a descriptive sense 
rather than as a qualitative evaluation) defended the unity of Spain on geographical, 
linguistic, legal, religious and historical terms and steadily attacked the arguments of 
peripheral nationalists.^^ This defence of the unity of Spain was obviously not a 
mere intellectual quarrel on the nature of the nation but aimed to discredit peripheral 
nationalism as an artificial political creation.^* Primo de Rivera ideologues 
repeatedly argued that the emergence of peripheral nationalism was nothing but 
another manifestation of the “disease” the Restoration system had brought to 
Spain.^^ This view, that may be already found in Maeztu during the first months of 
the dictatorship, maintained that liberties were used to destroy “national 
consciousness” and accused the liberal system of paving the way for the 
''balkanization’" of Spain.^® If regional claims had survived the Restoration it was 
only because they “were fuelled with [liberal] political goals” to undermine the 
dictatorship.^^
The same Manichean, Good-Evil rationale of the ‘enemy within’ can be 
detected here. In linking peripheral nationalism to the liberal system, the UP 
essayists blurred the distinctions between regionalism, nationalism and separatism 
and showed them as a unified whole of opposition to the fatherland.
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Notwithstanding their acknowledgement of a “good regionalism” in the past, always 
depicted in cultural and pseudo-folkloric terms, they considered the “poison” of 
politics had turned it into a “nationalist heresy” and, therefore, had to be 
suppressed/^
More importantly. Primo’s theorists intentionally portrayed the rise of 
nationalist claims as related to the problems of ‘social disorder’ during the years 
preceding the dictatorship. Their discourse presented peripheral nationalist demands 
and the actions of anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, republicans and communists 
against the establishment as the two sides of a single problem that had threatened the 
unity of the nation.^^ Maeztu put it in very plain terms. Peripheral nationalism and 
class struggle were a “cancer” in Spain, both originating in the nineteenth century 
through liberalism and tolerated by the Restoration.^"  ^ Furthermore, he accused the 
USSR of plotting against Spain and financing all Catalan separatists, anarcho- 
syndicalists and the Moroccan rebels of the Rif, via the French Communist Party.^^ 
This approach deliberately overlooked the significant ideological, political and 
social differences between peripheral nationalisms, which were principally 
conservative movements in the 1920s, and the Left in, order to present them all 
together as enemies of the fatherland. Thus, regional political claims were equated 
with social disorder and the defence of Spain became also the defence of the social 
order.
Repression from the state and a centralist organisation of the country were 
the two main measures proposed by the ideologues to combat the “separatist 
problem”. As Primo himself had proclaimed the state had “the duty to confront 
anyone harming the unity of the fatherland” and no middle ways would be used to 
ensure the “oneness of the nation.”^^  As the ideologues of the regime acknowledged, 
the regime had to base its policies on a “forthright and prompt repression of all 
separatism and disrespect for the common Fatherland.”^^  This repressive measure 
had to be complemented with “the development of an intensive provincial policy”.
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as opposed to a regional one/^ The official discourse, in this case, combined the 
attack against the political opponent with the justification of governmental policies a 
posteriori.
The regime’s repressive reaction was the quintessential one of a dominant 
nation-state when facing the emergence of a different nationalism within its 
boundaries. In these cases nationalist agitators of a non-independent country are 
accused of inventing artificial problems. At the same time, that particular region is 
punished with mistrust and sanctions, which ultimately consolidate those alleged 
artificial problems and reinforce the phenomenon which its mere existence was 
denied. In fact, this was exactly the case in Catalonia and to a lesser extent the 
Basque provinces, where primorriverista repression led to the reinforcement of 
nationalist tendencies and the emergence of a popular nationalist Left in Catalonia. 
Moreover, the repression aligned Spanish Republicans, Socialists and Catalan 
nationalists in their fight for a democratic republic.*® The association between the 
Left and peripheral nationalism that the primorriverista ideologues denounced was 
in fact the outcome of the dictatorial policies.
Finally, it is essential to stress that by the end of the 1920s the UP posture 
regarding regionalism constituted an abrupt ideological breach with the views of 
Carlist and Catholic Integrists. Not surprisingly, at the beginning of the dictatorship 
Vazquez de Mella had complained about the centralism of Primo and advocated the 
political rights of the regions, while in April 1925, Don Jaime, the Carlist pretender, 
had denounced the dictatorship’s attacks to regionalism as “unjustifiable” and 
“violent” and proclaimed himself the champion of regional freedoms.*^ During the 
Civil Directory, new problems arose between the Traditionalists and the 
government, again on the regionalist issue. In January 1928, Victor Pradera, one of 
the leaders and the main ideologue of the Traditionalists after the death of Vazquez 
de Mella, accused Prime’s centralist policies of having a negative effect. In a debate 
at the National Assembly, Pradera told the dictator his repressive approach to the 
regional question was in fact fostering peripheral nationalism and advocated the 
political representation of the regions. Primo’s reply was categorical. First he firmly 
denied the accusations. Then he blamed the “weak governments” of the past for the
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emergence of Catalonian nationalism, and confirmed state repression as the main 
policy to suppress peripheral nationalism. Finally, he forbade any further discussion 
of the regionalist question in the National Assembly in the future and announced 
that “the Government, responsible for the Nation’s Power, feeling itself assisted by 
the unanimity of the national thought, will ban all discussion on regionalism in the 
press, books, and cultural centres.”*^
The quarrel exemplifies the huge discrepancy between the traditionalist and 
the National Catholic concept of Spain. The case of Pemân is telling. A political 
theorist, who frequently pegged his ideas on to Vazquez de Mella, acknowledged 
that traditionalist postulates concerning the autonomy of the regions should not be 
applied by the dictatorship. On the contrary, the state had to “place in front of any 
theoretical [political] program the supreme realism of removing any danger for the 
unity of Spain” and suppress all regional movements. For this task he demanded 
from the state “an absolute inflexibility [in] its supreme duty to police, protect and 
harmonise” the nation.
The regeneration of the nation
The idea of regeneration acted in the discourse of the regime’s ideologues as 
the positive pole of the Anti-Spain. An ideal-typical common denominator which lay 
at the core of Fascist ideology,*"  ^the rebirth of the nation was the main tenet in the 
regime’s propaganda. Incorporating the ideas of Costa, Ganivet, Picavea and Ortega 
to their discourse the primorriveristas presented the regenerationists as the 
intellectual forerunners of the UP. Pegging their ideas on to these prestigious 
intellectuals, they scorned democracy, justified the closure of Parliament, and 
defended the regeneration of the nation via dictatorship as the only possible 
alternative.*^ This representation of regenerationist ideas was a biased, selective and 
simplistic one. It intentionally overlooked a general advocacy for a genuine 
democracy in the regenerationists’ writings and twisted all their postulates on 
national regeneration towards anti-liberal and authoritarian solutions. For example.
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while Ganivet had disapproved dictatorship as the means to carry out the 
regeneration of Spain, the UP theorists argued the abulia of Spaniards’ psychology 
and the “mental damage” done by the liberal politics could be only entirely removed 
by a government of coercion, force, and order, that is, by a dictatorship
The regeneration of the nation Primo’s ideologues proclaimed, although 
based on those alleged traditional essences of Spain, did not mean a mere return to 
the golden eras.*  ^The dictatorship, the primorriveristas claimed, “not only came to 
solve and clear up the mischief of the past, but to build and elaborate a new Spain in 
every aspect.”*^  The regeneration of the nation would reach total proportions and the 
regime changes would extend the whole society. From the regime’s mouthpiece, 
they advocated total regeneration of Spanish society. A regeneration that had “to 
reach every single sector of the national life; the political one and all of them, simply 
because all those sectors were corrupted by the destructive evil prior 1923.”*^  The 
regeneration of the nation in National Catholicism was therefore based on an 
idealisation of the past but did not seek to tum the clock back and aimed to grasp the 
whole society. In this sense, the UP theorists certainly differentiated themselves 
from Traditionalism and related their views to the totalitarian dreams of Fascism.
Aware of the need to propose new national goals to Spanish society as a way 
to strengthen patriotic sentiments the primorriverista intelligentsia proposed various 
routes. As far as the concept of national regeneration is concerned, it is possible to 
differentiate three main themes on which the official discourse framed the idea of a 
new Spain: Hispanismo, Spanish Morocco and the religious revival. None of them 
were in fact brand new as topics of Spanish nationalism, but certainly all of them 
were to acquire a renovated strength during the dictatorship. More importantly, all of 
them were conceived as a means to nationalise society on the principles of National- 
Catholicism. Pemân did not hide his intentions when declared that the governmental 
aim of these “collective enterprises” was to “give a sense of unity to the nation” and 
to strength “the affirmation of our [Spanish] personality -  one and powerful - in the
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international arena.” Moreover, these “national aspirations” were being promoted to 
“shock the totality of society and beget the necessary social consciousness.” *^
It is within this context of a confident nationalisation of the masses that one 
has to understand the Pan-Hispanic discourse and policies of Prime’s regime. At the 
doctrinal level, the contribution of the UP ideologues to Hispanismo was 
remarkable. Consistent with their providential concept of Spain and their idealised 
view of the American conquest, the strongmen of the regime attacked the Black 
Legend and praised the spiritual expansion of Spain in Am erica.Underlining the 
common religion, language, and imperial consciousness that had created the 
‘Spanish race’, Peman asserted that the great ideal of Spain was to “radiate its 
spiritual presence in America.”^^  He rejected material expansionism and political 
imperialism as childish diseases that nations like England, France and Germany 
were still suffering from. According to Peman, Spain as the first imperial nation in 
history had overcome those archaic malaises and was in a position to enlighten and 
direct its former colonies in a spiritual manner. The practical side of that Spanish 
spiritual expansion was the creation of a society of Hispano-American nations with a 
unified law in order to stop the “aggressive advance” of the Anglo-Saxon powers. 
Moreover, the society would emphasise the primacy of the Catholic element as the 
unifying factor among nations and Spain was to have the leading role.^ "* Thus, Spain 
regained its imperial mission and indirectly fought North American and British 
interventionism in Spanish America.
Peman also understood the domestic utility of the Hispanic-American ideal. 
He portrayed Mussolini’s territorial demands towards France, Austria and Greece as 
an attempt to buttress Italian nationalism within Italy. Spain needed to followed the 
fascist example and promote “a policy of national affirmation, of Spanish cohesion 
and unity”, in order to create an “imperial consciousness”.^  ^ Hispanismo, Peman 
claimed, had to be at the core of this new imperial consciousness and work to 
inculcate Spaniards nationalist goals. It also represented the antithesis of peripheral
Pemân, El Hecho, 255.
^  Pemartin, “Politica Hispano-Americana”, in Eduardo Pérez et al., Cursos de ciudadania [Madrid: 
1929], 38-91; Zoj valores,52S-529, 565-568.
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nationalism and regionalism. The “rebirth of the imperial consciousness”, Pemân 
insisted, “is in itself the very negation of all movements of [national] dissociation.”^^  
The second of the “great collective enterprises” the ideologues proposed to 
the Spanish people was the colonial adventure in Africa. Like Pan-Hispanism, it had 
a clear neo-imperial connotation - even if the official message insisted the Spanish 
protectorate in Morocco was a “civilising mission”. In many respects, the UP 
luminaries simply followed the line the dictator and Martinez Anido had established 
during the Military Directory: Spain was fighting against barbarism and Bolshevism 
in the name of western civilisation.^^ The same Manichean rationale we have seen in 
the ideologues’ attack against peripheral nationalism can be appreciated here. It also 
had a domestic political objective, for it sought to endow Spanish identity with a 
strong counterrevolutionary flavour that would cement unity among Spaniards on 
religious bases. Maeztu, for instance, confessed his dream as Spaniard would be to 
see his “Fatherland becoming the vanguard of the Counterrevolution, as it was of the 
Counterreformation in the sixteenth century.” *^
Like the Military Directory, the Civil Directory used the colonial war not 
only to portray Primo as a military genius but also as modem Messiah. Comparisons 
of Primo to the Catholic Kings, Napoleon and Mussolini continued to be the norm in 
the regime’s propaganda machine years after the landing of Alhucemas.^^ According 
to the primorriveristas, military success in Africa proved the providential character 
of the nation’s leader {caudillo), while at the same time showed Primo as a man of 
action able to understand Spanish people’s p s y c h o l o g y . Y e t  for all the 
primorriverista effort to politically maximise victory in Africa, the imperial myth 
had its limits as a propaganda asset, simply because war in Morocco had been highly 
unpopular since 1909. The fact that in 1927 the regime decided to call the 
commemoration of the end of the African campaign, the Fiesta de la Paz (thus
Pemân, ibid., 255 and La Nacion, 13-10-1928 and 23-10-1928. The dictatorship truly attempt to go 
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celebrating peace rather than conquest) is significant of the dictatorship’s 
understanding of the popular mood regarding the Moroccan war.'°^
There is little doubt that the ideologues of Primo regarded religion in their 
nationalist political discourse as the main spiritual means of bringing Spaniards 
together and it was used as an active tool to encourage patriotic feelings. As shown 
in Chapter 1, religion had proved quite useful as a factor of political mobilisation in 
Spain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in what was known as 
the ‘Catholic revival’. By the mid-1920, the regime was eager to gain mass support 
stirring the population in the name of Catholicism. Pemartin wanted Catholicism to 
act as an “idealist force of social action.” As for domestic political use, once 
again, this evocation of religion was not mere nostalgia of the past, but rather paved 
the way for the future. When explaining the term “religion” in the slogan of the UP, 
Peman asserted:
“[T]he religious affirmation in the UP’s motto is not a lyrical invocation of 
the past [...] It is the proclamation of a Spanish conviction, which has in itself the 
commitment to give a Catholic meaning to all the orientations of our policies.” '^ ^
What the UP essayist found useful in Catholicism as a political creed was its 
association with authority, hierarchy and order, together with its strength as a 
spiritual unifying factor. These were exactly the same virtues French integral 
nationalism highlighted from Catholicism. In both the French and the Spanish cases 
it is possible to observe a political and ideological instrumentation of the Catholic 
religion. This utilisation of Catholicism is what Michel Winock has named 
“Catholicity”. Here, the important ideological matter was not the content of a faith, 
but religion interpreted as a framework of order. It was not gratuitous that Primo’s 
ideologues emphasised the role of religious indoctrination as a way to nationalise the 
masses in authoritarian values. Peman insisted on a strong mandatory Catholic 
education (from elementary school to university) as the way for the masses to gain a 
powerful sense of national unity and social order. Maeztu also realised the
For the commemoration o f the Fiesta de la Paz see Chapter 6.
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importance of religion as a political device. He advocated inculcation of a religious 
and, above all, nationalist feeling in the masses so they would not follow the Russian 
example. To accomplish this, he reckoned, what was needed was not just a strong 
dogmatic system but also mighty state institutions. Patriotism was a powerful 
sentiment “to stir the human being” and had to be encouraged. But patriotism would 
not last unless it was “tied to a system of ideas by individuals and to an order of 
institutions and laws by society.” ®^^ The primorriverista intelligentsia regarded the 
importance of both the elaboration of a nationalist doctrine and the state agencies as 
two complementary elements for promotion of nationalist feelings.
It should be noticed here that the primorriveristas reserved the main and 
supreme role of propagating national identity to the state and not to the Catholic 
Church. Following the ideological premises established by the Military Directory, 
the UP ideologues claimed the Church should assist to promote patriotic feelings but 
always in a position of subordination vis-à-vis the sate. The Catholic Church would 
not constitute an independent power as Traditionalists demanded. Catholicism may 
be regarded by the regime’s luminaries as ‘co-substantiaT to the nation, but the 
Church was certainly not to be on a par to the state. And it was precisely in the 
process of new authoritarian state-building initiated by the Civil Directory that the 
cracks in the alliance between the dictatorship and the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
appeared and the rupture of the regime with the Social-Catholics consummated.
THE CREATION OF THE NEW STATE AND THE UNION PATRIOTICA 
The National Assembly and the Constitutional Project
Following the views of Maurice Barrés, the idea of an “internal constitution” 
of the nation, in which historic, religious and institutional values acquired a 
normative dimension, was taken as the doctrinal starting point in the building of a 
new authoritarian political r e g i m e . T h e  invocation of Catholicism and Monarchy 
as “the two maximum Spanish realities” and the organic concept of the nation 
clearly implied a hierarchical and anti-egalitarian notion of society, in which 
individuals were subordinated to the “will of the nation”. Hence, the opposition to 
liberal individualism and the defence of a hierarchical society were to characterise
^''^LaNacion, 12-7-1927.
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the discourse of the ideologues of the regime concerning both the formation and 
functioning of the Asamblea Nacional Consultiva (National Assembly) and the 
construction of the corporative state.
The first step towards the elaboration of an anti-liberal political model was 
the creation of the National Assembly, a government-controlled chamber which 
substituted the constitutional Cortes. The idea of a new unicameral assembly had 
been advanced by the dictator as early as November 1925.^^* The project, however, 
encountered some problems and the wave of criticism it received from different 
political sectors, including the Catholic Right and the king, postponed its 
implementation. Finally, Primo decided to go ahead and in September 1927 a Royal 
Decree convoked the Asamblea Nacional.
In early 1927, Pemartin launched a campaign from the pages of La Nacion to 
support the creation of the National Assembly, which, he deemed, should be based 
on corporative representation and would mean “the final and definite dissolution of 
political parties.” ' I n  his view, what Maura had failed to see was that “classical 
Parliamentarism [...] was the main, the only, obstacle for that revolution from above 
that has to be made completely in Spain.” Now the Assembly had to integrate all 
social classes, via “corporative and class suffrage,” and reach “efficient solutions” 
for the problems of the nation, especially in social and economic matters. Diverse 
social groups would be represented in “Aggregations in Corporations”, as opposed 
to political parties, and they would harmonise the national interest in the chamber. 
This idea of harmonic social integration did not envisage a return to the happy 
medieval Arcadia imagined by the Carlists, but rather to create “a future social and 
political world clearly differentiated from the past.”" '  However, the problem in 
Pemartin’s proposal lay in its inability to specify how that new “corporative and 
class suffrage” was to be organised, not least how those “Aggregations in 
Corporations” would assemble.
What Pemartin rightly foresaw was the elitist character of the chamber and 
its total subordination to the government. The essential aspect in the “radical 
reform” proposed by the Andalusian philosopher was to strengthen the
Pemartm in La Nacion, 31-1-1927.
La Nacion 17-11-1925; 18-11-1925.
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“independence of the executive power and governmental stability.” This was 
certainly the case. When the dictator formed the Assembly most of its members 
were chosen representing the state administration or the UP (including Pemartin, 
Peman and Maeztu), and the government always kept a complete control over its 
own congress. Notwithstanding the participation of Social Catholics and some 
conservative dynastic politicians of the Restoration regime in the National 
Assembly, the new chamber utterly alienated liberals, who complained that its 
corporative nature was a direct attack to the most elemental democratic principles. 
The radical political implications of the creation of the National Assembly was 
clearly perceived by El Sol. In early October, the liberal daily highlighted the fact 
that not even in Italy had parliament and universal suffrage been abolished. Spain 
was the only European country where parliamentary institutions had been 
replaced. The socialists also refused to join the primorriverista charade and 
Francisco Largo Caballero, Fernando de los Rios and Dolores Cebrian (Juliân 
Besteiro’s 'wife) rejected the invitation to become assembly members. Rather than 
integrating the different strands of support for the dictatorship the creation of the 
Asamblea Nacional exacerbated the difference between political groups.
The formation of the National Assembly meant the introduction of the 
corporative conception in a public institution for the very first time in Spanish 
history. This conception of the assembly was conditioned by the influence of both 
Traditionalist corporativism and Italian Fascism and it constituted the first effective 
step towards a new authoritarian state. The following step was the drafting of a 
new constitution, in which Peman and Maeztu took part as members of the First 
Section of the National Assembly. The section was a body constituted by the 
dictator to prepare a draft bill for a new constitution and was formed by important 
figures of different right wing groups, such the Traditionalist Pradera, the Maurists 
Goicoechea and Gabriel Maura, the conservative Juan de la Cierva and a majority of 
UP members (Yanguas, Garcia Oviedo, Peman and Maeztu).
When the conservative members of the section demanded a return to the 
1876 Constitution, only adding some amendments, the primorriveristas opposed
Gomez-Navarro, El régimen, 269.
El Sol, 11-10-1927.
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them and defended a radical rupture with the Restoration s y s t e m . M a e z t u  
proposed the substitution of universal ballot for a corporative suffrage and the 
restriction of the “right of citizenship” to those who supported the government. 
Peman publicly insisted on the need to reject the 1876 Constitution and create “a 
new modem and effective organisation” of the state, which should encourage the 
executive power and concentrate on the economic issues of the nation. It was time 
“to go from the individualist state to the social state.”^^  ^The UP essayists supported 
in the First Section the creation of a new authoritarian political regime, but their 
actual legal and political proposal was still little systematised.^^^ When the final 
draft was finally completed in July 1929, the dictator’s reticence over adopting the 
text and the eventual fall of the regime made the work of the First Section useless 
and the plans to implement the new constitution were abandoned. Nonetheless, in 
the 1930s the members of Accion Espahola regarded the text as the “germ” of their 
new “doctrinal movement.”*'^
The Corporative State
The creation of a corporative system to regulate national production and 
eliminate class struggle was doubtless one of the main contributions of the 
dictatorship to the formation of a new state. The corporative reform was 
masterminded by the Minister of Labour, Eduardo Aunos, who framed the system 
combining doctrines of late nineteenth century Social Catholicism, Sorel’s 
syndicalism, and Fascism. Aunos, wanted the new system to be the backbone of a 
modem technocratic corporative state, a third way beyond socialism and 
l iberal ism.Fascinated with the Italian example after his trip to Rome in 1926 
where he met the fascist leader Giuseppe Bottai, the Spanish Minister of Labour 
created a state-controlled corporative organisation. It covered all economic sectors, 
divided in 27 corporations and controlled by 27 corporative councils {consejos de
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corporaciôn) and formed arbitration committees {comités paritarios) to resolve 
disputes between employers and workers. Moreover, the corporations were 
conceived no only to solve labour conflicts but also to inculcate both “workers and 
employers a great patriotic feeling”, t h a t  is, to indoctrinated the population in 
nationalist values. It was, after all, a system embedded in organicist theories of 
German nationalism, closer to the models of the radical Right than to Social- 
Catholicism.*^^
Such a fascist leaning in the structure of the state proved highly 
controversial. The system was soon severely criticised by many industrialists, 
landowners and Social Catholics, who considered it led to a huge state 
interventionism and resented the involvement of the socialists in the corporative 
m o d e l . I t  was precisely at this point that the new corporative system became a 
challenge to ecclesiastic interests, since the non-incorporation of Catholic unions 
into the comités paritarios seriously hampered the Church’s attempts to expand its 
social influence and to defeat the forces of secularisation. The Catholic daily, El 
Debate, criticized Aunos’ system as centralist and denounced the state manipulation 
of the consejos and c o m i t é s Social-Catholics especially lamented the formation 
of comités in the countryside (for they thought it would pave the way for a socialist 
takeover) and paralysed the implementation of the primorriverista agrarian 
legislation.
The ideologues of the UP presented the system as the only way to modernise 
the country using transformation and constructive discursive strategies designed to 
emphasise the need for change. They developed further Primo’s technocratic 
discourse and encouraged state intervention, via corporativism, protectionism and 
investment in public works. They deliberately gave a pseudo-scientific and technical 
flavour to this discourse and asserted that governmental intervention “aimed to 
transform Spain into a country of full and scientific economic performance, via the 
systematic exploitation of all its resources.”^^  ^The goal of state intervention was to
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perform “a great social task”, so the regime could surpass socialism “with its own 
arms: socialising, Christian and rationally, improving the current reality, instead of 
destroying it.” ^^ * In addition, “a state-oriented intervention in the national economic 
process” was needed “to overcome the crude rough laissez-faire and the liberal 
utopia.”^^  ^ In other words, the regime proposed social reforms administered by the 
state intending to pacify class struggle by creating national solidarity i n s t e a d . L i k e  
the fascist theorists in Italy, Aunos proposal defended a ‘third way’, which went 
beyond liberal and socialist models while safeguarded capitalists’ interests by state 
protectionism.
In short, the primorriveristas espoused a new concept of state, which clearly 
differed from previous conservative models. This new National-Catholic model was 
vaguely defined from a doctrinal viewpoint. Nevertheless, the attempt to go beyond 
liberal institutions via a corporative chamber, the reinforcement of the executive 
power, the subordination of the legislative to the government’s vdll, and the 
limitation of citizens’ rights were elements which showed that the dictatorship was 
firmly taking an authoritarian direction. In fact, all these factors can be observed in 
the process of fascistization (fascstizzacione, as it was labelled in Italy) started by 
Mussolini in 1924, in which liberal institutions were bypassed via enforcement of 
the executive power and which culminated with the demotion of parliament to that 
of a decorative institution after the 1928 electoral reform.
Aunos system was design to co-opt the moderate sectors of the labour 
movement into a system that attempted to indoctrinate workers in patriotic values. 
Yet the political price paid by the dictatorship was enormous. The corporative 
system alienated the Social Catholics, the regime’s main base of social support, and 
employers, who thought the arbitration committees would benefit workers. This 
meant that large sectors of the upper and middle classes, which had supported the 
regime precisely on the basis of crushing the working class, felt betrayed when the 
corporative system was created. On top of this, when Calvo Sotelo announced his 
tax reform. Primo made public his intention to implement a land reform and Spain 
was hit by the ‘peseta crisis’, landowners and industrialist began to reconsider their
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support for a dictator whom they had backed to defend their interests and who they 
now deemed was turning against them/^^
The UP and the mobilisation of the masses
Inspired by the Italian example, the regime sought popular support and 
created the UP in April 1924. As Pemân pointed out years later, the goal was at 
these first stages “to equip the dictatorship with a civilian base” to support the 
government and express public accep t an ce . Pu t  it in another way, the UP was 
created to give the dictatorship an instrument of ideological hegemony.Despi te  its 
early formation. Primo did not give the party a complete national structure before 
1926 and its political programme was not fully defined until July 1928 - when the 
dictator outlined the doctrine and the way the UP had to perform in public.
The ideologues of the regime helped to define the doctrine of the party in the 
official press and lectures.^^^ From the pages of La Nacion, Pemân, in a long series 
of articles entitled “Comments on the UP Decalogue” presented the party as the 
ideal tool to indoctrinate the masses in the principles of fatherland, religion and 
monarchy, so a “real spirit of citizenship” could be embedded in the whole 
population. The UP was to be the single party of the nation, since in the future 
there would be only room for two political parties: the national one, defender of the 
patria, social order, and Christian civilisation, and the communist one. This vision of 
the UP was shared by Maeztu and Pemartin, who, like Mussolini, repeatedly insisted 
the party was “neither right nor left” but “national.” Moreover, the 
primorriveristas reserved for the party the role of penetrating all areas of society so 
the UP could link the elite to the needs of the masses, and ultimately indoctrinate the 
people. This view was identical to those of Alfredo Rocco, the mastermind of the
Calvo’s proposal aimed at increasing upper classes’ taxation and hunting down tax evasion. Calvo, 
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totalitarian Italian state, who advocated infiltrating the people from the party, in 
order to spiritually guiding the masses.
The mobilisation of the masses to support the regime became paramount in 
this scheme. Pemân thought that the UP should neutralise the “negative” and 
“destructive” aspects of mass politics and proposed canalising the political impulses 
of the masses into “constructive action”, which essentially meant popular 
participation in the regime’s patriotic celebrations and gatherings for praising the 
Spanish caudillo}^^ Pemartin also realised the need of mobilising the masses. To 
complete the work of the dictatorship, he wrote, “the support of the masses is 
needed. Canovas created for himself an artificial support via false and conventional 
suffrage [...] Let us look at its sad consequences and take as many measures as 
needed to form a real support to awake and co-ordinate a great Spanish citizens’ 
mass.”*"^  ^Following the dictator’s concept of citizenship. Primo’s house intellectuals 
stated the UP had to be “the civic militia” which would spread the official ideology 
and guarantee “the definitive irreversibility” of the “formidable transformation” 
brought about by the regime.
Another feature the UP ideologues shared with the Italian fascists was the 
perception of the party and the militia as a tool for combating the Left with 
v io l ence . Maez t u  saw the UP and the Somatén as the avant-garde in the defence of 
the state and Christian civilisation against the Left. Always ready to justify violence 
against his political enemies, Maeztu declared in a conference in Bilbao in late 1927, 
that he was prepared “to shed his blood with the UP and the Somatén in the struggle 
against communism.” "^^  ^ When in 1929, after the insurrections of Valencia and 
Ciudad Real, the government failed to mobilise support from the party’s affiliates, 
Maeztu saw changes were needed in the UP. In a letter to Pemân dated December 
1929, he forecast that the UP would be necessary “to establish some sort of 
fascism.” "^^  ^In the light of the events, the task was to build a strong UP similar to the 
Soviet Communist party and the Fascist one, since in these countries the party was 
the base of stability of their regimes. To strengthen the basis of the UP, Maeztu
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opined, some sort of political and institutional privileges for the militants were 
needed, so the members’ lives would be dependent on the maintenance of the 
regime, as in Italy and the USSR. Maeztu proposal clearly moved towards a 
totalitarian party fused with the state. It was too late. By December 1929, the 
dictatorship was in a terminal crisis and the UP rank and file was leaving the sinking 
ship.
NATIONAL CATHOLICISM, FASCISM AND THE PRIMORRIVERISTA
HERITAGE
In order to understand the impact of counterrevolutionary European trends in 
the UP doctrine, one has to analyse first of all the reception of the Italian regime by 
Primo’s ideologues. A political science comparison may tell us that the 
primorriverista regime was more similar to Pilsudski’s dictatorship in Poland than 
to Mussolini’s in Italy. The seize of power by the military and the creation of an 
official party as a mechanism of social control are common elements in the 1920s 
Greek, Polish and Spanish dictatorships.*"^  ^ But from a historian’s perspective, the 
truth of the matter is that in terms of ideology and political goals the UP luminaries 
looked to Rome for inspiration, not Warsaw. Prime’s propaganda machinery 
steadily presented the Spanish and the Italian dictatorships as equivalent historical 
movements. It claimed both regimes had defeated Bolshevism and regenerated their 
nations in a similar authoritarian manner. It also forecast that the UP would follow 
the Italian example in the mobilisation of the masses.*"** The UP theorists 
contributed to the promotion of this parallelism and stressed in their books and the 
official press the ideological similarities between the two dictatorships.*"*  ^However, 
such an apologetic view of fascism did not mean a mimetic assimilation of Italian 
doctrine but rather a selective incorporation of some principles and ideas. Thus the 
conception of the UP as anti-party, the Fiihrerprinzip, the corporative system, the 
state intervention to overcome class-struggle, and the need to mobilise the masses, 
were ideas similar to (when not directly taken from) fascist postulates; whilst some
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other aspects, such as the non-confessional character of the fascist state or the 
clashes between the Italian government and the Vatican, led the UP essayists to 
censure Mussolini’s standpoints.
The UP essayists’ occasional criticism of the Italian dictatorship has been 
considered as evidence of the ideological differences between National Catholicism 
and Fascism. Peman’s negative characterization of the fascist state as “agnostic” and 
Pemartin’s disapproval of the “divergences” between the Italian government and the 
Church are usually portrayed as examples of this ideological d i screpancy.This  
view, however, overlooks the steady defence Primo’s ideologues made of Fascism 
as a modem political doctrine and fails to recognise that the aim of the Spanish 
thinkers was to present Fascism as compatible with Catholic political doctrines. It 
was not by chance that, when in November 1928 the Catholic daily El Debate 
launched a campaign criticising the increasing power achieved by the state in Italy 
and the Fascists’ quarrel with the Vatican, Pemartm responded vimlently from the 
pages of La Nacion defending Mussolini’s r e g i m e . H e  argued Mussolini’s 
postulates were attuned with the Vatican doctrine (especially the Leo XIII anti­
liberal theses) and suggested the ‘Roman Question’ would be solved simply by 
locating “fervent Catholics in the fascist high ranks.” It was a matter of people 
not of doctrine.
This attempt to incorporate fascist postulates into a hard core of authoritarian 
conservatism was by no means exceptional in the European Right. As Martin 
Blinkhom has observed, rightist regimes all around the continent began in the 1920s 
to borrow selectively from the Italian example -  a tendency only to be increased in 
the 1930s with the Nazis in power. This process of ideological fascistization and 
the political alliances among Fascists and conservatives in many European countries 
have made the task of differentiating between Fascism, the radical Right and other
For a critique o f the Fascist “agnostic state” see Pemân ibid., 174-175.
Gonzâlez Cuevas, Accion Espanola, 100; idem, Historia de las derechas, 281. Especially striking is 
the case o f Genoveva Garcia Queipo de Llano who quotes Pemartin regrets about the “discrepancies” 
between Mussolini and the Vatican, but overlooks the fact that in the following paragraph o f that very 
same article Pemartin states that these discrepancies are not really important and that Fascism is 
perfectly compatible with Roman Catholic postulates. See Garcia Queipo de Llano, “Los ideôlogos”, 
227-230. Pemartin's article, “Dime con quien andas...”, La Nacion, 6-12-1928.
For the Social Catholics’ criticism see the editorials o f El Debate, 2-11-1928; 13-11-1928; 20-11- 
1928; 27-11-1928.
La Nacion, 6-12-1928; 28-12-1928; 28-1-1929.
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forms of conservatism all the more difficult for historians. Nevertheless, for 
analytical purposes it is possible to differentiate at least two strands of a new right- 
wing thought in the inter-war period: a radical Right, as represented in the main by 
Fascism, and a conservative Right, which included constitutional conservatism but 
also various currents of conservative authoritarianism.'^^
Among the different groups of the radical Right there were of course 
ideological differences. Fascism represented, at least on paper, a form of 
revolutionary ultra-nationalism for national rebirth that was based on a vitalist 
philosophy. Fascists considered their respective nations as being in a state of 
decadence due to the effect of liberal and democratic institutions and sought to 
create an authoritarian system led by a new ruling elite that would bind society 
together within a new social o rder .Mussol in i ’s party and regime were of course 
the touchstone of Fascism in the 1920s. Other groups in the radical Right which 
emerged as a reaction to the socio-political changes of the first quarter of the 
twentieth century were also extremely nationalist and opposed liberalism and 
democracy but their political views relied more on traditional religion than Italian 
fascism. Action Française, for example, was virulently anti-Marxist, violent and 
defended a hierarchical social order; yet the ideas of mobilising the masses and 
transforming class-structures were not as discursively prominent as in the fascist 
case.'^^
On the other hand, authoritarian conservatism embraced those sectors of the 
traditional liberal conservative parties, which partly broke with the parliamentary 
forms of moderate conservatism. It proposed a partial transformation of the system 
but avoided radical breaks in legal continuity, let alone encouraged social revolution. 
Chamberlain in the UK, Sonnino in Italy, and Joao Franco in Portugal and the 
Maurist Youth in Spain are some examples of these authoritarian conservatives 
acting within conservative parties.
Martin Blinkhom, “Introductuion. Allies, rivals, or antagonist? Fascist and conservatives in modern 
Europe”, in M. Blinkhom (ed.), Fascist and Conservatives. The Radical Right and the Establishment in 
Twentieth-Century Europe [London: 1990], 2, 8.
Ibid., 1. For a different division stressing the differences between Fascism, radical Right and 
conservative authoritarian Right as the “three faces o f authoritarian nationalism” see Stanley Payne, 
Historia del Fascismo [Barcelona: 1995], 24-30.
Martin Blinkhom, Fascism and the Right in Europe [New York: 2000], 6.
Eugene Weber, L ’Action Française [Paris: 1985], 25-38.
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If we are to locate UP ideology within the European framework of the new 
Right of the 1920s, National Catholicism would represent a significantly 
fascisticised Spanish variant of the radical Right, which went beyond the postulates 
of both liberal conservatism and reactionary traditionalism and bid for an 
authoritarian and centralist state. True, National Catholicism incorporated ideas and 
policies from the Italian regime. Yet the discourse of Primo’s ideologues cannot be 
considered fascist sensu stricto. Their core postulates resembled much more those of 
L ’Action Française, both in their use of Catholicism as an ideological tool to 
promote a hierarchical social order and their limited will to change social structures.
It is in the conception of the nation and the political principles derived from 
it where we can find the key differences and similarities between National 
Catholicism and Fascism. As shown above, at the core of the UP discourse lay the 
organic concept of the nation in which Catholicism is identified as the essence of 
Spain. Based on a providential and vitalist interpretation of history, the nation is 
endowed with a sacred quality in its inception and Catholic religion defended as the 
Spanish Volkgeist. As in any other nationalism defined by ethnic factors following 
the German romantic tradition, including Italian Fascism, the nation is portrayed as a 
living organism to whom individuals and territories are completely subordinate. As 
opposed to the ‘civic’ model of nation defended by liberals, Spanish National 
Catholic identity is not linked to any sort of political rights or liberties, but rather by 
a spiritual character: religion.
This religious concept of the nation plays the key role in the process of 
“sacralization of politics”. Catholicism was considered to be the spiritual value to 
politically regenerate the nation and the crucial means to inculcate patriotic feelings 
among the masses. In this way, the political discourse and the nationalist ideas 
became ‘sacralized’ and National Catholicism can be considered as a political 
religion, like some other nationalisms which emerged in societies in which the 
Church wielded a great influence in the formation of mentalities.^^* National 
Catholicism indisputably coincided with Italian Fascism, and later Nazism, in the 
sense that they all constructed a religion of the fatherland, regarding the nation as the 
highest spiritual and political v a l ue . However ,  while in the Fascist example the 
concept of Fatherland originates from a secular concept of nation, and later
158 For the concept o f political religion see the introduction to this work.
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incorporates Catholic rhetoric and rituals, in the case of National Catholicism the 
very concept of nation was endowed with an essential Catholic connotation. As 
opposed to the Fascists, the primorriveristas directly incorporated religious ideas, 
myths, and rituals into their nationalist discourse with no previous ‘sacramental 
transference’.
Yet the trees of difference should not preclude us from seeing the forest of 
similarities. Mussolini and Primo’s regimes emerged from analogous socio-political 
crises in the aftermath of WWI.^^° This had an impact on the ideological similarities 
of both dictatorships. Nationalism and counterrevolution became the main tenets of 
both regimes because they were considered the most appropriate ways to overcome 
the leftist challenged. The idea of the nation as the supreme sacred value, the use of 
the state as a means to indoctrinate and control the whole society, the attempt, at 
least on paper, to overcome class struggle via national solidarity were all common 
elements in fascist and National Catholic ideology. Primo and Mussolini realised the 
profound transformations brought about by the Great War and considered new 
challenges required new measures, such as rebuilding the nation-state and 
incorporating the masses into the political system via anti-democratic mobilisation. 
As a result, both dictatorships produced a twin populist and Manichean discourse of 
national re-birth and fighting the anti-nation - a black and white picture that could 
simplistically explain a rapidly changing Europe.
The political discourse bound to this concept of the nation was violently 
authoritarian and it established a double ideological rupture with conservative and 
traditionalist doctrines in Spain. First, the ideologues of Primo de Rivera went 
beyond Maurist postulates by defending an absolute rejection of liberal political 
principles, including universal suffrage, the Constitution of 1876, the Parliament, 
and the political parties. Here, the influence of the new European radical Right 
became paramount. In this sense, it is difficult to accept the view that “the 
ideologues of the regime belonged to a not radically anti-parliamentary traditional 
Right” and their postulates were far from fascist ideology.
For Germany see Burleigh, The Third Reich, 3-8. For Italy see Gentile, The Sacralization, x.
Paul Preston, Las derechas espaholas en el s ig h  XX: autoritarisme, fascismo y  golpismo [Madrid: 
1986], 20.
Garcia Queipo de Llano, “Los ideôlogos”, 227-230. In the same vein, Manuel Garcia Canales, El 
problema constitucional en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera [Madrid: 1980], 116.
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Second, National-Catholic discourse clearly detached itself from 
Traditionalism in several main issues. Here, the assumption that Primo’s 
theoreticians were unable to go beyond the traditionalist political discourse seems 
highly questionable. The defence of a centralist state, the fascist influence in the 
formation of a single party and the conception of the corporative organisation in 
which the state is to play a dominant role are all examples of issues that 
differentiated the primorriveristas' position from both Social Catholics and 
Traditionalists, and indeed led to the political confrontation of the latter with the 
dictatorship. Moreover, the invocation of tradition and national glories in Primo’s 
political collaborators did not mean an attempt to return to an idealised past, as was 
the case with Carlists. Rather they wanted to build a new political regime in keeping 
with modem times while preserving what they deemed to be national essences.
The significance of National Catholicism as an ideology has also to be 
considered in the light of its own historical development and the highly influential 
role it was going to play during the Second Republic and Francoism. Soon after the 
fall of Primo in January 1930, ex-ministers and ideologues of the regime gathered 
together to form the Union Monarquica Nacional (UMN). In April 1930, Maeztu, the 
count of Guadalhorce, Calvo Sotelo, Peman, Pemartin, Vicente Gay, Delgado Barreto, 
and the son of the dictator, José Antonio, founded the new party in an attempt to 
replace the UP. The political discourse of the UMN did not vary substantially from 
the one of the UP, reproducing its apocalyptic vision of Spain if democracy was to 
succeed. During 1930 and early 1931, in an effort to gain popular support the main 
propagandists of the UMN campaigned around Spain, praising ‘sacred violence’ to 
retake power and accusing the liberal monarchist parties of being willing to return to 
the ‘decadent’ parliamentary s y s t e m . I n  turn, the dynastic right openly condemned 
the UMN’s ideological radicalism and ostracized the primorriveristas because of their 
belligerent model of a c t i o n . T h e  abmpt breach with the formulae of the dynastic 
right that began during the Civil Directory continued after the fall of Primo’s regime.
The coming of the Second Republic on 14 April 1931 did nothing but 
accelerate the ideological radicalism of the primorriverista intelligentsia. In
Gonzâlez Cuevas, Accion Espanola, 97-101.
Ben-Ami, “The Forerunners”, 60-63.
Ben-Ami, “The Crisis o f the Dynastic Élite in the Transition from Monarchy to Republic, 1929- 
1931” in Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (eds.). Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain. 
[Oxford; 1990], 79.
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December that year, the Alfonsine Monarchists, as they came to he known, published 
the first issue of Accion Espanola, a political journal created to develop a theory of 
counterrevolution able to endow civil-military insurrections against the Republic with 
a doctrinal base.^^  ^ During the following years those who gathered around Accion 
Espanola, and its political party, Renovacion Espanola, steadily propagated the 
beliefs that they had first anticipated during the dictatorship. True, opposition to a 
democratic state gave the primorriveristas^ discourse a more traditionalist flavour. 
And yet the main principles of Hispanismo, militarism, the myth of Anti-Spain, the 
incorporation of fascist ideas and the sacred concept of the nation remained at the core 
of National Catholicism.
The primorriverista influence on authoritarian thought in the 1930s went well 
beyond the members of Renovacion Espanola, since it also provided the doctrinal 
bases of what has been considered the “real” Spanish fascism of Falange and the 
JONS. The Spanish fascists, led by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, inherited the 
concept of Catholicism as ‘co-substantial’ with the nation, and the concomitant use of 
‘Catholicity’, to frame a discourse in which the unity of Spain, the imperial dreams, 
the condemnation of Enlightenment thought and the exaltation of Mussolini became 
paramount in the same manner the UP propagandists had done the previous decade. 
This ideological bond has to be understood in two ways. First, it is important to bear 
in mind that the characteristics of Fascism in every country partially derived from the 
specific national traditions in terms of conservative and patriotic rhetoric. In this 
case, the doctrine of Primo’s ideologues was the final contribution to the Spanish 
nationalist tradition and certainly paved the way for the Falange. Second, one should 
not forget, the political, economic, and even family links that the falangistas had with 
figures of Renovacion Espanola, which facilitated not only the funding of Falange
Gil Pecharromân, Conservadores, 102.
See, for instance, Ramiro de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad [Madrid: 1934]; José Pemartin, 
“Culturas y nacionalismo (III)”, Accion Espanola, 1-10-1934, 78-79; “Culturas y nacionalismo (IV)”, 
Accion Espanola, 1-10-1934, 277-297; Introducciôn a una filosofia de lo temporal Doce leciones 
sobre Espacio, Tiempoy  Causalidad [SeviWa, 1937, f ‘ ed, 1934-1935].
For these ideas o f the leaders o f the Spanish Fascists see Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, Obras 
Complétas, [Madrid: 1954], 49-51, 53-54, 64-69, 127, 286-287, 754, 757; Onésimo Redondo, Textos 
Politicos [Madrid: 1975], 156-172. The main exception to this Catholic concept o f the nation was 
Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, whose secular postulates were uncommon among the Spanish fascists. See, 
for example. La Conquista del Estado, n. 10, 16-5-1931.
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and the JONS but also the process of mutual ideological reception. Thus the advent 
of Spanish Fascism did not occur suddenly in the 1930s, but rather represented a 
process of ideological crystallization of primorriverista nationalism from the previous 
decade onwards.
The Civil War was the final step in the ideological development of the 
Alfonsist Monarchists. It was during these years when they openly advocated the 
merging of Nazism and Italian Fascism with traditionalist postulates to formulate a 
“Christian Totalitarianism”, as the bases of the “National Catholic” state - the Spanish 
variant of the regimes of Hitler and M u s s o l i n i . T h i s  ideological task had an 
extension at the political level. The figures of Accion Espanola actively intervened in 
the creation of the F.E.T. y  de las JO.N.S., the single political organisation that fused 
Falange, the Carlists, and the rest of the rightist groups under Franco’s leadership in 
April 1937.” ^
The former UP ideologues also took a leading role as propagandists of 
Franco’s Nationalists. Soon integrated in his provisional government, they defended 
the army as the redeemer of the nation and emphasised the struggle against Anti- 
Spain as before in religious and pathological terms to justify the uprising against the 
democratic Republic and the subsequent repression of Republicans. The same 
totalitarian rationale that the primorriveristas had employed ten years ago was then 
applied in the process of de-humanization of the “internal enemy”. Peman’s famous 
work. The Poem o f the Beast and the Angel (1938), in which supreme Good has to 
fight a “crusade” against utter Evil, was only one of the numerous writings exhorting 
this course of a c t i o n . I n  the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, the destruction
For the political relations between the Alfonsist Monarchists and Falange see Preston, “Alfonsist 
monarchism and the coming o f the Spanish Civil War”, in Martin Blinkhom (ed.), Spain in Conflict 
1931-1939. Democracy and Its Enemies [London: 1986], 171-173.
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José Pemartin, Qué es 'Lo nuevo’... Consideraciones sobre el momento espanol presente 
[Santander: 1938], 32, 52, 248-249; “ Espafta como pensamiento”, Accion Espanola [Burgos: 1937], 
399, 402-404. For Pemân see, for example, “La transiciôn y el estilo de Menéndez Pelayo”, 23-5-1937 
ABC, Seville; “Una politica de unidad”, ABC, Seville, 1-9-1937; José Antonio, pero todo José 
Antonio”, ABC, Seville, 20-11-1938; “La Falange Espahola Tradicionalista y de las JONS”, 
Orientacion Espanola, 1-8-1938 and 15-8-1938.
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For the invention o f an international Communist plot to justify the military coup o f July 1936 and its 
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myth o f the Anti-Spain by the rebels during the Civil War see Reig Tapia, “La justificaciôn ideolôgica 
del alzamiento de 1936”, 211-237.
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of the “internal enemy” was no longer a political metaphor, it became the actual 
physical extermination of political opponents.
Franco, who himself subscribed to Accion Espanola during the republican 
years, sought a kind of national regeneration, based on the Catholic idea of 
redemption and a bastardised version of regenerationism, which was nothing but a 
duplicate of that elaborated by Primo’s intelligentsia. The same “baroque” 
rhetoric of Patria, Purity, and Poetry was used ad nauseam to gain control of society 
after the war.^^^ Indeed, the entire Francoist corporative state was constructed on 
these ideological bases in which nationalist postulates, violence and economics were 
interrelated to frame a totalitarian Spain that, as in the cases of Italy and Germany, 
was able to protect existing traditions, adapting them to modem times.
In their attempt to give a doctrinal basis to Primo’s dictatorship the UP 
ideologues created a new National Catholic discourse according to what they 
considered to be the Zeitgeist, which effectively differentiated itself from 
Traditionalism and Maurism. Their ideology was at times superficial and lacked 
great originality, but by mixing various conservative traditions the regime’s 
luminaries certainly generated a new highly fascisticised nationalist discourse 
similar to the rest of the European radical Right. This discourse had at its core a 
sacred concept of the nation and a religious concept of politics with totalitarian 
aspirations analogous to the one represented by Fascism, but maintained 
Catholicism as the main unifying national factor. It also had an official rhetoric that 
emphasised the image of two irreconcilable Spains. There can be little doubt that 
during the second half of the 1920s the ideologues of the regime unequivocally 
anticipated the precepts of the 1930s Spanish extreme Right, and constituted the 
ideological and personnel basis of Francoism. Thus, we must radically reconsider 
the view that there was neither a nationalist ideology of the Spanish Right nor a 
process of political polarisation in Spain prior to the coming of the Second Republic 
in 1931.
For the idea o f national regeneration in Franco see Michael Richards, “Constructing the Nationalist 
State: Self Sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years”, in Nationalism and the Nation, 
149-157.
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CHAPTER 4. STATE NATIONALISATION OF THE 
MASSES: THE ARMY
“Sirs, have you ever considered that over the next ten years approximately one 
million Spaniards will complete military service? Let us dream....One million 
Spaniards!... Imagine that those men when they leave the barracks for the last time 
take away embedded in their brains the idea o f  the fatherland. [Because] the 
fatherland is a common good that has been willed to us and we must transmit it 
entirely to our successors. ”
(Emilio de Rueda)^
INTRODUCTION
The role of the army as an agency of nationalisation is often highlighted as 
essential to the process of nation-building. By its very nature, the army of the modem 
state has become an institution devoted to fostering the feeling of national unity 
among the masses. Daily life in the armed forces requires soldiers to expand local 
attachments and to consent to, if not accept, the ideology of the state. Nineteenth and 
early twentieth century systematic conscription provided European states vdth the 
possibility of teaching the language of the dominant culture and indoctrinating a vast 
part of the population in patriotic values. With its rituals, ceremonies and regimental 
schools, the army grew to be a ‘school of the fatherland’ in which all social classes 
were integrated and national allegiance was forged.
And yet historical analyses have proved that the army as a nationalising state- 
agency was not without its problems. At the turn of the twentieth century, the process 
of nationalisation of the masses within European armies was hampered by several 
factors. First, military service meant the temporary loss of cmcial manpower for many 
families and, therefore, a severe economic dismption. In addition, a system of 
monetary redemption and different exemptions allowed the upper classes to pay in 
order to get their sons dispensed from military service. Understandably, the lower 
classes showed little interest in soldering, and saw military service more as a burden 
for the poor than a universal duty to protect national interests. In France, for instance.
U 5
antimilitarism was prominent in rural areas and rates of draft evasion and desertion 
remained high throughout the entire nineteenth century/ In Italy, the ruling class did 
not show sufficient zeal in spreading liberal values via military service, nor the 
attempts of the liberal state to create a systematic plan to increase national identity 
among the recruits, found any success. Before WWI, indoctrination into the army 
remained weak and even the effort to create a soldier’s handbook to promote national 
consciousness failed.^
The situation was very similar in Spain. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
frequent use of the army in social repression, the Moroccan War, and the maintenance 
of monetary redemptions perpetuated the popular classes’ alienation from the army. 
Rejection for the military can be clearly detected in the popular press and culture, 
where dozens of books, theatre plays and songs denounced a conscription system that 
benefited the rich.  ^ At the other end of the social ladder, the upper classes and the 
bourgeoisie showed little interest in contributing in person to the military. The 
widespread use of monetary redemptions by these sectors of the population clearly 
hampered interclass integration into the national ideal. Moreover, the state faced 
serious problems to incorporate recruits into the national army at the turn of the 
century. Figures of draft evaders and those declared unfit or exempted were extremely 
high from the time of the colonial wars in Cuba and the Philippines, and remained so 
during the first two decades of the century.^ Notwithstanding new legislation 
reforming the recruitment system and reducing monetary redemptions introduced in 
1911 and 1912, official figures of the period 1914-1923 show that 46% of potential 
recruits never joined the army, because they were declared exempted, physically unfit 
or they simply deserted.^
* Emilio de Rueda y Maestro, Moral Militar [Madrid, 1925], 50-51.
 ^For the the role of army as an agency o f nationalisation in pre-WWI France see, Weber, Peasants into 
Frenchmen, 292-302.
 ^Gentile, The Sacralization, 9.
 ^ Serrano, El turno del pueblo [Barcelona: 2000], 22-23; Manuel Espadas, “Orden social en la 
mentalidad militar espahola a comienzos del siglo in Tufiôn de Lara (éd.), Espaha, 1898-1936; 
Estructuras y  Cambio, [Madrid: 1984], 348-349.
 ^Serrano, El turno, 22-49
 ^The percentage of those draftees out of the total available to be soldiers for the years 1914 to 1923 are 
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It is within this context of state failure to turn the army in an institution that 
embodied all classes and promoted patriotic feelings among them, that the 
primorriverista use of the military as an agency of nationalisation has to be 
understood. For an institution that had taken over the state proclaiming that the nation 
was on the verge of disintegration, the employment of military service to strengthen 
patriotic values amongst young Spaniards was unsurprising. Once in power. Primo 
carried out a reform of army structures, the military educational system and the 
recruitment scheme in an effort to intensify and broaden the transmission of 
nationalist ideas amongst both soldiers and officers. Yet Primo went far beyond the 
classical indoctrination of recruits and used the military to spread nationalist ideas to 
all sectors of the civilian population. From October 1923, an army of military 
governmental delegates was sent throughout Spain with the specific order to spread 
patriotic values among all Spaniards regardless of age and gender. Throughout the 
dictatorship these officers published propaganda, organised patriotic lectures and 
arranged nationalist festivals in hundreds of towns and villages. The work of the 
delegates was only one part of a vast scheme of mass indoctrination that the regime 
favoured. The formation of a national system of pre-military, gymnastic and political 
education for teenagers and children was the other great primorriverista project. 
Created with the direct intervention of the dictator, the Servicio Nacional de 
Educacion Fisica Ciudadana y  Prelimitar (National Service for Physical Citizenry 
and Pre-military Education, SNEFCP) was an army directed state organisation aimed 
at forging young patriots in military centres prior to their soldering.
The present chapter analyses the role of the army as an agency of mass 
nationalisation inside and outside the barracks during the dictatorship. The first part 
deals 'with the process of indoctrination within the army. Here it is possible to 
differentiate between those transformations in the education of officers, the creation 
of the General Military Academy in Zaragoza being the main reform of the 
dictatorship, and those reforms designed for the soldiers, including modifications in 
recruitment and military education. The second part explores military indoctrination 
of civilians outside the barracks, focusing, first, on the role of governmental delegates 
and, then, on the formation of the SNEFCP.
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INDOCTRINATION IN THE ARMY 
The military’s sacred educational mission
The idea of an army-led national regeneration firmly took root in the barracks 
during the 25 years that preceded the dictatorship. For decades Spanish officers were 
educated in the belief that national regeneration was only possible if they were able to 
inculcate strong patriotic feelings among the population and, therefore, to ‘make’ 
better Spaniards that would, in turn, improve the fate of the fatherland. For a social 
group that was turning progressively more nationalist as a result of the needs of 
modernisation, army officers found patriotic education key in order to force the 
masses into accepting the ideology of the nation-state and avoid revolution from 
below. ^  As class struggle increased in Spain, so did the number of officers that 
advocated a dual role of the army as nationalising agency and social pacifier -  in fact 
the two sides of the same coin. From different political approaches, echoing the 
regenerationist discourse, officers insisted on a better distribution of wealth combined 
with nationalist education as the best manner to transform society from above.* And 
almost invariably, this literature equated military regeneration \vith social 
regeneration. In all cases, the nationalisation of the masses aimed to stop the growth 
of socialist and anarchist ideas.
Like the Spanish army, nationalist doctrines taught in military academies were not 
monolithic. Liberal and conservative-traditionalist trends of military nationalism can 
also be traced in those responsible for training cadets.^ Liberal military teachers 
emphasised values of freedom, representative government and French Enlightenment 
ideas as the main principles in which soldiers had to be educated; while conservative 
officers understood monarchy, family and religion as the unquestionable core values 
of the political order. Notwithstanding the differences between both groups, it is 
possible to detect three major common points in post-1898 military literature. First, 
officers considered their educational task as sacred and presented themselves as
’ Balfour The End, 174-175.
® See, for intance, Eduardo Escartln, El Ejército en la accion politica [Madrid: 1905]; Antonio Garcia 
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“apostles” of the nation. “The army must observe a religious cult of patriotism” in 
order to cultivate love for the fatherland among the soldiers, stated the progressive 
liberal Ruiz Fomells.^^ The conservative Joaquin Fanjul also talked about military 
nationalism as a faith with its “principles and dogmas”, and encouraged fellow 
officers “to preach the religion of the fatherland”. Equally, Primo de Rivera, 
himself, gave voice to this belief in 1916, when he penned that the “ideal of the 
Fatherland” must be “sermonized and popularised religiously”.'^ Symptomatic of this 
nationalist discourse soaked in religious terms was the main role military educators 
accorded to the flag and the anthem as sacred representations of the fatherland. Well 
aware of the emotional power of symbols, army text books devoted many pages to 
explain the holy meaning of the national emblem. By presenting the oath of allegiance 
as a religious ceremony and associating the national symbol with the family, ancestors 
and national heroes, the army clearly attempted to inspire loyalty to the patria by 
appealing to emotive feelings, which in turn would foster the military values of 
honour, obedience, and sacrifice.'"' The very insistence on promoting national 
symbols in the army also suggests that military educators were conscious of the 
minimal impact patriotic emblems had on the population before recruitment.
Secondly, military literary production and press clearly show that during the 
Restoration army officers were fully aware of the shortcomings of the military as a 
‘school of the fatherland’. The main burden was clearly monetary redemption and the 
lack of a truly universal conscription.'^ Demands for the reform of military 
recruitment were common among the officer corps and did nothing but increase after 
1898.'^ In addition to universal conscription, officers stressed the need for a different 
kind of military instruction. Teaching in military academies and barracks was seen as 
ineffective, monotonous and lacking physical education. Instructors proposed to turn 
the emphasis from technical into moral education and the improvement of the
** Ruiz Fomells, La educacion moral, 116. 
Fanjul, Sociologla, 21-22.
Miguel Primo de Rivera, “Prologue” to Garcia and Malta, Elementos, xiii.
See, for instance, Ruiz Fomells, La educacion moral, 110-128; Fanjul, Sociologla, 76-91; Navarro, 
Mâximas, 17, 22-41; Garcia and Malta, Elementos, 37-41.
Claims for a universal military services can be found in Ruiz Fomells, La educacion moral, 50; 
Fanjul, Sociologla, xiv; Garcia and Malta, Elementos, 66-67.
Manuel Espadas, “La instituciôn libre de enseftanza y la formaciôn del militar espaflol durante la 
Restauraciôn” in Temas de historia militar, vol. 1, [Madrid: 1982], 504
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physical education system, as the way to form healthy and well-indoctrinated 
patriots/^
Thirdly, despite the inadequacies of the army as a nationalising agency, the officer 
corps demanded a further involvement in educating society. Military literature from 
the 1890s onwards advocated the idea that patriotic indoctrination should be at the 
heart of children’s education. According to this view, children should be instructed in 
patriotic values from a very early age, first at home and then at the elementary and 
secondary schools. After that, military service would be the last phase of the 
nationalisation process. Obviously, this “educational plan” required the additional 
participation of the state in mass indoctrination - something neither liberal nor 
conservative officers seemed to object to. On the contrary, they considered the army 
should be leading this patriotic education outside the barracks, from elementary 
education all the way to military service and that it should even operate in workers 
circles to nationalise adults.'* Different proposals for children’s military education 
show a keen interest in forming armed battalions in state schools and public military 
instruction centres as a complement of the educational system.'^ Nationalisation of 
society went hand in hand with militarization of society.
By 1923, army officers had been being educated for more than 30 years in the idea 
that the military was failing in nationalising the masses and reforms were needed, 
both at the academies and the barracks. More dramatically, officers had been taught 
that their didactic mission should go beyond the barracks and reach the whole society. 
Officers increasingly began to believe in their ‘sacred’ role as national regenerators 
and considered liberal politicians as an obstacle in fulfilling their task. In turn, this 
perception certainly paved the way for a military takeover of the state in the name of 
national regeneration.
Fanjul, Sociologla, 137-141.
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Shaping officers
Instruction and control of officers became of extreme importance if the regime 
wanted to succeed in nationalising the population, or indeed to assure its own political 
survival. Although all the different factions of the Spanish army (junteros, Africanists 
and the artillery corps) gave Primo their support in overthrowing the Restoration 
regime, this was more of a ceasefire between them than a proper integration under a 
single figure.^® How the regime was able to integrate these factions was the key to the 
dictatorship’s performance. Prime’s endeavour to indoctrinate officers was twofold. 
On the one hand, he combined legislation and propaganda in the military clubs to 
unify the military doctrine under his supervision. On the other, he created the General 
Military Academy in Zaragoza to educate all cadets in the same doctrine and 
strengthen solidarity between different corps.
Government propaganda made its way into the military clubs and garrisons via 
conferences and publications. The dictatorship created the appropriate framework for 
the promotion of military publications granting them official status and distribution 
and, from early 1926, officers were encouraged to produce patriotic works as part of 
the regime’s campaigns of nationalisation.^* Monetary awards, official recognition 
and prestige seem to have been a good incentive for military authors. Literature on 
patriotic indoctrination flourished and an important number of new official books, 
addressed both to military instructors and soldiers, circulated in the barracks during 
the dictatorship.^^
Accompanying the boom in the publication of army text books and pamphlets, the 
regime orchestrated a series of conferences and training courses for those officers who 
had educational responsibilities. Even civilians serving as reservists, the so-called 
oflciales de complemento, were considered “apostles of the fatherland” and trained to 
promote militarist feelings “in schools, factories, mines, workshops and the
Gomez-Navarro, El régimen, 353-359.
RO 29-1-1926 launched the campaign o f ‘citizenry culture’. In Diario Oficial de Ministerio de la 
Guerra (hereafter Z)OMG), 31-1-1926, p. 249.
Among the ‘educational’ books written by military officers were Teodoro Iradier Herrero, Catecismo 
del Ciudadana [Madrid; 1924]; Francisco Adân Caflizal and Antonio Tarrasa de Entrabasaguas, Libra 
de Cuata, 2 vol. [Valencia: 1926]; José Mas y Casterad, Moral, Educacion e Instruccion [Zaragoza: 
1926]; Ricardo Villalba Rubio, Método de Instruccion Integral para el recluta y  soldado de infanteria 
[Toledo: 1928]; Luis Pumarola Alaiz, Democracia y  Ejército [Toledo: 1928]; Juan Plaza Ortiz, La 
sociologla y  el Ejército [Toledo: 1928].
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countryside”.^  ^ Primo himself was at the fore of the most important campaigns, such 
as the 1927 conference series at the Casino de Clases in Madrid. In the opening 
conference, the dictator devoted his speech to explain to non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) the educational role of the army in civil society. He insisted upon the sacred 
duty NCOs had in propagating the official tenets of ‘citizenry’ and patriotism, 
together with the military values of hierarchy, sacrifice, not only when instructing 
soldiers but also in their daily life dealing with civilians outside the garrison.^"  ^When 
in March 1929 the regime organised a two-week course in Toledo to teach officers 
how to indoctrinate civilians with patriotic ideas, the entire dictatorship’s 
intelligentsia was summoned. In late February, the dictator personally addressed his 
ideologues encouraging them to participate and, finally, Peman, Pemartm, Aunos, 
Calvo Sotelo, Yanguas, and Pérez Agudo were among the lecturers on the course.^^ 
These conferences and courses popularised an already quite simplistic official 
discourse and pushed forward the idea that the army must intervene in mass 
indoctrination outside the barracks. It is important to notice here that the impact of the 
conferences went far beyond those attending the meetings, since the official 
propaganda machinery was always keen on producing and distributing books after the 
events. For example, once the course in Toledo finished, the Junta de Propaganda 
Patriotica published a volume of the proceedings.^^ The dictator wrote the preface 
and ordered 20,000 copies to be printed for the first edition. Out of this first edition, 
almost 2000 copies were sent to military schools, libraries, clubs and barracks.^^ Fully 
aware of the importance of these centres as ‘communitative facilities’ of military 
society, the dictatorship showed a special interest in promoting its doctrine in these 
institutions.^^
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Government propaganda was combined with legislation to gain control of the 
military clubs. A Royal Order of 24 April 1926 placed the elected governing boards 
of the clubs under direct supervision of the Military Governor of the region. It also 
created a formula to give state ownership to those buildings and libraries, as payment 
for the functioning of the clubs. Further legislation in 1927 created a new statute for 
all military cultural centres. The Circular Royal Order of 13 April 1927 stated that the 
government aimed to strengthen the “union and comradeship among all Arms, Corps, 
and Institutes in the Army and the Navy” and promote culture and gymnastics among 
officers.^^ However, it was more limitation than enlightenment that the regime sought 
with the new law. Primo knew the essential role that the clubs had played in the 
formation and development of the military Juntas and was resolved to avoid any 
political discontent emerging from the centres. Art. 4 forbade “all political and 
religious discussions, and any other that undermines or damages military law or 
discipline”. In a time when some cracks in the military alliance were clear, as shown 
by the 1926 insurrection of the Sanjuanada and the revolt in the artillery corps, the 
dictatorship decided that only its ‘apolitical’ propaganda would be allowed to 
circulate in the clubs in order to reach a unity of doctrine among the officers.
Prime’s search for unity of doctrine and comradeship among corps was to find 
momentum with the creation of the General Military Academy of Zaragoza (AGM) in 
1927. The idea of an academy in which cadets from all different corps studied for two 
years together had been implemented in the AGM of Toledo between 1882 and 1893. 
Although closed suddenly by the liberal Minister of War, General Lopez Dominguez, 
due to the pressures of his fellow artillery officers, the first epoch of the AGM 
contributed to draw the army together and increased inter-arms solidarity.^® This was 
something Primo knew well, since the dictator had been a cadet in Toledo, together 
with some other key members of his regime, such as Barrera, Sanjurjo, Berenguer, 
and Cavalcanti.^^ Reforms in military education and the reopening of the AGM were 
soon on the primorriverista agenda. In February 1924, Primo announced his intention 
of creating a new military general academy and, in September that year, a committee 
was formed to study the re-organisation of military education. From 1924 on, the 
regime also sent officers abroad to investigate different educational models in military
ROC 13-4-27, Coleccion Legislativa del Ejército (hereafter CLE), 1927, N 198, 250-252. 
Roberto Sânchez Abal, La ensefianza militar en el reinado de Alfonso XII [Madrid: 1989], 132. 
Julio Busquets, El militar de carrera en Espana, [Barcelona: 1984], 80.
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academies. Colonel Millan Astray went to the French academies of Saint Cyr and 
Saint Maixent, whilst Lieutenant Colonel Fermin Espallargar travelled to the USA. 
But it was the dissolution of the Artillery corps, and the subsequent closure of the 
artillery academy in Segovia in 1926, that finally made the creation of the AGM an 
urgent necessity.^^
The Royal Decree of 20 February 1927 established the new AGM in Zaragoza 
with the specific aim of providing “a common military spirit in all corps”. T h e  law 
highlighted “moral instruction and education” of cadets as one of the main goals of 
the academy in order to achieve unity of military doctrine. In other words, the regime 
thought that a fervent moral teaching would first lead to solidarity among the officers 
and eventually to strong indoctrination of soldiers under the same military principles. 
The conditions for entering the academy did not radically differ from those 
established in the 1880s, nor did the subjects taught. Yet when comparing the original 
programme of 1882 to the one of the 1920s, it is possible to detect an increasing 
emphasis in those subjects designed to promote national consciousness, such as 
Spanish history and civil and military law.^ "^
Probably the most relevant factor in understanding the sort of education Primo 
wanted in the army has to do with the team the dictator selected to direct the AGM. 
Initially, Primo considered Millan Astray for the post of director. Millan had 
previously taught in the Infantry Academy in Toledo, where he instructed cadets in 
bushido (the samurai code). Furthermore, as chief of the Spanish Legion, Millan 
educated his soldiers in a blend of irrational principles, military symbolism and 
theatrical liturgies, extremely similar to those of Fascism.^^ But the many enemies 
Millan had within the army, especially among the junteros, made the dictator think 
twice. It was then when Primo decided to give the post to another Africanist officer, 
Brigadier General Francisco Franco.^^ Franco had participated in the formative phase 
of the new AGM too. Like Millan, he had been sent to the École Militaire de Saint 
Cyr in a study trip. In March 1927, Franco was called to be part of the committee
^^Ibid, 82.
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formed to create the new academy and in January 1928 he was named director of the 
AGM.”
As a student in the Infantry Academy in Toledo Franco had achieved only 
very poor results but, once in Morocco, he had been quickly promoted in the officer 
ranks due to the fact that he was Sanjurjo’s protégé.^* The educational skills of the 
would-be dictator had been developed in Africa, where Franco had co-founded the 
Legion with Millan Astray in 1920. As the second in command of the Tercio de 
Extranjeros, he soon got a reputation for the brutal punishment of his own men and 
the widespread use of terror ‘against civilians and soldiers alike. The colonial 
experience was certainly incorporated into the life of the AGM, where Franco formed 
the teaching team with his Africanist friends.^^ The director himself wrote the 
Decalogue of the academy following the Decalogue of the Legion and the eighteenth 
century Military Ordinances of Charles 111."^  ^ The Decalogue perfectly illustrates 
Franco’s mentality as a mixture of fascist rhetoric and medieval military idealism. 
The “Ten Commands of the AGM” emphasised patriotism, loyalty to the king, 
discipline, courage and sacrifice, as supreme moral values that had to be exteriorised 
in everyday life.'^' The aim was to turn the cadets into a sort of “Soldier-Knights” of 
the Spanish Golden Age, based on a vulgarised version of the ‘baroque discourse’ of 
Patria, Poetry and Purity that the primorriverista ideologues were promoting."^^
The education given in the AGM was pure indoctrination. It was not only that 
the Africanists who taught in Zaragoza exalted fascist and militarist principles, but 
also that their educational techniques led to the irrational manipulation of the cadets."^  ^
Most of the Africanists had no educational training whatsoever and they merely 
applied in Zaragoza the brutal conductivist methods learnt in the colonies. Moreover, 
Franco selected teachers according to their war experience in Morocco, rather than
 ^ Paul Preston, Franco. ‘Caudillo de ' [Barcelona: 1998], 79.
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their knowledge of the subjects they had to teach/"^ This certainly created a pedagogic 
environment that while concentrating on ‘moral’ and physical education subordinated 
technical and theoretical instruction. No wonder that Ramon Franco accused his 
brother in a private letter of giving the cadets a “troglodyte education”."*^ Highlighting 
moral education as the supreme edification for cadets was much in line with Primo’s 
conception of military formation as spiritual instruction. The aim was to promote a 
messianic nationalism, which sought a permanent state of emotional fervour in the 
cadets. In this respect, the selection of the Africanists to rule officers’ education was 
no coincidence. Their anti-intellectual stance made them ideal to indoctrinate soldiers 
under the primorriverista guidelines."^^
It was precisely this fanatical indoctrination of cadets in authoritarian values, 
among other things, that led the republican Minister of War, Manuel Azana, to close 
dovm the AGM in July 1931, as part of a general plan to reform the army."^  ^
Notwithstanding the relatively short life of the AGM, its historical legacy is 
significant. The ‘unity of military doctrine’ to consolidate the regime that Primo 
sought with the creation of the AGM could not be achieved, since the first promotion 
graduated in July 1930 once the dictatorship had fallen. On the contrary the creation 
of the AGM deepened the fractures within the army during the dictatorship. The 
unification of studies had been an long-standing demand of the junteros, who 
understandably enough did not like the Africanists’ monopoly of the AGM. As for the 
artillery, always proud of their separate education as an elite, the AGM only added 
insult to injury. After Primo’s dissolution of the corps and the closure of their 
academy with the king’s acquiescence, artillery officers turned towards 
republicanism.
In the long term, the consequences of the AGM were dramatic. During his 
years in Zaragoza, Franco cemented the group of loyal officers, who would in time 
rebel with him against the democratic Republic in 1936. Many of the cadets educated 
in the AGM would eventually join the Falange in the 1930s and almost all of them 
fought under Franco in the Civil War."^ * When in 1942 the AGM was re-opened. 
Franco reinstalled the same educational model he had created during Primo’s
Busquets, El militar, 81.
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dictatorship -  only incorporating a few new elements both at the discursive level (i. e. 
vicious anti-Azana attacks) and liturgical ceremonies (e. g. adoption of the Fascist 
salute)/^ In the opening ceremony on 2 December 1942, Franco insisted that it was 
the duty of the army to transmit its values to the rest of society/^ At the heart of the 
Francoist ideological justification for reopening the AGM lay the primorriverista 
belief that the army must shape civil society.
Shaping ‘Citizen-Soldiers’
When in 1925 the Chief of the Infantry Instruction Battalion, Major Emilio de 
Rueda y Maestro, addressed the reservist officers in a course, he stated patriotic 
indoctrination had to be the main priority in the barracks. Since family and the 
schooling had failed in the process of nationalisation, the argument went, it was then 
the army the main agency called on to indoctrinate citizens in patriotism during 
military service.^^ The army’s potential for the task was certainly appreciated:
“Sirs, Have you ever considered that over the next ten years time 
approximately one million Spaniards will complete military service? Let us 
dream....One million Spaniards!... Imagine that those men when they leave the 
barracks for the last time take away embedded in their brains the idea o f the 
fatherland.
Deploying Fichte’s views on the power of patriotic ideas and the need to 
propagate them, Rueda concluded: “[The army must] bring to the most remote comers 
of the Peninsula the emotion of unity among the individuals and the bodies which 
constitute the nation [...] emotion that, with the passing of time, produces the illusion 
o f the anthropological unity, o f the unity o f origin'"P Rueda’s conference perfectly 
illustrates the regimen’s perception of military service as a tool of mass 
nationalisation. First, the primorriverista army was aware of the shortcomings of the 
process in the past and firmly convinced of the utility of military service as a means of
Cardona, “La reforma”, 79-80. 
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Rueda, Moral Militar,, 44-52.
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solving the ‘patriotic deficit’. Second, they knew that national feeling could be 
artificially created and imposed upon the youth while soldering.
Reforms were needed if the military was to successfully transmit its values to 
soldiers. As shown above, one of the foremost problems of the army was that almost 
half of the potential conscripts never enrolled. In addition, partial exemptions 
continued to exist hampering interclass integration. Soon after seizing power. Primo 
reformed the recruitment system. The Royal Decree of 29 March 1924 stated the need 
for creating a modem army so as to mobilise large sectors of the population, 
following the lessons of WWI. Aiming at a considerable rise in the numbers of those 
doing their military service, the decree reduced the possibilities of being exempted for 
reason of physical or psychological deficiency and toughened the penalties for 
d e se rte rs .I t  also set out to create a strong reservist corps not only for reasons of 
defence but to indoctrinate citizens during peacetime. Furthermore, the decree 
provided the NCOs with the possibility of becoming schoolteachers via special 
training.^^ In the words of the legislator, the soldier-teacher would “bring to the state 
schools [...] the patriotic spirit, the habits of discipline and the love for the armed 
institutions, paving the way in the infants’ minds for the idea that serving the Patria in 
arms is not only a duty but a honourable right”.
If we are to consider the total numbers of those enrolled in the army, the 
primorriverista reforms were a partial success. The percentage of those potential 
recruits actually joining military service steadily increased during the dictatorship. In 
1923 the percentage of draftees joining the army was 56.46%. By 1930, the figure had 
risen to 62.66%.^^ The explanation for this growth lies in different factors. First, a 
broader conception of those fitted to join the army sent many to serve in “auxiliary 
services” in the barracks. Self-mutilation of fingers and toes, a widespread practice 
before, might now not ensure being declared unfit. More importantly, the military 
control of the municipalities via delegados ensured the recmitment process was not 
manipulated by the caciques. Thus the possibilities of falsifying family circumstances 
in order to be exempted substantially decreased. In addition, since the very beginning
RD, 29-3-1924, DOMG, 30-3-1924, 985-993.
Ibid., Base 11. The NCO were required an “special training” in the teacher training colleges 
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of the regime the delegados made clear in public addresses that desertion was a crime 
of lese-Patria. They encouraged public denunciations of deserters and their 
prosecution became more common/^ Finally, the ‘pacification’ of the Protectorate 
and the resulting decrease in the number of Spanish troops in Africa might have had 
an impact on those previously reluctant to die in the Moroccan war.
If figures show us the steady increase in those receiving military 
indoctrination, in terms of soldiers’ “educational value” the success of the 
primorriverista reforms is much more dubious. In the name of modernisation the 
primorriverista reform reduced the length of the military service from three to two 
years, which obviously abridged the time for indoctrination within the barracks.^^ Not 
less important was Primo’s decision to maintain the partial monetary redemptions. 
This allowed serving for just nine months to those who could afford it, paying 
different quantities according to their family or personal income.^® Thus the old 
officers’ demand of achieving a truly universal military service was never 
accomplished under Primo and the gap between upper and middle classes and the 
lower classes remained.
The dictator tried to justify the monetary redemptions arguing that they were 
based on the soldiers’ cultural capacities and portrayed the pecuniary emancipation as 
a mere “complementary economic measure”. '^ No one could seriously believe it. 
Even officers close to the dictator publicly acknowledged that the maintenance of 
monetary redemptions was due to the state’s need of money to fund the army.^^ As a 
result. Infantry Major Luis Pumarola admitted, the “reduced service of the soldier in 
the barracks” did not allow a “scrupulous education on military morality.”^^  More 
criticism of the effects of both the reduction and the redemption came from inside and 
outside the military in the subsequent years. Gabriel Maura, for instance, denounced 
the redemptions as a “flagrant injustice”, which led to the “unavoidable failure of the
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educational mission aimed at by the d ictator".G eneral Mola suggested Primo’s 
decisions were motivated by political exigencies and summarized the officers’ 
dissatisfaction with the measures as follows:
. .with the reduction of service and the facilities given to obtain the monetary 
redemption, difficulties in instruction and in the number of individuals with deficient 
war preparation rose, so that only the miserably poor felt obliged to continued 
soldering full-time and to suffer the pains of the African campaign. All these 
measures, intended to gain support from big opinion sectors, were extremely 
detrimental for the Army’s efficiency, without gaining, in exchange, the political 
support aimed fbr.’’*^
To be sure, the regime tried to promote a new type of education on military 
bases. This new model aimed to politically indoctrinate soldiers while taking into 
consideration the reduction of serving time. Already the early 1924 reforms 
established that all Spaniards must “acquire a strong martial spirit” during their 
soldiering.^^ Subsequent annual programmes incorporated the official principles into 
the soldiers’ “moral” educational programmes, which included the teaching of 
concepts such as love for the fatherland, the king and the flag, heroism, obedience, 
honour, and civil duties.^^
The 1927 General Instruction Plan provides a good example of how important 
indoctrination in the barracks had become for the regime. It divided military 
education into three different areas: technical, tactical and moral. It established that 
“moral education” was an integral part of soldier’s formation and therefore should be 
taught throughout his tour of duty. According to the plan, the instructor should not 
only promote martial moral values in those lectures devoted to them, but also take 
advantage of such didactic occasions as those “presented by real life, not forgetting 
that such practical lessons are engraved more deeply in the rough soldiers’ 
intelligences, than arid conferences”.^ * This patronising, didactic approach was
Ibid., 99.
Maura Gamazo, Al servicio de la historia, vol 2, 53.
Emilio Mola Vidal, Obras Complétas [Valladolid: 1940], 1029.
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combined with other structural changes in the army, which sought to frame a more 
efficient educational system. Thus the Royal Decree of 1 January 1927, gathered the 
inferior units (peloton, seccion and compama) in single battalions with the goal of 
turning the latter units into “permanent schools of instruction”.^  ^Moreover, temporary 
schools (unidad escuela) were planned in every military region aiming to improve 
military-educational performance.^^
Fully aware of the different political positions within the army, the regime laid 
stress on the need to achieve a “unity of doctrine” in those principles to be taught to 
soldiers, which in reality meant to homogenously reproduce the official authoritarian 
canon.^^ Since the beginning of the regime new teaching manuals for officers and text 
books for soldiers were published in ever increasing numbers and publications 
rocketed after the 1926 governmental campaign to produce “patriotic books”.^  ^ As 
shown above, these nationalist works were widely circulated in military garrisons by 
the Bureau of the President (Secretaria Auxiliar de la Presidencia del Consejo de 
Ministros), although the government also proved itself keen on subsidizing extreme 
right-wing charities to distribute them. This was, for instance, the case with the 
Patronato Social de Buenas Lecturas, a charity founded by the Marquis of Comillas, 
the Count of Cerralbo and Vazquez de Mella, which received public money from the 
Diputacion de Barcelona to donate books from its collection, Biblioteca Patria, to 
barracks, hospitals and prisons.^^
These works essentially popularised nationalist, authoritarian, irrational and 
interventionist ideas, which had become paramount among the officer class in the 
years prior to the dictatorship. Yet the fact that these ideas had become official 
doctrine and were now intensively promoted among the soldiers made the 
transformation of the army into a vehicle of mass indoctrination all the more 
remarkable. This new military literature was no longer the reflection of a mounting 
stream of discontent within an institution at odds with the liberal state, but the official 
propaganda of a military dictatorship in which the army effectively controlled the
RD 31-12-1926, DOMG, 1-1-1927, N l, 4-5.
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State apparatus. Proposals for change now had real possibilities of being realised. As 
explained in Chapter 2, notorious among the new ideas of primorriverista military 
literature was the need to shape a “New Man” in the form of the “Citizen-Soldier”. 
The most ambitious plans envisaged this ‘New Spaniard’ as being educated from 
childhood in nationalist and militarist values in state-controlled schools, followed by 
pre-military academies and, finally, military service as the last step in the making of 
the Citizen-Soldier.^"^ Once the process of indoctrination was complete, he had to act 
as a “good citizen”. And this, in the words of the military writers, meant that he had to 
adore the leader of the nation, join the Somatén, participate in patriotic ceremonies, 
help local authorities, and politically mobilise himself for the regime.^^ It almost goes 
without saying that these views presented regime, army, and nation as intrinsically 
linked, in an attempt to monopolise the idea of Spain. The army had been turned not 
only into a key state agency devoted to propagate patriotism, but also into an official 
organisation seeking to attract support for the primorriverista regime.
In the ‘patriotic’ battle for the hearts and minds of young Spaniards leftist 
ideas became the main enemy and the conquest of the rural masses the foremost goal. 
The director of the Infantry Academy, José Villalba Riquelme, drew a neat line when 
dividing the bulk of soldiers into peasants and urban proletarians:
“ ...the former, the most healthy and robust and with scarce education, 
constitute the main mass in Spain; the difficulty in the instruction of these recruits 
lays in their simplicity and lack of culture, but on the other hand their moral and 
physical development is better, since they are not contaminated by the atmosphere of 
the factory, the mine, or the political meeting. The latter, with greater culture, and 
with easily learnt skills in the use of war machinery, are infected with alcohol and 
socialist predicaments.”^^
It is highly significant that those in charge of military education emphasised 
the importance of indoctrinating peasants as opposed to urban workers. The regime
See Adân, Ciudadanîa , 97-104; Mas, Moral, 3-8; Pumarola, Democracia, 52; Villalba Rubio, 
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saw the agrarian masses as a vast non-politicised social group, which should be 
indoctrinated by the state before the Left could gain active support from them. Even 
the most humble members of society were now considered important for 
indoctrination. In this sense, it is easy to understand the efforts made by military 
propagandists to increase the number of illiterate soldiers joining the regimental 
schools in the barracks.^^ According to military instructors, the key was in selectively 
teaching soldiers and providing them with a carefully chosen range of books, so they 
did not follow “negative propaganda”.^ * Some officers even demanded educating 
military instructors in modem sociology so they could effectively argue against 
soldiers’ socialist ideas in the barracks.^^ The goals behind this policy were twofold. 
First, reduction of illiteracy would mean a better-educated population and this would 
eventually improve national production. Second, if a certain cultural level was 
provided in the army according nationalist principles, the chances of the lower classes 
being attracted by Socialist or Anarchist propaganda would he severely reduced. It 
should be noted here that this attempt to indoctrinate and mobilise the lower classes 
via military service signalled an abrupt breach with the Restoration’s conservative 
policies of mass de-mobilisation. Unlike conservative politicians, often too 
intimidated by the masses, the primorriveristas sought to incorporate them into the 
system via political indoctrination.
An essential component in the formation of the “New Man” was to endow 
Spaniards with a strong physique. Improving the strength of the ‘race’ had been part 
of military plans in the decade prior to the dictatorship. Following social-Darwinist 
principles, military officers had come to the conclusion that the survival of the fittest 
applied to nations and races as well as individuals and, therefore, nations needed 
strong men to defend the fatherland and, ultimately, to stay alive.*® It hardly needs to 
be said that these officers understood that the army was the proper institution to 
deliver physical education inside and outside the barracks. The problem enthusiasts of 
gymnastics faced was that physical education was in a state of total disarray in the 
military garrisons. José Villalba Riquelme, director of the Infantry Academy, was the
See, for instance, Mas, Educacion, 9; and Adân, Ciudadama, 46. For the regulation o f the 
simultaneous teaching o f reading and writing in the regimental schools see ROC 12-8-1927, CLE, 
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most active officer in seeking to improve of physical education in the army. A man 
always aware of new European educational initiatives, Colonel Villalba created a 
special unit in the Infantry Academy for the teaching of physical exercise and in 1911 
he organised a tour to study the teaching of gymnastics at different military academies 
around the continent. The conclusions of the report produced upon his return urged 
for the creation of a physical education teaching college for both soldiers and civilians 
in Spain.*^ But despite the efforts of Villalba and his colleagues, very little was done 
in the years before the dictatorship. As bitterly described in a text book for physical 
education instructors published in 1923, physical education in the garrisons was 
absolutely overlooked and NCOs without any sort of previous training were those in 
charge of organising and overseeing soldiers’ physical exercise.*^
Improvement of physical education training soon became an important goal of 
the dictatorship. The regime not only upgraded the level of gymnastics in recruits’ 
study plans but also attempted to professionally train officers and NCOs in the 
teaching of physical education.*^ In the quest for professional instructors, the regime 
transformed the Military Institute of Physical Education into the Central School of 
Gymnastics in 1924. The old Institute, an organisation linked to the Infantry 
Academy, was then turned into a semi-independent military college devoted to the 
training of officers and NCOs.*"* By 1927, the dictator established that only military 
officers with a degree in gymnastics could be in charge of physical education in the 
barracks. NCOs working as instructors’ aides were also required to have been 
educated at the Central School of Gymnastics.*^
The scope of the modernisation drive in the teaching of physical education 
became clear when in May 1925 the government announced its intention to 
implement the gymnastic military model in the whole of society. According to Primo, 
after the experience of the Great War, the teaching of physical and pre-military 
education had become a must in Europe. He proclaimed “the need to apply the 
Central School of Gymnastics unity of doctrine to all state, provincial and local 
educational centres, as well as to all private societies and clubs which had any sort of
Federico Gonzâlez Deleito, La educacion fisica en Suecia [Toledo: 1911].
Augusto Condo Gonzâlez, Manual del Instructor de Gimnasia [Toledo: 1923], 3-10.
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relationship with public centres”.*^  In order to frame a coherent plan to extend 
patriotic gymnastics throughout the entire educational system, the regime created an 
inter-ministerial commission, presided over by (then General) Villalba. The 
commission had the task of structuring the physical education training blueprint for 
both military and civilian teachers and the creation of a centralised agency, the 
National Committee, to co-ordinate moral and physical education outside the 
barracks.V illa lba knew the task was immense. As he put it in an internal report, 
physical education was virtually non-existent in schools and gymnastic, sport and 
shooting associations had no single doctrine, method, or procedure to promote pre­
military education. It was a question of “creating a whole brand new system”.**
We will later in the chapter return to the question of pre-military education, 
but let us focus here on the training of military teachers. In 1925, Villalba considered 
the Central School of Gymnastics to be the only institution capable of properly 
shaping gymnastics teachers, and yet, he acknowledged, “at present it cannot have an 
important impact due to its scarce resources and economic means.”*^  He proposed 
sending a research team to different European military academies to come up \vith the 
ideal educational plan for Spain. Not without reservations due to its high economic 
cost, the proposal was finally approved and in the spring of 1926 and a team of three 
members of the inter-ministerial commission visited military academies in France, 
Italy, Sweden and Germany.^^ Yet progress was bound to be slow. Although the 
Central School drafted a new statute for the physical instruction of troops unifying the 
“doctrine” of the different corps in the army, by 1927 it had yet to be passed and the 
1911 Provisional Infantry Gymnastic Statute remained official legislation.^^
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The number of officers joining courses at the Central School of Gymnastics 
doubled during the dictatorship, rising from 32 in 1923 to 64 in 1929.^^ But for all the 
significance that the Central School of Gymnastics gained in primorriverista plans, 
the reality was that the number of officers and NCOs graduating from the school was 
simply not enough to substantially improve the instmction of physical education in 
the army. According to Villalba, a total of 220 officers and 200 sergeants had become 
teachers and instructors respectively in the period 1919-1927.^^ In other words, 
assuming that all graduates at the Central School were teaching physical education, by 
the late 1920s the Spanish army had approximately one teacher and one instructor per 
1,000 soldiers. In addition, the economic conditions of the garrisons remained terribly 
poor throughout the dictatorship. By 1930, soldiers still lacked the most basic 
equipment and facilities for practicing physical exercise.^"^
Together with moral indoctrination and physical education, the dictatorship 
was keen to promote patriotic rituals and reinforce national symbolism in the 
barracks. Primorriverista military text books insisted on the importance of making the 
recruits feel an emotional attachment to national symbolism. The regime’s obsession 
with the “unity of doctrine” was matched only by the primorriverista passion for 
unifying national symbols. In March 1925, the regime imposed a single military 
uniform for the entire army in order to increase the sense of belonging to the same 
national institution.^^ Two years later, a Royal Decree established that the merchant 
ships had to sail under the same flag as the navy. The government justified the change 
arguing that, firstly, maritime sailors had demanded the unification and, secondly, that 
Spaniards living overseas had complained to the Directory that when they saw the 
merchant ships they could not see “the genuine flag of the Fatherland”.^  ^ With this 
unification the regime completed a phase, which had began in 1843 Avith the 
appropriation of the Royal Navy insignia as the national flag. The red and yellow flag 
of the monarchy had progressively been adopted by all state agencies, and the 
merchant navy was the last Spanish institution with other colours. It did not, however.
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bring an end to the conflict regarding the national flag. As is well known. Republicans 
remained loyal to the red, yellow and violet tricolour flag, workers kept on waving 
their red and black insignias and peripheral nationalists preferred their own flags to 
the Spanish one.
In line with its efforts at doctrinal and symbolic unification, the regime also 
attempted to regulate military ceremonies within the barracks. The most important of 
all, the Oath to the Flag, was radically transformed during the dictatorship. In early 
1924, Primo decided that the national standard was not to be kept in the barracks 
anymore and ordered the recruits to “take their military sacrament under the sun, 
together with their fellow citizens”, effectively turning the oath to the flag into a 
popular ceremony.^^ The Royal Decree of 31 March 1924 was unambiguous. It 
ordered military authorities to organise a public commemoration of the pledge to the 
national flag aiming to unite soldiers and the people “in a single will”. The 
government also declared the celebration a “National Day” and established that all 
state buildings, schools, universities, seminars, garrisons and military and civilian 
boats had to display the Spanish flag to commemorate this patriotic festival. In search 
of a public communion between the people and the soldiers, in which the national 
emblem became a sacred item, the decree was self-explanatory:
“In order to endow the oath with that popular support that cannot be officially 
legislated and enforced. Authorities must organise the fiesta (because this day must be 
a celebration of the Fatherland) in a way which contributes to exalt the masses’ love 
for the Flag, itself the representation of national honour and the emblem in which all 
Spanish regions merge”.
The regime wasted no time in implementing the new legislation. In early April 
1924, the king presided over a massive ceremony in which hundreds of recruits 
pledged their allegiance to the national flag in the Paseo de la Castellana in Madrid.^^ 
Integration of the masses into military public ceremonies went a step further the 
following year with the creation of the Festival of Graduating Soldiers. The Military 
Directory, attempting to assimilate civic, military and religious rites into a nationalist 
ceremony, invented the ritual via royal order. The first act was to be a public mass
RD 31-3-1924, CLE, 1924, n. 128,188.
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with the presence of one infantry, one cavalry, and one artillery battalion. Following 
the mass, the military governor had to give a speech reminding the soldiers of the 
significance of their vow to the patria and their duties outside the barracks. After the 
speech, the soldiers, wearing festive uniforms, had to march and bless the flag while 
the military band played martial music.^^
In seeking to assure public success, the Festival of Graduating Soldiers was 
declared a public holiday. Under the Military Governor’s command, the entire 
ceremony was to take place in front of civil and ecclesiastical authorities. Moreover, 
members of trade, industrial and agricultural associations were to be invited, together 
with workers’ unions and any other “local prestigious corporations”. There is little 
doubt that the dictatorship attempted to turn this ceremony into an all-class integration 
ritual, in which the army remained the ‘sacramental administrator’. It is telling that 
the religious character of this nationalist ceremony was emphasised with the 
incorporation of a Catholic mass, a very well-known ritual among Spaniards. Indeed, 
the military governor’s speech and the soldiers’ kissing of the flag were reminiscent 
of the priest’s sermon and the congregation’s communion in the Catholic mass. But it 
is also worth noting that here the Catholic ritual was performed in order to ‘sacralize’ 
a national item (i. e. the flag) and was part of a broader patriotic ceremony. In this 
ceremony, the fatherland, and not the Christian God, was the supreme divinity 
celebrated. In the same manner that the ideologues of the regime drew selectively 
from Catholic doctrine in order to frame official nationalist discourse, the dictatorship 
openly incorporated Catholic rituals into nation-state ceremonials. In both cases. 
Catholic forms were subordinated to the Nation as the supreme deity.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact primorriverista reforms had on those 
young men joining the military service. The record suggests that more Spaniards 
participated in military service than ever before, the number of reservist officers was 
unparalleled, political indoctrination and propaganda in the barracks reached 
unprecedented levels and new patriotic rituals were invented. However, it is possible 
to detect certain factors which critically hampered the process of nationalisation. As 
noted above, the preservation of monetary redemptions hindered interclass integration 
into the national ideal and the reduction of military service to two years allowed less 
time for indoctrination. Contemporary accounts of garrison life portrayed a gloomy
Rubio, Cronica [1986], 141.
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situation. Most of the companies lacked the number of troops required, the vast 
majority of the recruits graduated without having proper military instruction, and 
many soldiers worked as officers’ personal assistants,^®® According Major Garcia 
Benitez, indifference and corruption pervaded life in the garrisons and soldiers soon 
understood that the best thing to do was not to get involved, not to enquire about 
anything, and to automatically obey the orders given by officers.'®* The effect of this 
way of life was not the creation of a ‘New Spaniard’ but of apathetic soldiers whose 
only aim was to survive in the barracks for eight months waiting for permission to 
return home.
The transformation of the military educational system was far from being 
completed. For all its legislation and propaganda, the regime was powerless to 
sufficiently increase the number of political and physical education instructors. Once 
again, the reason is partially to be found in a lack of funds. As General Mola 
observed, economic restrictions and the African campaign precluded the 
materialisation of Prime’s military reforms.'®^ From 1925 on, the military budget was 
gradually reduced both in terms of total money received by the army and in relation to 
the percentage taken out of the national budget.'®^ In addition, the growth in the 
numbers of recruits (more than 10% throughout the dictatorship) further pressurised 
the military educational system.'®'* Ironically, Primo was somehow a victim of his 
own success in incorporating more recruits into the army. With a military budget 
constantly decreasing and the number of recruits steadily increasing, the intended 
conversion of the army into an indoctrinating machine proved impossible.
RCO 2-6-1925, CLE, 1925, n. 145,201-202.
Infantry Major Ladislao Cuadrado, “Algunas transformaciones y sintesis de un plan de instrucciôn”. 
Memorial de Infanteria, September 1930, vol. 38, n. 224, 201-208.
Navajas, Ejército, 161-162.
Mola, Obras complétas, 1029.
The annual distribution o f the military budget in millions of pesetas was as follows: 1924 (second 
semester)/1925 (first semester): 1,343.1; 1925/1926: 1,185.5: 1926 (second semester): 497.9; 1927: 
948.2; 1928: 932.4; 1929: 925.9; 1930: 1,036.7. The percentage o f the military expenditure out o f the 
total national budget was as follows: 1924/1925: 36.4%; 1925/1926: 32.2%; 1926 (second semester): 
30.2%; 1927: 26.0%; 1928: 26.6%; 1929: 25.0%; 1930: 26.33%. Data in Navajas, Ejército, 189. 
Nevertheless, by the end o f the dictatorship the regime increased the educational item in the military 
budget. The money allocated to military instruction centres grew a 7.44% in the last two years o f the 
dictatorship. It went from 9,266,018.10 pesetas in 1929 to 9,912,682.10 pesetas in 1930. With 
Berenguer in government, the educational item for 1931 went up to 10,714, 304.75 pesetas. RD 3-1- 
1929, CLE, 1929, 22; RD 3-1-1930, CLE, 1930, 22; RD 3-1-1931, CLE, 1931,14.
The number o f  recruits went from 134,410 in 1923 to 148,522 in 1930, a 10.49% increase. The 
number o f recruits throughout the dictatorship was as follows: 1923: 134,410 recruits; 1924: 142,901; 
1925: 140,275; 1926: 150,116; 1927: 153,885; 1928: 139,139; 1929: 144,615; 1930: 148,522. Data in 
Anuario Estadistico de Espafia 1931.
T50
THE ARMY AS EDUCATOR OF CIVILIANS
The most ambitious plans for army-led mass indoctrination took place outside 
the military garrisons. As explained above, during the years prior to the dictatorship 
the majority of military officers had come to the conclusion that the army was the 
only institution capable of regenerating a decadent Spanish society. For the most 
radical military nationalists, fulfilling this self-imposed task meant that the army had 
to leave the barracks and indoctrinate civilians in patriotic values in their ovm towns 
and villages. Once in power. Primo de Rivera attempted to carry out these plans of 
total mass indoctrination and sent hundreds of officers out of the barracks as “apostles 
of the fatherland”.
In the primorriverista bid for civilian mass indoctrination, it is possible to 
differentiate between two institutions created by the regime. The main role was 
played by the delegados gubernativos, an army of officers distributed throughout the 
entire country with the specific aim of organising patriotic conferences, mass rallies 
and military parades in support of the regime. The delegates operated throughout the 
whole of the dictatorship and their activities aimed to indoctrinate all sectors of 
society, without the distinctions of gender, class, or age. Conversely, the Servicio 
Nacional de Educacion Fisica, Ciudadana y  Premilitar (SNEFCP), focused on 
children and youngsters and it only operated during the last years of the dictatorship. 
Seeking to morally and physically improve the ‘race’, the SNEFCP instructed an elite 
group of officers, whose duties included teaching gymnastics, pre-military education 
and patriotic doctrines to the ‘New Spaniards’.
The apostles of the fatherland
In October 1923, the Military Directory established the post of the delegados 
gubernativos to assist the new civil governors -  the latter military officers themselves. 
Directly controlled by the Minister of the Interior, Martinez Anido assigned delegados 
to all judicial districts (cabezas de partido) in the country to “inspect and orient” 
municipal life. Their initial task was to gain total military control of provincial life 
and destroy the caciquil local network. In this manner, the dictatorship hoped the 
delegados would create a “new citizenry” in towns and villages. Primo was fully 
aware of the fact that the destruction of the old political structures had to be
105 RD 20-10-1923, La Gaceta 21-10-1923.
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complemented with the emergence of a new type of citizen at the municipal level. The 
delegates were ordered to organise the local Somatén, boy-scouts, gymnastic 
associations and cultural societies for men and women in order to diminish illiteracy 
rates. They were also responsible for organising patriotic conferences, which should 
promote the virtues of the “Spanish race” and emphasise the duty to defend the 
fatherland, respect authority and the head of the state, protect the environment, and 
pay t a x e s . F o r  this educational undertaking of “strengthening the citizen’s soul and 
body”, delegates were advised to enlist the participation of local teachers, priests and 
doctors.
The delegados were only responsible to the civil governors, who in turn were 
directly controlled by the Minister of the Interior. In this hierarchical structure, all 
orders came from Primo and Martinez Anido. They were wholly sensitive to the 
importance the delegates would have for the future of the regime. Primo and Martinez 
Anido’s initial instructions made clear that the military dictatorship depended upon 
the delegates’ success .Fear ing  the delegates could be corrupted by the caciques. 
Primo insisted they should not accept presents or invitations to lunch from anyone in 
towns and villages under their jurisdiction. Following his populist drive, the dictator 
ordered the delegates to help “the poor and the middle-classes”, and keep the price of 
basic products low.^ ®^  The actions of the delegados governing, controlling, 
‘educating’, and censoring municipal life would be the yardstick by which civilians 
would measure the Military Directory.
The regime found no problems in gathering volunteers for the job. Most of the 
delegados were previously in the military reserves, earning 75% of an active officer’s 
salary, and becoming an “apostle of the fatherland” meant getting full pay. By early 
December 1923, 523 governmental delegates were already in post all around Spain. 
Out of the 523 delegates, 434 were commissioned to serve at judicial districts and 89
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at provincial capi ta l s /Popular  response to the arrival of the delegates appears to 
have been sceptical. According to the memoirs of a former delegate, at first most of 
the locals in towns and villages were profoundly mistrustful of the officers, whom 
they saw as new caciques in uniform.^Despite the cold reception, during the first 
months the delegates showed a strong zeal in their cleansing of public administration. 
Fuelled by an avalanche of anonymous denunciations made by the public, they 
arrested and jailed dozens of municipal councillors and caciques Soon the situation 
became chaotic. On 1 January 1924, Martinez Anido sent “confidential instructions” 
to the military governors and the delegados as new guidelines to inspect the 
municipalities. The Minister of the Interior requested caution when pursuing caciques, 
since an eventual judicial liberation of the alleged criminals would weaken the 
delegates’ public i m a g e . T h e  petition was ignored and four weeks later Martinez 
Anido insisted in moderating the number of arrests, deportations, and fines imposed 
by the delegados. Once again, the minister argued that massive confinements were 
worsening public support for the delegates and maintained anonymous denunciations 
should lead to investigations and not to immediate detent ions.^In the following 
months, Martinez Anido often insisted in minimizing captures in different letters sent 
to the delegados, clearly showing that ministerial guidelines regarding detentions 
were not been followed.^
The actions of the delegates were devastating for the old political elite. After 
the dissolution of municipalities, the delegates became the new local lords. They 
formed the new provisional tovm councils, imprisoned political opponents and 
controlled information published in local newspapers. The implementation of the new
The names, corps, and destinations o f all delegedos appointed in December 1923 in AGA, Interior, 
Box 149, File 15.
E.T.L. (pseudonym of Enrique Tomâs y Luque), For pueblos y  aldeas. De las memorias de un 
Delegado Gubemativo [Toledo: 1928], 52-53.
Dozens o f these denunciations are found in AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle ISA,  Files 1 and
2 .
Martinez Anido to civil governors, “Instrucciones reservadas que los Sres. Gobemadores civiles y 
Delegados gubernativos deberân tener présentes en sus misiones inspecteras de los Ayuntamientos”, 1- 
1-1924, AGA, Interior, Box 149.
ROC 27-1-1924, Gaceto 29-1-1924.
For the letters sent to the delegados and the civil governors demanding moderation in the number o f  
arrests see Martinez Anido to civil governors, 2-2-1924; Martinez Anido to civil governors, circular 
telegram 5-2-1924; Martinez Anido to civil governors, circular telegram, 20-8-1924, AHN, 
Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17 A, Box 2. For the issue of provincial deportations and the civil 
governors' authority over the delegados see Civil Governor o f Granada to Marinez Anido, 22-8-1924; 
further petitions o f moderation in Martinez Anido to all delegates, 8-3-1925, AGA, Interior, Box 149; 
Martinez Anido to Civil Governors, 29-1-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17 A, Box 2.
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municipal statute in 1924 did not change the delegates’ position. On 8 March 1924, 
Calvo Sotelo wrote to the civil governors explaining how the statute had to be 
implemented. Legally, civil governors were responsible for the election of those 
corporative representatives “on interim bases’’. ^However ,  they also chose those 
councilmen who were to be popularly elected, since municipal elections were 
cancelled sine die. In practice, this meant that governors controlled urban 
municipalities and delegates rural town councils. For all the legislation ordering the 
delegates to respect “municipal autonomy”, military officers seem to have reinforced 
their local power after the enactment of the s ta tu te .^Four  months after the 
implementation of the law, Martinez Anido complained to the governors about the 
delegates abusing their authority. As described by the Minister of the Interior, the 
delegates were involved in all details of municipal life, such as the designation of all 
public officers, including minor p o s t s . I n  October that year, Calvo wrote to Primo 
demanding the gradual elimination of the delegates. In his view, the delegates had 
already fulfilled their initial mission and were by then causing “a huge moral damage 
to the regime”. The idea of municipal autonomy, so highly publicised by the 
regime, turned out to be incompatible with the actions of the delegates.
Reducing indiscriminate imprisonments and respecting municipal autonomy 
were questions of public image. Secretly using the delegates to spy on political 
opponents and purging suspicious liberals from the state apparatus were a very 
different issue. In early January 1924, the Minister of Interior ordered the delegates to 
send him “confidential reports” on those judges “who weakly support governmental 
actions”. In this manner liberal judges would not obstruct the regime’s eradication of 
caciques. I n v i g o r a t e d  by Martinez Anido’s orders not to tolerate “whether in the 
press or in conversations anything that could damage the Directory’s prestige”, 
political repression touched all those opposing the regime. Republicans, Liberals, 
Communists, Anarchists, Conservatives and Carlists were imprisoned and exiled for
Calvo Sotelo to civil governors, 28-3-1924, AGA, Interior, Box 149.
The RD 29-3-1924, Gaceta, 30-3-1924, reiterated the presence o f delegates in town councils until 
elections were called,
Martinez Anido to civil governors, 11-7-1924, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17 A, Box 2. 
Calvo Sotelo, Mis servicios, 26.
Martinez Anido to civil governors, 5-1-1924, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17 A, Box 2. 
Martinez Anido to civil govemors, 10-10-1923; and Martinez Anido to civil governors, 27-10-1923, 
AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle ISA, Files 1 and 2.
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propagating “anti-Spanish” i d e a s C i v i l  governors soon understood the huge 
potential delegates had for crushing provincial political opposition. At the local level, 
delegates selected those civilians that were willing to collaborate with the 
dictatorship. The role of these civilians was essentially to gather information and anti- 
primorhverista propaganda and pass it to delegates, who in turn filtered the 
information to the governors. At the top of the pyramid, Martinez Anido controlled 
the whole network. For example, Fernando Garrido y Garrido, secretary of the San 
Fernando Casino, handed private correspondence between the leader of the 
Republican Radical Party, Alejandro Lerroux, and the republican novelist and 
politician, Vicente Blasco Ibanez, to the provincial military authorities. The letters 
analysed the Spanish political situation after 13 September 1923 and described 
Lerroux’ intention of ousting the dictatorship with a republican military coup. Just 
one month after the letters were written, the Minister of the Interior and Primo had a 
copy in their offices.
Martinez Anido also fostered inter-provincial communication among civil 
govemors. Different investigations on mti-primorhverista military officers. 
Anarchists and Republicans were coordinated from Madrid with the intervention of 
diverse provincial govemors, showing high efficiency in political repression. 
Moreover, the Minister of the Interior reinforced Spanish police cooperation with 
France, the USA and the UK and extended the espionage network abroad. As Spain 
entered the “Anti-Bolshevik Intemational”, the official justification for international 
cooperation was fighting Communism. In fact, much of the information passed to the 
Ministry of the Interior from abroad regarded suspected Communist activities. 
However, the ultimate goal of this collaboration went beyond the stmggle against 
Communism and implicated all political opposition, as proved by the detention of 
Ramon Alvarez. A Umguayan journalist, Alvarez had interviewed Unamuno during 
his exile in Paris. French police informed Martinez Anido about the meeting. When
Some examples o f repression of leftists, liberals and conservatives in AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, 
Bundle ISA, Folders 1, 2 and 5. For the repression of Carlists and Jaimistas see Gobemaciôn, Bundle 
40 A.
Some reports sent by delegates informing on collaborators and political enemies are found in AHN, 
Presidencia, Bundle 331, Box 1.
The letters in AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 1 BA, Folder 1.
Some examples o f inter-provincial coordination for political repression in AHN Gobemaciôn, Serie 
A, Bundle ISA, Folders 1 and 2.
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the reporter tried to cross the border together with the Uruguayan national football 
team, he was arrested and his “interview with Unamuno and some other documents 
offensive to the Spanish Patria and the Military Directory” were confiscated/^^ The 
regime’s inquisitorial network was designed to silence all sorts of opposition.
The destruction of local caciques and political repression went hand in hand 
with the ‘educational mission’ of the delegates. Despite the reduction in the number of 
delegates and the different duties they were assigned throughout the dictatorship, the 
regime always insisted on the task of mass indoctrination as an essential obligation.
It was precisely after the first reduction in the number of delegates in early 1925 when 
the regime emphasised the need to strengthen patriotic education. As Martinez Anido 
explained to the delegates, nationalist teaching was an “investment” in eventual 
patriots:
“The Delegates will find a wide field for their activities in cultivating the 
moral energies and civic virtues of our youth. The Fiesta of the Tree, the Boy Scouts, 
school friendly societies, the Fiesta of the Flag, etc, etc: these are some examples of 
patriotic goals which are completely under the delegates’ jurisdiction. The educational 
action [...] exercised over the current generation of children will eventually flourish 
with positive impetus. For this reason, although at first sight the action seems sterile, 
the delegates must work on it carefully, since it always gives a mellow fruit”.
The regime used the same technique for nationalising civilians that it was 
using for indoctrinating soldiers. A combination of theory, put forth in patriotic 
conferences, and practice, through national rituals and gymnastics, was implemented
Some correspondance between Matinez Anido and the British and United States o f  America 
Embassies in Madrid in AHN Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 18 A. For tens o f cases against suspected 
working class militants see AHN Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17A, Bundle 42 and Bundle 59, Box 2.
Minister o f  Interior to Gerona frontier post, 28-3-1925; Civil Govemor of Gerona to Minister o f  
Interior, 8-4-1925; Intemal report of the Ministry of Interior, 14-4-1925, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, 
Bundle 18A, Folder 6.
The institution o f the delegados was transformed throughout the dictatorship both in terms of 
numbers and duties. After one year o f work purging municipalities. Primo decided it was the right 
moment for reducing the number o f delegates. The dictator argued the good functioning o f the new 
town councils and economic considerations led him to consider the reduction. In early 1925, the 
number of delegates was reduced to 224. They were ordered to concentrate on their “educational 
mission” and gathering popular support for the UP. The following year the number o f delegates was 
reduced to 132. The officers were ordered to move to the provincial capital under the direct supervision 
of the civil govemors. The final reduction o f 1927 set the number o f delegates at 79. This number was 
to remain static until the end o f the dictatorship.
Martinez Anido to delegates, 8-3-1925, AGA, Interior, Box 149.
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in the same manner that military instructors ‘educated’ recruits. However, 
indoctrinating entire towns and villages required many more personnel. Since the very 
beginning, the Ministry of the Interior asked public school teachers, priests, and 
civilians not linked to the old regime to cooperate in the educational campaigns 
directed by the delegates. The record suggests teachers in public schools (maestros 
nacionales) actively cooperated with the military officers. Tens of the delegates’ 
reports sent to Martinez Anido confirmed teachers’ involvement in the task of 
“national regeneration”, giving patriotic lectures, during the first months of the 
r e g i m e . T h e  delegates were aware of the importance teachers’ cooperation had for 
patriotic propaganda. One of the first things the military officers did when taking 
charge of their posts as delegates was to gather together all the maestros in the 
judicial district. The delegates demanded support for the regime and active 
cooperation from the local teachers’ associations and the meeting concluded with a 
public declaration of allegiance to the d ic ta torship .The  system was effective. 
During the first months of 1924 dozens of “patriotic conferences” to indoctrinate 
adults and children took place throughout Spain. More often than not, the delegate’s 
speeches were complemented by the participation of teachers.
Teachers were also involved in the celebration of public ceremonies. In this 
the delegates progressed apace. Following Martinez Anido’s orders, the military 
officers took every single chance to mobilise the population. They organised the 
celebration of the Day of the Race and the Fiesta of the Sanctification of the Somatén 
Flag in towns and villages where these ceremonies had never taken place before. As 
described in Chapter 2, the Feast of the Sanctification of the Somatén Flag, regime’s 
anniversaries and military victories in Africa were also popularly celebrated under the 
administration of civil govemors and delegates. Even ostensibly non-nationalist
The reports from the delegates and the provincial civil govemors in AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 331, 
Box 1. See also the creation of a Junta de Cultura Fisica by the local delegate in Aoiz. Jesus Maria 
Puentes Langas, La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera en Navarra [Pamplona: 1998], 105. More cases of 
priests, teachers and doctors co-operation with the delegates in La Rioja in Carlos Navajas, Los cados y  
las comadrejas. La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera en la Rioja [Logrofto: 1994], 77-87.
See, for example, reports from the delegates of Carabanchel Bajo, Llano de Vich, Santa Coloma de 
Famés, Mondofiedo, Palos de Moguer, Barco de Valdeorras, Pola de Siero, Vich, Talavera, Llodio, 
Caldas Reyes, Olot, Salas de los Infantes, Alcira, Quintanar de la Orden, Puenteareas, Linares, 
Cistieraa, and Belorado. AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 331, Boxes 1 and 2, Some other delegates 
addressed the teachers in the local press asking for inculcating love for the fatherland in children’s 
hearts. This was the case o f the delegate José Femândez Navarro in El Magisterio Castellano, 1-3- 
1924.
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ceremonies such as the Fiesta of the Tree and the Saving Feast gained a patriotic 
connotation and went through a revival under military direction. In these fiestas the 
delegates gathered the local authorities for the occasion, hoisted the Spanish flag and 
delivered patriotic speeches. In many of these ceremonies, a public mass was given. 
In some other cases local priests collaborated by giving homilies as a part of the 
r i t u a l . A s  in the nationalist ceremonies with soldiers. Catholic imaginary and 
rhetoric were integrated into civic patriotic rituals. As in the case of the recruits, this 
integration was in terms of subordination to the nation considered the supreme deity.
The physical improvement of the Spanish ‘race’ was also one of the delegates’ 
duties. Martinez Anido’s initial orders emphasised the importance of inculcating 
hygienic customs into the daily lives of the masses with regard particularly to food, 
drink and household sanitation and sanitary inspections were soon carried out by the 
delegates. The mandate additionally included the promotion of physical education 
for both adults and children. The Royal Order of 7 April 1924 announced the creation 
of a gymnastic record book, which the delegates should deliver to locals to keep a 
record of their physical exercises. However, the evidence suggests the delegates failed 
to promote gymnastics during the Military Directory. Two months after the Royal 
Order, some of the delegates complained to the Ministry of the Interior because they 
had yet to receive the gymnastic diary. Very few delegates mention in their reports 
any sort of gymnastic activities organised in their district whatsoever. With the 
exception of a few delegates, who instructed civilians with the military gymnastic 
book in municipal fields, most of the ‘apostles of the fatherland’ were far from 
prioritising physical education among their activities.
The formation of the Civil Directory brought the intensification of the 
indoctrination of the masses. The Royal Decree of 29 January 1926 officially 
sanctioned a new campaign aiming to “plant moral and patriotic ideas in the humble
See reports from the delegates o f Valencia de Alcântara, Hellin, Andujar, Icod, Palos de Moguer, 
Llodio, Olot, Sala de los Infantes, Alcira, Carifiena, Calatayud, Madrigueras, and Iniesta. See also civil 
governor o f Cuenca to Presidencia del Gobiemo, AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 331, Box 1.
Tens of reports on diverse patriotic celebrations in AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 331, Box 1,
Martinez Anido to civil governors, 7-12-1923; “Misiôn de los Delegados Gubemativos acerca de los 
Ayuntamientos en virtud del Estatuto Municipal vigente”, “Instrucciones sanitarias para los Sefiores 
Delegados Gubemativos”, 4-1-1924, by Martinez Anido. AGA, Interior, Box 149. See also RO 29-3- 
1924, Gaceta, 30-3-1924.
See for example delegate of Toro to Presidencia del Gobiemo, 31-5-1924. AHN, Presidencia, 
Bundle 331, Box 1.
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minds" of the lower rural classes. It established “the celebration of Sunday 
conferences for adults of both sexes in every town with less than 6,000 inhabitants in 
the kingdom”. The conferences should deal with the fulfilment of citizen’s duties, 
Spanish and local history, and professional topics, such as agriculture or small 
industries. The events were to be organised by the mayor and would take place in the 
town hall. The legislation recommended mayors select the lecturers from amongst 
teachers, doctors, pharmacists, military officers and priests. Paralleling soldiers’ 
education, the regime prioritised indoctrination of rural masses, a vast social group 
considered not yet “intoxicated” by leftist ideas.
The selection of mayors as organisers of patriotic conferences enlarged the 
scope of those involved in mass nationalisation. Nonetheless, the campaign did not 
signal a lesser involvement of the delegates and the civil governors in rural 
indoctrination. Delegates, who were ordered to move to the provincial capitals under 
direct supervision of the civil governors ,cont inued to organise conferences and 
ceremonies in towns and villages from 1926 on presidential instructions. Less than a 
month after the legislation on rural conferences for adults came out, the chief of the 
Bureau of the President, Antonio Almagro Mendez, wrote to Martinez Anido 
enquiring about the conferences. In his letter. Lieutenant Colonel Almagro reminded 
the Minister of the Interior that Primo had a special interest in the celebration of the 
conferences and urged Martinez Anido to encourage mayors, via governmental 
delegates and civil governors, to fulfil their duties. Obediently, the Minister of the 
Interior sent a telegram to all civil governors the next day. He ordered them to press 
mayors to celebrate the conferences and demanded reports on the events. 
Moreover, Martinez Anido sent 200 copies of Primo’s Disertacion ciudadana to 
every single province the following week. The aim was clear: the dictator’s work had 
to “reach all towns and be the base of Sunday conferences.” "^^^
Sunday conferences in small towns were conceived as a second mass. The 
entire adult population would gather to hear the missionaries of the fatherland.
Among those few who reported the organisation of physical exercises to Madrid in the spring o f  
1924 were the delegates o f Cazalla de la Sierra, Andujar, and Alpera. AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 331, 
Box 1.
RO 29-1-1926, DOMG, 31-1-1926, n. 24,249.
RD 20-3-1926, DOMG, 23-3-1926, n. 65, 74-75.
Jefe de la Secretaria Auxiliar de Presidencia del Consejo de Ministres to Martinez Anido, 23-2- 
1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61 A, Box 3.
Martinez Anido to civil governors, 24-2-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61 A, Box 3.
Martinez Anido to civil governors, 6-3-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61A, Box 3.
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preaching the dictator’s gospel. The homogenisation of doctrine that the Royal Order 
of 29 January 1926 demanded for these conferences should be based on the national 
leader’s thought. This model anticipated a form of mobilisation and propaganda later 
used in Fascist Italy during the 1930s. In 1932 Mussolini created the “Sunday 
meetings”, at which party speakers propagated Fascist doctrine. The idea behind this 
model was very similar to the primorriverista. The propagandists gathered the entire 
adult population in every commune and preached nationalist dogma. As in the 
Spanish case, governmental representatives focused their weekly activities on small 
towns and villages. Unlike Spain, however, in Italy all those exercising the patriotic 
apostolate belonged to the official party.
Yet this sort of mass indoctrination proved difficult to realise. In the province 
of Âlava, for example, the civil governor found serious problems in organising the 
meetings, since most of the villages had a very small population of farmers and 
“lacked suitable people for cultural tasks whatsoever”. As a result, he had to recruit 
personnel, namely teachers, from outside the villages, and this delayed the 
organisation of the e v e n t s . I n  Barcelona, Primo’s plans for organising patriotic 
conferences in small towns overlapped with a very similar campaign promoted by the 
provincial government. In the spring of 1926, the Diputacion Provicial de Barcelona, 
subsidised a series of patriotic and professional conferences held in the Popular 
Libraries of small towns. The delegates of Arenys de Mar and Manresa were actively 
involved organising the events. When the courses ended, the delegates organised 
some more patriotic conferences during the summer. Even in those provinces where 
the governor acted efficiently, like Santander, only 50% of the municipalities had 
celebrated the conferences by early March 1926. The civil governor of the province 
optimistically reckoned that all municipalities would have had their first meeting by 
April. Whether it was due to lack of coordination, human and economic resources, 
or mayoral political will, Sunday conferences seem to have had an irregular 
implementation. The Royal Decree of 28 December 1927 insisted on the necessity of
For the Sunday meetings in Italy see Gentile, The Sacralization, 97.
Civil Governor o f Alava to Martinez Anido, 26-2-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61 A, 
Box 3.
The courses were celebrated in Pineda, Canet del Mar, and Salient between March and June 1926. 
ADPB, Departament de Instmcciô Pùblica, Bundle 4177, File 15.
See, for example, the celebration of Sunday conferences in Botrils, La Vanguardia, 27-8-1926.
Civil Governor o f Santander to Martinez Anido, 8-3-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 
61 A, Box 3.
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stimulating the celebration of Sunday conferences in towns with less than 6,000 
inhabitants/"^^ Two years after the creation of Sunday lectures, the regime deemed the 
number of events clearly insufficient.
The work of the delegates as propagandists was hampered by a series of 
factors throughout the dictatorship. First of all, the actions of the delegates seriously 
contributed to the destruction of the caciquil network in the countryside. After the 
dictatorship, the liberal and conservative dynastic parties were incapable of 
reproducing their old political structures at the local level. Still, during the
dictatorship some caciques remained active in the shadows opposing and obstructing 
the work of the delegates. In April 1926, Martinez Anido announced that “old 
politicians”, posing as regime’s supporters, were trying to influence the civil 
governors’ decisions in several provinces. He warned civil governors against 
following any sort of “recommendations” from anyone (with the exception of the 
UP), in order to avoid Restoration-style political practices. According to the reports 
civil governors sent to Madrid in late 1927, the “virus of the old politicians” 
continued to menace the regime in Orense, Vizcaya, Mâlaga, Teruel, Valencia, and 
Granada; and as late as December 1929, the civil governments of La Rioja and 
Navarre informed Primo that the removal of the delegates would lead to the 
immediate re-emergence of caciquismo in their provinces.
Another real danger of the actions of the delegates was that the “apostles of the 
fatherland” would turn into caciques themselves. Placed in the position of local lords, 
the delegates could not always resist the temptation of using their power for their own 
benefit. For all the warnings Martinez Anido’s gave about the necessity of 
demonstrating unquestionable moral behaviour, accusations of corruption soon 
appeared. On some occasions delegates were corrupted by the old political elites, who 
bribed the officer in order to keep control of municipal governments. This was the 
case, among others, of José del Olmo Medina, a delegate in the province of Valencia, 
who was allegedly paid 5000 pesetas to dismantle the town council of Guadasuar in 
March 1928 and set up a new one in April that year with different councillors. In 
some other cases the delegates simply abused their positions for material gain. For
Art. 6. RO, 27-12-1927, Gaceta 28-12-1927.
Ben-Ami, “The Crisis o f the Dynastic Élite”, 71-90.
One should bear in mind, however, that these reports were written to demand the permanence o f  the 
delegates, so the governors might well have exagerated the importance o f caciquismo in order to give
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example, Alberto Serrano Montaner, delegate of the province of Granada, accepted to 
be accomodated in a mansion offered by the town council, and was accused of buying 
jewellery and tickets to bullfights 'with public money. Moreover, Serrano allegedly 
abused his position by doing business with the municipality of Motril and pressed the 
tovm council to recommend him to the government as a member of the National 
Assembly. Although an enquiry by the Ministry of War concluded that none of these 
accusations could be proved, Martinez Anido discharged him immediately. This was 
the general line followed by the Ministry of the Interior: delegates accused of 
corruption were dismissed without delay, even in those cases when investigators had 
not found them guilty.
Martinez Anido followed a very similar policy in those districts where the 
military officers had family and friends, and the possibilities of caciquismo and 
political influence grew. In Lérida, for example, delegate José Valladaura Maya, was 
fired for having connections with the old political elites. Not willing to run any sort of 
risk, Martinez Anido decided not to keep any delegate who had influential relatives in 
the districts under his jurisdiction. This was the case of Fernando Suarez de Figueroa, 
delegate of Tortosa, who, despite having “good conditions for the post” according to 
the civil governor of Gerona, was not re-appointed in 1926 because his father was the 
director of the Bank of Spain in Tortosa and his father-in-law was a businessman 
connected to liberal elites. The same applied to those blamed of “immoral behaviour”, 
like Humberto Gil Cabrera, delegate in Lérida, anonymously accused of having a 
debased life and equally dismissed.*^* Obviously, Martinez Anido was aware of the
Primo the impression o f being in a difficult political situation in their provinces. 1927 and 1929 reports 
in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 332.
This was also the case o f  Francisco Alonso Burillo, delegate in Zaragoza, accused o f creating a 
business o f  coal trade and defrauding his partner. Although the military investigation could not prove 
him guilty, Martinez Anido discharged him immediately. The cases o f Alonso, Serrano and del Olmo 
in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 332. There were, however, some exceptions to this policy. 
Two delegates in the province of Seville, Juan Rodriguez Gutiérrez and Juan Borges Fe, got 
commissions out o f selling industrial machinery but they remained in their posts even when the civil 
govemor advised Martinez Anido otherwise. Julio Ponce Alberca, “Ejército, politica y administracion 
durante la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera: los delegados gubemativos en la provincia de Sevilla”, in 
Fuentes para  la Historia militar en los archivas espaholes [Madrid: 2000], 753-754.
Another case questioning a delegates morality is to be found in Gerona where Ricardo Motta 
Miegimolle was considered to be politically influenced by friends. Reports o f Civil Govemors on the 
delegates in Servicio Histôrico Militar (hereafter SHM), Coleccion Adicional de Documentes, Asuntos 
Générales, Bundle 11, Reel 7. At times the accusations of caciquil influence on delegates came from 
local leaders o f the UP and somatenistas. See the accusations o f the leader of the UP in Puebla de 
Cazalla, the Somatén and UP leaders o f Coronil and the mayor o f Pmna against Francisco Vâzquez 
Maquieira, delegate o f Morôn. Various letters to Primo dated 11-11-1924 in AHN, Presidencia del
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damage these accusations had in the eyes of the public and got rid of any questionable 
delegate. But for all the zeal the Minister of Interior took in dismissing delegates, the 
proliferation of corruption and charges of immorality seriously damaged the public 
image of the “apostles of the fatherland”.
The fact that the town councils had to pay the delegates’ salaries and costs also 
play a part in alienating the population from the military officers. In December 1923, 
the regime established that all municipalities in the judicial districts had to contribute 
pro rata to the delegates’ wages. In addition, the town councils were forced to pay the 
delegates’ travel expenses, plus 100 pesetas for stationary supplies. The head of the 
judicial districts also had to provide the military officers with housing, an office and 
an administrative assistant. This was an important burden for the municipal 
treasuries and soon problems with the payments arose. In June 1924, Martinez Anido 
urged the town councils to accelerate these payments. After seven months of the 
creation of the delegates, some municipalities had not paid a single peseta to the 
officers. The problem spread to the army, since the military garrisons advanced the 
money to the delegates before collecting it from the municipalities. In June 1926, the 
Minister of War wrote to the Minister of the Interior complaining about the 
“important and long-lasting debts” the municipalities had with the army. He claimed 
that several municipalities were ignoring the payments, despite the military’s 
continuous demands and the civil govemors mediation, which had “disturbed 
accountability in almost every regiment”. The Minister of War attached a report from 
the Military Govemor of the 8^  ^Military Region, which illustrated the magnitude of 
the trouble. In the second semester of 1925 and only referring to advance payments, 
the municipalities of Galicia and Leon had accumulated a debt of 20,343.45 pesetas 
with the delegates.
Support for the delegates within and outside the army gradually diminished. 
Initially conceived as a tool to fight caciquismo, by the end of the dictatorship the
Gobiemo, Bundle 442. See also the somatenistas o f Cazalla de la Sierra against the delegate Tomâs 
Alvarez in AGA, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 252, Box 6.
The municipalities had to pay the difference between the officers’ salaries in a situation of 
‘available’ (before becoming delegates) and ‘active’ (once they have been commissioned), which 
amounted to 25% of the total wages. RO 9-12-1923, Gaceta 10-9-1923; Martinez Anido to civil 
govemors, 9-12-1923, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17A, Box 2; RCO 10-12-1923, Gaceta 11- 
12-1923.
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governmental delegates had become an uncomfortable agency linked to political and 
economic scandals and a burden for the municipalities and the army itself. 
Nevertheless, Primo decided to maintain the institution until the end of his regime, 
intensifying the delegates’ activities on helping the Berenguer perfectly
understood how related the figure of the delegates was to the primorriverista regime 
in the public’s mind. Attempting to dissociate himself from the former dictator, 
Berenguer abolished the institution three weeks after Primo’s dismissal.
How successful might the institution of the governmental delegates be viewed 
as an agency of indoctrination? There can be no doubt that the delegates were fairly 
effective in destroying the caciquil power base at the local level. The liberal and 
conservative press welcomed the creation of the delegates and a segment of the public 
participated in this purging of municipal life, with denunciations of the old politicians. 
However, when it came to promoting nationalist sentiments, the results were much 
more dubious. During the Military Directory, the priority given to repressive 
measures made the propagandist task irregular and lacking in coordination, although 
the delegates managed to mobilise large sectors of both rural and urban population in 
nationalist festivities and pro-regime ceremonies. When in 1926 the Sunday patriotic 
conferences were institutionalised, the reduction in the number of delegates, structural 
problems, and the lack of cooperation on the part of the mayors seriously hampered 
the celebrations of these patriotic ceremonies. This should not come as a surprise. 
When the Italian Fascists institutionalised ‘Sunday meetings’ in the 1930s, they also 
failed to make an impact on the masses. In Spain, the initial popular scepticism 
towards the delegates turned into disapproval before long.*^* Indiscriminate political 
repression, corruption and diverse cases of power abuse proved those who initially 
saw the delegates as ‘new caciques in uniform’ to be correct. The fact that after the 
fall of the dictatorship a village welcomed republican campaigners with the banner 
“Long live to the men who bring us the rule of law” is telling. The primorriverista
The letter o f the Minister o f War to the Minister of the Interior, 12-6-1926, and the report in SHM, 
Colecciôn Adicional de Documentes, Bundle 11, Reel 7.
For the connections between the delegates and the regime’s political party see chapter 6.
RD 21-2-1930, Gaceta, 22-1-1930.
Gentile, Sacralization, 97, 186-187.
Emiio Porta, La Dictadura en las aldeas [Valencia: n. d.], 213-215.
Enrique Montero, “Reform idealized. The Intellectual and Ideological Origins o f the Second 
Republic” in Spanish Cultural Studies, 129.
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disregard for legality back lashed and led many to associate the rule of law with 
democratic reforms and a non-arbitrary constitutional system.
Many military officers realised the negative consequences of the delegates’ 
experience. Officers were simply not prepared to carry out governmental and 
administrative tasks at the local level and their acts caused dismay among civilians. 
Members of the government also perceived the lack of political and administrative 
preparation of the delegates, who tended to run the country as a military barracks. As 
mentioned above, Calvo Sotelo was one of the first to realise the negative effect the 
delegates were having on the popular image of the Dictatorship and as early as 1924 
asked Primo to dissolve the institution.*^* General Mola also noticed that the 
delegates’ actions increased the civilians’ animosity towards the entire military.*^^ An 
institution designed to nationalise the people with military values ended up producing 
the reverse effect, that is, a reinforcement of civilian values.
Pre-military education and patriotic gymnastics
The figure of the governmental delegate was conceived as a ‘shock treatment’ 
to regenerate local life. Initially, Primo declared the institution of the ‘apostles of the 
fatherland’ provisional and the gradual reduction in the number of delegates seemed 
to indicate that the institution would one day be finally abolished. However, 
nationalist indoctrination was always a factor of extreme importance in the dictator’s 
policies. While the delegates were carrying out their commissions, much more 
ambitious plans of mass indoctrination were developed. From 1925 onwards, the 
regime began the design of an educational system that would instruct every child and 
youngster in nationalist values. The result was the creation of the Servicio Nacional 
de Educacion Fisica Ciudadana y  Premilitar, (SNEFCP) - a state military 
organisation designed to morally and physically improve the ‘race’.
As mentioned above, the idea of educating youngsters in military values 
before becoming recruits was present in military literature prior to the dictatorship. As 
in many other European countries, pre-military education was present in Spain before 
WWI. This was an education given by the state-funded National Shooting Association
160 Francisco Hemândez Mir, Un crimen de lesapatria  [Madrid: 1930], 156-159.
Calvo Sotelo, Mis Servicios, 25.
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{Tiro Nacional de Espana, TNE) and private colleges, which entitled a reduction in 
the time spent in military service to those who took a series of courses and gunfire 
practice. As with many other institutions in Spain during the Restoration, the system 
did not work. Fraud in obtaining the degrees to avoid some months of military service 
was widespread in private colleges and only the rich could benefit. Moreover, the 
TNE lacked the economic and human resources for setting up schools to offer 
premilitary education to the lower classes.
Determined to overturn the inefficient conditions of pre-military education. 
Primo reorganised the system. According to the regime, pre-military instruction was 
too theoretical and very little attention was paid to physical and “moral” education. 
On top of this, private colleges were badly equipped and very expensive, so 
precluding the lower classes from joining pre-military e d u c a t i o n . T h e  guiding 
principles of the primorriverista reform were “unification of doctrine”, interclass 
integration and bringing schools under direct control of the state. Seeking “unity of 
doctrine”, a Royal Decree of 8 May 1925 established that all pre-military education 
teachers had to be military officers, including those instructing in private schools, and 
placed all schools under direct control of the Military High Command {Estado 
May or) The following month, a Royal Order specified the academic programme to
be taught in pre-military schools. Not surprisingly, the military directory introduced a 
new study plan, which strongly emphasised the teaching of physical education and 
“citizenry education” -  the latter drawing heavily upon love for the fatherland, 
discipline, honour and loyalty, among other concepts.
The pre-military educational system reform also underlined the educational 
role of the state. The state would provide its own schools free of charge in order to 
make the instruction available to the lower classes. Regarding private colleges, the 
government cancelled all licences for pre-military teaching. Only those private 
academies linked to “patriotic societies”, such as the TNE, were allowed to offer pre­
military instruction, and even in those cases were forbidden to charge for it.^^  ^Finally,
Mola, Obras complétas, 1028. Very similar views were shared by the officers Pardo Gonzâlez, 
Blanco, and Major Beta (pseudonym) in their critique of the delegates. Nava) as, 99-100.
See reports by the national assembly o f the TNE in El Tiro Nacional de Espana [Madrid: 1915], 74, 
and Tiro Nacional de Espana [Madrid: 1918], 23-27,47-69.
Primorriverista criticism o f the Restoration pre-military education in the preamble o f the RD 8-5- 
1925, CZE, 1925, n. 117, 151-155.
Art. 5 and 8, RD 8-5-1925.
ROC 27-6-1925, CLE, 1925, Appendix 6, 3-16.
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the government attempted to tackle cheating in pre-military education by reserving for 
itself the last word on service reduction. Students with a pre-military degree were to 
be examined at the barracks by army officers before they were given any sort of 
concession.*^*
These measures sought to improve an inefficient system. However, Primo 
made very clear that the 1925 reform was being enacted on a provisional basis and 
promised extensive changes in two years time.*^  ^ What the government wanted was 
an entirely new educational model, not merely an upgrading of the Restoration one. 
At the same time as legal modifications were introduced. Primo created an inter- 
ministerial commission aiming at organising a new pre-military and physical 
instruction in every educational centre in the country, from elementary schools to 
universities.*^** After the aforementioned 1926 field trip to European military 
academies, the commission concluded that the improvement of the “race” required 
drastic measures. It drew up a plan which established compulsory gymnastics for all 
Spaniards of both sexes from the ages of 6 to 18. Moreover, the state would enforce 
mandatory patriotic gymnastics in private associations and companies. Even as part of 
young ladies’ “domestic teachings”, physical education now became obligatory. All 
children and teenagers would be given a biometric card so that the government could 
follow their physical and moral development.*^* The entire society would be under 
direct governmental scrutiny, regardless of gender, class, or profession.
Pre-military education was conceived as the continuation of physical 
instruction. From the age of 18, male teenagers would join state-controlled 
paramilitary organisations, where they would develop their nationalist and militarist 
ideology further. In this manner, the dictatorship sought not only to shape “obedient 
patriots”, but also to increase the number of army reservists. Villalba considered the 
Italian pre-military education the best in Europe, for it provided the would-be 
reservists with solid discipline and a high level of solidarity. However, he lamented 
that the Italian pre-military education could not be fully applied in Spain, since the 
fascist model was run by both the army and the Volunteer Militia for the National 
Security of the State, the latter a particularly trans-alpine institution.*^^ Instead,
Art. 13, RD 8-5-1925.
RD 8-5-1925. 
RD 8-5-1925.
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Villalba proposed tighter state intervention, total military control of the Spanish 
system, and suggested pre-military instmction should eventually become mandatory 
for all male adolescents in the count ry .Fina l ly ,  the commission’s plans also 
included a post-military education for those who had finished their military service in 
the garrisons but were yet to have their annual reviews. Post-military instruction was 
to be given by the same centres teaching pre-military education to civilians up to the 
age of 38.
In March 1927, Primo formed the Citizenry, Physical and Pre-military 
Commission, with the specific task of drafting a blueprint for the new legislation on 
physical and pre-military education. The dictator named General Agustin Luque 
president of the Commission and General Villalba vice-president. In theory, the 
creation of this Commission was a good idea, since it included the president of the 
TNE, Luque, and the director of the Military Central School of Gymnastics, Villalba, 
who should have designed a definitive project for the pre-military educational system. 
In practice, different views on how the system should be framed and the stmggle to 
control it led to a ‘civil war’ inside the Commission, which ultimately delayed the 
implementation of the pre-military education programme.
If Villalba and Luque were to agree on one point, however, it was on the 
importance of female indoctrination. The view of women as the keystone of the 
“Spanish race’s physical regeneration” was common amongprimorhveristas. Both as 
girls and would-be mothers, it was argued, females had to be “scientifically” trained 
to improve their bodies and adequately educate their sons.^^  ^Hence, the Commission 
encouraged the creation of a “Female Association”, which would foster “intellectual, 
moral and citizenry education” and prepare women to fulfil “their high social 
mission” - i.e. being patriotic m o t h e r s . T h e  Commission took further steps along 
these lines and sent the plan “Female Physical Education National Project” to the 
dictator. Drafted by the school inspector Candida Cardenas Campo, the report
Ibid., 62-67.
For the dispute between Luque and Villalba about the role the TNE should play in the pre-military 
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considered women, “as citizens, [have] the same obligation as men to defend their 
patria and contribute to its progress”. Ms Cardenas put forward a scheme of 
physical and political indoctrination, in which girls and youngsters would be educated 
from the ages of 3 to 25. This indoctrination would take place “at home and in all 
private and public schools, from kindergarten to university”. Their physical 
development and the fulfilment of their patriotic duties would be monitored on a 
biometric card. Those failing to present the card would be automatically excluded not 
only from all state, provincial and municipal posts, but also from workshops and 
factories. Even marriage would be forbidden for those lacking the appropriate 
physical record. Mothers, Cardenas penned, had the unavoidable duty to educate their 
sons in “vigour, health and energy” and those not well-prepared were failing the 
nation and, therefore, should not been allowed to marry.
In general terms, Cardenas’ proposal reflected the biological ideological trends 
so much in vogue all around Europe in the 1920s. These pseudo-scientific theories 
stressed the need to redeem racial decadence and considered maternity to be a 
patriotic duty.^^* Nevertheless, the implications of Cardenas’ plan were an 
unprecedented state intervention in controlling the lives of Spaniards at work, school 
and home. If the plan was to be implemented possibilities of a clash between the state 
and the Catholic Church, and between the government and employers seemed high. 
Contrary to the passive role Fascism awarded women as “reproducers of the nation”, 
the primorhveristas envisaged the “making” of the patriotic mother as a radical state- 
led process, which blurred public and private spheres in a way not conceived in 1920s 
Italy.’’’
It was not, however, until November 1928 that the dictator created the 
National Physical Culture Committee. Primo decided to place it under direct control
Bases 14 and 15 o f “Bases que para el desarrollo en Espafia de la Educaciôn Ciudadana, Fisica y 
Premilitar présenta la Comisiôn nombrada al efecto al Excmo. Seflor Présidente del Consejo de 
Ministros”, in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 202, Box 1, File 14971.
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of the Bureau of the President and named Villalba director/S im ultaneously, an 
internal report of the Bureau of the President provided the guidelines on which the 
National Service for Physical, Citizenry and Pre-military Education (SNEFCP) would 
be framed. It established the need to directly transmit the national leader’s ideas to the 
people, assuring “unity of doctrine”, and proposed all books, documents and 
conference topics had to be selected by the Bureau of the P r e s i d e n t . I n  January 
1929, the government established the organisation of citizenry education for adults 
and pre-military and gymnastic instruction for youngsters in all non-provincial capital 
judicial districts. Once again the regime prioritised the indoctrination of the rural 
masses over industrial workers. Those Majors in a situation of “forced availability” 
{disponibles forzosos) could apply for the post on a voluntary basis with the important 
incentive of regaining their full salary -  as opposed to the 80% of the wages paid as 
disponibles forzosos. Their duties included lecturing to adults and coordinating and 
directing patriotic gymnastics and pre-military education in the judicial districts.
The mission of these officers was very similar to that assigned to the 
government delegates in terms of promoting gymnastics and organising patriotic 
conferences. When in the last weeks of January 1929 Villalba developed the 
programme, he chose to give the SNEFCP the same hierarchical structure of 
delegates. Thus, SNEFCP officers were responsible to the provincial govemors, who, 
in turn, were accountable to Villalba. The latter only had Primo commanding him. 
Seeking to have as much impact as possible, Villalba ordered SNEFCP officers to 
require assistance from the mayors and the UP local leaders in order to gather the 
masses in nationalist conferences which would take place on Sundays and other 
holidays. As for pre-military education, Villalba believed this “instmction must be 
addressed to the masses, to the totality, and not to obtain a few exceptional 
individuals.” Above military doctrine, gunmanship and gymnastics, Villalba 
emphasised the importance of “moral education”, designed “to develop in the
The Physical Culture Committee was created and placed under the direct control o f Presidencia by 
the RD 3-11-1928, DOME, 6-11-1928, n. 243, 341-342.
“Origen del excedente de la oficialidad en las escalas del Ejército”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
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audience the feeling of love for the fatherland [...] and everything else which tends to 
make them proud of being Spaniards.” *^^
The delegados had received much criticism due to their lack of preparation as 
educators of civilians. Villalba was resolved not to let this happen with the new 
‘apostles of the fatherland’. In February 1929, he began to prepare a course to 
indoctrinate SNEFCP officers before they were posted to their districts. This course 
was to be divided into political and physical education and included lectures by 
regime ideologues and classes given by the members of the Central School of 
Gymnastics. Villalba personally drafted the topics of the political lectures. The 
selection of subjects on which the director of the National Physical Culture 
Committee wanted his men indoctrinated is self-explanatory. The first conference 
should focus on national unity; the second on the doctrine of the father of Portuguese 
integralismo Antonio Sardinha; the third on ecclesiastical doctrine, aiming to explain 
to Catholics that “submission to constituted powers” was a moral duty and that there 
was no religious impediment in supporting the primorriverista regime; the fourth 
simply sought to expound upon Fascist minister Alfredo Rocco’s ideas on the 
corporative state. Primo was delighted with the syllabus. He personally wrote to the 
regime’s main ideologues to demand their participation in the conferences and opened 
the course with a short lecture.
The course took place between the 10^  ^and the 30^ *^  of March 1929 in Toledo. 
The training gathered together about 50 officers of the SNEFCP who were lectured by 
the dictatorship’s intelligentsia in the A l c a z a r . T h e  government was so pleased with 
the results that it decided to publish the lectures in a book and distributed 20,000 
copies among the civil govemors for propaganda purposes. Concurrently, captains 
and majors of the Central School of Gymnastics trained SNEFCP officers on teaching 
physical education. The training here included both theory and practice and the 
Central School of Gymnastics used its most modem educational techniques, such as
General José Villalba to Primo, 2-2-1929, “Minutas sobre el cumplimiento del Real Decreto de 14 
de Enero de 1929 sobre conferencias patriôticas e instrucciôn premilitar”, AHN, Presidencia del 
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filmed documentaries on teaching gymnastics and the application of research devices 
from the physiological laboratory.**^ The courses had a good reception amongst the 
conservative military press, which described the topics of the lectures as “a real 
gospel of citizenry brought to the rural soul” of the nation. The Gallic, Le Journal, 
was a bit more analytical and portrayed the new Spanish pre-military educational 
system as “inspired on the French model in terms of practical training and based on 
Fascist principles in terms of moral education”.***
The course in Toledo certainly provided SNEFCP officers with a better 
preparation as “apostles of the fatherland” than the delegates ever had. By June some 
SNEFCP officers were already working in their districts and, in July, Villalba 
published a Royal Order designed to cover the vacancies of SNEFCP Local Leaders 
as soon as possible.**^ Yet when the new agency was put into action, old problems 
arose. SNEFCP officers needed active cooperation from the municipal governments if 
they were to succeed in their propagandist mission. In March, the dictatorship ordered 
both civil govemors and mayors to coordinate their efforts in helping the officers. 
Provincial and local authorities were instmcted to provide premises for patriotic 
conferences, rifle ranges and gyms. In addition, they were required to publicise 
officially pre-military courses and adult conferences.*^** But for all governmental 
pressure, many mayors refused to provide the necessary facilities arguing that there 
was no money in the annual municipal budget to be spent on this issue. By early July 
the number of municipalities declining cooperation was such that Martinez Anido 
ordered the civil govemors to force municipal councils to include a special item for 
acquiring sports premises in the following year’s budget. In the interim, civil 
govemors should press local associations and individuals to temporarily and freely 
hand over their ranges and gyms to SNEFCP officers.*^*
Increasing pressure on municipal treasuries was not the only factor leading to 
the failure of the SNEFCP. For all Primo’s support, Villalba was unable to properly 
arrange the SNEFCP. As late as December 1929, a Royal Order commissioned the 
“definitive organisation” of the SNEFCP to the National Physical Cultural Committee
For the training see “Dossier con conferencias y demostraciones prâcticas” and Primo to Carlos 
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and provisionally suspended all further incorporation of officers into the service. 
When the dictatorship fell in January 1930 the SNEFCP had only 267 officers 
distributed throughout Spain and, by the end of that year, 50% of the Spanish judicial 
districts had yet to be assigned an officer.
Berenguer’s government reformed the primorriverista model of pre-military 
and adult education and reorganised the National Physical Cultural Committee. 
Once again Berenguer tried to get rid of the most radical primorriverista innovations 
in his attempt to return to the old Restoration system. It is telling that the first 
measures taken by the new government were scrapping “citizen indoctrination” from 
the educational plans and the incorporation of schoolteachers into the pre-military 
p r o g r a m m e . T h e  officers of the SNEFCP, now renamed the National Service of 
Physical and Pre-military Education (NSEFP), were not to lecture or train anymore. 
They were transformed into “inspectors” whose job it was to supervise civilian 
t e a c h e r s . I n  addition to political reasons, the motives behind the reform were also 
economic. According to Berenguer, the primorriverista system cost the government 
950,000 pesetas per year and the state simply could not afford such expenditure on a 
model that was not working and depended on the altruism of municipalities and 
private societies. The reformed system would just concentrate on pre-military 
education and incorporate civilian instructors. But the Berenguer system was also 
doomed to failure. In January 1931, the new dictator ordered the 327 infantry officers 
of the SNEFP to cease their activities. Three months later, the provisional Republican 
government suspended the National Physical Cultural Committee sine die and 
dissolved the SN EFP"‘
The primorriverista dream of imbuing all Spaniards with nationalist and 
militarist values never came true. Most of the mass indoctrination plans, whether 
concerning children, teenagers or adults were never realised. When attempted in their 
most basic form, the complexity of the task and the lack of state resources led to 
failure. Under-funded, short lived, badly organised and dependent on municipal 
charity to function, the SNEFCP could not have a real impact on the population.
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CONCLUSION: A NEGATIVE NATIONALISATION
What were the consequences of using the army as the main agency of 
nationalisation in and outside the barracks? The educational role Primo endowed the 
army with had an important cost for the military itself. Scholars have pointed out that 
military officers as a whole came out of the dictatorship even more politicised than 
they were in 1923.*^  ^ This was partly due to Primo’s military policies. The different 
factions that amalgamated themselves behind Primo in September 1923 were 
disunited in 1930. The artillerymen advanced towards republican positions after they 
felt the king had betrayed them in supporting Primo’s suppression of the corps and 
their regimental school. The junteros, most of them infantrymen, begrudged the 
dictator’s gradual support of the Africanists. This was an essential factor in the 
disruption of the regime’s educational system because the great majority of military 
teachers, delegados and officers of the SNEFCP belonged to the infantry corps. Only 
the Africanists, delighted with the dictator’s interventionist policies in Morocco from 
1924 onwards and in control of the AGM, seemed happy with Primo’s military 
policies. But the primorriverista indoctrination of officers and the direct military 
intervention in governing and educating the masses at all social levels also played an 
undeniable part in the army’s politicisation. The experience of hundreds of officers in 
local government partially explains the widespread military predisposition to 
intervene in politics during the 1930s.*^* Primorriverista values concerning the 
military’s messianic mission and the National Catholic idea of Spain seem to have 
permeated the minds of many officers. In 1931, the Republican Minister of War, 
Manuel Azana, complained about the difficulties he found in reforming the military, 
since most of the officers were obsessed with religion, valour, and elitism and 
therefore were unable to understand the needs of a modem democratic army.^^^ The 
fact that the great majority of those graduated from the AGM eventually fought on the 
Nationalist side does nothing but illustrate the nature and the influence of the 
primorriverista military education. For soldiers, the influence of the primorriverista 
educational system was rather different. The regime reformed both the recmitment 
and the educational system and brought military ceremonies to the streets. It
Gabriel Cardona, El poder militar en la Espana contemporanea hasta la guerra civil [Madrid: 
1983], 104-105.
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succeeded in raising the number of young men joining the army, but the military’s 
educational budget did not match the increase, making physical and moral 
indoctrination ineffective. It should also be remembered that the dictatorship 
maintained monetary redemptions and corruption and favouritism were far from 
eradicated from the barracks. As a result, the dictatorship could not reverse popular 
contempt for military service.
How successful might the army be considered as an agency of nationalisation 
outside the barracks? An overall consideration of the actions of the delegates and the 
SNEFCP officers indicates that the use of the army to indoctrinate the masses was a 
failure. True, the delegates managed to stage some nationalist ceremonies and 
partially mobilised the population, especially in rural areas. And yet the public image 
of the delegates soon deteriorated owing to indiscriminate repression, accusations of 
corruption and the financial strain put upon the municipal treasuries. This process was 
abetted by the very nature of the delegates’ work, which merged the role of political 
commissariat with that of “missionary of the fatherland”, and thus combined 
repression and instruction in the same figure. When the regime created an institution 
specifically devoted to nationalisation, the SNEFCP faced the same problems of 
under-funding and had no time to make an impact. Military intervention outside the 
barracks actually produced the reverse effect to what it sought to accomplish. As 
mentioned above, some military officers and members of the government noticed that 
the work of the delegates besmirched not only the regime but also the entire army. It 
also led to the discrediting of the National Catholic idea of Spain. Since the 
primorriverista officers constantly presented nation, regime and army as the very 
same thing, the drop in popular support for the regime led to a fall of support for this 
idea of Spain that the delegates were propagating. Thus the effects of the military 
indoctrination of civil society were what might be called a “negative nationalisation”, 
in which increasing opposition to the state agents propagating the official canon of the 
nation accompanied the rejection of the very idea of nation defended by those agents. 
The fact that all those groups challenging the official concept of Spain, and 
prosecuted by the “apostles of the fatherland”, (i.e. peripheral nationalists, 
regionalists. Republicans, Carlists, Anarchists, etc) re-emerged stronger than ever 
immediately after Primo’s dictatorship shows the negative effects that military 
propaganda had achieved in the process of state nationalisation. Moreover, 
conservative monarchists, Social-Catholics, Socialists, and liberals agreed on one
L 8 4
point immediately after the fall of Primo: the army should never again intervene in 
politics.^^^ As an editorial of the monarchist ABC put it, the regime’s policies had 
turned the army into a state institution “incompatible with the nation” Primo’s 
militarist policies led to a consensus on the supremacy of civil power.
This is not to say that the primorriverista use of the army as agency of 
nationalisation can be overlooked. The regime’s plans were unparalleled in Spanish 
history both in terms of scope and ambition. The dictatorship sought inspiration in 
some other European countries and chiefly found it in Fascist Italy. The SNEFCP was 
partially built on the Italian model and plans to indoctrinate women, although more 
radical in Spain, were based on the same conception of mothers as “procreators of the 
nation”. In some other cases, such as the Sunday lectures, the dictatorship’s policies 
anticipated those eventually adopted in Italy in the 1930s. The desire to shape 
Spaniards’ minds and bodies led the government to envisage a society militarily 
monitored and instructed from the cradle to the age of 38. In this respect, the regime 
advanced towards a position of totalitarian control over the Spaniards’ lives.
It has been argued that one of the main differences between Primorriverismo 
and Francoism was that in the 1920s the army regarded itself as the “interpreter” of 
the national will, whereas in the 1940s the army would consider itself the “maker” of 
the national will.^ ®^  This might have been the case of the military conspirators in 
September 1923. However, if we consider the primorriverista plans for mass 
indoctrination, tlie record suggests the regime was willing to forge, if not the “national 
will”, at least the national identity. In fact, the idea of forging civil society on military 
values was kept alive by the primorriverista intelligentsia during the Second Republic 
and the Civil War. In the electoral campaign of January 1936, Calvo Sotelo, then 
leader of the Alfonsine Monarchists, declared military values had to shape civil 
society and on these bases the “New State” would be founded.^®  ^ During the Civil 
War, Pemartln also advocated a “profound militarization of the state” that would
ABC, 29-1-1930; El Debate, 30-1-1930; El Liberal, 29-1-1930; El Sol, 2-2-1930; El Socialista, 31-
1-1930.
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emerge from the Nationalist side? "^^  There was nothing new, then, when Francisco 
Franco stated in 1942 that military values should shape civil society?^^
Pemartm, Qué es ‘lo nueyo\ 15-29. 
Blanco, La Academia, 194.
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CHAPTER 5. STATE NATIONALISATION OF THE 
MASSES: THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
“Schools must be nationalised. Every single one, whatever the type, in which 
children are not educated in Catholicism and love for Spain must and will be shut 
down ”
(Suarez Somonte)^
INTRODUCTION
Socio-economic transformations, brought about by industrialization, and 
political changes, linked to the emergence of the liberal state, paved the way for the 
creation of a modem system of public schooling in nineteenth-century Europe. The 
national educational system was designed not only to match these social changes 
and to complement the needs of a literate population, but also as a way to achieve 
social cohesion within the national ideal. Teaching the official culture and 
indoctrinating the masses in patriotic values became essential in the process of 
nation-building, as the social cement in which allegiances to the state were formed.^ 
The process of “creating nationals” in public schools had two, intertwined main 
mechanisms. First, oral and written transmission of the official language took place 
in schools controlled by the state, leading to cultural and linguistic homogenisation 
of the population. Second, state control over the curriculum provided the 
government with an enormous power when selecting which “histories” of the nation 
were taught, which sort of cultural values were transmitted as ‘national’, and which 
ideas and beliefs were considered part of the nation’s identity.^
And yet historical analyses have shown that state educational systems were far 
from being completely effective in the process of nationalisation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The lower classes seldom found sending 
their sons and daughters to the school worthwhile, since it deprived them of an 
important source of manpower and dismpted family economies. In France, for
* Quoted in Ramôn Lôpez Martin, Ideologia y  educacion en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (I). 
Escuelas y  Maestros [Valencia: 1994], 35,
 ^Gellner, Nations, 18-39.
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instance, most children in the countryside worked in the fields nine months per year 
and many peasants considered educating their sons and daughters useless."  ^Nor was 
it that linguistic acculturation made great progress either. In many rural areas, the 
majority of the adults and many children were unable to speak French and remained 
using their local languages and dialects well into the twentieth century.^
European states also met the resistance of the Church, which struggled to retain 
its traditional control over education. In Italy, liberal governments saw their 
promotion of national identity in primary schools severely challenged by the 
Catholic Church, which steadily and successfully opposed the educational 
expansion of the central state. It was not until Mussolini and the Vatican reached a 
compromise in the 1920s that the problem was partially solved, and even then, 
tensions in educational prerogatives between the Catholic hierarchy and the Fascists 
remained throughout the 1930s.^ In France, the secular educational policies of the 
Third Republic finally triumphed at the turn of the century, only to produce a strong 
reaction from the Right, which promoted a clericalist view of a ‘true’ France as the 
only hope for national renewal.^
The Spanish educational system faced very similar problems to those of its 
European neighbours. The lower classes realised that child school attendance meant 
a lost day of income from his/her labour and schoolbooks and materials were a 
serious burden on many family budgets.^ However, Spain had a lower number of 
children attending school and illiteracy rates were the highest in Western Europe at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.^ Chronically under-funded, the national 
educational system could not make much progress in expanding the Castilian 
language in rural areas of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. In addition, 
the battle among those advocating a secular education and the clericalists in the
Prasenjit Durara, “Historizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When” in Becoming 
National,\ 5 \ - \ l l \  Eduardo Manzano Moreno, “La construccion histôrica del pasado nacional”, in La 
gestion de la memoria, 33-62.
Weber, Peasants, 321-326.
306-314.
 ^ Giuseppe Talamo, “Riforma della scuola e sistemi politici”, in Fernando Garcia Sanz (ed.), Espana e 
Italia en la Europa contemporanea: desde finales del s ig h  XIX a las dictaduras [Madrid; 2002],419-426.
’ Herman Lebovics, True France, The Wars over cultural identity, 1900-1945 [Ithaca & London: 1992], 
xiii, 7.
* Rial, Revolution, 215.
 ^The number o f primary education students in France, Germany and Italy in 1905 was as follows: France 
1,422 students per 10,000 inhabitants; Germany 1,577; and Italy 928. The figure for Spain in 1909-1910 
is 746 students per 10,000 inhabitants. Data in Clara Eugenia Nùfiez, Educaciôn y  desarrollo econômico 
en la Espana contemporànea [Madrid: 1992], 292-293.
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second half of the nineteenth century did not end in a decisive victory for either, 
though the Catholic Church was granted a prominent voice within the Restoration 
system. As in the Italian case, the Catholic hierarchy acted as a parallel and 
independent power from the state. The Church had a fundamental say in the national 
school curricula, and priests sat in the national Public Instruction Council and all 
municipal and provincial educational councils. Priests were responsible for 
censoring schoolbooks and teaching the mandatory subject of Catholic religion in 
both public and private schools .Hence the promotion of civic values associated 
with the preponderance of the nation as the ultimate source of state legitimacy was 
seriously hindered.
When Primo took power, the deficiencies of the national educational system as 
an agency of mass nationalisation were evident to all political groups. The role of 
education as the key for national renewal had been at the centre of the political 
debate for decades -  acquiring a special impetus after 1898. The primorriverista 
restructuring of the educational system has to be understood as a strategic part of the 
dictator’s plans for Spain’s regeneration. Changes in the national curriculum, 
indoctrination of teachers, development of state schools and expansion of Castilian 
language became the hallmarks of a reform aimed at increasing the nationalisation 
of the masses. The present chapter analyses these transformations. The first part 
analyses the educational principles of the . primorriverista regime and the 
surveillance measures imposed on teachers. The second section deals with the new 
ceremonies and patriotic books introduced into schools to promote national identity. 
A third part explores the reception among teachers of the expansion of the state 
educational system in terms of schools and budget. The fourth section analyses the 
changes in the secondary education curriculum and the reaction it provoked in the 
Catholic Right. The last pages of the chapter look at the implementation of official 
linguistic policies and the political implications the process of “Spanishization” had 
in Catalonia.
Manuel de Puelles Benitez, “Secularizaciôn de la ensefianza en Espafla 1875-1917)” in Espana entre 
dossiglos (1875-1931), 197.
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EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE CONTROL OF TEACHERS
Primo’s regenerationist views were clearly reflected in the regime’s educational 
policies. He believed that educational reform was essential to the formation of ‘new 
Spaniards’. The dictator took an active role in the educational reform and got involved 
in the institutionalisation of a formative public school system that sought to overcome 
the cleavages in Spanish society and imbue the population with a common national 
identity. For the primorri\eristas the indoctrination of the masses in National-Catholic 
values and the transformation of the educational system could only be achieved with the 
intervention of the state. The regime’s discourse always prioritised the formation of a 
strong state as the essential device for social indoctrination. Thus, the Church should be 
subordinate to the state on educational matters and the government must have last word 
in the contents of the public school curricula.
This is not to say that the regime opposed teaching religion in public schools. On 
the contrary, the ideological architects of National Catholicism maintained religious 
education should be mandatory as an essential part of the nationalist indoctrination of 
Spanish children. The ideologues of the regime argued that that if Catholicism was 
consubstantial with the Spanish nation, then religion should be taught as part of patriotic 
education. Together with a strong religious education, the primorriveristas advocated 
the introduction of military values of honour, obedience and sacrifice in primary 
schools, as the initial steps in the formation of a citizen-soldier.^"^ In addition, 
ideologues of the regime recommended fostering the presence of Spanish history and 
literature in the curricula, introducing Spanish-American History into the educational 
plans, and imposing Castilian language in all public schools.^^
The primorriverista educational programme faced important obstacles in its 
implementation. First, the immense power the Church in educational matters and the
Boyd, Historia, 166.
Prime de Rivera, Disertacion, 16; Adân and Tarrasa, Ciudadania, 96-97; Mask, Hacia la Espana 
nueva, 277-281.
Pemân, El hecho, 308-314; Pemartm, Los valores, 423; Rodriguez Tarduchy, Psicologia, 249; Manuel 
Siurot Rodriguez, “La escuela y sus problemas bâsicos” in Pérez Agudo et al., Curso de ciudadania, 181.
Francisco Caballero Infante, Educacion civicay su alcance en la Escuela Primaria [Sevilla: 1924].
Pemân, El hecho, 308-314, For the proposal, later adopted by the government, o f the introduction of 
Spanish American history in the curriculum see Pérez Agudo, “Lamentable estado de la Ensefianza. Los 
estudios Hispano-Americanos”, Revista de Segunda Ensenanza, January 1926; Blanca de los Rios, 
“Nuestra raza es espahola (Ni latina ni ibera)”. Revista de Segunda Ensenanza, June 1926.
190
feeble state structure made it impossible for the regime to run the school system without 
ecclesiastical cooperation. Second, the political support all Catholic groups initially 
gave to the dictatorship would be put at risk should the dictatorship drastically limit the 
Church’s educational influence. As in other instances, Primo sought to integrate the 
Church within the system. In the words of the dictator, priests and teachers should 
combine their efforts to inculcate love for the patria and the regime in the children’s 
m i n d s . I n  practical terms, the policies of the regime sought expanding public 
education at the same time as granting measures favourable to the Church. The price of 
integration and cooperation was maintaining ecclesiastical privileges in private schools, 
while enforcing state authority in the entire educational system. The delegados were 
granted the power of supervising teaching materials and curricula. Moreover, the 
delegates were ordered to punish all those educators, secular or ecclesiastical, who 
propagated ideas against the official doctrine. Military officers became the supreme 
local authorities on educational matters, controlling both public and private schools.
Control and repression of primary education teachers
In his role as the Iron Surgeon, Primo believed that to ‘cure’ the educational 
system he first had to remove the “cancerous cells” from the national body. The first 
educational measures taken by the dictatorship aimed to stop the spread of so-called 
‘unpatriotic doctrines’ in the schools and impose Castilian as the only language in the 
classrooms. Issued less than a week after the coup, the ‘decree against separatism’ 
contemplated prison sentences for those propagating secessionist doctrines in schools.^^ 
Two days later, a circular reminded primary school teachers that it was compulsory to 
teach in Castilian and forbade Catalanist books and schools.** In October 1925, a royal 
order perfectly encapsulated the ideas behind the primorriverista educational policy: the 
main goal of the state was to seek its own preservation and the government had to 
pursue this objective above all others. The state demanded an obligatory cooperation 
from all citizens, most especially from public officers who had the duty to serve it 
loyally in every single moment of their lives. Teachers had to be “a paladin of civic 
virtues” in and outside the school. Those publicizing ideas against the unity of the 
fatherland (whether actively or by omitting “essential facts in the explanation of
Art. 2, RD 18-9-1923, Gaceta, 19-9-1923
LaNaciôn, 1-1-1929.
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Circular 20-10-1923, BOMIP, 16-11-1923, 833-834.
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Geography and History”), or attacking Catholicism, private property and family values 
were committing a crime against the state and the nation/^
In order to secure an adequate implementation of the above legislation, the 
dictatorship created mechanisms for monitoring teachers. Once again, the figure of the 
delegado became paramount in terms of both propaganda and repression. The delegates 
were soon commissioned with the task of inspecting public and private schools and 
penalizing those teachers propagating “antipatriotic ideas’’.^ ® Indeed, throughout the 
entire dictatorship Primo and Martinez Anido encouraged the delegates to devote their 
efforts to mass indoctrination.^* As shovm in chapter 4, the delegates were extremely 
active in delivering official propaganda and organising nationalist ceremonies in rural 
and urban areas. Moreover, they were keen to gain the much-needed maestros' support 
for the organisation of patriotic lectures for adults and children, something they 
managed to obtain on many occasions.^^
Primo took a personal interest in controlling teachers. He set up a surveillance 
scheme that sought to reward and punish teachers according to their political loyalty 
towards the dictatorship and their competence in propagating nationalist ideas. In 1924 
and again in 1925, Primo ordered Martinez Anido to collect the names of those state 
teachers {maestros nacionales) who had shown an extraordinary zeal at work.^^ Primary 
school inspectors nominated candidates for the rewards and the governmental delegates 
supervised and authorised the names proposed. Then the delegates handed the file to the 
civil governors who reported to Martinez Anido and General Navarro y Alonso de 
Celada, the Military Directory ‘minister’ of education.^"* What lay behind the idea of 
rewarding competent maestros was not only to gain teachers’ support for the regime, 
but actually to draw up a census of loyalist and opposition educators in Spain. These 
investigations on the “best” teachers were complemented with enquires about those
19 RO, 13-10-1925, Colecion Legislativa de Instruccion Publica (hereafter CLIP), 1925, 569-571.
RO 29-8-1924, CLIP, 1924, 533-534.
Martinez Anido to civil governors. Circular letter, 7-12-1923; Primo de Rivera to delegates, 10-12- 
1923; Martinez Anido to delegates, Circular letter, 8-3-1925, AG A, Interior, Box 149.
See dozens o f letters and telegrams fi*om teachers to Primo in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 
356, Box 1.
See Martinez Anido to civil governors, 27-5-1924; Martinez Anido to Primo, Report on teachers, 13-
11-1924; General Navarro to Martinez Anido, 11-22-1925, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 
3.
See Martinez Anido to civil governors, 14-2-1925; Martinez Anido to civil governors o f Alicante, 
Badajoz, Baléares, Burgos, Gerona, Granada, Logrofio, Orense, Palencia, Santander, Teruel and Vizcaya, 
27-2-1925; Martinez Anido to Primo de Rivera, 2-7-1925. AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 
3.
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maestros that were not following the primorriverista legislation. In many occasions, the 
reports sent to Madrid included sanctions imposed upon teachers.^^
Purges of teachers from public and private schools were a constant throughout 
the dictatorship. Initially fuelled by accusations from the public, the delegates inspected 
schools and the civil governors sanctioned dozens of teachers from late 1923, on the 
grounds of recommending Unamuno’s books, teaching liberal doctrines or refusing to 
gather pupils for the visit of the Bishop.^^ The formation of the Civil Directory did not 
lead to a lessening of the inquisitorial role of the delegates. In May 27, 1926, the 
General Director for Primary Education, Suarez Somonte, declared schools “must be 
nationalised” and threatened to shut down “every single one, whatever the type”, in 
which children were not indoctrinated in Catholicism and love for Spain.^^ The new 
civilian team in charge of education really meant it. The day after Suarez’s comments 
were published in the press, the Minister of Public Instruction, Eduardo Callejo, wrote 
to Martinez Anido inquiring whether the delegates were still legally entitled to inspect 
schools, and requested further involvement of the military in the persecution of 
maestros with “irregular behaviour”.^ * The Interior Minister reassured Callejo and 
replied that the governors would keep on supervising and sanctioning teachers via 
delegates and inspectors to “correct those irregularities”.^  ^ The record suggests that 
Martinez Anido was right and dozens of teachers where expelled, fined and removed 
from their posts for political reasons during the civil directory, while some others were 
rewarded for their loyalty to the regime.^®
In the long term the military control imposed upon maestros had the same 
negative effects as the primorriverista persecution of other public employees. Teachers 
grew increasingly frustrated by the despotism of the delegates. In 1927, different groups 
of teachers wrote to Primo advocating a different and pedagogic model of inspection as
See, for example, General Navarro to Martinez Anido, 22-11-1925; Martinez Anido to the Civil 
Governor o f Almerla, 14-2-1925; Martinez Anido to the Civil Governor o f Castellôn, 14-2-1925; Civil 
Governor o f Pontevedra to Martinez Anido, 16-2-1925. AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 3. 
^^Ben-Ami, 105.
Lôpez Martin, Ideologia (I), 35.
Callejo to Martinez Anido, 29-5-1926, AGA, Interior, Box 149.
Martinez Anido to Callejo, 4-6-1926, AGA, Interior, Box 149,
See, for example, reports from the civil governors to Martinez Anido in AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, 
Bundle 61, Box 3; “Uniôn Ciudadana Anticaciquil de Villalba” to the General Director of Primary 
Educaction, 20-11-1927, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358; Primo de Rivera to Callejo, 9-1- 
1930, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 114, Box 2.
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opposed to the repressive one established by the dictatorship/^ In some exceptional 
instances, the actions of the delegates led to outbursts of violence. In the town of Moya 
(Las Palmas), for example, the father of a sanctioned teacher tried to kill the local 
delegado by stabbing him in the neck.^^ When the dictatorship fell in 1930, teachers 
denounced in the press the repression they had suffered under Primo and demanded an 
amnesty for some of their colleagues, arguing that the primorriverista system did not 
seek to correct the faults of those expelled, but merely to get rid of those politically 
problematic for the regime.^^
Scrutinizing the teachers’ message also required controlling primary school 
inspectors. The regime almost immediately realised school inspectors’ potential to 
supplement the delegates’ work. Inspectors were granted the power to close down 
public and private schools where doctrines against the unity of the fatherland or against 
religion were taught. They could also close down schools if they found teachers 
teaching in languages other than Castilian. Should they find any opposition from the 
headmaster or teachers, the inspector had to inform the civil governor, who would 
enforce the sanction.^"  ^ In the Royal Decree of 13 October 1925 inspectors and school 
directors were again ordered to be on the alert for cases in which anti-social ideas or 
doctrines against the unity of the patria could be exposed. In those cases with “enough 
circumstantial evidence” {indicios suficientes de culpabilidad), teachers could be 
suspended straight away.^^ The government insisted inspectors had to thoroughly 
examine text books and students to find out whether anti-patriotic or anti-social ideas 
had been taught.^^ What is more, inspectors had to inquire about teachers’ behaviour 
outside the school. They should investigate how maestros conducted themselves in 
town and whether they spread anti-patriotic ideas among the locals.^^ This effectively 
turned school inspectors into spies at the service of the regime. Once more, the 
primorriverista dictatorship blurred the frontiers between public and private spheres in 
the name of protecting the fatherland, while attempting to build the surveillance 
machinery of a totalitarian state.
See various letters from teachers to Primo, December 1927, in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 
358.
For the assassination attempt see civil governor o f Las Palmas to Martinez Anido, 19-2-1929, AHN, 
Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17A, Box 2.
El Magisterio Espanol, 14-5-1930.
RO 12-2-1924, CLIP, 1924, 84-85.
Art. 1, RO 13-10-1925, CLIP, 1925, 569-571.
These examinations and sanctions applied equally to private shools. Art. 2, 3 and 4, RO 13-10-1925. 
Art. 5, RO 13-10-1925.
194
As de facto assistants to the delegates, inspectors also played an active part in 
the propaganda machine, organising patriotic conferences and establishing cultural 
associations.^* However, it was the inspectors’ repressive role that had a deeper impact 
on the primorriverista educational system. The wave of expectations that the Military 
Directory initially created led many ordinary citizens and public officers to send 
confidential accusations denouncing teachers to the military government. In the first 
three months of the dictatorship, hundreds of teachers were accused of diverse 
irregularities -  from repeated absenteeism to running illegal businesses selling school 
materials in class. Trying to cope with the situation. General Luis Navarro quickly 
reacted by sending inspectors to investigate the claims, usually within less than ten 
days.^^ By early December 1923, the cascade of accusations was such that the 
government issued a Royal Order attempting to harmonise the investigations."^® The 
inspectors found themselves with the huge task of running hundreds of ‘criminal’ 
investigations against teachers. The latter, quite correctly, saw the inspectors as 
repressive bureaucrats and governmental spies and soon showed strong disaffection for 
them. In every single annual meeting of the Asociacion Nacional del Magisterio 
throughout the dictatorship, teachers demanded the inspection task should be carried out 
by maestros and not by ‘functionaries’."*^
Not that the impact of the primorriverista system was any better among the 
inspectors themselves. Military control and the inquisitorial tasks imposed upon the 
inspectors increasingly led to the complete politicization of the corps. As a cuerpo de 
funcionarios the inspectors lost their autonomy and became subordinate to the 
delegados and civil governors. The fact that the delegates were ordered to perform the 
same job as the inspectors also infuriated the latter, who steadily and unsuccessfully 
protested against military meddling."*  ^ The regime reacted to these demands of 
professional independence by further tightening the state control over the inspectors. In
See, for instance, Civil Governor of Ciudad Real to Presidencia del Gobiemo, 12-7-1928, AHN, 
Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358; Civil Gobemor o f Àlava to Martinez Anido, 26-2-1926; Civil 
Govemor o f Santander to Martinez Anido, 8-3-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 3.
For accusations between September and December, 1923, see AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 
101, Files 1 to 460. More accusations for the period 1924-1930 in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
Bundle, 217, Box 1; and AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358.
RO 13-12-1923, CLIP, 1923, 511. Functionaries were wamed that they would be punished should they 
present false claims. As with local political leaders, it seems that many people took the fall o f the 
Restoration regime to carry out personal vendettas against teachers.
Lôpez Martin, Ramôn, “La Inspecciôn de la Enseftanza Primaria en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera”, 
in Historia de la Educaciôn, n. 6, (1987), 316-317.
Ib id , 319-320.
October 1926, the government granted the Ministry of Public Instruction with the power 
to transfer inspectors to different posts around the country. This fragrantly violated the 
principle of immobility of inspectors established in 1913, which only infuriated the 
inspectors further."^  ^Additionally, Primo and Martinez Anido reassured the delegates in 
their ‘educational mission’ and insisted they should keep educators under close 
observation."^"^
These measures, in fact, complemented rather more surreptitious governmental 
manoeuvres. In June 1926, Martinez Anido set up an intelligence network to spy on 
inspectors. In a confidential letter, he instructed all civil governors to secretly gather 
information about “the political moral and social milieu” in which the inspectors 
worked and lived. Martinez Anido commanded the delegates should watch the 
inspectors closely and report their political affinity to the governors. The governors in 
turn should report to the General Director of Primary Education for possible sanctions 
The following week, the first confidential intelligence reached the Ministry of Public 
Instruction. The governors’ reports were political files on every single inspector in 
Spain, detailing their activities outside the schools and their degree of loyalty to the 
dictatorship."^^ Many inspectors not fulfilling their ‘patriotic duties’ were removed from 
their posts, especially in Catalonia where the primorriveristas launched a ‘crusade’ 
against the use of Catalan in primary schools."^^
The primorriverista military-run surveillance system of schools proved to have 
unintended consequences. As in many other areas, the work of the military delegates led 
to a backlash by civilian professionals who grew increasingly hostile to the dictatorship. 
The regime’s reaction to this discontent, tightening state control and purging the cuerpo, 
only made things worst. Once the dictatorship had fallen, the inspectors themselves 
publicly complained about the political policing the dictatorship had force them to 
undertake and called for a complete rearrangement of the corps and the recovery of their 
pedagogic task."^ * The primorriverista system alienated inspectors from the regime and
For the inspectors dissatisfaction with the RD 22-10-1926 see El Magisterio Espanol, 20-11-1926.
^  See Martinez Anido to civil governors, 27-1-1926 in AGA, Interior, Box 149; and RO 28-12-1927, in 
La Gaceta, 29-12-1927.
Martinez Anido to civil governors, “Circular Confidencial y Reservada”, 24-6-1926, AHN, 
Gobemaciôn Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 3.
On some occasions the civil governors sent copies of their reports to Martinez Anido. See Civil 
Govemor o f Corufia to Director General o f Primary Educaction, 3-7-1926; Civil Govemor o f Murcia to 
Martinez Anido, no date; Civil Govemor o f Zaragoza to Martinez Anido 1-7-1926. AHN, Gobemaciôn 
Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 3.
Lôpez Martin, “La Inspecciôn”, 321.
El Magisterio Espanol, 19-4-1930; El Magisterio Espanol, 18-6-1930.
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the maestros from the inspectors. A key element in the chain of ideological control in 
the educational system, the inspection of schools, was broken by the primorriveristas.
PATRIOTIC BOOKS AND CEREMONIES
Intensive governmental activities in banning books and repressing ideas were 
not initially matched with serious changes in the primary education curriculum. The 
regime, however, was keen in selecting the ‘appropriate’ Spanish history texts and 
elaborated lists of books to be bought by public schools and libraries."^  ^The dictatorship 
drew upon a range of nationalist texts for children written for the ‘Book of the Patria’ 
award. Created by the Maurist Minister of Education, Cesar Silio, in 1921, this prize 
aimed to stir patriotic feelings and promote ‘civic virtues’ among children. Although the 
jury failed to choose a vanner in 1922, many of the 63 works presented were later 
published and included in the official reading lists during the dictatorship.^® The 
primorriveristas chose to grant official status to those works that portrayed the imperial 
glories and Catholicism as the hallmarks of Spanish history, while at the same time 
emphasising the idea of the ‘fatherland in danger’. It is important to notice here that a 
common feature of these books was the continuous appeal to national vanity coupled 
with the use of a passionate and stirring language. This was a patriotic education 
understood not as intellectual education, but as emotional learning and, hence, its 
obsessive resort to the idea of the ‘endangered patria’ and its continuous emotional 
appeal to ‘feel the greatness of the fatherland’. Hence, too, the essential role of teachers 
in this emotional pedagogic technique, which required a total and fervent commitment 
from the maestros in order to make a decisive impact on the young audience.
Primorriverista educational policies undoubtedly provided the adequate ground 
for an editorial boom of patriotic schoolbooks. Some of the works presented to the 
‘Book of the Patria’ award were directly backed by the regime’s ideologues, such as 
Adolfo Villanueva’s Patria y  Hogar, a book for which Peman wrote the prologue.^^ 
Some others became bestsellers, as was the case of Manuel Siurot’s La emocion de 
Espana, a book modelled on the French patriotic reader. Le tour de France par deux
Del Pozo and Braster, “The Rebirth”, 89.
Alberto del Pozo Pardo, “El Libro de la Patria’, Un concurso escolar vaclo, de matiz regeneracionista 
(1921-1923)”, in J. Ruiz Berrio (ed.). La educaciôn en la Espana contemporànea [Madrid: 1985], 195- 
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Adolfo Villanueva, Patria y  Hogar [Burgos: 1927].
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enfantsP  Moreover, the primorriverista campaign launched in 1926 to produce 
patriotic books did nothing but increase the number of works published aiming at 
fortifying national identity among children.Simultaneously, the government made 
sure that the editorial boom matched public demand. It included these new titles in the 
officially ‘recommended books’ for the escuelas nacionales, delivered them to schools 
and public libraries and gave them out to the inspectors and teachers involved in the the 
organisation of patriotic conferences in rural areas. A sort of history book that had had a 
good market during the Restoration now found the market expanded by state 
intervention.
Although the commercial success of these works certainly pleased the 
dictatorship, the primorriveristas sought more state control over school-texts. As early 
as November 1923, Primo ordered the Royal Council of Public Instruction to produce a 
report on the establishment of a single text in primary and secondary education. 
However, clashes between the regime and the liberal-controlled Royal Council of Public 
Instruction seem to have precluded the production of the report. In 1926, the regime 
purged the Council, filled it with primorriverista loyalists, and ignored the institution 
hereafter.^^ Yet the government was determined to have a single text for primary 
education and ordered the Royal Academy of History to prepare a graded series of 
history texts for mandatory use in the country’s public schools. The Royal Academy of 
History asked the former director of the Centre of Historical Studies, Rafael Altamira to 
create the series.^^ A liberal fully committed to the promotion Spanish patriotism via 
history books, Altamira wrote the first manual of the series. Interestingly, the book 
presented the Habsburg rule as the Spanish golden age and, much in line with the 
primorriverista discourse, emphasised the recently “renewed prestige of Spaniards” in
Manuel Siurot Rodriguez, La emocion de Espam  [Madrid: 1924]. By 1927 the book had reached its 
third edition.
Among those children’s ‘patriotic books’ published during the dictatorship were Virgilio Hueso, 
Nociones de Historia de Espana [Madrid: 1923]; Alfredo Gil Mufliz, Hispania Mater, 3 vol. [Burgos: 
1923-1930]; Julio Cejador y Fracua, Tierray Alma Espanola [Madrid: 1924]; Gabriel Vergara, Nociones 
de Historia de Espana [Madrid: 1927]; C. Suârez (Espafiolito), Rafael Novela para muchachos [Madrid: 
1926]; Pascual Santacruz, Espana sobre todo [Madrid: 1926]; Ezequiel Solana, La Patria Espanola’, 
Manuel Siurot Rodriguez, La emocion de Espana’, Martinez Mufloz, Una escuela de la Patria; Juan Ruiz 
Romero, La Raza [Barcelona: 1926]; G. Victores Femândez, Cartilla para la instruccion civico- 
patriotica de los ninos [Guadalajara: 1927]; idem. Manual Civico-Patriôtico para los ninos y  adultos 
[Guadalajara: 1928]; Gerardo Rodriguez, Historia de Espana [Madrid: 1928]; José Xandri Pich, Del solar 
hispano: (notas goegràficas e histôricas, costumbres y  folklore) [Palencia: n. d.]; Gabino Enciso 
Villanueva, Mi patria: Lo que ha sido, lo que es y  lo que puede llegar a  ser [Burgos: 1929, 1 ed. 1920].
For the reform o f the Council see RD 25-6-1926. After the reform the Council was not consulted in 
major educational reforms.
Boyd, Historia, 160, 190.
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the international arena and the hope the nation would “as important in the world as it 
was from the times of the Catholic Kings to the mid-seventeenth century”.^  ^However, 
Altamira’s work was not published until 1930. Berenguer’s government granted the text 
official status on March that year and it became mandatory in all public schools.^^ 
Liberal teachers welcomed the book, while the Catholic Right criticized For the 
primorriveristas it was all too late. By the time the book was in the schools. Primo had 
been forced to resign.
If the regime’s attempt to produce a single history text can only be considered in 
terms of failure, the dictatorship did much better when it came to promoting patriotic 
ceremonies. Whether introduced in the curriculum or considered as extra-curricular 
activities, the primorriveristas gave a great importance to the commemoration of so- 
called ‘patriotic events’. Anniversaries of Primo’s coup, the Day of the Spanish Race 
and the Feast of the Somatén flag sanctification became school festivals in which 
children were lectured on the nation, the regime and its leader. More often than not, 
these commemorations also included a ceremony in which the national flag was blessed 
while students sang patriotic hymns.^° In this manner, students were encouraged to 
internalise images of national identity in an atmosphere of patriotic communion 
specifically created to excite the feelings of the youngsters. For example, after the first 
transatlantic aerial crossing from Spain to South America in 1926 by Spanish pilots, the 
state ordered public schools to explain the event in geography class.^  ^ The idea behind 
the teaching of such an event was twofold. First, the authorities attempted to combat the 
inferiority complex that, according to them, some progressive regenerationist views had 
created among the masses. The flight of the Plus Ultra, the official press stated, was 
evidence of the fact that Spain was no backward country and could achieve great 
modem “deeds”. Second, the crossing was portrayed as a contemporary Columbus’ 
voyage, therefore, underlining the Hispanista vision of the dictatorship. In an
Real Academia de la Historia [Rafael Altamira], Historia de Espana, para use de las escuelas 
primarias [Madrid; 1930], 61.
RO 16-4-1930, Gaceta, 23-4-1930.
For the liberals see El Magisterio Nacional, 6-5-1930. For the Catholic Right, Atenas, 15-3-1931, 273- 
274.
Some examples o f these ceremonies in public and private schools in Delegate o f Alpeta to Presidencia,
2-5-1924; Delegate o f La Roda to Presidencia, 2-5-1924, Delegate of Concentaina to Presidencia, 17-10- 
1924, AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 133, Box 1; Delegate o f La Roda to Martinez Anido, 21-5-1924, AHN, 
Presidencia, Bundle 331, Box 1; Civil Govemor o f Granada to Primo de Rivera, 20-3-1926; Presidencia 
del Consejo de Ministres report, 21-6-1926; Civil Govemor o f Comfta to Ministrio de Gobemaciôn, 2-9- 
1926, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358. See also El Magisterio Espanol, 10-10-1928; La 
Vanguardia, 13-10-1923; El Noticiero Universal, 12-10-1928.
1QQ
atmosphere of nationalist exaltation, the record suggests that teachers not only 
explained the aviators’ adventure in class, but many schools organised public homages 
to the “heroes of the Plus Ultra'\^^
The regime was also keen on of inventing and re-inventing traditions. The 
official establishment of the Day of the Spanish Book {Fiesta del Lihro) was 
unquestionably the primorriveristas' greatest success. Created by the Royal Decree of 6 
February 1926, the fiesta was to be celebrated in all educational institutions on 7 
October, the anniversary of the birth of Cervantes. The government was completely 
resolved to direct the festivity and carefully instructed primary and secondary schools, 
universities, polytechnics and professional colleges on how they had to observe the 
event. Every educational institution in the country was legally obliged “to 
commemorate the Day of the Spanish Book with solemn public events, dedicated to 
praise and popularise national publications and the culture of the fatherland”.^  ^Primary 
schools should devote “at least, one hour to explain to students the importance of books 
as instruments of culture, civilization and [spiritual] richness”.^ "* To make sure the 
celebrations took place in the manner the government had planned, three weeks before 
the first Day of the Spanish Book, Martinez Anido mobilised civil governors and 
delegates for the occasion.^^ The Minister of Interior ordered all diputaciones 
provinciales and municipalities to cooperate with the celebration and organise public 
lectures in the high schools. In addition, all public corporations had to assign a certain 
percentage of their budget to buy books to be donated to poor children and “popular” 
(public) libraries had to be built in every Spanish province.^^
Behind the promotion of libraries and the donation of books lay the 
regenerationist idea of educating the masses in patriotic values as a way to build a 
strong national identity.^^ But the Fiesta del Libro had further implications. Above all, it 
was a vindication of the Castilian language. Restoration liberal governments had 
promoted Castilian as the national language in public schools and turned Don Quixote 
into a national emblem. In 1912 and again in 1920, the educational authorities ordered
RO 3-2-1926, BOMIP, 9-2-1926.
See tens o f teachers’ reports in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358.
RD 6-2-1926, Gaceta 9-2-1926.
RO 17-9-1926, in El Magisterio Espanol, 21-9-1926, 754.
Martinez Anido to all Civil Governors, 20-9-1926, AHN, Gobemaciôn Serie A, Bundle 61, Box 3.
RO 17-9-1926, in El Magisterio Espanol, 28-9-1926, 833-834. Further legislation insisting on the 
donations was issued two years later, RO 24-9-1928, in El Magisterio Espanol, 1-10-1928, 14.
For a contemporary interpretation o f the Fiesta del Libro as a means to improve the “integral health of
the race” see José Martos Peinado in El Magisterio Espanol, 1-10-1928, 1-4.
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the mandatory reading of Don Quixote in public schools on a daily basis. The 
primorriverista establishment of the Fiesta del Libro was the heyday of the linguistic 
policies of school Spanishization. It was also the National-Catholic response to similar 
celebrations peripheral nationalists and regionalists held, such as the Day of the Catalan 
Language. It was no coincidence, then, that Primo’s government made significant 
efforts for the promotion of the Fiesta del Libro in Catalonia.^^ At the same time, the 
regime’s ideologues were always eager to stress the universal character of Castilian 
language, linking it to their Hispanista policies and the revival of Spanish 
imperialism.^^ The figure of Cervantes, himself a soldier who had participated in the 
battle of Lepanto, was a permanent reminder of the sixteenth century Spanish imperial 
glories.
According to the conservative press, the celebration of the Fiesta del Libro was 
an important achievement for the Dictatorship.^^ In Seintander, for example, three new 
libraries were opened in the province to commemorate Cervantes on 7 October 1926. In 
addition, school trips were organised to the library of Menéndez Pelayo. Once there, 
children were lectured on the historian’s live and said a prayer for the soul of the 
traditionalist thinker, the honour of the nation and the Spanish book in front of the 
statue of Menéndez P e l ay o .O n e  of the reasons for this success lay in the teachers’ 
support for the celebration. Teachers welcomed the initiative from the very first day and 
took an active role in the celebrations. El Magisterio Espanol praised the Fiesta as 
follows: “[This is] one of the government’s best ideas. And, it has not been just an 
initiative, like many others that are later forgotten, but [the government] has made its 
best since the very first day and has mobilised all possible elements for the Fiesta to 
produce positive results.”^^  Martinez Anido’s network turned out to be highly effective 
in mobilising teachers.
Nevertheless, for all the primorriverista use of the state apparatus, the success of 
the Fiesta del Libro in terms of mass mobilisation should not be exaggerated. 
According to Gomez Baquero, a liberal educationalist, the general public scarcely 
attended the events organised in schools and academies nor did bookshops increase
For the implementation o f the Fiesta del Libro in Catalonia see below, ‘The Spanishization of  
Catalonia’.
For the promotion o f Castilian and the Hispanista policies o f the UP ideologues see chapter 3,
M. Cluyle, “Don Quijote en Flandes”, Revista de Segunda Ensenanza, December 1926, 383-385.
ABC, 9-10-1928; El Magisterio Espanol, 12-10-1929.
Union Patriotica, 1-11-1926, 24.
El Magisterio Espanol, 7-10-1926, 67-68.
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their sales during the 1927 celebrations. In his view, the main problem was that the 
regime had put too much stress on public rites to commemorate the Fiesta del Libro, but 
these were newly created artificial ceremonies and the public did not respond. “The 
Fiesta del Libro began imposing a liturgy and two years later it is already old, wasted, 
decrepit”, he concluded.
Not all patriotic ceremonies in the schools were recent primorriverista 
inventions. In some cases, the regime revitalized old rituals and transformed them into 
new National Catholic ceremonies. First celebrated in the 1890s, the Day of the Tree 
{Fiesta del Ârboî) was a salutation of nature and the fatherland, in which school 
children planted trees and teachers gave patriotic discourses. Planting trees symbolised 
the growth of the locality as part of the regeneration of the whole nation. For many 
conservative regionalists, the Fiesta del Arbol became the main exponent of how the 
“little patria” could regenerate the “larger patria” and the ceremonies spread throughout 
Spain in the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1904 the Fiesta del Arbol was 
officially established and in 1915 it was declared a mandatory celebration in all national 
schools. However, the ‘officialisation’ of the fiesta signalled its decline since many 
municipalities saw it as a centralist imposition from Madrid. By the early 1920s, the 
Day of the Tree was in clear decay.
Primo decided to revive the ritual as a means of patriotic child indoctrination. 
The original conservative regionalist message of promoting the “little patria” had to be 
modified, for it antagonised the primorriverista Unitarian concept of Spain. 
Unsurprisingly, the regime called upon the delegados to modify the message.^^ Since 
the very beginning of the dictatorship, they organised the Day of the Tree in their 
districts as part of their general task of promoting patriotic feelings among the 
population.^^ The delegates organised the fiesta in the same manner as other patriotic 
rituals: they assembled the local authorities, hoisted and blessed the national flag and 
gave patriotic speeches. The teachers were also invited to utter some patriotic words and 
children read poems and sang nationalist songs composed for the event. On many 
occasions, the local priest recited a public mass, sanctifying the flag and the trees as the 
symbolic and organic representations of the patria. In this ‘patriotic communion’, the 
delegados certainly fulfilled their role of ‘apostles of the fatherland’, while teachers
El Sol, 12-10-1927.
Del Pozo, Curriculum, 219-224.
Martinez Anido to delegates, 8-3-1925, AGA, Interior, Box 149.
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became the ‘priests of the nation’ addressing their young ‘flock’. As with the 
primorriverista ceremonies for soldiers, Catholic imagery and rhetoric were integrated 
into civic patriotic rituals in schools. Like all the other National-Catholic ceremonies, 
this integration was in terms of subordination to the supreme deity: the nation.
It is beyond question that the regime saw schools as the most important vehicle 
for the transmission and consolidation of nationalist images, symbols and discourses. 
Whether drawing upon liberal icons (Don Quixote) or conservative rituals (the Day of 
the Tree), the primorriveristas transformed messages and rituals of the Restoration and 
turned them into specific National Catholic celebrations. Control from the Interior 
Ministry and the use of delegados also homogenised primorriverista patriotic and civic 
rituals in terms of ceremony and discourse. In these celebrations of the nation, the 
school became the church of the fatherland and the commemoration of civic saints, like 
Cervantes, was entrusted to teachers in their role as lay priests.H ow ever, the effective 
transmission of National Catholicism as a civic religion in the school needed something 
more than patriotic lectures and rituals. Improving the material conditions of schools 
and teachers became indispensable for the success of the indoctrination policies of the 
regime.
STRUCTURAL REFORMS: SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS
The dictatorship adopted the battle against illiteracy as one of its main 
educational priorities. Like the regenerationists, the primorriveristas considered the 
high number of illiterates in Spain as a symptom of the country’s backwardness, and 
accused the caciques of deliberately keeping the masses ignorant so the local elites 
could maintain their political power.^^ Since the beginning of the dictatorship. Primo 
directed the delegates to create cultural associations, which would provide reading 
classes in towns and villages.*® He also demanded public cooperation in this task, 
especially from teachers and priests, and mobilised the UP militants for the organisation 
of ‘anti-illiteracy campaigns’.** Although these measures may have had some sort of 
temporary effect and certainly scored a propaganda victory for the government, they
Dozens o f reports from the delegates in AHN, Presidencia, Bundles Bundle 358 and 331, Box 1.
For a description o f the school as the church o f the patria in where kids worship “Saint Cervantes” and 
the maestro are the priests o f the fatherland, see Rafael Pérez Pérez in El Magisterio Espanol, 3-10-1928, 
35-36.
Diaz Retg, Espana, 54; Pemartin, Los valores, 422,
RD 20-10-1923, Gaceta, 21-10-1923.
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could not solve the problem of illiteracy in Spain. As Primo’s much-admired Joaquin 
Costa had noticed at the turn of the century, only by tackling the chronic shortage of 
schools and improving the salaries of teachers could illiteracy rates go down the long 
term.
The regime was fully aware of the need to promote the construction of new 
schools and in November 1923 legislated facilitating credits to the municipalities with 
this specific aim in mind.^^ In April 1924, the government created the Junta for the 
Promotion of Public Schools, an agency in charge of coordinating state funds for school 
constructions, and, seven months later, more credits were given to the municipalities for 
building schools.^^ What all this legislation shows is that the regime advanced towards 
extensive state intervention in public education, reinforcing the role of the central 
government in terms of financial and legal control to the detriment of the municipalities. 
In other words, the dictatorship furthered the process of nationalisation of public 
education (i.e. bringing schools under the direct control of the central state). This 
process soon paid off in terms of the number of new schools constructed. In the last 
three months of 1923, 78 new schools were built. Throughout 1924, 652 schools were 
inaugurated and this figure had risen to 857 by 1925.*"^
For the primorriverista team in charge of education during the Civil Directory 
school building became a major task not only for improving the appalling pedagogic 
conditions of the country, but also in terms of political propaganda. For a technocratic 
dictatorship building schools was seen as a material justification of the regime and a 
way to gain popular support. In 1926, Suarez Somonte stated that increasing the number 
of schools was the number one objective. The reason was simple:
“[Of all works of the dictatorship] the one that has rose the people’s enthusiasm 
most [...] has been the increase in the number of teachers with 2.500 schools created
** The mobilisation o f the UP against illiteracy in LaNaciôn, 3-11-1925. For the cooperation of maestros 
and priests see RO 28-12-1927, Gaceta 29-12-1929.
RO 2-11-1923, CLIP, 1923, 447-450.
"  RO 12-4-1924, CLIP, 1924, 245-246; RO 24-11-1924.
Lôpez Martin, Ideologia (I), 105. There are important discrepancies over the number of schools 
inaugurated during the dictatorship. The highest figures are in Samaniego Moniego’s La poUtica 
educativa en la Segunda Republica [Madrid: 1977], 218, with 8,909 schools and Ben-Ami’s Fascism, 
286, with 8,000 schools. Diaz de la Guardia lowers the figure to 6,636 in “La enseftanza con Primo de 
Rivera”, Historia 16, n. 71, 21. Rial in Revolution, 216, gives a figure o f 5,979 and Lôpez Martin in 
Ideologia (I), 106, calculates in 4,506 the number of new schools created.
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and the intensification of school constructions. Every school created or built in whatever 
locality is a town gained for the regime.”*^
Suarez Somonte might have been under the illusion that building schools in a 
locality was tantamount to gaining its political support, but there can be no doubt that 
the regime took advantage of the constructions to promote itself. The governmental 
delegates turned every single opening of a new school into a nationalist ceremony. In 
the purest primorriverista style, they gathered the population, delivered patriotic 
speeches, and sanctified the national flag. As in the case of the Fiesta del Ârbol, 
maestros were also invited to utter some patriotic words for the occasion and children 
sang nationalist anthems. Almost invariably the new schools were named after Primo de 
Rivera.
By 1926 the regime was seriously behind schedule in constructing the schools it 
had promised. Somonte calculated 2000 new escuelas had to be built in 1927 simply to 
catch up with the government’s original plans.*^ He presented a proposal for 
accelerating the number of school-building projects that included a series of measures 
all which called for a further state funding of the educational system. The Director 
General for Primary Education realised that the current legislation favoured urban 
centres in terms of state subsidies and proposed the state should pay for 50% of the cost 
of schools in villages and small towns. Moreover, for extremely poor localities the 
Director General for Primary Education intended the central government to take full 
responsability for funding schools, since these municipalities “needed a more energetic, 
efficient and complete state protection, imposed by force”.S u a r e z  Somonte’s plans 
were to partially find legal expression in 1927 when the Section of School 
Constructions {Seccion de Construcciones Escolares) was created in the Department of 
Primary Education to coordinate school bu ild ing .T he  following year, a Royal Decree 
facilitated state direct funding to the poorest municipalities and established a Committee 
for School Constructions (Comision de Construcciones Escolares) in every Spanish
Suârez Somonte, “Notas para el presupuesto de V  ensenanza en 1927”, AHN, Presidencia del 
Gobiemo, Bundle 358.
Dozens o f reports on the opening school ceremonies in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358. 
“Notas para el presupuesto de 1“ ensenanza en 1927”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358. 
Suârez Somonte, “Proyecto de Real Decreto para la creacion de Escuelas” and Suârez Somonte to 
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province, in order to evaluate their diverse material necessities.^® More importantly, 
Suarez Somonte’s project found monetary backing in the “special budget” {presupuesto 
extraordinario) issued by the dictatorship in 1926. This allowed the Ministry of Pubic 
Instruction to heavily invest in school buildings. Thus, the state spent 9 million pesetas 
in school constructions in 1927, 12 million in 1928 and 14.5 million in 1929, a rather 
substantial increase when considering that in 1920 the central government had spent just 
1.5 million in building schools.®^
Although this injection of money led to an important increase in the number of 
escuelas built, it far from solved the problem of the schools shortage in Spain. In 1927, 
out of the 2,000 schools needed according to Suarez Somonte, only 950 materialised. 
The shortfall infuriated maestros who bitterly complained about the broken promises 
and the fact that the regime had decided to reduce the target of schools to be built the 
following year.^^ In effect, things just worsened from then onwards. In 1928, only 671 
new escuelas were inaugurated, beginning a serious downswing in the number of 
schools constructed. By 1929, the numbers had plummeted to 562.^  ^Although initially 
the primorriverista propaganda machine could have deceived some sectors of the 
public, it did not mislead teachers, who insisted on the necessity of increasing the 
number of schools and improving the budget for their maintenance.^"* After the fall of 
the dictatorship, El Magisterio Nacional, alarmed after Berenguer had announced a cut 
in the public instruction budget, angrily grumbled:
“ ... the Spanish state has to spend more on primary education. People were led 
to believe that Maestros were well paid and that is not true. [The primorriveristas'] 
repeated so often that thousands of schools were being created, that many think that 
need is fulfilled already, and this is not the case..
Why did teachers consider primorriverista investment insufficient? After all, the 
regime expanded the number of escuelas nacionales from 27,080 in late 1923 to 33,446
^°RD 10-7-1928.
Ramôn Lopez Martin, “La construcciôn y creaciôn de escuelas en la Espafta del primer tercio del siglo 
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at the end of 1930.^^ Yet it is important to note that this 23.5% increase in the number of 
schools could not have had a decisive impact on improving the ratio of schools to 
students, since, as a result of the demographic boom of the 1910s, the number of 
children attending primary school grew an impressive 22.9% during the period 1924- 
1930.^^ By 1932-33, only 51.2% of school-age children were in fact on a school roll.^* 
In other words, for all the primorriveristas" efforts, the construction of schools during 
the dictatorship merely palliated the pressures imposed upon the educational system by 
the country’s demographic growth. Paradoxically, the upgrading of the educational 
system in the 1920s, which was itself a response to the process of socio-economic 
modernization of Spain in the first two decades of the twentieth century, fell victim to 
the demographic growth produced by that very process of socio-economic development.
Increasing the number of teachers and improving their material conditions and 
preparation was a necessary complement to the primorriverista quantitative structural 
reform of primary education. During the Military Directory, the regime promoted the 
creation of new primary teacher posts in an attempt to match the intended growth of 
new schools. As early as November 1923, the government identified the need to “create 
new Maestros and Maestras posts for primary schools”, to be paid for by the state.^^ 
Thus, the state created 1500 new posts in 1924 and 1000 more in 1925, an increase of 
8.64% in the total number of maestros nacionales. F o l l o w i n g  the same pattern of 
nationalisation of the educational system applied to the construction of schools, the 
dictatorship committed the central government to funding teachers.
During the Civil Directory, however, the creation of teaching jobs soon slowed 
down and by the end of 1926 the number of new maestros had plummeted to 300. °^  ^
The decrease was mainly due to a reduction in the 1926 Public Instruction budget and 
the chaotic situation produced in the allocation of those teaching posts created in 1924 
and 1925. Suarez Somonte was fully aware of the need to seriously increase the number
For the data on the number o f schools see Institute Nacional de Estadistica, Principales actividades de 
la vida espanola en la primera mitad del jzg/o AX [Madrid: 1952], 163.
In 1913 the Spanish population was 20,302,000 inhabitants. By 1923 it has gone up to 21,639,000. In 
1924 the number o f students in escuelas nacionales was 1,691,331. By 1930 it was 2,078,696. Anuario 
Estadistica de Espana 1930, xxiv.
Christopher Cobb, “The Republican State and Mass Educational-Cultural Initiatives, 1931-1936”, in 
Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (eds.), Spanish Cultural Studies, 135.
RD 2-11-1923, CLIP, 1923, 447-450.
In 1922-1923, the number o f maestros was 28,924. See Anuario Estadistica de Espana 1930 [Madrid: 
1932], 619. For the creation of teaching posts in 1924 and 1925 see RO 28-1-1924, CLIP, 1923, 50-52; 
RO 8-8-1924, CLIP, 1924, 509-512; RO 7-7-1925, CLIP, 1925, 371-372.
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of teachers if he was to, first, modernise the educational system and, second, gain 
support from the educators. In his report on the 1927 education budget, the Director 
General for Primary Education stated Spain was in a dramatic situation with only 1.50 
teacher per 1000 inhabitants, whereas France had 3.05 per 1000 inhabitants; Italy 2.30; 
and Germany 4.32. He concluded that to catch up with Europe, “we need 23,000 
maestros more, so there would be one teacher every 60 children”.
Suarez Somonte’s recommendations seem to have had an immediate effect and, 
in 1927, the state created 1500 new teaching posts. The following year, 700 men and 
women became maestros nacionales, 1000 more teaching posts were created in 1929, 
and plans to generate 1000 new posts in 1930 were achieved. All together, the 
number of maestros nacionales grew from 28,924 in 1922 to 34,680 at the end of 1930, 
a 19.90% increase. Yet the fact that the government legislated the creation of 
teaching posts did not necessarily mean that all those new maestros actually ended up 
teaching. The public competitions by which maestro posts were allocated were chaotic. 
In the 1923 and 1925 public competitions, hundreds of candidates who had passed their 
exams had to wait months, if not years, until they were assigned a school, while some 
others were never given a post. As a result of this incompetent organization of public 
competitions, El Magisterio Espanol denounced in late 1927 that Spain had “thousands 
of vacant schools without Maestro, and thousands of Maestros without school”. 
When the regime regulated the public competition system in 1928, it established a two- 
year interim period before a maestro was finally assigned to a school and a very 
complicated system of examination, which led to further confusion and irregularities.^®^ 
Consequently, the number of teachers without a school increased, as did the outrage of 
candidates, teachers’ associations, and parents of school children, who flooded the 
Ministry of Education and Presidencia del Gobiemo with hundreds of complaints. 
By the end of the dictatorship, 4,722 schools were vacant.^®*
“Notas para el presupuesto de r  enseftanza en 1927”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358. 
Lôpez Martin, Ideologia, 199-200.
See Anuario Estadistico 1930, 619.
El Magisterio Espanol, 31-12-1927.
Cândido Ruiz Rodrigo, “Maestros, escuela y sociedad (de la Restauraciôn a la II Republica)”, Historia 
de la Educaciôn, n. 16 (1997), 176.
Dozens o f  complaints about schools without teachers and teachers without a school in AHN, 
Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 356, Box 1. In 1925, maestros without posts assigned sent tens o f  
complaints to Presidencia del Gobiemo, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundles 356, 357 and 358. 
6-2-1930.
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It is hardly surprising that teachers felt outraged about this chaotic situation and 
things were no better with regard to their economic conditions. For all the dictatorship’s 
repeated promises of improving teachers’ salaries most of the teachers did not receive a 
wage rise. True, the dictatorship raised the salary of a small minority of the worst paid 
maestros -  those earning 2000 and 2500 pesetas per year. Yet the majority of the 
teachers did not get any kind of increase and most of them had to survive on 3000 
pesetas per year throughout the dictatorship*®  ^ No other single issue united teachers 
more than salary improvements. From the ipro-primorriverista El Magisterio Espanol to 
the liberal El Magisterio Nacional, from Catholic to Socialist journals, all education 
publications demanded urgent improvements in teachers’ salaries.**® Professionally, 
teachers associations of all sorts, directors of escuelas, and mayors signed dozens of 
petitions from 1926 onwards, as promised improvements failed to materialise.*** But 
despite the cascade of complaints, the government did not substantially improve 
teachers’ salaries. As Callejo privately acknowledged to Maximo Cuervo, jefe  of the 
Presidency’s Bureau, the state simply did not have the money to give in one go decent 
salaries to all those it intended to be the preachers of the Patria.**^
Some other serious difficulties were also to be found in the government’s 
undertaking to indoctrinate teachers. The regime was fully conscious of the social 
influence teachers had in villages and educating educators in National Catholicism 
would spread primorriverista values in the most remote places in Spain.* *^ During the 
Civil Directory, the state sponsored a series of pedagogic courses for maestros all 
around the country. Although organised in theory for the maestros’ professional 
improvement, the government used these courses for political indoctrination. Callejo 
and Suarez Somonte often lectured at these conferences and at times the courses closed 
with an oath of political allegiance to the regime.**"* However, there are some 
indications to suggest that official pedagogic courses did not always obtain the intended 
results. Some teachers saw the courses as an opportunity for tourism rather than
Victoriano Femândez Ascarza, Anuario del Maestro para 1929 [Madrid: 1929], 432-433.
Some examples in El Magisterio Espanol, 8-7-1926; 7-10-1926; 31-12-1927; 6-10-1928; 15-10-1928; 
and El Magisterio Nacional, 8-5-1930.
Dozens o f petitions o f salary increase from teachers associations and school directors in AHN, 
Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundles 357 and 358.
Callejo to Mâximo Cuervo, 15-2-1929, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle, 114, Box 1.
Consuelo Flecha, “La vida de las maestras en Espana”, Historia de la Educaciôn, n. 16 (1997), 205.
See telegrams from the Civil Govemor o f Soria to Presidencia del Gobiemo, 25-4-1927; Civil 
Govemor o f La Comfta to Presidencia del Gobiemo, 12-10-1927, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
Bundle 358.
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professional improvement and decided to skip lectures. For instance, this was the case 
of many teachers coming to Madrid for training in 1927. Once in the city, the maestros 
decided that the capital’s attractions were far better than the courses and never attended 
the lectures.^
The government also developed important plans seeking to instil patriotic 
feelings in teaching students. Suarez Somonte took up a policy of modernisation of the 
Teacher Training Colleges {Escuelas Normales). He wanted them to became “maestro- 
making laboratories”, educating teachers “on the lights of the truths of our holy 
Religion and the [...] equally holy love for the Fatherland”. A  entirely new curriculum 
was designed stressing the history and geography of Spain and Hispanic-America, “with 
special emphasis on the discovery and conquest of America, crystallizing in this 
teaching the greatness of Spain and the natural love of those nations to the mother 
Patria”. The Director of Primary Education conceived the teaching profession as a 
“priesthood” of the nation. As any other priesthood, he argued, the main bulk of the 
recruits would come from the lower classes; hence, the state should provide the means 
to facilitate teaching by vocations funding teacher schools. However, the 
primorriveristas failed to carry out a legal reform of the Escuelas Normales and the 
1914 curriculum remained in place throughout the entire dictatorship. More 
importantly, the record suggests that the quality of teaching in the Escuelas Normales 
seriously deteriorated. The number of students in teacher colleges grew from 16,905 in 
tie year 1923-1924 to 35,760 in 1929-1930, an increase of 111.53%.^** Yet the number 
cf teaching colleges just went up from 91 to 93 in the same period, a clear indication of 
overcrowded Escuelas Normales in where the training of “patriotic priests” became an 
impossible task.
In terms of mass nationalisation, the primorriverista reforms of primary 
education had patchy results. It was in the battle against illiteracy the government made 
srious improvements. Illiteracy rates fell from 39% in 1920 to 27% in 1930, in part due
The denunciation o f teachers “walking around” Madrid and not attending courses in Carlos 
Honteagudo to Primo de Rivera, November 1927 (no specific date indicated), AHN, Presidencia del 
(obiemo. Bundle 358.
“Reorganizaciôn de las Escuelas Normales para convertirlas en talleres y laboratorios de formar 
naestros a la luz de las verdades de nuestra Santa Religidn y al calor del amor igualmente santo de la 
htria”, Suârez Somonte to Primo de Rivera, 1926, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358.
“Proyecto de decreto de reforma de la enseftanza de las escuelas normales de mestros”, AHN, 
Vesidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358.
Anuario Estadistico 1930, xxiv, 620-621.
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to the growth in the number of schools and teachers.'*^ Yet the regime failed to turn the 
educational system into the indoctrinating machine it intended. A combination of 
structural and political factors explains the outcome. The process of nationalisation of 
the educational system was under-funded and the regime proved unable to build enough 
schools and improve teachers’ economic conditions sufficiently as to operate the 
transformation it sought. Despite an increase in the educational budget during the 
dictatorship, the Restoration legacy of underdevelopment and the population growth of 
the 1910s and 1920s seem to have been a burden too heavy. The promise of great 
changes initially gained the maestros' support for the regime, but as these failed to 
materialise teachers increasingly turned against the primorriveristas. Conservative 
teachers continued to demand more money from the state, while liberal maestros 
resented the fact that the government used public money to sponsor private education. 
Primorriverista military control and repression of educators only rubbed salt into the 
injury and alienated teachers further. Without adequate funding, educational structures, 
and cooperation from those professionals called to be the ‘priests of the fatherland’, the 
nationalisation of primary education was doomed to fail. In early January 1930, some 
three weeks before the fall of the regime, a progressive teacher, José Maria Villegas, 
perfectly expressed the failure of the primorriverista nationalising educational policies:
“Happily, Spanish schools do not have that nationalist trait, so characteristic of 
many other European schools [...] Spanish schools, in this sense, are the real 
representative of society’s thoughts and feelings. Not only they are not imperialist but 
they do not even have a great influence on the pupil’s patriotic formation [...] Nor in 
texts, nor in curricula, nor in personnel, there is a desire to inculcate the pride of the 
patria in the Spanish child.”
Nuflez, Lafuente, 94.
The Public Instruction budget during the dictatorship was as follows: 158,965,000 pesetas in 1923; 
169,668,000 in 1925; 171,327,000 in 1925; 156,182,000 in 1926; 156,182,000 in 1927; 150,346,000 in 
1928; 197,290,000 in 1929; and 188,114,000 in \92>Q. Anuario Estadistico 1930, xxx-xxxi.
For the conservative teachers’ view, El Magisterio Espanol, 30-4-1930. For the liberal teachers’ view, 
El Magisterio Nacional, 8-5-1930.
José Maria Villegas in El Magisterio Espanol, 4-1-1930.
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SECONDARY EDUCATION REFORMS
The process of economic modernisation that took place in the two decades 
before the dictatorship had led to a significant growth of the middle classes in Spain. 
This process of modernisation also brought the need of more technical and specialised 
training and secondary education became the key phase for preparing middle class 
youth not only for university studies but also for the new business, engineering, and 
technical schools. The regime did not overlook the importance secondary education 
had gained for the bourgeoisie and carried out a reform to modernise the system. The 
changes sought to please the middle classes but also to nationalise teenagers, since the 
regime’s ideologues considered adolescence a key stage in the process of political 
indoctrination. As with primary education, the nationalisation of the secondary 
educational system aimed at bringing schools under direct control of the state, but the 
outcomes proved to be very different in each case. For, while the Catholic Church 
opposed state expansion in primary schools. Catholic educationalists understood the 
Church could not compete vdth the state in creating the thousands of primary schools 
needed nor did they show much interest in instructing the poor mass es .Ho wev er ,  
private Catholic secondary schools outnumbered public high schools and the 
ecclesiastical authorities saw state expansionism as a serious threat to both their 
financial interests and ideological control over the bourgeoisie.
Whilst the nationalisation of primary education concentrated on monitoring 
teachers, extra-curricula patriotic celebrations and structural improvements, the 
transformation of secondary education focussed on a curricular reform and the 
imposition of a single national text book for each level and area of instruction. As early 
as November 1923, the dictatorship demonstrated its intention to carry out a reform of 
secondary and university education and ordered the Council of Public Instruction to 
produce a report. Published in March 1924, the report recommended modernising the 
system and facilitate the “full development of all physical, moral, and intellectual 
adolescent activities”, turning secondary education into an autonomous form of
123 Capitân, Historia de la educaciôn, vol. 2, 520.
Peman, El hecho, 313.
Fernando Garcia de Cortazar, “La nueva historia de la Iglesia contemporànea en Esparla” in Tufiôn de 
Lara (éd.), Historiografla espanola contemporànea [Madrid: 1980], 207-230.
Presidencia del Gobiemo to Council o f Public Instruction, 30-11-1923, AHN, Presidencia del 
Gobiemo, Bundle 356, Box 1.
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education and not merely a preparation for university. However, clashes between the 
dictator and the Council ended up with the advisory body being purged by the regime 
and the reform postponed for almost two years.
It was not until the formation of the Civil Directory that the reform began to take 
shape. In December 1925, Primo established the General Bureau of Secondary and 
University Education, an agency directly controlled by the minister of Public Instruction 
and created with the specific aim of restricting the power of the liberal-dominated Junta 
for Further Studies {Junta para Ampliacion de Estudios)}^^ During the first half of 
1926, Wenceslao Gonzalez Oliveros, Director of the General Bureau of Secondary and 
University Education, Eduardo Callejo and Primo himself all worked on the reform.
By June 1926, Callejo presented to Primo his blueprint of a royal decree for the reform 
of secondary education. Much in the same manner as the UP ideologues, the project 
emphasised the need to adapt the educational reform to “national psychology” and 
systematized the teaching periods seeking to improve the relations between primary and 
secondary education on the one hand, and high schools with universities on the other. 
What lay underneath this proposal was an attempt to unify all educational institutions 
under state control and avoid the “atomisation” {cantonalismd) produced by the liberal 
programs of the past.^^°
The Royal Decree 25 August 1926 initiated the reform of secondary education. 
It divided secondary education into two three-year degrees {bachillerato elemental and 
bachillerato universitario) in order to facilitate access to professional colleges and state 
agencies for those not wishing to pursue a university degree. When compared to the 
1903 program it replaced, the 1926 curriculum showed significant changes. First, it put 
more emphasis on scientific and technical teaching, much in the same line as Bottai, the 
Italian Fascist Minister of Education, was to attempt in his 1930s educational 
reforms. Likewise, this “scientific drive” was in perfect accord with the UP 
ideologues’ modernising discourse, which claimed to have scientific bases and 
advocated technical education in order to improve national productivity. Second, and 
not surprisingly, the new syllabus heavily stressed the teaching of history. Whilst the
The reprot in “Dictamen del Consejo de Instrucciôn Publica”, Boletin Instituciôn Libre de Ensenanza, 
April 1924.
Capitân, Historia, vol. 2, 518. 
See various docume 
“Proyecto de Deere 
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213
1903 programme included history courses in the 3"^  ^ and 4^  ^ years, the primorriveristas 
made history obligatory throughout the first four years of the bachillerato, increasing 
the number of hours per week from 6 in two years to 15 in four.'^^ Compulsory courses 
included World History, Spanish American History, Spanish History, and History of 
Spanish Civilization, a clear indication of the regime’s determination to instruct 
teenagers in Hispanista imperial values.
The most controversial change in the curriculum concerned the teaching of 
Catholic doctrine. Since 1895, the subject of religion had been optional in Spanish high 
schools and no exams on Catholic doctrine were required to obtain the bachiller 
degree. The primorriveristas made Catholic doctrine compulsory in the first two 
years of the Bachillerato Elemental. As the dictator explained, religion had to be 
mandatory since inculcating Catholic principles was as important as instruction in 
patriotism and honour. It is fairly evident that the government sought to incorporate 
religion in the curriculum as a mean to reinforce patriotic education in high schools, 
following the primorriverista conception of Catholicism as an instrument to imbue the 
population with ideas of authority, order, and hierarchy.However ,  religion did not 
become a standard subject in the curriculum. The Callejo Plan stipulated that no exams 
had to be taken on the subject to obtain the bachiller degree and, more importantly, 
students whose parents had declared they did not want their children to attend religion 
classes would be exempted.
This middle-way which turned religion into a compulsory subject but did not 
grant it the same status as the rest of the subjects in the curriculum predictably pleased 
very few. Progressive educationalists criticised the measure arguing that the state should 
not impose any religious dogma. The Catholic Right, which had been campaigning 
for the mandatory imposition of religion in secondary education, had mixed 
responses. While El Debate welcomed the changes, some others considered the 
reform was not good enough and re-started the campaign to force the dictatorship to
The 1926 Callejo Reform in RD 25-8-1926, CLIP, 1926, 508-518. For the Italian case see Talamo, 
“Riforma della scuola”, 425-426.
The 1903 Plan established 3 hours of history teaching per week in the 3rd year and 3 for the 4th. The 
1926 established 3 hours per week in the first 3 years plus 6 hours per week in the 4th year.
De Puelles, Educaciôn e ideologia, 212.
Primo de Rivera, Intervenciones en la Asamblea Nacional, 336.
See chapter 3.
Revista de Pedagogia, n. 57, 1926,431-444.
For the campaign to establish religion as a compulsory subject see, for example, Acciôn Catôlica de la 
Mujer to Primo de Rivera, 10-10-1923; Palma de Mallorca mayor to Primo de Rivera, 17-10-1923; 
teachers o f Almeria to Primo de Rivera, 10-10-1923, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 356, Box 1.
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establish compulsory religious education without exceptions. In November 1927, the 
reactionary Marchioness of la Rambla, for example, claimed in the National Assembly 
that religion was not really compulsory in Spanish secondary education and urged 
Minister of Public Instruction to abolish all exceptions. Callejo responded the 
government considered the study of “Catholic religion as the most perfect school of 
citizenry” and a key element in the spiritual improvement of the “Spanish race”, but the 
dictatorship never acceded to the ultramontane demands and legislation remained 
unchanged.
The secondary education reforms also proved problematic for those middle 
classes to whom the dictatorship looked for much of its support. Callejo Plan included 
retroactive measures, which required students in their 4*, 5^, and 6^*^ years to take new 
examinations to access universities. Understandably, discontent resulted among students 
and parents. By the end of November 1926, strikes broke out in high schools all 
around Spain but the primorriveristas ignored the students’ demands and no 
compromise was reached.
No other measure, however, triggered as much anger as the imposition of a 
prescribed single text book in secondary education. Parallel to the secondary education 
reform, the team Primo-Callejo engineered the creation of the single state-approved text 
book for each course of study -  the so-called texto mica. In early 1926, the dictator 
gave guidelines for the eventual legislation on the single text for both primary and 
secondary education: books must be inspired by “the principles of state religion, a 
fervent love for Spain and a profound respect for the established political system”. 
Teachers could give complementary explanations to the book, “providing those were 
within the limits of the love for the patria, respect for the state’s religion, Christian 
morals and established public institutions”. Primo foresaw the potential controversy 
that such a state imposition of nationalist, religious and pro-dictatorship principles could 
provoke, but the Marquis de Estella was not willing to compromise over the role of the 
state in the nationalisation of the masses. Weeks later, in a new report, he insisted on the 
patriotic principles that should guide the single texts and designed a system by which
For the views o f El Debate see Diaz de la Guardia, “La enseftanza”, 24.
The debate in the National Assembly in El Noticiero, 30-11-1927.
Rial, Revolution, 218.
Ignoring students’ demands did not mean ignoring their protests. The government closely followed the 
strikes and civil governors reported to Primo about the developement of events. See Civil Govemor of 
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the state would have absolute control of the selection, production and sales of the text 
books. Moreover, Primo ordered his minister of Public Instruction to draft a royal order 
on the texto unico “in virile and uncompromising language, defending the undisputable 
right of the state to conduct and adjust education”. I n  August 1926, Callejo presented 
his project to the dictator and the decree on the texto unico was finally approved late 
that month. Callejo defended the right of the state to produce text books, arguing that a 
state monopoly would not only improve books’ “doctrinal contents” but it would also 
reduce their cost, [economically] alleviating the middle class”.
Despite government efforts to gain the support of the bourgeoisie, the 
primorriveristas soon faced problems with the implementation of the texto unico. 
Initially, Primo wanted the single text to be in the schools by the academic year 1926- 
1927, but the Ministry of Public Instruction’s delay in producing the royal decree forced 
the regime to postpone its implementation until the following year. Once the system 
was functioning, the publication of official text books still did not follow immediately. 
Text books for the courses in Spanish Civilisation and American History were not 
distributed until 1929 and those for Spanish History and World History never saw the 
light of day. Not surprisingly, in those cases where the official books were published, 
they reproduced the primorriverista interpretation of Spanish history. For example, 
Francisco Yela Trujillo’s text book on Spanish Civilisation portrayed Menéndez Pelayo 
as the “wisest scholar of nineteenth century Spain”, described the “discovery and 
civilisation of America” as “one of the greatest deeds of human history”, and, based on 
Julian Juderias, attacked jealous foreigners for fabricating the Black Legend.
Yet the existence of an official text book did not necessarily mean that students 
were using it. As some teachers had predicted before the legislation was approved, the 
appearance of “official little bibles” for every subject would only bring confusion to the 
educational system, since teachers would continue to use their own materials.^"^  ^As the 
regime soon came to know, this prediction proved right and many high school teachers 
kept on recommending their own books even after the official ones were published. The 
government reacted by publishing a royal order in September 1928 emphasising the
“Bases para dictar una Real orden para el Ministerio de Instrucciôn Publica, referente al texto ùnico en 
las ensefianzas primaria y segunda, o sea el Bachillerato”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 358, 
Juan Francisco Yela Utrilla, Historia de la civilizacion espanola en sus relaciones con la universal 
[Madrid: 1928], 506, 509-512, 517. As many other primorriverista academics Yela supported the rebels 
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teachers’ obligation to use only official text, but this legislation seems to have had very 
little impact and denunciations of professors using their own works in the schools 
continued/
While the efficacy of the single text as an instrument of nationalisation was 
extremely limited, the political storm it provoked was unprecedented. Progressive 
educationists opposed the single text mainly on pedagogic grounds, claiming it 
diminished the figure of the teacher and hampered students’ learning processes, for it 
denied the plural nature of knowledge. Liberals did not overlook the fact that the 
dictatorship was using the state apparatus to instruct the masses in National Catholic 
values, something they strongly disapproved: “the state is the worst of all churches 
when it comes to fabricating dogma”, wrote Gomez Baquero, envisaging the failure of 
the primorriverista task of doctrinal unification.*"^*
Contrary to what it has sometimes been suggested, the single text was far from 
satisfying the clerical ambitions of the Right. Catholic teachers felt uneasy about the 
imposition of a single text and even some pro-primorriverista publications, such as El 
Magisterio Espanol, opposed the new measure.*^** The state monopoly on the contents 
and production of schoolbooks became a core problem for the Church. The Augustinian 
Father Delgado, described the single text as “tyrannical” and “against Natural Law”, but 
he especially resented the fact that no cleric had been appointed to the tribunals in 
charge of determining the content of the books. In his view, the Church, as the 
constitutional guarantor of the Catholic faith, had the right to oversee the single text.*^* 
The reference to the 1876 Constitution should not come as a surprise, for it indicates 
that the ecclesiastical elites had begun to realise they were better off under the 
Restoration. What the words of Father Delgado revealed was the Church’s willingness 
to cooperate on equal terms with the state, maintaining ecclesiastical autonomy and its 
ability to intervene in public educational matters at the same time, as had been the case 
from 1876. But what the primorriverista reforms sought was subordination of the 
Church to the state.
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Speaking for the Jesuits, Father Teodoro Rodriguez went a step further in his 
criticism of the texto unico and denied the state had the right to select books or teachers. 
In the name of “freedom of education”, he proposed leaving education entirely to the 
law of supply and demand, which would “eliminate those [schools] with no right to 
exist; so the paying public could freely choose”. Behind this social-Darwinist 
approach to education, there was an unmistakable reaction against the primorriverista 
policies which effectively reinforced the state as the supreme educational authority. The 
Church had expected, and indeed received, direct economic support from the state but 
now that the implications of this official sponsorship became clear the alarm bells were 
ringing in ecclesiastical quarters. As soon as the legislation on the texto unico was 
approved, the integrist El Siglo Futuro launched a campaign against it, accusing the 
government of appropriating ecclesiastical prerogatives.*^^ More importantly. Social 
Catholics, who constituted much of the UP social base, also objected the reform on very 
similar grounds.*^"* By late 1928, El Debate called Catholics to resist the process of 
primorriverista state control. A common technique to avoid censorship was criticising 
Mussolini when the intended object was Primo. El Debate severely condemned Fascist 
interventionism in education and denounced the state’s right to transfer Catholic 
teachers between posts as a scandalous state intrusion. The last paragraph of the 
editorial clearly expressed cooperation with, and not subordination to, the 
primorriverista regime was the aim of the Catholic Right:
“In these difficult and anarchic times. Catholics must, on the one hand, support 
governments and civil authorities; strengthening established powers. But on the other 
hand, [they] must be ready to defend the freedom and legitimate rights of the Catholic 
Church, against the intrusion of the civil power.”*^ ^
When in 1928 Primo granted the right to issue degrees to the religious university 
colleges of Deusto and El Escorial, thus breaching the monopoly of the state over higher 
education, the rift between the Church and the regime was already too wide as to 
comfort Catholics. The Church certainly welcomed the measure but was fully aware
Teodoro Rodriguez, El Estatism oy la Educacion Nacional en los Raises Civilizados [Madrid: 1928],
16.
El Siglo Futuro, 28-8-1926; 29-8-1926; 30-8-1926.
The Social Catholics’campaign against the texto ùnico in Enrique Herrera Oria, brother o f the editor of  
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that Deusto and El Escorial had a restricted curriculum and were very small compared 
to the state universities. This was a minuscule gain that did not bring the educational 
system under Church control -  the aspiration of the ecclesiastical authorities in 
September 1923.^^  ^ True, the concession of legal parity to the Catholic university 
colleges united liberal scholars, the democratic left and students in their opposition to 
the regime. University reform led to unprecedented student demonstrations, severe 
governmental repression and the resignation of the most prominent scholars in Spanish 
universities (Ortega y Gasset, Fernando de los Rios, Luis Jimenez de Asua), all of these 
factors which catalysed the fall of the regime. Yet, for the Catholic Church, the 
concessions could not balance the loss of “freedom of education” and the imposition of 
the single text in secondary education, the ecclesiastical stronghold which assured its 
ideological control over the middle classes.
In late 1929, Catholics received new ammunition from Rome in their battle 
against the dictatorship. Pius XTs Divini Illius Magistri was a fierce attack to state 
intervention in educational matters. In exactly the same social-Darwinist line that 
Spanish Catholics had been arguing in the 1920s, the encyclical defended the “freedom 
of private education” and denied the state the right to interfere in educational matters, 
let alone to prioritise state schools. After the fall of the dictatorship. Catholics went 
on to the offensive. They created new associations to defend the “educational rights” of 
the Church and soon demanded from Berenguer a total reform of the primorriverista 
educational system, the “most violent, unjust, and un-educational regime of LEGAL 
OPPRESSION in Europe (except Russia)”.
The clash over education between the dictatorship and the Church reflected an 
essential ideological division between the primorriveristas and the Catholic Right. For 
the Catholic Right, Catholicism was the supreme value-system and religious doctrine 
the main tool of political socialization. Patriotism was a complementary element of 
Catholic doctrine, but state expansion was viewed as a threat to the Church’s privileges. 
For the primorriveristas the nation was the supreme sacred value and state agencies the 
necessary tools for mass nationalisation. As in the case of Italy, the policies of mass 
indoctrination required a process of nationalisation of the educational system that
El Debate, 27-11-1928.
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For a discussion o f the encyclical see Juan Manuel Femândez Soria, Estado y  educacion en la Espana 
contemporanea [Madrid; 2002], 101-102.
inevitably led to serious tensions with the Church. In no other place did this become 
more obvious than in Catalonia, where the regime concentrated its efforts to 
“Spanishize” (espamlizar) the educational system, only to provoke ecclesiastical 
outrage thus deepening the cleavage between Church and state.
THE ‘SPANISHIZATION’ OF CATALONIA
The process of mass nationalisation acquired specific connotations in those 
territories where regional languages co-existed with Castilian. Primo saw the 
propagation of the Spanish language in Catalonia and the Basque Country as “the only 
effective means to widen and strengthen the spiritual and racial bases of Great 
Spain”. T h e  regime believed “separatists and regionalists” had used schools during 
the Restoration to “de-Spanishize Catalan children by teaching exclusively in Catalan” 
and, therefore, it was the dictatorship’s duty to foster an utterly Castilian education. 
The aim of primorriverista linguistic policy was twofold. First, it used language to 
transmit Spanish national identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country. At the same 
time, it sought to preclude regionalists and nationalists from using Catalan and Basque 
languages as tools for the political socialization of children in schools. As mentioned 
above, during the first weeks of the dictatorship the regime imposed teaching in 
Castilian in every single public educational institution in Spain, legislated prison 
sentences for teachers propagating secessionist doctrines in schools, and cut funding for 
teaching regional languages in state educational institutions.
But the regime also wanted to curb the influence of regional languages outside 
schools and after his return from a state visit to Italy in November 1923, Primo began to 
toy with the idea of prohibiting the clergy to preach in regional languages. The initiative 
was not new. Already in 1902, Romanones had issued a decree requiring the teaching of 
catechism in Castilian. But the wave of opposition this provoked from the clergy and 
the Catholic Right all around Spain eventually forced the liberal government to resign. 
The new conservative government of Sivela abolished the controversial decree only a
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month after the Liberals had approved Like Romanones, for Primo teaching the 
catechism in Spanish was an important issue, since Castilian was considered the 
guarantor of national unity and the main hope for cultural homogenisation. As had been 
the case in France, the Spanish Church promoted the teaching of catechism in regional 
languages and dialects, not only because it wanted to make sure that children would 
correctly understand religious postulates but also because it granted priests a privileged 
position in children’s education, compared to the s t a t e . T h u s ,  the issue of language 
was directly related to the power of the Church and the state to effectively indoctrinate 
the masses in non-Castilian speaking areas.
In the Basque Country, the primorriverista policies of Spanishization were far 
less controversial than in Catalonia. Some schools were closed and teachers arrested for 
teaching in Basque, but the regime was lenient and pragmatic when approaching the 
issue of l a n g u a g e s . I n  early 1924, General Echagüe, the Military Governor of 
Vizcaya and a Basque speaker himself, published an official note stating that the Basque 
language could be used in all those areas in where Castilian speakers were a minority. 
No punishment, the note followed, should be taken against those speaking or writing in 
Euskera.'^ "^
One of the main reasons for this primorriverista approach in the Basque 
provinces was the relative willingness of the Basque Church to co-operate vvdth the 
dictatorship. Although some priests were reprimanded and fined by military officers for 
preaching in Basque, the bishops of Vitoria during the dictatorship, Zacarias Martinez 
and Mateo Mugica, were staunch monarchists with very few sympathies for Basque 
nationalism, and no Episcopal protest greeted the prohibition of catechism classes in 
Euskera.*^^ They recommended priests to preach in Spanish or Euskera depending on 
which language was the spoken by the majority of the population in their parishes. As a 
consequence, during the dictatorship, preaching in Basque continued to be habitual in 
Basque-speaking areas, something the regime tolerated together with the publication of 
Basque cultural magazines sponsored by the Church. Moreover, to the dismay of 
Basque nationalists, a good number of rural priests in Vizcaya joined the UP, a move 
that certainly pleased the primorriverista authorities and strengthened the bond between
Del Pozo, “The Ribirth”, 87.
Del Pozo, Curriculum, 192-193.
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the Basque Church and the dictatorship/^^ Finally, the fact that primorriverista 
repression against members of the Basque nationalist movement was selective, as 
opposed to the indiscriminate actions in Catalonia, indicates that the regime was far less 
concerned with the impact of Basque nationalism than with the spread of Catalanism/^^ 
In Catalonia, the primorriverista strategy of nationalisation coupled with the one 
used for the renewal of the educational system, first repressing teachers and institutions 
considered of guilt of spreading regionalist or nationalist doctrines and, then, promoting 
schools, educational institutions, fiestas and lectures to cultivate Spanish nationalist 
values among the population. A letter from Alfonso Sala, then leader of the UMN, to 
the Presidencia del Gobierno perfectly illustrates the inquisitorial character of some of 
the regime’s supporters in Barcelona. In November 1923, Sala demanded the urgent 
abolishment of the Barcelona Municipal Cultural Commission, which he considered 
Catalanist, and the punishment of the “separatist” Federaciôn de Maestros de Cataluna 
and the Asociacio de Mestress Oflciales de Barcelona. He also insisted on the need to 
purge the inspectors, accused of not defending properly “the state’s rights” and being 
lenient with regionalist teachers. Moreover, Sala wanted all teachers in the province of 
Barcelona to pledge loyalty to “the interests of Spain”. Those under suspicion of not 
fulfilling their “sacred duty” should be sanctioned for life or sent to some other town in 
Spain outside Catalonia. Only with these measures. Sala concluded, “would the 
phantom of Catalan separatism go away for ever; [and] Spanish schools would achieve 
the miracle of inculcating love for the larger Patria in the masses”.
The regime moved fast to purge teachers considered Catalanists. As early as 
October 1923, teachers and inspectors were instructed to denounce colleagues who were 
teaching in a different language than Spanish. Dozens of state-school maestros were 
denounced by their colleagues, inspectors or, simply, by private individuals.^^® Actions 
were also taken against inspectors considered too lenient, who, as recommended by
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Sala, were sent to other Spanish provinces outside Catalonia and replaced by 
primorriverista l o y a l i s t s . T h e  regime targeted non-state schools too. Military and 
civil governors, with the assistance of the delegados, played an essential role by, first, 
purging municipal councils of those considered regionalists and, later, dismissing 
municipal employees accused of being Catalanists, which tightened the control over 
municipal schools and libraries.
The Mancomunitat was initially put under temporary military supervision. The 
cultural and teaching institutions controlled by the Mancomunitat were rapidly purged, 
the Universidad Industrial closed down and Roman Sol, the Mancomunitat culture 
councillor and member of Accio Catalana, j ailed. Putting linguistic policies in the 
forefront. General Losada, interim director of the institution, ordered all schools and 
cultural centres sponsored by the Mancomunitat to teach exclusively in Spanish, on 24 
January 1924.^ "^^  A week later, Losada named Sala president of the Mancomunitat, a 
post the leader of the UMN would hold until Primo decided to abolish the institution in 
March 1925.
Nor were state universities free from the primorriverista ‘crusade’ against 
Catalan language in educational institutions. Although Spanish was the customary 
language in Catalan universities, the dictatorship specifically prohibited the use of the 
regional language in Catalan and Valencian higher education. This measure was 
especially important in teacher training colleges, where state-sponsored courses on 
Catalan language had been free for all students since 1916. The primorriveristas saw 
these classes as a clear threat to their project of indoctrinating teachers in Spanish 
nationalist values and, during the first months of the dictatorship, the courses were 
brought to an end in the Escuelas Normales of Lérida, Tarragona, and Gerona.*^^
Dictatorial control of the University of Barcelona also became evident quickly. 
In November 1923, Primo appointed as its director Andrés Martinez Vargas, a well-
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known conservative and anti-Catalanist. His appointment provoked the opposition of 
liberal professors and the members of the Federacio Catalana d'Estudiants Catolics, 
who complained about the non-democratic election of the new director. The regime 
reacted by creating an information network within the University of Barcelona. Staunch 
primorriveristas sent secret reports to Martinez Anido and Maximo Cuervo in Madrid, 
denouncing the political activities of professors, lectures and student associations.'^^ On 
the basis of these denunciations, the dictatorship dismissed professors, closed down 
publications and even imprisoned the director of the journal Vida Universitària, when 
he refused to publish the magazine in Castilian as ordered by the civil governor of 
Barcelona, General Milans de B o s c h . W h e n  in 1925 the Minister of Public 
Instruction and the Medical Faculty of the University of Barcelona clashed over the 
language issue, the government temporarily closed it down. In April 1929, when the 
revolts in the universities were at their height and the conflict had spread all around 
Spain, Primo closed dovm the University of Barcelona.
As explained in Chapter 2, the Catalan Church, considered not merely a vehicle 
of linguistic and cultural transmission but a propagator of nationalist ideas, did not 
escape primorriverista repression. Throughout the entire dictatorship, the government 
closed dovm ecclesiastical associations, arrested and exiled dozens of priests, banned 
religious processions and purged Catholic schools. What lay behind these constant 
attacks on clerics was not merely the purging from the Catalan Church of ‘separatist’ 
elements but the control of an institution considered a challenge to the power of the 
state. At stake also was the whole primorriverista project of Spanishization in Catalonia 
and for these proposes the regime tried to force the Catalan clergy to preach in Castilian. 
Primo had this idea in mind since the early months of the dictatorship, but he knew that 
achieving it in practice would not be easy. The Vatican had defended the preaching in 
vernacular languages since the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century and Catalan 
bishops had reaffirmed their commitment to the provision of religious services in 
Catalan just a few months before Primo’s coup. Thus, the dictator’s suggestion to
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preach in Castilian found strong resistance both in Rome and Catalonia. Leading the 
opposition to this measure was Cardinal Vidal i Barraquer, the supreme Catholic 
authority in Catalonia. He declared himself open to cooperation with the regime but he 
was unwilling to order priests to preach in Castilian.
Facing resistance, Primo took action in three different fronts. First, he personally 
intervened to obtain the appointment of non-Catalans to rule the region’s dioceses and 
secure the transfer of Catalan clerics to outside of Catalonia. Even anti-Catalanist 
clerics, such as the Archdeacon of Tarragona Isidro Goma y Tomas, were, as Catalans, 
precluded from promotion inside Catalonia and sent to non-Catalan dioceses. 
Although the dictator publicly denied the existence of a policy of “marginalization” of 
Catalan priests, the truth is that this idea constituted a main element of the 
primorriverista process of nationalisation. In a private letter to Admiral Magaz, Primo 
stated that if the Catalan clergy mobilised its nationalist supporters, the solution would 
be to organise “a terrific raid and send [the priests] to serve in Andalusia, before their 
actions could have any effect”.
The second front was indeed in Catalonia itself where actions against priests 
preaching in Catalan continued to be organised from the Captaincy General of 
Catalonia. The creation in 1927 of the Junta de Accion Ciudadana in Barcelona 
provided generals Barrera and Milans del Bosch with the possibility to co-ordinate the 
repression of dissident clerics with civilian primorriveristas. The Junta Ciudadana 
actively conducted detentions of priests, penalised religious educators teaching in 
Catalan and fined ecclesiastical institutions accused of propagating anti-Spanish ideas, 
increasing even further the climate of political repression in B a r c e l o n a / T h e  
confrontation between civil and ecclesiastical authorities became extremely tense in 
Barcelona, where the Bishop of the province, Josep Miralles, refused to order his priests 
to preach in Castilian. Despite pressure from Barrera and Milans, Miralles maintained 
that the Vatican orders were to preach in the vernacular language and constantly 
declined sermonizing in Castilian. Moreover, he denounced the anti-clerical repression 
of the civil governor in Barcelona to Rome, urging the Vatican to defend the Catalan 
Church against state interference. However, the complaints of the Bishop of Barcelona
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to the Vatican were to no avail. In 1930, after heavy lobbying by the Spanish 
government in Rome, the Vatican transferred Miralles to the less important diocese of 
Majorca.
Rome became the third front of primorriverista action. Since the Holy See had 
the right to appoint and dismiss cardinals and bishops in Spain, the dictatorship 
launched a diplomatic offensive to compel the Vatican to abandon its protection of the 
Catalan episcopate. In 1926, during his visit to Italy, Eduardo Aunos, the Spanish 
Labour Minister, met the papal secretary of state. Cardinal de Gasparri, and demanded 
more cooperation from the Vatican with the primorriverista task of Spanishization. 
Aunos requested from the Pope a public condemnation of Catalan regionalism, the 
transfer of Vidal to the first available archdiocese outside of Catalonia, and the 
appointment of espanolista bishops in all Catalan dioceses.**^ Primo seemed determined 
to make the Vatican change its policies even if it meant to risk a schism. He informed 
Vidal that Rome had to choose between the regime and Catalonia and threatened "to 
expel the Nuncio and move straight away to the constitution of a National Church”, 
should the Vatican take the "wrong side”.^ *'^  One can only speculate on whether Primo 
would have gone as far as to create a Spanish National Church, but the truth is that 
diplomatic pressures soon began to pay off. In 1927, the Nuncio, Federico Tedeschini, 
exhorted the Catalan clergy to preach in Castilian and Vidal was threatened with a 
transfer to Zaragoza or Granada. Furthermore, Admiral Magaz, the Spanish ambassador 
to the Vatican since 1926, convinced De Gasparri to open an investigation on Vidal i 
Barraquer and the use of Catalan language in pastorals. The papal secretary of state sent 
the Nuncio and the Head of the Jesuits to inquire into the Catalanist propaganda by 
priests. As a result of the investigation and the pressures from the Spanish 
government, the Vatican ordered the Catalan clergy that no seminarist “contaminated 
with Catalanism” should be allowed to enter the priesthood. Although Rome did not
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establish Castilian as the pastoral language, it instructed Catalan priests to underline 
Spanish patriotism in their sermons and required that the Catalan catechism include new 
passages stressing love for the Spanish patria/
The new Vatican regulations were a victory for the regime. Nevertheless, 
changes in liturgies, catechism and sermons had been achieved at a very expensive 
price. Even after all the repression and its diplomatic efforts, the regime could not force 
the Catalan clergy to preach in Castilian. In turn, the Catalan clergy and laity considered 
the primorriverista policies anti-clerical and severely resented dictatorial repression. 
Moreover, the cleavage between the regime and the Social Catholics widened due to the 
primorriverista hostility towards the Catalan Church. In February 1928, El Debate 
claimed primorriverista actions were a clear violation of the Church’s right to choose 
the language in which the divine word was to be transmitted.^*^ As in the case of 
educational policies, the intensification of state-led policies of nationalisation deepened 
the primorriveristaSocidX Catholic divide.
The primorriverista strategy of nationalisation was not solely based on the 
repression of doctrines considered anti-Spanish. It also required the promotion of 
National Catholic values in schools and cultural institution. After the dissolution of the 
Mancomunitat in March 1925, the government concentrated all its efforts into 
promoting cultural espanolista policies from the provincial governments, or 
Diputaciones Provinciales. In Barcelona, Primo put Mila i Camps, Count of Montseny 
and a well-know Spanish nationalist, in charge of the Diputacion. The provincial 
government became the official centre of the primorriverista cultural programmes. The 
Department of Education the organized the donation of books, sponsored cultural 
associations, arranged patriotic conferences and granted scholarships for a variety of 
courses. The importance of the institution for the primorriveristas becomes obvious 
when the educational budget of the Diputacion is compared to that of the 
Mancomunitat. In the year 1922-1923, the Mancomunitat had a budget of 2,401,872 
pesetas allocated to its Department of Public Instruction; while, in 1929, the Diputacion 
resources for education amounted to 2,550,233 pesetas - a figure all the more significant
Bonet, “L’Eglèsia”, 335-352.
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if we consider it relates to just the province of Barcelona, whereas the Mancomunitaf s 
budget covered all four Catalan provinces/
The Department of Education of the Diputacion of Barcelona devoted much of 
its efforts and resources to buy books and distribute them amongst schools and public 
libraries. The nature of these works was essentially patriotic, devoted to hail the 
dictator, the Somatén or the Spanish race, although Spanish and Hispanic-American 
literary classics and religious publications were also included among the donations. 
Special attention was also paid to the preparation of patriotic fiestas. In 1925, for 
example, editions of the Revista Hispanoamericana were distributed among libraries 
and schools to commemorate the Fiesta de la Raza}^^ As instructed by the 
primorriverista legislation, the Diputacion annually organised patriotic conferences in 
all public libraries and educational institutions of the province and donated hundreds of 
books to national and municipal schools to celebrate the Fiesta del Lihro}^^
For all the promotion of the Castilian language by the Diputacion, it is important 
to note that books in Catalan were not expressly excluded from the donations and, in 
some cases, they constituted around 30% of the lots b e s t o w e d . N o r  did the 
Diputacion exclude sponsoring research on Catalan language. After the dissolution of 
the Mancomunitat, the Chair of Catalan Grammar was transferred to the Diputacion of 
Barcelona, which continued to fund the institution and different research projects on the 
Catalan language. This funding of Catalan studies was in agreement with some other 
measures taken by the regime, such as the creation of a Chair at the University of 
Barcelona for studying the work of the Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull in 1925, or the 
appointment of eight academics to study the Catalan, Basque and Galician languages at
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the Real Academia de la Lengua in Madrid in 1926.^ "^^  It is therefore fairly evident that 
the primorriveristas did not seek to “exterminate” Catalan language, as it is at times 
s u g g e s t e d . T h e  regime imposed Castilian as an instrument of nationalisation in 
schools and public institutions, yet the primorriverista conception of regional languages 
as folkloric relics did not preclude the promotion of their studies in the academia, while 
press and publications in Catalan were also tolerated.
The civil government of Barcelona acquired in the Diputacion a key intrument 
of the primorriverista nationalisation programme. In early 1926, the Diputaciôn"s 
Department of Public Instruction sponsored a series of courses in the public libraries of 
Pineda, Canet del Mar and Salient, which combined nationalist topics, such as 
Hispanidad, with professional lectures on fishing and agriculture. Once the courses 
ended, the Diputacion assisted the delegados in arranging the Sunday patriotic 
conferences in the province. Indoctrination of teachers was not overlooked. Since 
1926, the Department of Public Instruction organised patriotic pedagogic conferences in 
the Barcelona teacher training college specifically aimed at teaching how to lecture on 
patriotic v a l u e s . N o r  it was women’s education neglected by the primorriveristas. 
The provincial government maintained the funding of the Biblioteca Popular para la 
Mujer, initially established in 1909, and created new grants for study at the Women’s 
Professional College of Barcelona. As in the cases of the primorriverista plans for 
women’s political and physical indoctrination analysed in Chapter 4, it is possible to 
observe here the regime’s belief that women should be integrated into the labour market 
as well as nationalised. Once again, this approach to the social and ‘patriotic’ role of 
women clearly differed from the Fascist model in Italy, which condemned women to a 
passive role at home.^^®
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What was the overall impact of primorriverista policies of Spanishization in 
Catalonia? In October 1929, Primo stated in an official communiqué that his policies 
had eradicated Catalan nationalism and awaken a deep love for Spain among the people 
of Catalonia.^®  ^ Nine months later, General Berenguer abolished the notorious ‘decree 
against separatism’, arguing that the circumstances that originally led to its imposition 
did not exist anymore and praised the “manifest cordiality in which all regional 
sentiments evolve within the ideal of the unitary Patria”. In fact, nothing could be 
further from the truth. The dictatorial repression in Catalonia was intensive and 
arbitrary.^®  ^This was to alienate those sectors from which the dictatorship sought much 
of its support: the Church and the bourgeoisie. As a result of the repression important 
sectors of the middle classes and the clergy began to move towards Catalan nationalist 
options. Moreover, the monarchists in Catalonia, who had been strongly anti-Catalanist 
before the dictatorship, began to change their views and, once the dictator fell, 
embraced regionalism.^^^ The suppression of political liberties led Catalan regionalists 
to take refuge in cultural activities. Publications in Catalan rocketed during the 
dictatorship: in 1923, there were 6 newspapers published in Catalan, while in 1927, 10 
newspapers and 147 magazines were published in this language. By 1930, 10.2% of all 
books published in Spain were in Catalan.^ ®"^  In other words. Primo de Rivera’s policies 
of Spanishization put language in the front line of the dialectic between Spanish and 
Catalan nationalism and turned education into a political battleground. When in 1932 
Catalonia was granted political autonomy, the ‘Catalanization’ of schools became the 
first goal of the regional government.
At the educational level, the policies of Spanishization also led to serious 
practical problems in teaching. The imposition of Spanish in public educational 
institutions was certainly welcomed in those urban areas with a high number of 
Castilian speakers. After all, due to the steady flow of immigrants from other Spanish 
regions during the first two decades of the century, many Catalan towns had witnessed a 
rapid growth, becoming strongholds of Spanish nationalism.^®^ Yet, in rural Catalonia, 
teachers found teaching in Spanish a serious burden. In a letter to El Magisterio
The official note in Pérez, La dictadura, 288.
Ucelay, “La represiô”, 208.
José Luis de la Gran)a, , Justo Beramendi and Fere Anguera, La Espana de los nacionalismos y  las 
autonomias [Madrid: 2001], 79-80.
Nijftez Seixas, Los nacionalismos, 95.
Enric Ucelay da Cal, “La iniciaciô permanet: Nacionalismes radicals a Catalunya des de la 
Restamacià”, Catalunya i la Restauraciô, 1875-1923. [Manresa: 1992], 127-134.
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Nacional, an Aragonese maestro working in a village in the district of Tortosa bitterly 
described how he had to waste much of his lessons explaining the meaning of Castilian 
words, such as lentejas (lentils), to an amazed young audience which could hardly 
understand him?®  ^ In such circumstances, he considered his teaching was “anti- 
pedagogic” and demanded permission to use Catalan, or “at least some Catalan words”, 
when teaching. The Aragonese teacher was not alone in his petitions. Three months 
after the fall of the dictatorship, the maestros nacionales of Barcelona, most of them 
non-Catalan, called for total change of the primorriverista linguistic policy. They 
unanimously demanded, first, permission “to use regional languages in the classroom” 
and, second, the re-establishment of regional languages courses in the teacher training 
colleges.^®  ^As in the rest of Spain, in Catalonia the dictatorship failed to gain teachers’ 
support for its policies of nationalisation.
CONCLUSION: THE CATHOLIC TRAP
In many ways, the primorriverista failure in Catalonia epitomises the regime’s 
inability to turn the educational system into an effective indoctrinating machine for the 
whole country. The regime’s educational reforms had a twofold negative effect. They 
alienated key groups of primorriverista supporters (i. e. the Church, Social Catholics, 
and much of the conservative urban middle-classes) and antagonized teachers, the very 
state servants responsible for the transmission of the National Catholic message. The 
maestros’ disaffection with the regime was the result of a combination of dictatorial 
systematic control and repression and, above all, the primorriverista failure seriously to 
improve schools and teachers’ material conditions. For all the primorriverista 
investment in education, funds were simply not adequate to catch up with Spanish 
population growth, let alone to reach the educational level of the most advanced 
Western European countries. As a result, teachers slowly but steadily distanced 
themselves from the dictatorship. Consequently, the main piece in the ideological chain 
between the state and children did not work efficiently. Additionally, the disaffection of 
teachers and school inspectors with the regime due to repression and the inquisitorial 
educational system created by the primorriveristas reinforces the argument of the 
‘republicanisation’ of certain professional groups under the dictatorship.^®* Like many
El Magisterio Nacional 8-5-1930. 
El Magisterio Espanol, 22-4-1930.
208 Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 [Cambridge; 2002], 18-19.
231
doctors, clerks and state servants, teachers and school inspectors began to consider a 
constitutional republic as their best hope: a non-arbitrary form of power which could 
protect their own professional interests.
A second factor that seriously hampered the educational system as a successful 
agency of nationalisation was the primorriverista clash with the Catholic Church. This 
conflict was somehow inevitable. The process of nationalisation of the masses from 
above required the expansion of the state educational system, something that 
unavoidably affected ecclesiastical interests. This put Primo in an extraordinarily 
difficult position, since the state’s educational limitations made ecclesiastical 
cooperation indispensable in the primorriverista of task of nationalisation. As a result, 
like Mussolini, the dictator needed to make some concessions to the ecclesiastical 
authorities while, at the same time, expanding the public educational system. Yet the 
confrontation is also extremely telling about the real nature of primorriverismo. As 
explained in Chapters 2 and 3, primorriverista discourse developed a sacred concept of 
the patria, in which the nation was placed above Catholicism and the state above the 
church. Thus, when the nation was perceived to be under threat, as in the case of 
Catalonia, confrontation with the Church became acceptable.
For all its shortcomings, the public educational system grew significantly in 
terms of schools and teachers during the dictatorship. By 1931, the Second Republic 
could benefit from the primorriverista reinforcement of state education. This was, 
however, a poisoned legacy, for the economic situation of the 1930s made the 
improvement of a seriously under-funded educational system a very difficult task. The 
Republican-Socialist coalition (1931-1933) took a similar top-down approach to the 
primorriverista in an attempt to nationalise the masses, but this time indoctrination was 
in democratic and secular values. The creation of a “new republican citizen” became a 
key goal in the first democratic government, which promoted lectures and readings of 
the 1931 Constitution in small towns and villages via misiones pedagogicas -  teams of 
educators who travel the countryside to teach, perform plays and create schools and 
libraries. But financial restrictions, the revisionist policies of the period 1933-1936 and 
the lack of time precluded Republican-Socialist initiatives from having a significant 
impact.^®  ^ Ideologically, it was the Francoist regime which ultimately gained from the 
primorriverista experience. Once the subordination of the Church was secured and
209 Sandie Holguin, Creating Spaniards [Madison: 2002], 196; Cobb, “The Republican State”, 136-137.
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political opposition eradicated during and after the Civil War, the formation of a 
totalitarian National Catholic educational system finally crystallized in the 1940s. As in 
the case of Primo, Franco welcomed the help of the Church with his project of ‘political 
religion’, but did not allow an ecclesiastical tutelage of his regime.^*®
210 Elorza, “El franquisme, un proyecto de religiôn politica”, 73-76.
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CHAPTER 6. STATE NATIONALISATION OF THE 
MASSES: SOMATÉN AND UNION PATRIÔTICA
“...reason is not enough for the colossal endeavour of saving the people: we must light 
in it the flame of passion”
(Emilio Rodriguez Tarduchy)^
INTRODUCTION
On 21 November 1923, Primo de Rivera met Mussolini for an official lunch at 
the Palazzo Venezia. In his speech, the Spanish dictator described Fascism and 
primorriverismo as parallel movements of national salvation and presented the 
Somatén and the fascist militia as twin “secular institutions of civilisation and order”. 
That very same day, gratefully impressed by the Duce, Primo proudly declared to the 
press that Spain would follow the fascist example.^ When the official delegation 
returned to Spain on 1 December, Primo could see his approach to fascism had 
generated a great deal of expectation. At Barcelona harbour, together with the whole 
Catalan political elite, around 300 “blue shirts” of the Federaciôn Civico Somatenista 
(aka La Trazd) welcomed the King and the dictator with Roman salutes.^ The twelve 
tracista squads followed the royal retinue through the city. The streets of Barcelona 
presented an atmosphere of celebration - balconies in the Ramblas displayed Spanish 
flags and thousands of people gathered to cheer the King and the dictator. The 
procession first stopped at the cathedral where Alfonso XIII and Primo were greeted 
by the Cardinal-Archbishop of Catalonia and all Catalan bishops before hearing a Te 
Deum. Immediately afterwards, the group headed towards the town hall. At the 
entrance of the San Jaime Palace the mayor welcomed the distinguished guests and 
the municipal band played the Spanish national anthem in the middle of a popular 
ovation. What followed was an hour-long military parade in which army soldiers and 
navy sailors marched together with the Guardia Civil and police forces. At three 
o’clock, the king and his dictator went for lunch at the Ritz Hotel, where the Catalan 
political, military and ecclesiastical elites awaited. In the evening. Primo and Alfonso
’ Rodriguez Tarduchy, Psicologia del Dictador, 311-312.
 ^Both Primo’s speech at the Palazzo Venezia and his comments to the French newspaper 
L 'Information in ABC, 22-11-1923.
 ^El Debate, 1-12-1923 and 2-12-1923.
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XIII attended a banquet organised by general Barrera at the barracks of the Barcelona 
garrison. Both guests thanked the garrison for its leading “patriotic” role in the 13 
September coup and promised the new regime would lead to a “new Spain”."^
Yet the main event of the royal visit was scheduled for the following day. On 
2 December, a quarter of a million people gathered in Barcelona to commemorate the 
twentieth anniversary of the king’s coronation and to see Alfonso Xlll being 
decorated with the Somatén" s “Constancy Medal”. Perfectly organised by General 
Barrera, the patriotic celebration was conceived as the “beginning of a historic period 
for the nation”.^  The ceremony was meant to be the symbolic proclamation of the 
Somatén as the protector of the Spanish fatherland. Mobilisation for the event was 
impressive. In what was reported by the press as the biggest demonstration in Spanish 
history, 40,000 members of the Somatén came from all around Catalonia to pay 
tribute to the monarch and Primo.^ Members of the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, teh 
Barcelona police {mossos d ’esquadra). Civil Guards, the artillery “Hunters Battalion”, 
six aeroplanes and hundreds of children from Barcelona public and private schools 
waving Spanish flags were also mobilised for the ceremony. In an atmosphere of 
patriotic fervour, 250,000 people cheered the arrival of the monarchs and Primo to the 
royal tribune, while military bands played the national anthem and young students 
waved hundreds of Spanish flags. What followed in the next three hours - gun salutes, 
a military mass, patriotic speeches, a homage to the Virgin of Montserrat (patron saint 
of the militia), decoration of militiamen, and a parade of the 133 somatenista 
banderas (squads) - was to set a pattern for the primorriverista nationalist 
celebrations throughout the dictatorship. Over the next two days, Zaragoza and 
Madrid held similar celebrations to welcome dictator and king.^
The above paragraphs illustrate the primorriveristas" early intentions to use 
the Somatén for pro-regime mass mobilisation and to engage vast sectors of society in 
nationalist rituals. When from March 1924 onwards the regime was to create the 
Union Patriotica merging diverse right-wing groups {La Traza among them), the goal 
remained twofold. First, the formation of an official party sought a controlled mass 
mobilisation that could channel popular support for the dictatorship. Second, it aimed 
to “educate” the masses on primorriverista nationalist values. Thus the official militia
A description o f events and the speeches are found in El Debate, 1-12-1923 and 2-12-1923.
The words o f Barrera in José Fontân Palomo, El Somatenista espanol [Barcelona; 1924], 52-55. 
The ceremony in El Debate, 2-12-1923 and 4-12-1923 and Fontân, El Somatenista, 56-70.
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and the state-sanctioned party became essential agencies in both the transmission of 
the dictatorship’s nationalist discourse to the masses and popular mobilisation through 
nationalist rituals.
The importance of rites and ceremonies for the nationalisation of the masses 
has been highlighted by historians and political scientists alike.* The creation of 
national identity responds to a complex process by which individuals identify 
themselves with symbols that have the power to unite and stress a sense of 
community.^ The construction of a “national collective memory”, a must in the 
creation of national identity, is based on historical myths. These myths are objectified 
in symbols which are in turn displayed in public festivals and monuments. Thus 
public festivals, ceremonies and national monuments were (and are) used to anchor 
national myths and symbols in the consciousness of the people. In addition, public 
festivals and ceremonies are designed to make the masses feel that they are also part 
of the nation and could participate in the “national experience”.*®
Rituals are an essential component in the creation of a community of 
nationalist believers and in the formation of nationalism as a “secular political 
religion”.** The sacralization of national symbols takes place in patriotic ceremonies 
where the nation is endowed with sacred qualities and patriotic liturgies acquire a 
religious character previously reserved for the deity. As explained in the introduction, 
Italian and German fascists elaborated secularized religions as the political cement of 
the nation, which attempted to draw the people into anti-democratic political 
mobilisation and active participation in the national mystique as a way to foment 
popular consensus and social cohesion. In these new Fascist religions the role of 
rituals, symbolism, and sacralized rhetoric became paramount and were created in a 
syncretic manner, that is, incorporating and overlapping traditional Christian
'' El Debate, 4-12-1923
* Among the most important historical studies o f ceremonies and the process o f mass nationalisation 
are Mosse, The Nationalization o f  the Masses', idem, Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory o f  the 
World Wars [Oxford: 1990]; Maurice Auglhon, Marianne into Battle. Republican Imaginery and  
Symbolism in France, 1789-1880, [New York: 1981]; Gentile, The Sacralization', Seymour Drescher, 
David Sabean and Allan Sharlin (eds.). Political Symbolism in Modern Europe [New Brunswick & 
London: 1982]; E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds). The Invention o f  Tradition [Cambridge: 1983]; 
John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism [London: 1994].
 ^Montserrat Guibemau, “National Identity and Modernity”, in Alain Dieckhoff and Natividad 
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Mosse, The Nationalization, 6-8.
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metaphors, liturgies and symbols with fascist political discourse to idealise the 
Nation-State.
In these processes of nationalist mobilisation the official party and the militias 
were to play a key role. In the cases of Italy and Germany, the official party, together 
with some other state institutions, acted as the mediator between the leader and the 
followers to transmit both discourse and symbolised myths, while at the same time 
providing an instrument of social control over the masses. As shown in Chapters 2 
and 3, the UP and the Somatén Nacional were conceived by the ideologues of the 
regime as having that very same role of connecting the dictator’s discourse to the 
people and drawing the masses into an anti-democratic political mobilisation. The 
following pages analyse the role of the Somatén and the UP as state agencies of 
nationalisation, focusing on the patriotic rituals and ceremonies organised by them.
THE SOMATÉN NACIONAL 
Formation
The Somatén was certainly not a primorriverista invention. As a rural militia 
its origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages and throughout the nineteenth 
century it remained an important popular organisation fighting French invaders, 
Carlists and Federal Republicans in the Catalan countryside. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, the Somatén steadily grew in Catalan urban centres as a 
bourgeois response to increasing working class mobilisation. In January 1919, Catalan 
regionalists of the Lliga, Spanish nationalists of the Union Monarquica and Jaimistas 
joined forces and, with the support of the Barcelona financial elite, created the 
Barcelona Somatén, a civic guard {guardia civicd) under military supervision and 
integrated into the general framework of the Catalan Somatén. Its declared aims were 
protecting property, fighting the alleged Bolshevik menace, and keeping factories and 
public services running during strikes. By the end of 1919, employers’ organisations 
and different conservative groups had created civic guards in Madrid, Zaragoza, 
Valencia, Granada and Alicante following the Barcelona Somatén model. In the next 
two years, Palma de Mallorca, Seville and San Sebastian followed suit.^^
The actions of the Barcelona Somatén in the years before 1923 made for a real 
political education for the would-be primorriverista military elite. Generals Milans
Mosse, The Nationalization, 5-6.
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del Bosch, Captain General of Catalonia (1918-1920), Martinez Anido, Civil 
Governor of Barcelona (1920-1922), Arlegui, Head of the Barcelona Police, and 
Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia (1922-1923), provided the Somatén 
with arms and military training and co-ordinated the actions of the militia during 
strikes. For the military authorities, the militia proved to be extremely useful in their 
war against organised labour. First, the Somatén was used as a substitute for the army 
to repress strikers, so the military was not compromised in the eyes of the public. 
Second, Martinez Anido and Arlegui incorporated some somatenistas into the army- 
organised Sindicato Libre killing squads, which contributed to an increasing number 
of assassinations of trade unionist leaders in Barcelona.
Primo was delighted with the work of the Somatén in Barcelona and as early 
as March 1919 publicly demanded the extension of the Catalan militia all around 
Spain. Yet the successive Liberal and Conservative governments did nothing to 
extend the Somatén to all Spanish provinces under a centralised framework. Thus 
Primo had to wait until he personally took power to realise his dream of a National 
Somatén. Not that he waited long once in office. The manifesto of 13 September 
promised the formation of the Somatén Nacional in a matter of hours. Primo stuck to 
his word and four days after the coup a royal decree extended the Catalan militia to 
every province of Spain and the Moroccan protectorate. As explained in Chapter 2, 
the reason for this was twofold. First, it was an initial defensive measure to endow the 
regime with a civilian militia capable of backing the military government in case it 
came under pressure. Second, the military directory conceived the Somatén as a 
pedagogic organisation devoted “to strengthen the spirit of citizenry”. Primo de 
Rivera made no secret of it and, in the first years of the dictatorship, repeatedly stated 
that the Somatén Nacional was meant to be a real “school of citizenry” where all 
social classes would be indoctrinated in nationalist values.
Extending the Somatén to all Spanish provinces was something other than the 
mere replication of the Catalan militia around the country. The primorriverista model 
in effect militarised the militia, by placing the Somatén under direct control of army. 
The 17 September Royal Decree ordered each Captain General to chose a
Fernando del Rey Reguillo, Propietariosy  Patronos [Madrid: 1992], 626-682.
645-649.
Rey, “Ciudadanos”, 105.
'^RD 17-9-1923 inLaG aceta, 18-9-1923.
See, for example, LaNacion, 19-9-1925.
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“Commander of Somatén” from among his generals. Likewise, the regional Captain 
Generals had to select officers from among those in the reserve as military trainers of 
the local militias {Auxiliares militares)}^ The officers, in turn, were in charge of 
organising the local somatenes and naming the militia leader {cabo primero). This 
top-down approach shows Primo’s firm belief in the army as the essential institution 
for the creation of new agencies of mass nationalisation. The fact that the dictator 
took the same approach in the creation of the delegados gubernativos should not 
come as a surprise. In both cases army officers were in charge of organising the 
dictatorship’s “educational” network. Since the very first days of the regime, the 
militarization of society was understood as an integral component in the 
nationalisation of the masses.
Similar to the establishment of the delegados, Martinez Anido co-ordinated the 
creation of the militia from the Ministry of the Interior. During the first years of the 
dictatorship, the regimen’s second in command supervised the works of the Captain 
Generals and the Somatén commanders in every region and demanded civil governors 
to mobilise the delegates for the organisation and regular inspection of somatenes in 
small tovms and villages.^® Thus the delegates became the main link between the 
Somatén commanders in the cities and the rural militias. This military tutelage was to 
remain throughout the entire dictatorship tightly interweaving the fortunes of the 
somatenes with the actions of the delegates.^^
With this hierarchical and militarised structure the Somatén Nacional expanded 
into the most recondite places of Spain in a matter of months. This development also 
had much to do with the different groups that initially supported the regime’s 
initiative. The Catholic trade unions had been part of the militias in Madrid even 
before the dictatorship and when the Somatén Nacional was established many 
Catholic workers joined it in other Spanish towns.^^ In rural areas the powerful 
Confederaciôn Nacional Catolica Agraria (CNCA) and the Asociacion Catolica
Article 3, RD 17-9-1923. 
Article 4, RD 17-9-1923.
A vast number o f reports from captain generals o f all regions to Martinez Anido on the formation of 
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See Subsecretario de Gobemaciôn to civil govemors, 27-1-1926, AGA, Interior, Bundle 149.
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Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP) suggested to peasants that they join the militias, 
a recommendation that according to the catholic press they followed en masse?^
Regarding the mobilisation of the masses and their integration into the Somatén, 
the reaction of the upper classes was, however, mixed. In the cities, bankers, 
employers, industrialists and aristocrats fully supported the idea and funded and 
directed the militias.^"  ^In rural areas, some of the great landowners happily jumped on 
the primorriverista wagon and formed militias as their own praetorian guards,^^ but 
most of the caciques saw the creation of somatenes as a direct challenge to their 
power. Javier Tusell has suggested that “the Somatenes, presumably, were in the 
hands of caciquil organisations throughout the entire dictatorial period” in Andalusia, 
yet no evidence is provided to back this statement.^^ On the contrary, archival records 
show that the Captain Generals were very wary about the negative impact the 
caciques might have on the formation of the Somatén in southern Spain. Ten days 
after the Royal Decree establishing the Somatén Nacional was published, the Captain 
General of the 2"  ^Military Region (Andalusia) wrote to Primo explaining the difficult 
task he was facing.^^ The General believed he could not organise independent militias 
in towns of less than 3,000 inhabitants until the councils were transformed because of 
the caciques ’ control of the municipal boards. Once the governmental delegates had 
taken over the municipal councils in the autumn of 1923, the formation of somatenes 
began to take place in small towns and villages. In some cases, the caciques sought to 
infiltrate the militias with stooges or simply hampered the actions of those corporals 
opposed to caciquil influence, which in turn led to denunciations by members of the 
public sparking military investigations.^^ On some other occasions, however, the local 
bosses seem to have stepped aside and “allowed” the formation of the Somatén with 
only passive opposition. A year after the official establishment of the institution, the
for instance, Catholic trade unions and Corporal o f the Somatén o f Alcira to Martinez Anido, 14-1- 
1926, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 440, Box 1.
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Somatén General Commander of the 2"  ^ Military Region, Antonio Fernandez, 
complained to his Captain General about the “regretful apathy of the upper class” 
which did nothing to help him in creating militias?^ Although the primorriveristas 
might have tolerated the presence of caciques in the Somatén, the latter seem to have 
been rarely in control of the militias.
The political orientation and social strata of those groups which supported the 
formation of the Somatén from the start obviously had a severely negative impact on 
the readiness of some other political groups and social classes to join the militia. Thus 
the involvement of the upper classes and conservative elements of the lower middle 
classes (shopkeepers and small employers) in the urban somatenes alienated most of 
the blue collar workers.^^ In the same manner, the support of middle and small 
landowners made the integration of landless peasants (jornaleros) an impossible task. 
And yet the primorriveristas insisted the government wanted to integrate all classes 
into the militia. To get this message across, every regional commander was 
commissioned with the creation of an official regional bulletin of the militia as an 
initial step into the political indoctrination of the paramilitaries. Subscription to the 
regional bulletins was made mandatory for all somatenistas, who had to pay a small 
fee for the membership and the funding of the publication.
The set of political values defended in the pages of the somatenes^ bulletins 
were those of nationalism, counterrevolution, Catholicism and social order, together 
with a bitter anti-communism and anti-Catalan nationalism. As explained in Chapter 
2, these beliefs were loosely defined in a discourse that, nonetheless, led to the 
effective sanctification of political terms, such as patria, nation, and order, while 
including a veneer of pseudo-scientific vocabulary. The Somatén’s Decalogue, for 
example, described “Anarchists, paranoids, alcoholics, and effeminate people” as 
“mentally degenerate” and “public enemies”, thus portraying the nature of the 
regimen’s political opponents as subhuman and sick.^  ^ Despite the obvious political 
implications of these postulates, somatenista publications always presented the militia 
as non-political. Mindful of the popular perception of the somatenes as ideologically 
and personally linked to the extreme right, the paramilitaries emphasised that all 
ideological options were welcomed, including the “intellectual left” - the only proviso
Somatén general commander o f the 2"*^  Region to captain general of the 2"** Region, 2-9-1924, AHN, 
Gobemaciôn (Estado) Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 1.
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being that of supporting the regime/^ Vague ideological definitions had, of course, 
the goal of attracting the largest possible number of members from different political 
backgrounds, especially the middle classes not connected with dynastic parties, the 
so-called clases neutras. But ideological vagueness is also telling of the nature of the 
Somatén Nacional. Created as a “movement of citizens”, the primorriveristas 
understood that in the regime’s militia action should precede doctrine and strength 
and decision should herald the ideological debate -  a view much in line with the 
postulates of Schmitt and the fascist theoretician Giovanni Gentile.^^ In no other field 
did this combination of regime’s propaganda and mobilisation of the masses became 
more important than in the public ceremonies that the Somatén organised throughout 
the entire dictatorship.
The Battle for the Public Arena: Rituals, Virgins and Parades
By autumn 1924, the regime boasted the Somatén had more than 175,000 
members all around the c o u n try .Y e t the actions of the militias against political 
opponents of the regime had been almost non-existent in the year the Somatén 
Nacional had been functioning. As Primo himself acknowledged in October 1925, 
many wondered about the reason-to-be of the Somatén?^ For the dictator the 
explanation was clear. First, the militia was a “pre-emptive medicine”, a deterrent for 
eventual social disorders. Second, the Somatén was a “school of citizenship”, what in 
the dictators eyes meant a device of social indoctrination via mass mobilisation. In 
fact, by the autumn of 1925 the Somatén had been mobilised to participate in every 
single nationalist ceremony organised by the regime since 13 September 1923. These 
included not only activities related to the militia (the Fiesta of the sanctification of the 
Somatén flag and celebrations for the Virgin of Montserrat), but also participation in 
celebrations of Spanish military victories in Morocco, ceremonies for those fallen in 
Cuba and the Philippines, openings of school buildings, the Fiesta del Arbol and all 
sorts of pro-regime “patriotic campaigns”.
“Decâlogo del Somatén”, El Somatén. Boletin Oficial del Somatén Local de Madrid, August, 1924. 
The somatenistas acknowledged that because many o f their members were also militants o f radical- 
right groups the general public perceived the Somatén as an extreme rightwing organisation. El 
Somatén, May 1924.
”  Gonzâlez and Key, La defensa, 181.
Paz y  Buena Voluntad. Boletin oficial de los Somatenes de la 5" Region, September 1924. 
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During the dictatorship the Somatén Nacional created its own rituals, 
essentially developing those of the Catalan militia. The Fiesta of the sanctification of 
the Somatén flag was the foundational ritual of all militias and it was repeated on 
yearly bases during the annual military inspection. Whether in cities or in villages it 
usually followed a similar pattern everywhere. It began with a military parade of the 
members of the army and the local Somatén followed by an open air mass (misa de 
campana). Once the mass was over, the ecclesiastical authorities blessed the Somatén 
and the Spanish flags, while the military or local band played the national anthem. 
The sanctification of the emblems was followed by a series of speeches delivered by 
the Somatén's military commanders and the godmother (madrina) of the militia, who 
usually praised the paramilitaries, the war in Africa and the dictatorship at home. 
After the speeches, the sometenistas paraded in front of the authorities while the 
music bands played pasodobles?^
It is worth noting the novelty that the celebration of these fiestas had for 
hundreds of small tovms and villages where no popular patriotic ceremony had ever 
taken place. True, many in the countryside might have listened to patriotic discourses 
emanating from the pulpit or the balcony of the town hall during the Restoration. And 
yet the Somatén NacionaPs ceremonies encouraged the active participation of local 
men and women as never before. The militia’s parades, the speeches of the madrinas 
and the corporal of the Somatén were all new elements of popular participation in 
patriotic rituals. Further, the primorriverista ceremonies incorporate elements of 
popular culture, such as pasodobles and Catholic masses, designed to integrate 
thousands of peasants into the patriotic liturgy. For the first time, many individuals in 
rural Spain could identify themselves with symbols designed to stress the sense of 
national community and could “experience” the fatherland, with all its religious, 
populist and military connotations, in emotional terms.
In the cities and large towns the regime specialised in grand gatherings and 
parades, as a way to both indoctrinate and show mass support. In these cases, the 
primorriveristas put in practice all the experience gained in Catalonia during the years 
previous to the dictatorship. In the early 1920s, the Catalan elites had organised 
Somatenista parades to celebrate the day of the patron saint of the institution (the 
Virgin of Montserrat) and the oath to the militia’s flags, with support of the civil and
36 See dozens o f letters and telegrams from the civil governors and the delegados to Martinez Anido in
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military authorities. In 1921, the first grand gathering took place in Barcelona, where 
35,000 militiamen marched in a ceremony which included an open-air mass, blessing 
of the flags, interpretation of the national anthem, and popular displays of Spanish and 
Catalan flags. The show really gained momentum when Martinez and Arlegui, then 
Civil Governor and Chief Police Inspector of Barcelona respectively, paraded in an 
open topped car throughout the Paseo de Gracia to the delight of the public.^^ In the 
following years new parades were organised to commemorate the Virgin of 
Montserrat in Barcelona and Gerona. On these occasions, the recently named Captain 
General of Catalonia, Miguel Primo de Rivera, attended the ceremonies.^* Once in 
power. Primo was determined not only to maintain this newly invented “tradition” but 
also to export it to the rest of the country.
The Royal Order of 3 November 1923 declared the Virgin of Montserrat 
patron saint of all Somatenes in Spain, as a tribute to the Catalan militia praised for its 
religious and “glorious Spanish tradition” and its role in combating the French during 
the War of Independence.^^ In the months to come. Primo personally encouraged the 
celebration of the saint patron and Martinez Anido mobilised civil governors, 
delegates, Captain Generals and Somatén Commanders to assure the success of the 
celebration. Already in the spring of 1924, the ceremonies were widespread 
throughout Spain."*® In Madrid, for example, a huge altar with the figure of the Virgin 
of Montserrat was on display for the ceremony held in El Retiro park, where 
thousands of paramilitary paraded in front of the dictator."** In the following years, the 
Fiesta of the Virgin of Montserrat became the most important somatenista ceremony, 
frequently presided over by Primo and members of the royal family and always 
cautiously co-ordinated by the Ministry of the Interior."*^
The regime’s promotion of the Fiesta of the Virgin of Montserrat was not 
gratuitous. The decision was consistent with the primorriverista quest for the creation
AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 331, Box 1, and Bundle 442.
Martinez Anido to Minister of the Interior, 24-4-1921, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado) Serie A, Bundle 
59, Box 1.
Civil Governor o f Gerona to Minister o f the Interior, 1-5-1922, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado) Serie A, 
Bundle 59, Box 1.
RCO 3-11-1923, CLE, n. 496, 572-573.
See tens o f telegrams from local somatenes to Martinez Anido in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
Bundle 442.
El Somatén, May 1924.
See the correspondence o f Martinez Anido with the provincial Commanders, Captain Generals and 
Civil Govemors in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado) Serie A, Bundle 59, Boxes 1 and 2; and Presidencia 
del Gobiemo, Bundle 440.
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of a “patriotic religion”. The primorriveristas were fully aware of the power of 
religion to impact on the psyche of the masses. As one of the leaders of the Junta de 
Propaganda Patriotica, Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Rodriguez Tarduchy, bluntly put 
it, religion was the most important factor in the transformation of the “social 
psychology of the mob”."^  ^ The dictatorship sought to endorse Somatén rituals with a 
strong religious flavour that in turn emphasised the sacred character of the nation. The 
incorporation of Christian iconography, the celebration of open-air masses, the 
priests’ patriotic sermons and the interpretation of the national anthem during the 
benediction of the Somatén and the Spanish flags, were all elements intended to create 
the feeling of a mass nationalist “communion” among the participants and the 
public.^"  ^As in the primorriverista nationalist ceremonies with soldiers and students, 
Catholic imaginary and rhetoric were fully integrated into civic patriotic rituals.
The decision to declare the Virgin of Montserrat as the patron saint of the 
Somatén Nacional also had more subtle objectives: it aimed at transforming the 
Catalanist Virgin par excellence into a symbol of Spanish nationalism. By the early 
1920s, the cult of Monserrat was a well established ritual of Catalan regionalism and 
nationalism. By incorporating the Virgin into Spanish nationalism’s symbolic 
repertoire. Primo sought to deprive the Catalanist enemy of its own signs of identity.
The extent to which this new tradition of celebrating the Virgin of Montserrat 
grew roots outside Catalonia is not difficult to determine. The fiesta was celebrated 
throughout the entire dictatorship with the support of the state apparatus, but once the 
regime fell, the rapid decline of the Somatén and the disappearance of the celebration 
went hand in hand."^  ^ More importantly, the regime was unable to strip the Moreneta 
of its Catalanist connotations. During the period 1923-1930, the trend to baptise girls 
with the name Montserrat doubled in Catalonia."^  ^ The selection of the patron of 
Catalonia (and of a name that has no equivalent into Castilian) to baptise daughters 
has to be understood as an act of resistance by many Catalans who opposed the
Rodriguez Tarduchy, Psicologia, 249.
See, for example, El Somatén, May 1925.
The records o f the Ministry of the Interior only show one report by a civil governor on the 
celebration o f the Virgin of Montserrat during the Dictablanda. This marks a sharp contrast with the 
hundreds o f reports sent every year to Martinez Anido during the dictatorship. The report dated 27-4- 
1930 in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado) Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2.
The trend o f baptising girls with the name Montserrat and its political implications in Serrano, El 
nacimiento, 69-73.
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primorriverista policies of Spanishisation. The fact that the same pattern was to be 
repeated in Catalonia under Francoism should not come as a surprise.
Together with the Catholic features of Somatén" s rituals, it was the military 
factor which most contributed to the creation of a sacred idea of the nation at the 
symbolic level. In the years before 1923, the militias had developed militarised rites 
in the burials of comrades, where coffins were covered with the national flag, 
praetorian guards were installed around the coffin and collective oaths were made."*  ^
This military-religious symbiosis in the somatenistas" last honours was to continue 
during the dictatorship."^^ However, the drastic reduction of violent deaths in social 
clashes from 1924 onwards led to a sharp decline in the celebration of these funeral 
rites. Nevertheless, the regime used the Somatén ceremonies to honour those fallen for 
the patria in the colonial wars. Seeking to develop a cult of the dead, the Somatén 
celebrated ceremonies with veterans of Cuba and Puerto Rico and tributes to the 
fallen in the African fields were frequently paid as part of the militia’s rituals."^  ^
Likewise, the Somatén was mobilised every time the government organised a public 
mass to honour the Spanish army.^® As explained in chapter 2, masses for those fallen 
in Africa or to commemorate Spanish victory over Moroccan rebels became a central 
part of the nationalist rallies.^* In these ceremonies the nation was endorsed with the 
Christian symbolism of death and resurrection. Like Fascist Italy, all these elements 
became essential ingredients for a new “patriotic religion”, which placed the nation on 
the main altar.
Some factors, however, acted against the successful creation of a cult of the 
fallen in Spain. The main problem was the unpopularity of the war in Morocco.^^ The 
fact that the official celebrations of the end of the war emphasised peace over colonial 
greatness illustrates to what extent the regime was aware of the difficulties of imbuing
Fernando del Rey, “Ciudadanos honrados y somatenistas”, Estudios de Historia Social, (1987), n.42- 
43, 130.
See, for example, the funeral tributes paid annually by the Toboso Somatén to its fallen members, in 
El Somatén, October 1927,
See, for instance, the tribute paid by the Linares Somatén to the ex-combatants o f Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, El Somatén, August 1924.
For an account o f these ceremonies see, Rubio, Crônica [1974], 128-129, 143-44, 157,161.
See, for example, the discourses o f Primo and the Infante Don Fernando in front o f the Monument of  
the Soldiers Fallen for the Fatherland on 26 January, 1925, Casa, Dos anos, 717-718.
For the Italian case see Gentile, The Sacralization, 17-18.
See chapter 4.
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the Moroccan campaign with popular jingoist fervour.Second, Spain’s neutrality in 
WWI had precluded the formation of groups of veterans eager to experience again the 
comradeship of the front and honour those fallen in the battlefields - a phenomenon 
found in most European countries in the 1920s.^  ^ Unlike Italy, most of the 
paramilitaries in the Somatén Nacional had neither war experience nor had they 
fought the trade unionists in the streets.
Primo’s Somatén Nacional not only deviated from the Fascist militias in its 
lack of war ethos but also in its image. Whereas Italian and Nazi militias wore 
uniforms and militarised their public performances as much as possible, the 
somatenistas had no uniforms and marched without military discipline. As described 
by one witness, the somatenistas parading in Madrid in December 1923 were 
“excellent bourgeois, over-40 fathers, who looked more like peaceful tourists than 
heroic guardians of social order”.^  ^Their heterogeneous civilian clothes and peaceful 
image simply could not transmit “discipline and martial ideas” to the public.^^ This 
lack of martial spirit and military aesthetics certainly conditioned the initial popular 
reception of the Somatén. As the dictator acknowledged, the first somatenista parades 
were met with mockery and sneers by many in Andalusia.Nonetheless, he refused 
the idea of creating a uniform for the militia. For Primo “discipline and honour” were 
to be the essence of the Somatén over any aesthetic consideration.^^ The decision not 
to give uniforms to the militias seems contradictory for a regime so eager to endow 
civilians with military values. But it might well have responded to the intention not to 
blur the external distinctions between the army and civilian militants -  something that 
would have infuriated military officers. The army was to remain a different, superior 
class within the regime apparatus.
For all the initial problems the militia experienced. Primo’s confidence in the 
Somatén as the best tool whereby mobilise the masses remained intact. During the 
first three years of his regime, the Somatén was to play a key role in the so-called 
“campaigns against bad Spaniards”. These were regime-organised gatherings to show 
mass support for the dictatorship when criticised by the liberal opposition in exile. As
The celebration o f victory was named the “Fiesta de la Paz”. See its observance in Union Patriotica, 
15-10-1927 and 1-11-1927.
Mosses, Fallen Soldiers, 71-106.
Manuel Aguirre, Glosa del ano 23, [Madrid: 1944], 314.
Ibid., 3 \4 .
LaNacion, 18-10-1925.
LaNacion, 18-10-1925.
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early as January 1924, the dictatorship organised a parade outside the Royal Palace to 
honour the king and “make amends” for the “bad Spaniards” who had criticised the 
monarch and the regime. Representatives of all provinces, around 5,000 mayors 
coming from all over Spain, hundreds of Catalan somatenistas and 1,500 boy-scouts 
marched in front of Primo and Alfonso XIII. The following week Barcelona hosted 
yet another pro-regime celebration that was to last for three days.^° As anti- 
primorriverista opposition grew among liberal intellectuals throughout 1924, so did 
the regime’s resolution to mobilise supporters. The publication of the republican 
Blasco Ibanez’s Par Espaha y  contra el rey led to a new governmental campaign 
against the “bad Spaniards”. In December 1924, tens of Somatenes held parades in 
different towns while aristocrats and Catholic workers celebrated “patriotic” meetings 
to vindicate the figures of the monarch and the d i c t a t o r . I n  Valencia, the tovm 
council opted to change the name of Blasco Ibafiez S q ua r e . On  the 23 January 1925 
Martinez Anido gathered thousands of somatenes from all over Spain for a grand 
march on the streets of Madrid in defence of the king and the nation.^^
For a regime obsessed with its image abroad, these parades sought to 
demonstrate to the international community the popular support Primo had at home. 
In terms of objectives and even location (the Royal Palace in Madrid), they also bore 
a striking resemblance to those gatherings Francisco Franco was to organise when 
criticised by European democrats. For the primorriveristas, the patriotic campaigns 
were an important part of their endeavour to nationalise the masses via active 
participation in emotionally enhancing folkloric celebrations, in which king, dictator 
and nation were portrayed as the supreme good opposed to the evil of liberal- 
republican-Bolshevik-foreign-anti-Spanish critics. In other words, the campaigns 
sought to facilitate the symbolic popularisation of the Manichean views promoted by 
the regime at the discursive level through the active participation of the man in the 
street.
The nationalisation of the masses through participation in patriotic ceremonies 
was in absolute concurrence with the regime’s attempt to take the streets from the 
dictatorship’s political opponents. The “conquest” of the streets as a public political
The parades in Madrid and Barcelona in Rubio Crônica [1974], 127-131.
See telegrams o f Captains Generals and Somatén General Commanders from diverse regions to 
Primo de Rivera in December 1924 and January 1925, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 442. 
Rubio Crônica [1986], 160.
Paz y  Buena Voluntad, January 1925.
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space was in turn part of a much more far-reaching project to monopolise the 
symbolic universe and, hence, gain an absolute control of political discourse. 
Together with military censorship, official propaganda and mandatory inclusion of 
Primo’s official notes in all newspapers, the regime implemented a long-term 
symbolic repression to reduce the potential for organised protest. In the dictatorship’s 
bid for controlling the symbolic universe it is possible to distinguish three different 
interrelated tactics: assimilation of the enemies’ symbols, creation of new symbols 
and rites, and banning the iconography and rituals of the opponents. The regime 
attempted assimilation in the case of the Virgin of Montserrat but, as noted above, the 
Moreneta never fully made it into the sanctuary of Spanish nationalism. Some other 
historical myths shared by both liberals and reactionaries, such as the War of 
Independence, remained in dispute during the 1920s and 1930s. '^  ^ Probably no other 
case encapsulates better the struggle for controlling the nationalist symbolic universe 
than the repatriation of Angel Ganivet’s body. Claimed by both liberals and 
conservatives as the intellectual doyen of Spanish nationalism, his burial in Madrid in 
1925 ended with violent clashes between primorriverista supporters and opponents.^^ 
As in many other fields, the regime proved itself more effective at destroying 
than at creating. The so-called “decree against separatism” of 17 September 1923 
banned all regional flags and emblems from public display. Furthermore, in early 
September 1924, the Civil Governor of Barcelona forbade not only the celebration of 
the Diada, national day of Catalonia, but also bringing bouquets of flowers to the 
statue of Rafael Casanova, the Catalan national hero.^^ When the regime realised that 
intellectuals and Restoration political elites were turning their meetings into public 
acts of opposition, the dictatorship reacted by forbidding the events. In the Autumn of 
1924, for instance, a homage to Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, then an onti-primorriverista 
Professor of Law at the University of Madrid, was broken up by police.^^ Subsequent 
public meetings organised by liberals and conservatives to honour Eduardo Dato and 
Maranon were simply forbidden. The Left and mti-primorriverista groups of the 
extreme right were also kept from celebrating their rituals. The commemoration of
^  For the use o f the War of Independence as a mobilising myth by both Republicans and Nationalists 
during the Civil War, Xose-Manoel Nùflez, “Nations in arms against the invader: On nationalist 
discourses during the Spanish Civil War”, in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.). The 
Splintering o f  Spain. New Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War (forthcoming) [Cambridge: 2005].
® Garcia, Los intelectuales, 184-196.
Rubio, Crônica [1986], 151.
Villanueva, La Dictadura, 134-144.
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May Day was likewise forbidden “to avoid foreign interference” in Spain, while the 
Ministry of the Interior constantly refused to authorise Carlist public ceremonies.^*
In terms of inventing new symbols and rituals, the primorriveristas were less 
creative. Symbols that represented the nation - the flag and the anthem - remained 
unchanged. The symbolic unity of the militias was not achieved until January 1930, 
two weeks before the collapse of the regime.Notwithstanding the fact that some 
new celebrations were created, (the Dia del libra espanol and the Fiesta del soldado), 
the regime mainly re-elaborated existing ceremonies emphasising their military and 
nationalist features. The cases of the Fiesta del Arbol and the somatenista celebrations 
provide good examples of rites which changed their meaning under the dictatorship - 
shifting from the celebration of the local community to the national one. The 
relevance of this “re-invention of traditions” lay in its magnitude and geographical 
extension. The fact that the regime expanded regional ceremonies to the national level 
with the support of the state apparatus led to the multiplication of patriotic rituals all 
around Spain. To what extent these “new” rites were to be effective in terms of mass 
nationalisation very much depended on the official agencies’ ability to integrate and 
mobilise different social classes into the primorriverista nationalist ideal.
Problems, reforms and fall
The idea of integrating all social classes into the Somatén Nacional proved a 
difficult task from the start. For an institution that in the iprQ-primorriverista era had 
specialised in fighting trade unionists in the streets and supplying the services 
interrupted by industrial actions its appeal to the working class had to be limited. 
Before September 1923, dozens of trade unions had demanded to the government the 
dissolution of the Somatén in Catalonia, arguing that its existence effectively legalised 
the “arming of a conflicting class in the social struggle”.^ ® Some others on the 
extreme Left opted for more direct action. For instance, in April 1923 trade unionists
Some examples o f the prohibition o f Carlist ceremonies in San Sebastiân, Barcelona and Zaragoza in 
1924 and the closing down o f Carlist associations in Valencia in 1928 in AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, 
Bundle, 40. On May Day see Rubio, Crônica [1974], 141.
The regulation o f Somatén Nacionars flags and official emblems in RCO 17-1-1930, CLE, 1930, 
n.13,42.
Telegram of Gerona railwaymen to the Ministry o f the Interior, 25-6-1923. This and tens more trade 
union petitions to dismantle the Somatén in Catalonia in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 
59, Box 1.
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exploded a car-bomb during the celebration of the Virgin of Montserrat parade in 
Barcelona/^
The extension of the Somatén to the whole of Spain did little to improve the 
relationships between the militiamen and the working class. For all the support of the 
minority Catholic trade unions and the Sindicato Libre, the few working class men 
who decided to join the militia were often scorned, ostracised and threatened by 
fellow workers.^^ The situation deteriorated so quickly that by September 1924 the 
government decided to implement special measures against those mocking or 
intimidating somatenistas^ Nonetheless, the legal protection of paramilitaries 
threatened by members of the public was to no avail. Mockery, threats and retaliations 
against somatenistas continued to be carried out not only by workers in industrial 
cities but also by members of the lower classes in rural a r e a s . I n  the village of 
Catrocalbon, for instance, a great scandal broke out when two locals openly insulted 
the somatenistas during a public ceremony, “uttering notoriously vulgar remarks 
about the mothers of the militiamen”, yet no action seems to have been taken against 
them.^ ^
Scorn for the Somatén can be explained in terms of class struggle, but most of the 
popular contempt for the institution has to be understood in relation to the continual 
abuses of power carried out by the paramilitaries. The establishment of the Somatén 
Nacional provided a golden opportunity for many “free-riders” to pursue personal 
economic gains and/or advance their position in the local political arena. Soon the 
Somatén general commanders had to expel paramilitaries from the institution for a 
variety of reasons, including pressing false charges, business fraud, indiscriminate
Chief Police Constable to Director o f General Security. 24-4-1923, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), 
Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 1.
See the reports sent by the Somatén General Commander of the T‘ Military Region, General Dabân, 
to Martinez Anido, 7-7-1924, denouncing various threats made by socialists to those workers who had 
joined the Somatén in the region. See also Somatén General Commander of the 2"** Military Region to 
Martinez Anido, 2-9-1924, describing workers’ threats and their demands to sack those skilled workers 
who were affiliated to the Somatén in Jerez and Seville. AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 
59, Box 1.
Article 1, RD 8-9-1924, CLE, (1924), n. 398, 608.
See, among others, the case of Celso Benito Salinas, a Valladolid metal worker, who claimed he had 
been sacked due to a campaign of false accusations initiated by fellow workers when they found out he 
belonged to the Somatén. Celso Benito Salinas to Minister of Interior, 15-10-1927. AHN, Gobemaciôn 
(Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2.
For the incident in Catrocalbôn see AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, FFCC, Bundle 199, Box 2. 
More cases o f threats to Somatén members in villages in 1925 in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
Bundle 442.
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beating-ups, and using the somatenista card while d r u n k , I n  some rural areas, 
somatenistas organised criminal networks. As the civil governor of Albacete wrote to 
Martinez Anido, many somatenistas in the province were charging local peasants for 
crossing paths and roads in the name of “imaginary laws”, while some others simply 
“shot and robbed” travellers and locals alike.^^ This situation, the civil governor 
observed, had led to the Somatén's loss of prestige and was seriously hampering the 
possibility of integrating many citizens, “supporters of the current regime”, into the 
militia. Despite their illegal behaviour, the regime was always extremely lenient with 
paramilitary criminals. In the spring of 1927, the dictatorship declared an amnesty for 
all somatenistas convicted of lesser crimes, providing the latter were not against 
property. This measure marked a sharp contrast with the arbitrary and indiscriminate 
political and social repression of the dictatorship and led to further popular hostility 
not only against the Somatén but against the dictatorship as a whole.^*
Economic factors were to play their part too in the Somatén's shortcomings as an 
agency of mass nationalisation. Some Captain Generals found the SomatérCs 
mandatory annual fee a serious obstacle in their efforts to recruit paramilitaries. In 
January 1924, the General Commander of the Region proposed temporarily to 
cancel the fees and to supply weapons free of charge to facilitate the requitment of the 
lower c l a s s e s . T h e  following year, the Somatén Committee of the 7^*^ Region 
approved a reduction of the money devoted to Somatén Auxiliares militares, owing to 
the captaincy’s dire straits.*® In 1928 the issue of the membership dues was again at 
stake. The General Commander of the 6^  ^Region, Ramon Delgado, alerted Rodriguez 
Tarduchy that among “the rural population, especially in Castile, the compulsory 
payment of the fees was leading many affiliates to resign and would eventually end 
the life of the Institution in many towns’’.*^  Delgado advocated an outright abolition
The cases mentioned above in El Somatén, December, 1924. For economic sanctions imposed on 
Somatén Corporals due to “some misdemeanours” see the General Commander o f the 1®‘ Region to 
Martinez Anido, 22-10-1925, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 1 and 2. See, for 
instance, the confrontation between the mayor and the Somatén Corporal o f Canillejas (Madrid), The 
problem originated when the Corporal insisted in attending bullfights as part of the “local security 
forces”, which was considered by the mayor a mere excuse not to pay for the show. Direcciôn General 
de Seguridad to Martinez Anido, 6-7-1928, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2.
Civil Govemor o f Albacete to Martinez Anido, 31-5-1927, AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, 
Bundle 59, Box 2.
Gonzâlez & Rey, La defensa, 201-202.
General Commander o f the 7*'’ Region to Primo de Rivera, January 1924, AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 
442, Box 1.
General Commander o f the 7*^  Region to Primo de Rivera, 6-7-1925, AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 442.
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of the annual dues, for it was enough for the man in the street to volunteer to carry out 
his “citizen virtues”. And yet the first proposals coming from the commission 
gathered by Primo to carry out the reform of the Somatén advocated increasing taxes 
on gun licences as the way to finance the mi l i t i a . At  the core of this problem, as in 
every primorriverista agency of nationalisation, lay the state’s incapacity to properly 
fund the institutions designated to transmit national identity to the masses.
Economic problems, erosion of the militia’s public image and the 1926 
conspiracies against the dictatorship convinced Primo of the need to reform the 
Somatén Nacional. The militia’s inaction during the Sanjuanada and Prats de Mollo 
rebellions drew the ire of the dictator. After all, the institution had been created for the 
defence of the regime and these were the first two occasions when the dictatorship 
was directly challenged. In September 1927, the formation of a Somatén National 
Council was announced and in May 1928 a military commission was created to draft a 
blueprint of the new militia’s statute. Compelled by regional Commanders’ reports 
denouncing somatenistas' abuses of authority, the commission tried to balance the 
paramilitaries “excesses” by clarifying the duties and rights of the members.*^ The 
main objective was, however, to expand the militia and to increase its effectiveness, 
so the draft handed to Primo for approval in September 1928 included the formation 
of a women’s Somatén and granted new privileges to the institution, such as the 
confidentiality of Somatén informers and the acquisition of military force legal status 
when on duty.*"^  In December 1929 the new regulation of the Somatén finally turned 
law. It granted the militia those concessions that the somatenistas had been 
demanding -  freedom from arrest unless they committed a flagrant crime and from 
being jailed before trial - and elevated the paramilitaries’ status to that of secret state 
police.^^
Rodriguez Tarduchy to Fernando Fiôrez, Somatén General Commander o f the T* Military Region, 
“Modificaciones y aclaraciones mâs importantes que con reiaciôn ai Reglamento actual de Somatenes 
se hace constar en él confecionada por la Comisiôn designada a tal fin por la Presidencia del Consejo 
de Ministres", AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 441, Box 1.
Reports on somatenistas abuses in Captain General of the 5^ Region, Arturo Lezcano, to Presidencia 
del Gobiemo, 10-8-1927; Somatén General Commander of the Canary Islands to Fernando Flôrez, 21- 
6-1928, AHN, Presidencia, Directorio Militar, Bundle 441, Box 2. For the Commission’s comments 
see Rodriguez Tarduchy to Fernando Florez, Somatén General Commander of the 1®‘ Military Region, 
“Modificaciones y aclaraciones”, AHN, Presidencia, Directorio Militar, Bundle 441, Box 1.
A copy o f the document with Primo’s hand-written final corrections dated September 1928 in AHN, 
Presidencia, Directorio Militar, Bundle 441, Box 2.
See the project presented by Primo to his ministers, “Proyecto presentado al consejo de Ministres”, 
26-12-1929, AHN, Presidencia, Directorio Militar, Bundle 441, Box 2; and “Reglamento de la 
Institucion de Somatenes Armados de Espaha”, RD 31-12-1929, CLE, 1929, Appendix 19, 1-36.
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By the time the new regulations were implemented the Somatén had been 
undergoing a radical modification for almost a year. The insurrections of Valencia 
and Ciudad Real in early 1929 made the dictator realised that he could not count on 
UP and Somatén mobilisation to defend his r e g i m e . I n  Valencia and Ciudad Real, 
the local Somatenes stayed at home when the rebellion broke and it was down to the 
army to put the insurrection down. Furthermore, the intensification of the students’ 
revolt made it clear that the opposition was retaking the streets from the Somatén. In 
terms of political socialisation and nationalisation, the Somatén's apathy is extremely 
significant. Unlike Mussolini, Primo was unable to mobilise the militia and the party 
when the dictatorship was in trouble.*^ This shows not only a much lower level of 
political commitment to the regime of the Spanish paramilitaries than that 
demonstrated by the fascU but also less popular support.
Nevertheless, under growing political pressure. Primo decided to turn the Somatén 
and the UP into espionage and police institutions. The Royal Decree of 4 February 
1929 bestowed the party and the militia with “additional functions of vigilance and 
information” and called upon the Somatén for a further intervention in political 
repression.*^ Among the new measures, the regime created the “Citizens’ 
Investigation and Information Centres” (centres for political denunciations made by 
the public) under UP control, organised an espionage network whereby the Somatén 
Corporal of every “district, village or neighbourhood” was to collect information and 
establish databases of political opponents at the local headquarters of the party and the 
militia, and authorised the paramilitaries and UP affiliates to carry out searches in the 
homes of those suspected of opposing the regime.*^ Moreover, the somatenistas were 
encouraged to use violence against those compromising “public order” and authorised 
closing down those associations in which “political debates” were taking place.^®
There can be little doubt that these measures marked a qualitative drive towards 
semi-totalitarian positions by the dictatorship.^^ Party, militia, security forces and 
army were inter-linked in the service of primorriverista repression in what constituted 
the de facto creation of a police state. The distinction between public and private
Calvo Sotelo, Mis Servicios, 226. 
Tarchi, Fascismo, 146-148.
Exposition and article 4, RD 4-2-1929, in El Somatén, February, 1929.
Article 3 RD 4-2-1929 and Article 5, RCO 8-2-1929, Additional Disposition, El Somatén, February 
1929; RCO, 16-4-1929, CLE, n. 147, 86-87.
RCO 8-2-1929, Additional Disposition; RCO, 16-4-1929.
Gonzâlez Calleja, “La defensa armada del ‘orden social’”, 104.
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political spheres became blurred as paramilitaries were encouraged to invade the 
homes and organisations of political opponents. In terms of the Somatén"s public 
image, the consequences of the regime’s radicalisation were catastrophic. Not 
surprisingly, the regime’s “blank cheque” to the militia led to more abuses of 
authority, an increasing number of anonymously made false accusations, and en 
masse imprisonments of political adversaries.^^ The slight but steady decline in the 
number of affiliates throughout 1929 is telling of the counter-productive effects of the 
primorriverista totalitarian drive.^^ The fall of the regime in January 1930 did nothing 
but accelerate Somatén disintegration. Accusations of impunity and abuses of 
authority were made in the press and dozens of demands to disarm the militias poured 
into the Minister of the Interior’s desk.^ "^  Fully aware of its ideological and political 
connotations, the provisional Republican government abolished the Somatén, except 
in Catalonia, the day after it took power. The decree of 15 April 1931 justified the 
dissolution of the Somatén Nacional on the grounds of the militia’s lack of popular 
support, the paramilitaries’ abuses and the threat to the social order that the institution 
posed.^ ^
In no other place was the negative effect of the Somatén Nacional more evident 
than in Catalonia. Since the beginning of the dictatorship the number of somatenistas 
had consistently decreased in the region, falling from 65,735 members in September 
1923 to 62,850 in August 1928.^  ^ By 1929, the decrease in popular support of the 
militia was also obvious in terms of street celebrations. In a letter to Primo, General 
Barrera acknowledged that only 22,000 somatenistas took part in the 1929 street
For example, Emilio Casado Escobedo to Martinez Anido, 1-5-1929. Casado complained o f the fact 
that he and 90 other people had been jailed without charges for more than two weeks. A similar case in 
Manuel Rios to Martinez Anido, 19-10-1929. Rios demanded the release o f some prisoners, “neither 
political nor dangerous”, who had been jailed in Barcelona for three months without charges. For 
examples o f false accusations see Civil Govemor of Valencia to Martinez Anido, 2-12-1929. All 
correspondence in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2.
The records o f membership o f the Somatén Nacional in the last years o f the dictatorship are 
incomplete. However, all the data available shows a decrease in the number o f affiliates to the 
institution. The P* Military Region had 22,768 somatenistas in August 1928 and 22,492 in 1929. The 
7* Military Region had 19,703 somatenistas on 31-1-1929, while 12 months later the figure had 
dropped to 18,985. Data in Gonzalez and Rey, La defensa armada, 334, 336. See also the reports of  
regional Captaincies in December 1929 to Primo de Rivera, indicating a decrease in membership, 
AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, FFCC, Bundle 199, Box 2. Martinez Segarra, El Somatén, 277, also 
reckons a sharp drop in the numbers o f somatenistas in the last years o f the dictatorship; fi’om a total 
number o f 56,103 militiamen in the years 1927-1928 to 22,492 in 1930.
Some accusations after the fall o f the regime in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, 
Box 2. More cases in Martinez Sergarra, El Somatén, 353-356.
Decree, 15-4-1931, Gaceta 16-4-1931.
Gonzâlez and Rey, La defensa, 335.
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march in Barcelona - a reduction of almost 50% when compared to the parades of 
December 1923. Fernando del Rey has explained this decline in the number of 
Catalan somatenistas as a by-product of the down-tum in social clashes in Barcelona 
during the dictatorship.^^ While certainly a key factor, the reduction of strikes and 
street fighting does not explain by itself the drop in membership. It was the 
transformation of the militia into an agency of Spanish nationalisation and the 
primorriverista control of the institution that alienated many from the Somatén. From 
1924, as part of the Catalan oligarchy distanced itself from the dictatorship, the 
support for the institution began to decrease. More importantly, Primo’s mistrust of 
the rural somatenes, always under suspicion of harbouring Catalanist feelings, led 
General Barrera to carry out a purge of suspected Catalanist members in the militia, 
which certainly hampered the popular backing of the primorriverista Somatén?^
Few documents epitomise better the level of popular alienation produced by the 
primorriverista Somatén than the collectively drafted letter sent by the mayors of the 
Falset constituency in Tarragona to the new republican Minister of the Interior in 
September 1931. The mayors demanded the abolition of the Somatén in Catalonia, for 
the dictatorship had perverted the institution’s original “dignified local Catalan spirit” 
and turned the militia into a “vulgar tragi-comedy performed by a bunch of gunmen”, 
servile to dictator and king.^^ In the view of the mayors:
“It is well-known that in the last eight years [the Somatenes^ acted with a totally 
inverted morality. Thus, instead of a citizens’ institution in defence of the Catalan 
people, it turned into its quasi-executioner, giving unconditional help and resolute 
collaboration to those who vexed, trampled on and tried by all means to humiliate the 
most intimate and respectable aspects of the citizen’s consciousness and Catalan 
sentiments.”
97 Rey “Ciudadanos honrados”, 113.
In a letter to Magaz, 5-6-1925, Primo wrote he had confidence in the political situation of the 
Somatén in Catalonia, “for General Barrera visited them constantly”. Still, Primo showed some 
concerns about the political “mood” o f the somatenes in remote towns and proposed sending the 
Somatén General Commander to check their political views under the pretext o f a military review. The 
letter in Armiiîân, Epistolaho, 141-142.
Collective letter o f the mayors o f the district o f Falset (Tarragona) to the Minister o f Interior, 3-9- 
1931, in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2.
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The primorriverista attempt to ‘de-Catalanise’ the Somatén seems to have been 
successful, yet at a very high price, as popular contempt for the institution greAV in 
rural Catalonia during the dictatorship. The picture was no better in some other 
Spanish regions. The avalanche of public accusations against members of the Somatén 
in 1930 illustrates the deep grievances produced by the institution. During the first 
months of the Second Republic, socialist associations demanded the total 
disarmament of the individuals who had belonged to the Somatén, arguing they posed 
a danger to the newly established democratic system. The link between the 
institution and primorriverista anti-democratic values did not escape anyone. 
Contemporary observers also understood the failure of the Somatén as a state- 
controlled “pedagogic” agency. As the conservative Gabriel Maura noted in 1930, 
“the state cannot produce citizens like it coins money, but it can educate and train 
them; and to that effect, a tidy exercise of liberties is considerably better than the 
somatenista tactic.”^^* An institution created to indoctrinate the masses in the 
nationalist ideal had ended up dividing the population. As in the case of the delegates, 
the paramilitary combined the role of propagandists and repressors in the same figure, 
which certainly undermined popular acceptance. Like the delegados, the Somatén 
Nacional was the creation of a military state whose fate was interwoven with the 
fortunes of the regime. Once the dictatorship faced its final crisis in 1929, the disgrace 
of the militia went hand in hand with the discrediting of the authoritarian idea of 
Spain promoted by the Somatén.
UNION PATRIOTICA 
Formation and objectives
The warm welcome the squads of the Federacion Civico Somatenista (PCS) 
gave to Primo and the king in Barcelona in December 1923 should not come as a 
surprise. The leaders of the pro-fascist group had held conversations with Primo and 
Martinez Anido in late October seeking to turn the PCS into the regime’s official 
party and were eager to show the dictator that they had the capacity to mobilise
Various petitions of arms decommission in AHN, Gobemaciôn (Estado), Serie A, Bundle 59, Box 2. 
Maura Gamazo, Al servicio de la Historia, vol. 1, 60.
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popular support. Captivated by Fascist Italy, Primo initially seemed delighted with 
the idea of having the PCS as his main power base to build a primorriverista nation­
wide party. The tracistas were well connected with the military officers of the 
Barcelona garrison and had shown their devotion for the regime since its very 
beginnings. However, the dictator soon changed his mind. In late January 1924, a new 
meeting of the dictator with the tracistas did not lead to the creation of the official 
party desired by P r i m o . The PCS might have had supporters, if only a few, in 
Barcelona, but it was virtually unknown outside the Catalan capital. The grand 
ambition of creating an official party able to mobilise all sectors of society required a 
further amalgamation of conservative groups. When the UP was finally created in 
Barcelona in April 1924, the “blue shirts” of the PCS were included, but so were the 
members of the Union Monarquica Nacional (UMN) and many others ranging from 
former liberals to moderate regionalists.^®'^
Seeking to gain broad social support for his official party. Primo turned to the 
Social Catholics. Since early November 1923, El Debate had begun to question the 
effectiveness of the PCS as the basis for the eventual official party, for the tracistas 
had virtually no popular support outside Catalonia. At the same time, Angel 
Herrera had formed a commission with the specific goal of founding a new party that 
would mobilise social support for the r e g i m e . O n  30 November 1923 members of 
the Accion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP) and the Partido Social 
Popular created the Union Patriotica Castellana in Valladolid, as an alternative 
candidate to become the dictatorship’s p a r t y . I n  the following weeks new Uniones 
Patrioticas were created throughout northern Castile. In April 1924, Primo decided to 
unify the Social Catholic political movement and turned the UP into the official party. 
The implications of the choice were clear: by opting for the Social Catholics over the 
pro-fascist members of the PCS, the dictator aimed at benefiting from the already 
proven propagandists’ capacity to mobilise masses and, hence, to integrate large 
sectors of society into the primorriverista project.
Events would prove the validity of Primo’s judgement. Throughout 1924, the 
members of the Confederacion Nacional Catolica Agraria (CNCA), such as Gil
El Debate, 31-10-1923; 3-11-1923.
Gonzâlez Calbet, LaDictadura, 131.
For the different groups in the Barcelona UP see Ucelay da Cal, Enric, “La represiô”, 170-172. 
El Debate, 3-11-1923.
106 Gonzâlez Calbet, La Dictadura, 131.
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Robles, mobilised its affiliates and founded tens of Uniones Patrioticas in both 
Castiles/^^ Granting the initiative to the Social Catholics did not mean, however, that 
the regime renounced to its customary top-down approach when it came to the 
creation of institutions. As in the case of the formation of the Somatén Nacional^ 
Primo instructed civil govemors and delegados to set up the dictatorship’s institution. 
On 5 April 1924 a circular letter of the President of the Military Directory encouraged 
the delegates to devote all their efforts to the creation of the UP and, three weeks later, 
Primo openly suggested the delegados should “invite citizens to organise the new 
party, constituting local and provincial juntas”. A s  on many other occasions, the 
work of the delegates seems to have been patchy when it came to create new 
institutions. In August 1924, the Ministry of the Interior sent new guidelines for the 
formation of the UP in all provinces, emphasising the need to intensify the 
propagandist effort and be vigilant of those “old politicians” trying to infiltrate the 
party. The guidelines established a system in which governmental authorities would 
set up local organisational commissions including members of all social classes. 
These commissions were to elect a local committee, which in turn was to send 
representatives to the District Committee {Comité del partido judicial). Finally, the 
District Committee members were to choose delegates for the Provincial Committee, 
the top institution ultimately responsible to the soon to be created UP National 
Council in Madrid.*'®
Two points are significant in the official guidelines. First, the absence of 
regional committees in the UP pyramidal framework was very much in line with the 
regime’s idea of the Spanish nation-state. By emphasising the direct links between the 
province and the state, the idea of regional representation was bypassed, thus 
underpinning the very notion of region. Second, and more importantly, the govemors 
were endowed with the power of imposing or removing any person from any 
committees, while all mayors were named directors {vocales) of their respective UP 
district committee. In this manner, the top-down approach to the establishment of the 
UP led to the entanglement of the party with the state structure.
The primorriverista choice of the Social Catholics as the main organisation on 
which to build the UP and the process of incorporating the party to the state apparatus
El Debate, 2-12-1923; 7-12-1923.
Castillo, Propietarios, 344. See also Ben-Ami, Fascism, 127.
Primo de Rivera to civil govemors and delegates, 25-4-1924, in Casa Ramos, Dos anas, 546-549.
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were to have obvious consequences in attracting membership from certain social 
backgrounds. Those provincial middle and lower-middle classes affiliated to the 
organisations controlled by the ACNP, such as the CNCA and Accion Catolica, joined 
the UP en masse during the years 1924 and 1925.* '^ State and municipal public 
officers constituted the second largest group in the party’s rank and file becoming an 
important contingent of support for the regime. Finally, for all the apparent 
restrictions that the delegates had to impose to those related to the “old regime” 
wanting to become UP militants, many under the political control of the old caciques 
were allowed to join the party. This clearly seems to have been the case in rural 
provinces with a strong caciquil tradition, such as Huelva or Caceres, which had the 
highest number of members in Spain.
It is important to note that for all the Social Catholic organisational and human 
contribution to the formation of the party, the ideological tenets of the UP were based 
on the principles of military nationalism. Most significantly, the Castilian regionalism 
so latent in the founding manifesto of the Union Patriotica Castellana of November 
1923 was to fade away totally once the dictatorship took over the party.* 
Ideologically, as in many other fields, the military was calling the shots. As in the 
case of the Somatén, the primorriveristas initially presented vaguely defined values of 
patriotism, tradition and order as the ideological guidelines of the UP, seeking to 
attract the largest number of militants. The regime always insisted all ideologies and 
classes were welcomed in the UP. As in the case of the militia, there was a genuine 
attempt by the primorriverista to integrate the lower-class into the state-controlled 
party.**"* Much in the same way as Mussolini and his Fascist party. Primo presented 
the UP as an “anti-party”, as a “league”, as “movements of citizens”, aiming at 
differentiating the organisation from traditional political parties.**^ After all, the UP 
was meant to be a radically new political organisation. First, the UP was created to
“Instrucciones para la organizaciôn de la Uniôn Patriôtica”, in ibid., 654-656.
Martin Sânchez-Juliâ, Ideas claras [Madrid: 1959], 793.
Huelva had 97,750 militants in 1927. This means that 28.30% of the province’s population was 
affiliated to the party. Caceres had 93,120 militants (20.9% of the population). These are astonishing 
figures when compared to the 60,000 militants o f Barcelona (3.78% o f the population). Data in Gômez- 
Navarro, El régimen, 232-236.
“M anifesto regionalista en Valladolid”, El Debate, 2-12-1923.
For the interclass and multi-ideological character o f the party see the Madrid UP manifesto o f early 
1924, in Mask, Hacia, 139-156. Primo himself emphasised in a letter to the provincial UP leaders the 
need for keeping vague ideological principles to facilitate the affiliation o f citizens with diverse 
political views. Primo’s letter, November 1925, in Rubio, Crônica, [1974], 168-169.
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legitimise the perpetuation of an illegal r e g i m e / T h e  party was to be living proof of 
the dictatorship’s popular support, that is, Primo sought a ‘populist’ legitimacy as a 
‘substitute’ for the legal legitimacy that he never won at the ballot box. The idea put 
forward by some historians that Primo decided to perpetuate himself in power by the 
end of 1925 is clearly at odds with the fact that the dictator created the UP in early 
1924.*^  ^ Second, the “pedagogic” aspect of all primorriverista agencies was also 
present, conceiving the UP as a “school of citizenry”. As the ideologues of the regime 
acknowledged, the means to achieve these goals was to mobilise the masses following 
the Italian example .^To what extent this mobilisation was to be effective heavily 
depended on the structure and resources the regime was to endow the party with.
Party structure and propaganda machinery
Setting up the official party posed a series of difficulties to civil govemors and 
delegates alike. To begin with, some caciques opposed the creation of an alternative 
power base in their constituencies and used their political connections to hamper the 
creation of the UP.* On the other hand, many caciques saw the creation of the UP as 
a golden opportunity to jump onto the primorriverista wagon and many of them 
managed to gain control of local branches of the UP. Whether this was due to the 
delegate’s lack of knowledge of the local political arena or out of mere necessity in 
the absence of political personnel unconnected to the caciquil system is difficult to 
determine. Whatever the reason, it seems that in many rural areas the delegates had to 
choose between two rival factions when creating the UP, which effectively meant 
handing a blank cheque to one of the groups to chase its opponents under the 
dictatorship’s official umbrella.
The poor results obtained by the civil governors in the spring and summer of 
1924 led Martinez Anido to intensify the pressure on the delegates. In August the 
above mentioned guidelines for the formation of UP branches were sent to the civil
“Instrucciones del Senor Présidente a los gobemadores civiles, corporaciones provinciales y 
muicipales y Uniones Patrioticas”, Union Patriotica, 15-2-1927.
Ucelay, “La represiô”, 162-163.
For Primo deciding to perpetuate the dictatorship in late 1925, Enrique Guerrero Salom, “La 
dictadura de Primo de Rivera y el Corporativismo”, Cuadernos Economicos de ICE (1979), n. 10, 126. 
In the same vein Tusell, La crisis, 50.
Pemân, El hecho, 25-26.
This was the case o f Manuel Burgos y Mazo, a cacique in the province o f Huelva, who opposed the 
creation o f the UP and used the municipal judge o f La Palma del Condado to finstrate the 
governmental delegate’s actions. Tusell, La crisis, 78, 136-137.
Carlos Blanco, La Dictadura y  los procesos militares [Madrid: 1931], 119-120.
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govemors and in October the first delegates were dismissed for failing to rally support 
for the party in their d i s t r i c t s T h e  link between the delegates and the party, 
although initially presented as temporary, was never totally broken by the regime. 
Documents from the Ministry of the Interior show that Martinez Anido continued to 
monitor the activities of the party throughout the dictatorship. As late as 1929, civil 
governors, delegates and \]V jefes alike were reporting to the Ministry of the Interior 
and Presidencia del Gobiemo different problems the party faced on a regular basis.
In the long run, the UP subordination to the delegates was to have an important 
negative effect in terms of public acceptance, for when the delegates fell into disgrace 
in the eyes of the people, this was going to have a knock on effect on the public’s 
appreciation of the party.
In the cities, the regime’s attempt to integrate diverse political groups and 
social classes led to a series of problems. In Barcelona, the formation of the UP 
brought together members of the so-called “military party” (the pro-fascist of the 
PCS, mauristas, former republicans and military officers of the Barcelona garrison), 
the UMN and many Carlists. Although all these groups were all Spanish nationalists 
they differed on the political framework that they wanted for Catalonia. While the 
“military party” opposed any regional institutions and defended a provincial structure 
for Spain, the Carlists and the members of the UMN still considered the 
Mancomunitat as a valid organisation once it had been purged of Catalanists. The 
result was a struggle for power within the UP in Barcelona and Gerona throughout 
1924 that culminated in the suppression of the Mancomunitat and the victory of the 
“military party” in the spring of 1925, but that also weakened the support of the 
upper-classes of the UMN for the official party from its early stages. In Bilbao, the 
Basque oligarchy represented in the Liga de Accion Monarquica simply refused to 
merge with the UP. Thus the official party that emerged in Vizcaya was basically run 
by middle-class members with no previous political experience, as was the case in
See for example the case of Antonio Baeza Borras, delegate o f La Carolina, who was suspended 
from his duties in October 1924 after the civil govemor accused him o f incompetence for not properly 
organising the UP in his district. AHN, Presidencia, FFCC, Bundle 202, Box 2, File 14986. Another 
delegate dismissed for not sufficiently increasing the number of members of the local UP was 
Commander Groizar, delegate o f Alcâzar de la Roda (Albacete), in October 1925. See Martinez Anido 
to Civil Govemor o f Albacete, 2-10-1925, AHN, Gobemaciôn, FFCC, Serie A, Bundle 17 A, Box 2.
Many o f  these reports from 1927, 1928 and 1929 in AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, FFCC, 
Bundles 332 and 446.
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many other provincial c a p i t a l s . I n  Madrid, since the very moment the dictator 
announced the creation of the official party, both Liberals and Conservatives opposed 
it on grounds of ideology. For both El Sol and La Época, the UP was a extreme-right 
party and its creation a serious burden for the eventual return to a constitutional 
r e g i m e . I n  the capital, Liberal and Conservatives began to understand the 
implications of the dictator’s move. For all his comments on the temporary character 
of his position in power, Primo was there to stay.
Internal squabbles, the delegates’ inefficiency and ideological opposition 
mounted by those who had initially supported the regime certainly hampered the 
consolidation of a strong UP during the Military Directory. Yet it is important to 
notice that during its first years the dictator did not seem terribly eager to endow the 
UP with a relevant function in the regime and prioritised the power of the military 
over the party. It was only by the autumn of 1925, once he had decided to form the 
Civil Directory, that the dictator increasingly began to promote the role of the UP, 
declaring it “independent” from governmental control and ready to rule Spain. As 
explained in chapter 3, it was also then that the UP ideologues arrived in the public 
arena, the dictatorship was endowed with a nation-wide mouthpiece. La Nacion, and 
the founding (or buying) of provincial pro-govemment newspapers increased.
The UP created the most sophisticated propaganda network known in any 
Spanish political party. In 1926, the Madrid UP divided the party into five main 
sections, including one for “Culture, Propaganda and Publicity”. By early 1927, 
this section had formed Propaganda and Political Actions Commissions in every 
district of the capital, which in turn created diverse neighbourhood propaganda 
subcommittees.^^* In addition, the Madrid UP provincial headquarters were divided in 
four sections: propaganda, provincial affairs, local affairs and statistics. Conceived as 
a centre of information, the headquarters had their own census, a press archive on
For the internal disputes in Barcelona see Ucalay, “La represiô”, 169-171. For the struggle in 
Gerona see Lluis Costa i Femândez, La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923-1930). Comunicaciô i 
propaganda a les comarques gironines [Barcelona: 1995], 7.
Ben-Ami, Fascism, 143-144.
El Sol and La Época reactions to the creation o f the UP in April 1924 in Gômez-Navarro, “La Uniôn 
Patriôtica”, 108.
LaNacion, 18-10-1925.
The other four sections were Government, Finances, Madrid Public Works and Interior. Union 
Patriôtica, 15-12-1926.
Uniôn Patriôtica, 15-1-1927.
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political and social issues and collected data on every single m i l i t a n t . T h e  UP 
structure in Barcelona also shows a modem and extremely hierarchical concept of 
party structure being implemented by the primorriveristas. The provincial jefe, 
Andrés Gasso y Vidal, former secretary of the Camara de la Propiedad Urhana de 
Barcelona, directed the party with the assistance of a Provincial Committee. Under 
direct control of the Provincial Committee there were ten District committees, 
covering all of Barcelona’s urban area. In four of the most populated districts 
subcommittees were formed so the party could reach every single neighbourhood of 
the city. In addition, over ten UP Cultural Centres were opened all around the Catalan 
capital to improve the propaganda work and counterbalance the appeal of leftist casas 
del pueblo. On top of this, youth, women and workers’ sections of the UP were 
created seeking to attract new members by appealing to specific sectors of the 
population. The power of Gasso extended the boundaries of the city. He commanded 
13 Provincial Jefe Delegates, who, in turn, were aided by a plethora of Assistant 
Delegates {Delegados Asesores). The Provincial Delegates’ mission was to tour 
around the province checking the development of tens of local committees and UP 
Cultural Centres in towns and villages and reporting back to Gasso.
The creation of such a vast network in the cities was indicative of the 
dictatorship’s will to form a modem party able to reach many different sectors of 
society. Especially telling was the formation of UP female sections. According to the 
official discourse, women were key players in the process of nation-building not just 
as mothers but also as heroines who had played an important historic role in the 
formation of the Spanish patria. Additionally, in the eyes of the regime women were 
considered citizens, albeit not in equal terms to men when it came to the right to vote. 
True, Calvo Sotelo’s Municipal Statute had granted women the right to vote for the 
first time in Spanish history. Yet only widows and orphans over 23 years of age were 
enfranchised, thus excluding the vast majority of Spanish women. Even if the right to 
vote was never exercised, for elections were never held during the dictatorship, the 
measure elicited great apprehension in traditionalist quarters. Primo provoked still 
more controversy when all women were allowed to “vote” (i.e. to sign in favour of the 
dictatorship) in the 1926 plebiscite. The official press hailed Primo as a revolutionary
Union Patriôtica,\-6-\921.
Union Patriotica, 15-4-1927.
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visionary of modern politics, while clerical reactionaries condemned women’s 
participation in political acts/^^
In fact, the incorporation of women into the political arena was in total 
concordance with the primorriverista concept of “controlled female mobilisation”.'^  ^
The idea was the gradual incorporation of women into provincial juntas, town 
councils, educational and charity institutions via the UP. Thus, when the party began 
to create female sections these were essentially devoted to ‘pedagogic’ tasks, such as 
publishing patriotic children’s magazines, lecturing, practising collective gymnastic 
exercises singing nationalist songs and teaching the lower classes how to read and 
vvrite at the UP cultural centres.'^"' Some other propagandist activities were also 
related to charity, such as organising free lunches for the poor. For example, when in 
May 1927 a lunch for 560 poor people was organised at the Casa de la UP in Madrid, 
the primorriveristas declared that those sort of acts were more important to “building 
the patria than all the discourses of charlatan propagandists” -  a clear allusion to the 
Soc i a l i s t s . In  other words, providing food and teaching basic literacy skills became 
the means of a paternalist approach through which the regime aimed at gaining the 
support of the lower classes.
Notwithstanding the many problems that the regime found in the creation and 
organisation of the party, the UP dramatically increased its membership throughout 
1925. By July 1926, when the Gran Junta Nacional de la Union Patriotica was 
established. Primo declared that “more than 700,000 individuals, including women”, 
were affiliated to the p a r t y . A  year later, an editorial in Union Patriotica claimed 
the number of members was 1,319,428.'^^ Although these figures have to be taken 
with more than a few grains of salt, there is little doubt that the regime had formed the 
largest right-wing political party in the history of Spain.
For a primorriverista defence o f the limited franchise for women see José Fontân Palomo, Haber 
del directorio [Barcelona: 1925], 125.
LaNacion, U -\Q -\926.
See articles by Carmen Ferns Zaracondegui in Union Patriotica, 6-11-1926, and 1-12-1926.
For women’s conferences at the UP culture centres see Union Patriotica, 1-6-1927. For the 
gymnastics exercises and the singing of nationalist anthems. Union Patriôtica, 15-7-1927. For the 
funding o f “patriotic” children’s magazines see “Secciôn Femenina de la Union Patriôtica de Terrasa”, 
ADPB, Departamento de Instruccion Publica, Bundle 4176, File 23.
Uniôn Patriotica, 1-6-1927.
Uniôn Patriôtica, 1-10-1926.
Union Patriôtica, 15-7-1927.
Figures o f UP membership nation-wide are almost impossible to get, for the official press only 
published the data for the year 1927 and the aforementioned archive o f the UP headquarters in Madrid 
disappeared without a trace during the Second Republic. Gômez-Navarro calculates the UP had
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Ceremonies and mobilisation
Together with the official press, the military and the Somatén, Primo 
increasingly relied on the party to carry out propaganda tasks. In line with their 
“pedagogic” mission, UP Culture Centres all around Spain organised hundreds of 
“patriotic lectures”. As in the case of the governmental delegates’ Sunday 
conferences, the upetistas not only lectured on the greatness of the Spanish nation and 
the goodness of the regime but also covered professional, technical and cultural topics 
in their dissertations. A more sophisticated version of the “patriotic lectures” were the 
so-called “patriotic affirmation acts”. These usually included a lecture followed by a 
banquet, speeches, and an afternoon party, where the public danced to traditional 
folkloric music such as jotasP^ Food and dancing were combined here with patriotic 
indoctrination creating a festive atmosphere and thus attempting to make the 
nationalist discourse more appealing to the popular classes.
While some of these acts took place indoors, it is important to notice that the 
primorriveristas developed a taste for open-air ceremonies. Popular banquets, dances, 
and the opening of public buildings were all considered good opportunities to 
celebrate acts of patriotic affirmation. The idea behind these ceremonies was using the 
party to help the regime to monopolise the public political sphere -  a task, as we have 
seen, to which the army and the Somatén also contributed significantly. In fact, the 
primorriveristas were prepared to go a long way to succeed in their endeavour. At a 
time when Basque Nationalists and Catalan regionalists were increasingly turning to 
hiking, as part of the few “cultural” activities that they were allowed to carry out 
without risking sanction, the upetistas countered and began to organise patriotic 
fieldtrips to the countryside.^^®
The party was also behind the official campaigns to promote the consumption 
Spanish products. Launched almost on a yearly basis, these campaigns “in defence of 
Spanish goods” significantly targeted women and presented the purchase of products
1,696,304 members in 1928 according to official provincial figures. However, he acknowledges that 
these figures were clearly adulterated and reckons the real militancy could be four times less than the 
official figures suggest. Gômez-Navarro, El régimen, 231.
Tens o f these lectures and ‘patriotic affirmation acts’ were regularly reported in the pages o f Union 
Patriôtica.
See, for example, the field trip to the Church o f Santa Cruz de Olorde organised by the Barcelona 
UP, La Razdn, 4-2-1928. For Catalan regionalists’ promotion of hiking see La Veu, 19-11-1923. For 
the case o f Basque Nationalists see Pablo et. al., El péndulo, 181.
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“Made in Spain” as a “patriotic dnty”/"*^  It is evident that these campaigns were in 
accord with the regime’s economic nationalism.*"^  ^ Yet, on closer examination, it is 
possible to detect a more subtle goal behind the promotion of domestic products. The 
campaigns constantly emphasised the fact that Spanish products were “as good or 
better than foreign ones” and heavily criticised those Spaniards who assumed foreign 
goods were better than Spanish ones just because they were manufactured abroad. At 
the heart of this criticism lay not only a vindication of Spanish products, but also of 
Spain as a nation. By claiming the superiority of Spanish goods over foreign ones, the 
regime aimed at ending what it saw as a Spanish inferiority complex - a complex that 
led Spaniards to assume the superiority of their fellow Europeans in many different 
fields. It was not by chance that the magazine of the UP had a section called 
“Successful Spaniards Abroad” which reported the professional achievements of 
Spaniards in Europe and the Americas as evidence of the international respect for 
Spain as a nation. It almost goes without saying that the regime tried to capitalise on 
these “successes” and presented them as part of Spain’s revitalisation under the 
dictatorship.
This triumphant representation of Spain has to be understood within the new 
positive image of the nation fostered by the regime both at discursive and symbolic 
levels. As a reaction to the “pessimistic nationalism” of the Generation of 98, the 
primorriveristas heralded the immediate re-birth of the Spanish nation. Likewise, 
official propaganda began to represent the nation in more positive terms. The regime 
reproduced nineteenth century paintings representing key moments in Spanish history 
in stamps, postcards, almanacs and even the packing of sweets.*"*^  This representation 
of the so-called “history painting” sought to popularise pictures of a victorious Spain 
against Muslim infidels, while simultaneously emphasising the Catholic nature of the 
fatherland. In addition, the primorriveristas were resolute in endowing the image of 
Spain with a more festive character and hence the official press began to depict 
bullfighting and romerias as the expression of the real national character. What is 
interesting when looking at personifications of Spain as a female figure during the 
dictatorship is the process of “Andalusization” that the image of the patria underwent.
See, for example, “Prefiramos productos espafloles”. Union Patriotica, 1-4-1927. For campaigns 
specifically addressing women see the manifesto of the Comité femenino pro-Producciôn Nacional, in 
Maria José Gonzalez Castillejo, “Los conceptos de mujer, ciudadania y patria en la Dictadura de Primo 
de Rivera, Imâgenes, simbolos y estereotipos”, Mujeres y  ciudadania [Mâlaga: 1993], 9.
For the regime’s economic nationalism see Ben-Ami, Fascism, 240-264.
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In clear opposition to the fin de siècle icon of the Mater Dolorosa, primorriverista 
propaganda represented Spain as a joyful and beautiful Andalusian young lady.^ "^ "^  
Against the Castilian sense of austerity, restraint and drama represented in the 
paintings of the artists of the Generation of 98, the primorriverista icons portrayed 
joy, youth and beauty in bright colours, much in consonance with the official idea of a 
rejuvenated nation. Paradoxically, in doing so the primorriverista partially 
perpetuated in the Spanish collective imaginary the “orientalist” representation of 
Spain as Andalusia created by foreign travellers throughout the nineteenth century.
Whilst foreign “recognition” of Spanish achievements became an essential 
propaganda tool to nationalise Spaniards at home, the UP also explored xenophobic 
routes to mobilise the man in the street. To begin with, the aforementioned 
“campaigns against bad Spaniards” not only targeted those Spanish citizens 
denouncing the abuses the regime abroad, but also the foreigners who, “jealous of the 
Spanish resurrection”, gave them credit and support. On other occasions, the 
upetistas were mobilised to protest against “anti-Spanish campaigns” following 
criticism of the regime in the foreign press. The campaigns were a way to show the 
world that the Spanish people stood by its dictator and no “foreign intervention” 
whatsoever would alter the nation’s destiny to regain its place in the sun. After all, the 
primorriveristas repeated again and again, it was the envy of Spanish greatness that 
led foreigners to invent the Black Legend. The moral of the story was that foreigners 
could not be trusted and Spanish liberals’ admiration for French and British political 
systems posed a threat to the very essence of the nation. Probably no one put it in 
blunter terms than Commander Rodriguez Tarduchy, when he penned that praising 
foreigners equalled “de-Spanishizing Spain”. P a r a d o x i c a l  as it may seem, the 
upetista discourse and ceremonies had a strongly contradictory character. On the one 
hand, the primorriveristas copied the ideas and ceremonies of the Italian fascist and 
the French extreme Right and show an acute need to be positively recognised by
Alvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa, 258.
See, for instance, the pictures of young Andalusian ladies going to a romeria on the front page o f  La 
Nacion, 28-10-1925. See also Spain represented as a young Andalusian lady on the front page o f Z,a 
Naciôn, 12-10-1929. See also the publicity posters of the 1929 Ibero-American exhibition in Seville in 
Rosa Cal, “El mundo de las exposiciones (III). Del IV Centenario a Sevilla-Barcelona (1929)”,
Historia 16, n. 194, (1987), 88.
Union Patriotica, 17-5-1927.
This was the case o f the student revolt, which was presented as having been instigated by foreign 
interests.
Rodriguez Tarduchy, Psicologia, 309-310.
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foreigners - which in a way indicates that the primorriveristas suffered from the same 
inferiority complex that they intended to cure Spaniards of. On the other hand, the 
regime needed to create a ‘foreign threat’ in order to be able to play the xenophobic 
card in the game of mass mobilisation. For all the primorriverista contradictions, it is 
important to notice that both discourse and ceremonies perfectly suited the upetista 
Manichean view of a world divided between Good and Evil. And this clear-cut 
dichotomy was probably more useful to stir nationalist emotions than any other 
complex political analysis.
Like Fascist Italy, and later Nazi Germany, the official party in Spain acted as 
the mediator between leader and the masses to transmit both discourse and 
symbolised myths. Discursively, the primorriverista press propagated the image of 
the dictator as a prophetic leader and a national saviour in religious terms. 
Additionally, the official media constantly printed pictures of the national Caudillo in 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and brochures, while Primo’s portraits were 
frequently displayed in UP centres and public ceremonies. Furthermore, tens of 
towns and villages named streets and squares after the dictator and, from 1926 
onwards, the vast majority of new elementary schools chose as their namesake Primo 
de Rivera. Admittedly, Primo lacked the oratory skills of Mussolini and the UP did 
not have the propagandistic strength of the Fascist Party, but this was no impediment 
for the regime’s attempt to create a personality cult of the dictator. It was Primo’s 
showmanship concept of politics that fuelled this cult of personality. In Madrid, the 
UP regularly held rallies in front of Primo’s house, the Palacio de Buenavista, to 
show their support for the dictator, a liturgy which reminded the British ambassador 
to Madrid of Fascist gatherings at the Palazzo VeneziaP^
Primo’s constant tours around Spain provided UP provincial branches with a 
good opportunity to mobilise supporters. On some occasions, the presence of the 
dictator certainly led to the organisation of grand gatherings. On 29 May1924, for 
instance, 30,000 people gathered in Medina del Campo to hear the speech of the 
dictator. In January 1926, liturgies during his visit to Barcelona included a
148 For Spain see La Nacion, 11-12-1925.
See Chapters 2 and 3.
Among many other examples, see El Somatén, August 1924; Union Patriotica, 1-4-1927; La 
Nacion, 13-9-1927.
Ben Ami, Fascism, 157.
A photographic reportage of the event was published two years later in Union Patriotica, 1-11- 
1926.
269
gargantuan parade of 20,000 upetistas marching in front of Primo and a separate rally 
at the Olympia Theatre which gathered together 7,000 “selected” supporters. In 
September 1928, the celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the coup set in motion the 
entire party network. For a week, the upetistas organised meetings, lunches and 
parades in hundreds of towns and villages throughout the country. The central 
focus of the celebrations was, however, to be in Madrid. Thousands of UP militants 
all over Spain were given free train tickets and boxed lunches to travel to the capital. 
According to the official press, 100,000 upetistas marched on the streets of Madrid on 
13 September 1928 to commemorate the anniversary. Three days later 40,000 
primorriveristas paraded in Barcelona.
Perhaps no other celebration epitomises better the eclectic character of the 
primorriverista ceremonies than the Fiesta de la Raza. The 12^ of October 
celebration provided the regime with an excellent opportunity to disseminate its anti- 
Black Legend discourse, to emphasise the supremacy of Castilian language and to 
present the legacy of the Spanish empire in a positive light. In clear opposition to 
the pessimist and pro-European views of the Generation of 98, the primorriveristas 
celebrated the nation in a optimistic fashion looking towards America. Additionally, 
the Fiesta de la Raza emphasised the sacred character of the nation. The 12^  ^ of 
October coincided with the popular celebration of the Virgin of Pilar, the national 
patron saint. Together with military parades, open-air masses placing the patria 
under the protection of the Virgin of Pilar became a common event of the Fiesta de la 
Raza all over Spain. Again, religion was considered to be “the most powerful engine 
to reach the heart of the masses” and Catholic iconography and rituals were used to 
stir the emotions of the people in favour of the national ideal and the regime alike.
Whereas the religious character of the Day of the Race had been paramount 
since the Maura government declared October the 12* an official fiesta in 1918, the 
military connotations of the celebration became increasingly important from 1923 
onwards. During the dictatorship, delegates were in charge of organising the festival
153 Union Patriotica, 15-4-1927.
La Nacion, 10-9-1928; 11-9-1928; 12-9-1928.
La Nacion, 13-9-1928.
La Naciôn, 17-9-1928.
See, for example, Vicente Gay in £ /Debate, 13-10-1923.
For the political use o f the Virgin of Pilar from the Peninsular War to the 1930s see Giuliana Di 
Febo, La Santa de la Raza [Barcelona: 1988], 35-42.
Rodriguez Tarduchy, Psicologia, 249.
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in towns and villages, army parades were included as part of the nationalist ritual and 
military authorities presided over the celebrations. This military character was 
especially emphasised in 1927, when the 12^  ^of October was declared “Fiesta of the 
Race, the Soldier and Peace” to commemorate the Spanish victory in Morocco. The 
main events of the celebration took place in Zaragoza, where, after the usual masses 
and consecrations of national flags, hundreds of soldiers marched in a parade presided 
over by Primo. Catholicism, the old empire and the new colonies were all 
celebrated at the same time in a symbiosis of past and present united in religious 
permanence.
The process of “militarization” of the Fiesta de la Raza formed part of a 
broader strategy to take the celebration into the streets. From 1918 to 1923 the 
celebrations had on many occasions taken place indoors and the Fiesta de la Raza had 
gained relatively little popular support. The vddespread celebration of open-air 
masses and military parades, together with the regime’s mobilisation of UP members, 
somatenistas and school children to march in the streets as part of the ceremonies, 
transformed the commemoration of the fiesta during the dictatorship. In order to 
achieve this transformation Primo used party and state resources alike. In early 1925, 
the dictator declared that the UP had among its missions to stir the people’s “spiritual 
vibrations [of] love for the race”. As a result, diverse sections of the party issued 
manifestos mobilising upetistas and organised public UP flag sanctifications as part of 
the Fiesta de la Raza celebrations. Conceived as a ceremony especially suitable for 
the indoctrination of young people, the dictatorship fostered their incorporation into 
the Fiesta de la Raza. Provincial administrations devoted part of their resources to 
propagate the Hispanista ideal in educational centres and public libraries, teachers 
were instructed to devote some hours to explain to pupils the grandeur of Hispanismo, 
while the regime carefully organised the participation of children from public and 
private schools in the Fiesta de la Raza parades.
La Naciôn, 12-10-1927.
See reports from different ceremonies in provincial capitals in La Vanguardia, 13-10-1923 and El 
Debate, 13-10-1923.
Primo's speech, 10-4-1925, in Casa, Dos anas, 842-843. For the manifestos mobilising the party’s 
rank and file and the sanctification o f the UP flags see El Noticiero Universal, 11-10-1928 and 12-10- 
1928.
In October 1925, the Diputacion de Barcelona, for instance, supplied special issues o f the Revista 
Hispano Americana to schools and libraries. See ADPB, Bundle 4176, File 49. The instructions to 
school teachers in La Naciôn, 12-10-1926 and 10-10-1928.
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There can be little doubt that the primorriverista efforts to popularise the fiesta 
paid off. By 1928, Madrid witnessed huge parades with 30,000 children marching in 
the streets, while the Barcelona press also noted the massive celebrations showed the 
Fiesta de la Raza had taken a firm root in the Catalan capital. Furthermore, 
hundreds of villages celebrated the Fiesta de la Raza for the first time during the 
dictatorship, proving once again the key role of the governmental delegates in 
spreading patriotic rituals. Yet the use of the Fiesta de la Raza as a device for 
governmental propaganda and the continual representation of nation and dictatorship 
as conterminous were soon to prove costly for the primorriveristas. As in the Somatén 
ceremonies, once the regime entered its final crisis in 1929 the participation in the 
ceremonies decreased remarkably. More importantly, notwithstanding 
primorriverista efforts, the impact of the Fiesta de la Raza on the population was at 
best dubious. In an editorial of October 1930, La Nacion bitterly acknowledged that 
some were not convinced of the efficiency of the celebrations while others simply 
considered the Fiesta de la Raza u s e l e s s . T h e  following year, Berenguer’s 
government removed the militarist connotations of the Fiesta de la Raza and opted for 
a more low-key celebration.’^  ^ The Republican-Socialist government of 1931-33 
declared the Fiesta a national holiday, but removed the Catholic masses from the 
celebration and shifted the emphasis of the official discourse towards liberal 
Hispanismo}^^ Democratic principles and the Spanish language, and not Catholicism 
and militarism, became the dominant themes of the celebration.
Crisis, radicalisation and fall
By 1928, the fact that the UP was not making the expected impact on the 
population became obvious to some local leaders. Consequently, they began to send 
proposals to Primo to radically improve the propagandist techniques of the party. 
Some of the proposals were concerned with symbolism. After all, with the exception 
of the party emblem and flags, which were positioned on the façade of the UP centres, 
and the cockade with the national colours worn by some militants during patriotic
For Madrid see La Nacion, 12-10-1928. For Barcelona see El Noticiero Universal, 12-10-1928. 
According to the primorriverista press the number o f children marching in the streets o f Madrid had 
dropped from 35,000 in 1926 to 20,000 in 1929. La Nacion, 12-10-1926 and 12-10-1929.
La Nacion, 11-10-1930.
La 11-10-1930.
12-10-1932; 13-10.1932; E /D eW e, 12-10-1932; 13-10-1932.
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acts, the UP had done very little to promote distinctive party symbols. The 
somatenista and upetista mayor of the district of Miraflores del Palo (Malaga), 
Manuel Moreno Millan, proposed the mandatory placing of the Spanish flag and coat 
of arms on all public buildings, including post offices, and churches. But these were 
not to be conventional national flags. Moreno wanted the UP emblem, its tenet and 
the date of 13 September to be embroidered to the national flag, so all citizens would 
have the nation, the party and its leader “impressed on their brains from a very early 
age” 169 other proposals focussed on improving governmental propaganda in the 
press. For example, the upetista Anselmo Blasco thought that the “great benefits” 
brought by the regime to Spain did “not reach the masses, which seem[ed] unaware of 
them”.^ ®^ Consequently, Moreno proposed the creation of a modem magazine, with a 
circulation of 1 million issues per month including English, French, German, Italian, 
Portuguese and Arabic editions.
These petitions did not fall in deaf ears. In 1928, Primo created the Junta de 
Propaganda Patriotica y  Ciudadana (JPPC). A special branch of the Press and 
Censorship Cabinet, the JPPC was directed by Lieutenant Maximo Cuervo, ye/e of the 
Bureau of the President. Cuervo, Caledonio de la Iglesia, the head of the censorship 
department, and a team of fifty military officers, soon centralised primorriverista 
propaganda efforts and began publishing books and pamphlets. In the spring of 1929, 
the JPPC published Cursos de Ciudadania (a compilation of lectures by regime 
ideologues), followed by Las Dictaduras y  el Sr. Cambo later that year, and produced 
a series of pamphlets and postcards to be distributed among public officers and the 
general public at l a r g e . A t  the same time, the JJPC co-ordinated massive 
publication of the dictator and the primorriverista ideologues’ books. These works 
were later sent to all civil governors, who in turn distributed them among schools, 
cultural organisations, town councils, libraries, military barracks and UP centres.
In addition, the JJPC orchestrated a series of “patriotic demonstrations” to 
protest against the “conspiracy” of the foreign press and the student revolt. With the
Manuel Moreno Millân to Presidencia del Gobiemo, 19-10-1928, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, 
Bundle 204, Box 1.
Anselmo Blanco to Primo de Rivera, 20-5-1928, AHN, Gobemaciôn, Serie A, Bundle 17A, Box 2. 
The postcards were to be signed by state and municipal officers as proof o f support for the 
dictatorship. AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 199, Box 1 and Bundle 192, Box 2.
For the publication and distribution o f the works see various documents in AHN, Presidencia del 
Gobiemo, Bundle 190, Box 1, Bundle 192, Box 1, Bundle 199, Box 1, and Bundle 204, Box 2.
Union Patriotica, 15-4-1929.
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help of the civil governors, the JPPC mobilised UP militants to participate in patriotic 
acts in which signatures of support for the regime were collected and thousand of 
pamphlets delivered. As the civil governor of Lugo crudely put it, these acts were a 
good opportunity “to flood the province with [pamphlets] and make citizens swallow 
their concepts”.F u rth e rm o re , domestic propaganda was coupled with international 
promotion of the dictatorship. Cuervo tried to intensify the regime’s presence in the 
international media and prepared a series of new publications to be sold abroad. 
Seeking to counter the increasingly negative image the regime was gaining in Europe 
and Latin America, the JPPC co-ordinated its activities with Plus Ultra -the 
propaganda agency established by Primo in Paris in 1926 to promote the image of the 
regime in the international arena. As a result of this collaboration, the JPPC 
launched La Espana de Hoy. Periodica editado en espanol, fiancés, aleman e inglés 
para propagar en todo el mundo el resurgimiento actual de Espana and Espana 
Nueva, and funded the translation into French of propagandists’ works, such as 
Pemartin’s Los valor es historicos en la Dictadura
The JPPC also supported private propagandist initiatives in defence of the 
regime. The most notorious case was Propagandistas de Espana, a civil nationalist 
organisation devoted to “inspire the masses to praise the Spanish Race” which, 
according to the official records, had “had almost no activity whatsoever” since its 
foundation in 1927.^^* In July 1929, however, Propagandistas de Espana was granted 
official recognition by Primo and the JJPC began to assist the patriotic association.*^^ 
The reason for this backing was the JJPC’s urgency to promote the Seville and 
Barcelona international exhibitions of 1929. In June that year, the Bureau of the 
President had received a shocking report from the Commissioner of the Ibero- 
American Exhibition in Seville stating that the exposition desperately needed more
174
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Civil Governor of Lugo to Cuervo, 30-7-1929, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 192, Box 1. 
For the activities of Plus Ultra see Rosa Cal, “Los gastos reservados y la prensa con Primo de 
Rivera”, Historia 16, n. 271, November 1989, 72-77.
AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 204, Box 2.
Some examples o f the JPPC backing of individuals’ propagandist initiatives in AHN Presidencia del 
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visitors. The Commissioner pointed out that many foreigners would not visit the 
exhibition due to the “[political] atmosphere in the country” and “the alarming 
situation” created abroad by the primorriverista opposition.^*' More importantly, the 
report suggested not enough Spaniards were visiting the exhibitions in Seville and 
Barcelona and, hence, the people could not grasp the “patriotic effort” carried out by 
the regime in organising the events. The proposal by the Commission was an “integral 
plan” to publicise Seville and Barcelona exhibitions both in Spain and abroad. The 
plan was an example of a modem approach to propaganda similar to that put in 
practice by Mussolini in the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution.'*^ It included 
the participation of embassies, public officers, publicity agencies and other private 
companies, such as travel agencies, hotels, restaurants and health resorts, and 
emphasised the use of posters, cinema and flyers as the most effective means of 
attracting the public.'*^
The report constituted a serious blow to a project that Primo himself had 
passionately endorsed since his first days in power. For all the money and propaganda 
the dictatorship had put into the exhibitions throughout the years the results were a 
fiasco.'*"' It was not only that the actions of the opposition were having a knock-on 
effect in restraining the number of foreign visitors but, more cmcially, the fact that 
Spaniards were not visiting the expositions deprived the regime of a political success 
at home. Unlike Italy, where the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution constituted 
a key event in the construction of the so-called “culture of consent” and encouraged 
mass support for Mussolini’s dictatorship, the Seville and Barcelona exhibitions 
elicited the wrath of Spanish Republicans.'*^ In their view, the Seville and Barcelona 
exhibitions were nothing but clear evidence of Prime’s megalomania and a deceitful
“Propuesta de propaganda y publicidad presentada a la Comisiôn Permanente de la Exposiciôn Ibero 
Americana en la sesiôn de 14 de jimio de 1929”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 199, Box 1.
“Propuesta de propaganda y publicidad”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 199, Box 1.
For the Fascist propagandist effort see Jeffrey T. Schnapp, “Epic Demonstrations. Fascist Modemity 
and the 1932 Exhibition o f the Fascist Revolution”, in Richard J. Golsan (ed.). Fascism, Aesthetics, and  
Culture [Hanover, NH: 1992], 1-37.
183 “Propuesta de propaganda y publicidad”, AHN, Presidencia del Gobiemo, Bundle 199, Box 1.
Economically, both exhibitions went hugely over budget. A report o f the Presidency Bureau pointed 
out on 28 May 1929 (just one day after the opening of the Barcelona exhibition) that the Comité de la 
Exposiciôn Internacional de Barcelona already had a deficit of 390,000 pesetas. Bureau of the 
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manifestation of the decadent monarchic system. Far from attracting the population 
towards the national ideal, the exhibitions seems to have further exacerbated the 
divisions among Spaniards.
In many senses, the primorriverista propaganda offensive came too late. By 
the time the JPPC was formed the UP was losing members and the dictatorship was in 
crisis. At the heart of the party’s problems lay its very official nature. This had 
attracted many opportunists who hoped to benefit from their affiliation but were not 
committed to the regime - ideologically or otherwise. Evidence of this lack of 
political commitment is to be found in the party organs. For a party which claimed to 
have over a million militants, the fact that La Nacion and Union Patriotica had 
circulations of 50,000 and 6,000 issues respectively shows that the UP affiliates did 
not even bother to read the official press. By 1926, it was clear to senior figures in the 
regime that the UP was a breeding-ground of personal ambitions for many members. 
In December, Milans del Bosch and Barrera publicly called for a purge of the party 
and “elimination of all those that had joined [the UP] in bad faith”.*** Nevertheless, 
the task of reorganising the UP on ‘purer’ ideological bases did not begin until 
January 1930, when both party and dictatorship were collapsing.**^
The factor that most significantly contributed to the fall of the UP, and to a 
large extent to the collapse of the regime, was the loss of Social Catholics’ support for 
the party. From 1928, the Social Catholics grew increasingly disaffected with the 
dictatorship as they began to understand that Primo was not going to implement their 
political agenda. The exclusion of Catholic trade unions in the comités paritarios and 
the educational reforms granting more power to the state to the detriment of the 
Church were all indicative of the divergent route the dictatorship was taking from the 
Social Catholics’ goals. *^ ° Social Catholic discontent can be detected in the pages of 
El Debate from the Autumn of 1928, when the newspaper questioned the regime’s 
attitude towards the Catholic Church and demanded more state money for the clergy. 
This campaign led to a furious response by La Nacion defending government 
spending on the clergy while reaffirming the subordinate status of the Catholic
Republican critique o f the Seville exhibition in Maria José Ruiz Acosta, “Hacia el gran reto: la labor 
de la prensa en preparaciôn de la Exposiciôn Iberoamericana de 1929”, Historia y  Comunicaciôn 
Social, 2, (1997), 221-227.
As Calvo Sotelo acknowledged in Mis servicios, 331-332.
Union Patriotica, 1-12-1926.
Union Patriotica, 15-1-1930.
See chapters 3 and 5.
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Church vis-à-vis the s ta te/Moreover ,  in what constituted a common subterfuge to 
pass negative judgements on to the Spanish dictatorship, Angel Herrera’s newspaper 
intensified its criticism of Italian f a s c i s m / I n  April 1929, following the censoring of 
an editorial in El Debate, Herrera wrote a letter of complaint to Maximo Cuervo 
explaining that the article was pro-monarchical and was aimed at “destroying the 
republican atmosphere that four Republican intellectual politicians were trying to 
spread in Madrid”. Crucially, Herrera added that the newspaper’s campaign to 
promote the figure of the King, sought to facilitate “an easy transition to a different 
regime”. In the spring of 1929, the rift between the dictatorship and the Social 
Catholics was widening by the day.
The consequences of the split were catastrophic for the official party. 
Throughout 1929, both Social Catholic cadres and rank and file militants increasingly 
left the UP as the dictatorship faced one crisis after another. It is important to notice 
here that the Social Catholics’ gradual withdrawal led to the radical authoritarian wing 
of the party to take absolute control over the Moreover, all this happened in a
moment when Primo had turned the UP and the Somatén into espionage and police 
institutions, seeking to make political repression more efficient. However, the results 
of this “totalitarian drive” were counterproductive, for it was not only ineffective in 
curbing opposition to the dictatorship, but it also made the UP and the Somatén more 
unpopular .Especial ly damaging for the UP was the new legislation to repress 
suspected dissidents from among public servants.Functionaries constituted the 
largest professional sector of the party’s rank and file, and indiscriminate arrests and 
random legislation alienated public servants from the regime. No less important 
was the attack on professional groups, such as lawyers, doctors and architects, which 
turned against the dictatorship due to the primorriverista interventionism in their 
associations and the repressive measures taken against political dissidents. As a result.
La Naciôn, 12-10-1928.
See E /D gW g editorials 2-11-1928; 13-11-1928; 20-11-1928; 27-11-1928.
Angel Herrera to Mâximo Cuervo, 5-4-1929, AHN, Presidencia, FFCC, Bundle 192, Box 2, File 
13003.
Gil Pecharromân, Conservadores, 54.
Gonzalez and Rey, La defensa, 215.
RD 4-2-1929, RCO, Additional Disposition, 8-2-1929, El Somatén, February, 1929; RCO 16-4- 
1929, CLE, n. 147, 86-87.
5-2-1930.
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the integration of middle-class professional groups into the regime, which Mussolini 
gradually achieved in Italy, never happened in Spain/
In the spring and the summer of 1929, Cuervo and Martinez Anido 
orchestrated a series of patriotic acts to “demonstrate” to the opposition at home and 
the foreign press abroad that popular support for the regime remained unchanged/^^ 
Yet the fact that civil governors and delegates were once again in charge of organising 
the gatherings is indicative of the low level of independence the UP had gained 
throughout the years and, indeed, of the little trust the government had in the party’s 
capacity to mobilise the masses. Prime’s scepticism towards the UP was not 
unfounded. In April 1929, the Barcelona UP’s provincial Jefe bitterly informed the 
dictator about the inaction of the militants. In a frank letter to Primo, Gasso wrote that 
90% of the members were either “indifferent” or “disappointed” with the regime. 
Another 5%, Gasso explained, went to party centres just to read the newspaper and 
play cards, and around 5% of the militants wished “to act in good faith, but owing to 
the lack of assistance by their jefes [their] enthusiasm could not materialise.... It can 
be said that Not doing is the tenet of the UP in Barcelona”.^ ®^ Furthermore, the 
establishment of a branch of the JPPC in Barcelona did not make things any better for 
the primorriveristas. On the contrary, Gasso saw the establishment of a JJPC 
committee in Barcelona as a challenge to his position and became remarkably 
uncooperative.^^^ Under such circumstances of lack of interest and disappointment of 
militants and internal struggles between the primorriverista cadres, it is hardly 
surprising that the UP failed to mobilise its members when it was most important for 
the survival of the regime.
The decadence of the party was implicitly admitted by Primo in late 1929. In 
an official note dated 17 December, the dictator boasted that the UP had “600,000 or 
700,000 affiliates”. Regardless of the more than dubious correctness of the figure, the 
statement implied a loss of around 50% of UP militants in two years, compared to the
Francisco Villacorta, “Dictadura y grupos profesionales organizados”, Ayer, n. 40 (2000), 51-78.
See also Pilar Calvo Caballero, Las organizaciones patronales en Castilla y  Leôn durante la Dictadura 
de Primo de Rivera [Valladolid: 2004], 213-228.
On diverse patriotic acts in the provinces of Granada, Lugo, Câdiz, Jaén, and Madrid see 
correspondence between civil governors and Mâximo Cuervo in AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 192, Box 1.
Gômez-Navarro, “La Union Patriôtica”, 138.
For Gassô boycotting the actions o f the JPPC in Barcelona see Eduardo Pérez Angulo, Jefe de la 
Junta de Propaganda Patriôtica y Ciudadana de la Delegaciôn Provincial de Barcelona, to Cuervo, 8-4- 
1929, AHN, Presidencia, Bundle 192, Box 2.
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1.3 million affiliates Union Patriôtica claimed the party had in 1927.^°^ Two weeks 
later, the dictator stated the obvious and conceded different sectors of society were 
disaffected with the regime, including Catholic political groups and functionaries - the 
two backbones of the UP rank and file.^ ®^  After Primo was compelled to resign on 29 
January 1930, the party simply collapsed. Once Berenguer ordered the civil governors 
to cut all support to the UP, the desperate calls for unity from the pages of Union 
Patriôtica were to no avail.^ ®"^  Created from above the official party could not survive 
without the primorriverista regime.
Nevertheless, a small group of primorriverista hard-liners were determined to 
build on the legacy of the dictatorship. In April 1930, ex-ministers and ideologues of 
the regime gathered together to form the Uniôn Monarquica (UM) in an attempt to 
replace the UP. The same month the UP Provincial Leaders Assembly recommended 
the upetistas to join the UM on an individual basis. During the summer of 1930 the 
last sections of the UP were dissolved.^®  ^The primorriverista dream of a great mass 
party faded away without the support of the state apparatus.
In 1923 Primo claimed he was to follow the example set by Mussolini. Seven 
years later his regime had collapsed while the fascist dictator had consolidated his 
power and enjoyed a certain level of popular support.^^^ When comparing the 
development of the Fascist Party and the UP, the picture that emerges is one of two 
regimes travelling in opposite directions. In Italy, the Fascist Party gradually 
integrated different conservative groups and increasingly accommodated Catholic 
rhetoric into its discourse throughout the 1920s.^ ®^  In 1929, the Lateran Agreements 
effectively integrated the Catholic Church into the Fascist state. Conversely, the UP 
increasingly radicalised its discourse, political goals and political personnel 
throughout the 1920s, a process which led to the gradual alienation of conservative 
groups from the regime. In 1929, the departure of the Social Catholics from the UP 
paved the way for the fall of the dictatorship.
202 Official note in Pérez, La Dictadura, 296-300.
Official note, 31-12-1929, in E /W , 1-1-1930.
Primo’s words for unity in Union Patriôtica, 8-2-1930.
Gil Pecharromân, Conservadores, 56.
Felice, Mussolini il Duce, 1-55.
John Pollard, “Conservative Catholics and italian Fascism: the Clerico-Fascists”, in Blinkhom, 
Fascist and Conservatives, 32-50.
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CONCLUSION: A POISONED LEGACY
How successful might the UP and the Somatén be considered as agencies of 
nationalisation? An overall consideration of the actions of the party and the militia 
indicates that the UP and the Somatén's attempt to indoctrinate the masses was a 
failure. After all, the lack of mobilisation during the 1926 and 1929 revolts shows that 
not even the members of the party and the militia were fully committed to defend the 
dictatorship. Moreover, the very official nature of the UP and the Somatén, and the 
tight military control exercised over them linked the public’s image of the agencies to 
the regime’s popularity. This meant that when the dictator and the military began to 
lose popular support by 1928 the public’s image of the party and the militia soon 
deteriorated. This process was abetted by the constant abuses by the Somatén, the 
privileges granted to UP members and the regime’s ‘totalitarian drive’ of 1929. By 
transforming the party and the militia into repressive police institutions, the agencies’ 
popularity severely decreased. The discrediting of the UP and Somatén had a knock- 
on effect on the public’s perception of the National Catholic idea of Spain. Since the 
primorriveristas constantly presented nation and regime as the very same thing, the 
drop in popular support for the regime led to the fall of support of the official idea of 
Spain. Thus, as in the case of the army, the actions of the party and the militia led to a 
‘negative nationalisation’, in which increasing opposition to the state agents 
propagating the official canon of the nation were accompanied by the rejection of the 
very idea of nation defended by those agents.^®* The fact that disaffected middle- 
classes who had initially supported the regime increasingly turned towards the 
defence of a democratic and republican idea of Spain (or towards alternative 
nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country) has to be understood as 
a reaction to the monarchist authoritarian canon promoted by the UP and the Somatén. 
Unlike Mussolini, by the late 1920s Primo had failed to create a “culture of consent” 
that could integrate diverse social classes into the national ideal.^^^
The negative impact of the UP and the Somatén as agencies of mass 
nationalisation was obvious as soon as the dictatorship fell. Democratic liberals 
criticised the UP’s “secret denunciations and illegal arrests” and claimed a democratic
For the ‘negative effect’ o f the army as an agency o f nationalisation see Chapter 5.
On the creation of a “culture o f consent” in Italy under Mussolini see Pier Giorgino Zunino,
L ’ideologia del fascismo, 176-180; Victoria de Grazia, Culture o f  Consent: The Mass Organization o f  
Labour [Cambridge: 1981]; and Felice, Mussolini il Fascista, La organizzazione dello Stato fascista  
[Turin: 1968], 369-381
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citizenry based on “the public exercise of rights and duties”.^Furtherm ore, six days 
after the fall of Primo, Ortega condemned the dictatorship’s policies for fostering the 
divisions among Spaniards and “de-nationalising” the state agencies?^ ^  The state 
apparatus, Ortega observed, was not at the service of all Spaniards but exclusively of 
the primorriveristas. For the madrilène philosopher, the formation of a “great national 
party” integrating all social classes was the only way to “renationalise” S p a i n ? A  
similar emphasis on democracy and civil rights is to be found in the socialists’ 
discourse. Against the primorriverista militarised concept of citizen, the socialists 
presented “the people” as the essence of the nation and asserted the need to educate 
the masses in civil and democratic values in order to form a democratic regime.^ 
Significantly, the socialists challenged the Social Catholics’ claim to speak for the 
nation, arguing the “real Spain” was liberal and democratic and not the reactionary, 
backward-looking patria the Right represented. “Do they [the Social Catholics] really 
deceive themselves thinking they are Spain?”, El Socialista ironically wondered.^ 
Far from consolidating a uniform national identity the dictatorship led to the 
fragmentation of it, with different competing Spanish identities fighting to become 
hegemonic among the masses.
Yet the primorriverista nationalist rituals and top-down mobilisation were to 
have a long lasting impact. Like the fascists, the primorriveristas built a symbolic 
universe taking the liturgy and the language from the Christian tradition in order to 
endow the nation with a sacred aura. This facilitated the ‘interiorization’ of the nation 
as a sacred value by thousands of Spanish Catholics perfectly familiarised with 
Christian liturgy and symbolism. What is interesting when looking at the rites 
developed during the dictatorship is the extraordinarily high number of them. The 
thousands of patriotic ceremonies celebrated all around Spain were unprecedented and 
reached the most remote comers of the country, hence reinforcing the dominance of 
the Catholic-Monarchic symbolic universe in the public political sphere. This in turn 
constituted a poisoned legacy for the Second Republic, for the democratic forces 
found it extremely difficult to transform the National Catholic symbolic universe 
constructed in the 1920s. As a result, the Second Republic was to suffer a
2-2-1930.
El Sol, 5-2-1930.
This proposal was supported by Ossorio y Gallardo and Luis de Zulueta in the following days. El 
%  6-2-1930 and 7-2-1930.
El Socialista, 3-1-1930; 31-1-1930.
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‘representation crisis’ for the political authority of the democratic parties was not 
integrated into a wider social order that could create a sense of national community? 
On the other hand, the experience the Social Catholics had gained during Prime’s 
regime in terms of mass mobilisation, party organisation and nationalist rituals was 
vital during the 1930s, when most of the former cadres of the UP entered Accion 
Popular, first, and, later, CEDA?^^ The Catholic Right not only incorporated much of 
the primorriverista discourse (counter-revolution, the cult of the leader, and organic 
and hierarchical concept of nation, the myth of the Anti-Spain) but also the sacred 
symbolic universe developed during the dictatorship?^^ Furthermore, some 
primorriverista rituals (such as the misas de campana consecrating the national flag), 
and myths {Hispanidad) became essential tools to mobilise support for the rebels 
during the Civil War?^* And it was the same primorriverista top-down approach to 
mobilisation that Franco was often eager to use to orchestrate grand gatherings against 
“bad Spaniards” and critical foreigners all the way through his 40-year long 
dictatorship. The Manichaean discourse of both dictatorships had their equivalent 
Manichaean rituals.
“La Espafia de ‘El Debate’ no es la verdadera Espafla”, El Socialista, 1-2-1930.
Radcliff, “La representaciôn de la naciôn”, 311-312. The failure of Republicans and Socialists to 
create an overarching, mobilising state nationalism during the Second Republic in Helen Graham, 
“Community, Nation and State in Republican Spain, 1931-1938”, in C. Mar Molinero and A, Smith 
(eds.), Nationalism, 133-147.
For former upetistas and somatenistas in the CEDA see Castillo, Propietarios, 349-359. For the 
rituals and organisation o f the CEDA, with its youth and female sections, see, for example, CEDÀ, 15- 
1-1935, n. 38, 6; 15-2-1935, n. 40.
See, for instance, CEDA, 15-2-1935, n. 40, 12-13; 1-9-1935, n. 51, 10-11; Revista de Estudios 
Hispanicos, n. 7, July 1935, 78-83; n. 9, September 1935, 246-247.
For the use of misas de campana see Giuliana di Febo, Ritos de guerray de victoria en la Espana 
franquista [Bilbao: 2002], 46-47. For the use of the myth of Hispanidad see Eduardo Gonzâlez Calleja 
and Fredes Limôn Nevado, La Hispanidadcomo instrumenta de combate [Madrid: 1988].
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CONCLUSION. FROM NEGATIVE INTEGRATION TO 
NEGATIVE NATIONALISATION
In the aftermath of World War I, some European elites resorted to dictatorships 
as a way to halt the advance of the Left. In these cases nationalism and counter­
revolution were two sides of the same coin. Repression of political opponents went 
hand in hand with vast programmes of mass indoctrination in nationalist values 
designed to gain the hearts of the population, diminish the appeal of the Left among the 
lower classes and legitimise the dictatorships simultaneously. The principal argument of 
this thesis has been that the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera has to be understood within 
this counter-revolutionary European context as an authoritarian nationalist regime 
which attempted a vast process of nationalisation of the masses in National Catholic 
values. As many other European dictatorships of the inter-war period, Primo realised 
that the liberal oligarchic system would not hold in the post-1918 world and envisaged 
the need to create a new authoritarian state that could integrate the masses without 
paying the toll of a real democracy. In Spain, and elsewhere, this required the creation 
of a new political discourse that would redefine the traditionally dominant liberal canon 
of the nation and rally the people around the dictatorship via ‘negative integration’, i. e. 
the indoctrination of lower and middle classes in nationalist ideas emphasising foreign 
and domestic foes.
Seeking to reach a wide audience, the primorriverista discourse during the 
Military Directory was intentionally vague and populist. It blended elements from 
regenerationists, Maurists, Social Catholics, Traditionalists and above all military 
nationalism in a ‘negative discourse’ that attempted to integrate different political 
groups from the opposition to common enemies (such as caciques, peripheral 
nationalists, syndicalists, Moroccans, etc). In the first two years of the regime, the 
primorriverista discursive strategies sought to justify the existence of the dictatorship 
on a temporary basis. During the Civil Directory, once the dictator announced his 
intention to build a new state, the primorriverista discursive strategies shifted to ensure 
the disparagement of the Restoration and the transformation of the Canovista structures. 
National Catholicism was created from above in an attempt to endow the regime with a 
solid doctrinal basis and increase social support for the dictatorship. It merged French
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integral nationalism, Italian fascism and vitalist philosophy with diverse postulates of 
the Spanish anti-liberal right to formulate a new discourse which heralded the end of 
democracy, defended a sacred concept of the fatherland and promised a national re-birth 
via authoritarian corporative state. The result was a new highly fascisticised nationalist 
ideology in line with the European radical right.
Aiming to create a ‘political religion’ based on the cult of the nation as the 
supreme value that could have an impact on the entire Spanish society, the 
primorriveristas promoted a series of political myths (the messianic leader of the 
fatherland, the Anti-Spain and so on), displayed a religious rhetoric, fostered national 
symbols in the public sphere and invented a series of nationalist rituals. The goal was 
nothing less than the moral and physical improvement of the ‘Spanish race’, the making 
of a ‘new Spaniard’, and to this end state agencies were mobilised to an unprecedented 
extent. Yet the results of this process of state nationalisation were patchy. Although the 
dictatorship managed to mobilise sectors of Spanish society hitherto uninvolved in 
politics, create a catch-all interclass party and organise tens of nationalist rituals in the 
most remote comers of the country, its effectiveness was poor. The regime failed to turn 
the National Catholic concept of Spain into the hegemonic one, let alone to create any 
sort of consensus among Spaniards about the nation and the regime. On the contrary, 
the more the regime radicalised its discourse the more social support it lost.
Reasons for this failure lie in the functioning of the state agencies as much as the 
policies implemented by the primorriveristas. First of all, it is possible to detect a 
pattern in the work of state institutions under Primo: both the educational system and 
the army lacked the necessary funds to carry out the ambitious plans of mass 
nationalisation. Here the primorriveristas were caught in a sort of ‘demographic trap’. 
The economic development of the first two decades of the twentieth century had led not 
only to the rise of a working class which challenged the Restoration system but also to 
an important demographic growth. The primorriverista programmes of mass 
nationalisation were precisely an attempt to neutralise the threat of a changing society 
by integrating the lower classes into the national ideal. Consequently, Primo reformed 
the state agencies seeking to turn them into modem efficient indoctrinating institutions. 
Yet the modernisation of the state agencies could not keep pace with the demographic 
growth which put extra pressure on these already obsolete institutions, thus hampering 
their functioning as effective indoctrinating machines.
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A second factor which seriously undermined the efficiency of the state agencies 
as institutions of nationalisation was the alienation of public sector officials and 
workers. Primorriverista policies of purging, surveillance and repression of teachers 
and public servants by the military antagonised the very personnel the dictatorship 
needed for an effective transmission of the official message. To make things worst for 
the regime, Primo did not merge the UP with the state bureaucracy but rather used 
military officers to control the state apparatus. Unlike Mussolini, Primo did not create a 
bureaucracy linked to the official party and thus precluded the emergence of a new 
political clientele dependent on the regime. Hence, the primorriveristas could not be 
assured of the political loyalty of the UP social bases nor the ‘passive popularity’ that 
Mussolini achieved in Italy. By the time Maeztu realised the need for granting upetistas 
a privileged position in the state apparatus in December 1929, the primorriverista 
edifice was crumbling and most of the upetistas had already abandoned it.
Thirdly, the implementation of primorriverista policies of nationalisation 
severely undermined the initial support of many on the Right. Indiscriminate repression 
in Catalonia towards all those labelled ‘separatists’ led to the detachment of the 
regionalist sector of the Catalan bourgeoisie and the Traditionalists from the regime, 
while the linguistic policies of ‘Spanishization’ brought direct confrontation between 
Catalan Church and teachers, on the one hand, and the primorriveristas on the other. As 
in many other cases, language teaching policies proved to be counterproductive rather 
than an unifying factor in the process of state nationalisation. As Calvo Sotelo observed 
as early as 1924, the regime’s policies of nationalisation in Catalonia made things 
worse, turning many sectors of the population, hitherto opposed to of all sort of 
Catalanism, into Catalanist sympathisers.^
In the case of the Social Catholics it was not so much the primorriverista anti- 
regionalist policies as the incorporation of the UGT into the comités paritarios and the 
increasing power of the state in educational issues that led to the gradual breach vdth the 
government from 1928 onwards. This proved costly for the primorriveristas, as the 
Social Catholics constituted the main social bases of the UP and the Somatén, but it was 
in many ways a logical product of the primorriverista ideological understanding of the 
leading role the state should have in process of nationalisation. While the incorporation 
of the socialists into the corporatist state was essentially a primorriverista move to co-
Calvo, Mis servicios, 68-69.
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opt the moderate sector of the working class, Primo always considered the Church as 
subordinate to the state. He was determined to extend state control over education to 
secure an effective process of nationalisation which necessarily collided with 
ecclesiastical interests. The dictator had to trade off some concessions (as granting the 
right to issue decrees to religous colleges), yet he held firm in more important issues in 
terms of mass nationalisation such as the texto unico and the creation of new public 
state-controlled secondary schools.
Governmental policies of nationalisation also proved counterproductive in the 
rural areas. The public image of the delegados soon deteriorated owing to 
indiscriminate repression, accusation of corruption, the officers’ inability to deal with 
municipal issues and the financial strains put on local councils. When the regime 
created a permanent institution specifically devoted to mass indoctrination in the rural 
areas in 1929 the SNEFCP faced the same old problems of under-funding and had no 
time to make an impact. The overall effect of the actions of the ‘apostles of the 
fatherland’ was to undermine the regime, the military as a whole and the National 
Catholic idea of Spain, since primorriverista officers constantly presented nation, 
dictatorship and army as the very same thing. A similar negative effect on the urban and 
rural population is to be observed in the cases of the Somatén and the UP. The abuses of 
the militia and the transformation of the party into a repressive police institution created 
hostility towards the regime and discredited the primorriverista idea of Spain. If the 
primorriverista discourse sought a ‘negative integration’ of the entire population against 
the ‘enemies of the fatherland’, the actions of the agencies propagating that message led 
to a ‘negative nationalisation’.
The different political proposals that emerged after the fall of the dictatorship are 
telling of the discredit into which the primorriverista idea of Spain had fallen aind, 
ultimately, of the regime’s failure to nationalise the masses in National Catholic values. 
In Catalonia, different nationalist and regionalist factions came together in their struggle 
against the dictatorship, and cultural production in the Catalan language increased, 
while democratic republican Catalan tendencies gained mass support. In the Basque 
Country, the two factions of the Basque Nationalist Party re-united and the nationalist 
movement soon increased its popular support. In other areas of Spain regionalist 
movements mushroomed in the early 1930s. Some of these movements were the 
continuation of the late 1910s and early 1920s conservative regionalism, but some 
others had acquired a more democratic veneer. More importantly, as a reaction against
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the dictatorship, the idea of a republican democratic Spain took root among many in the 
urban centres. As soon as the primorriverista regime collapsed, a democratic Spanish 
nationalism re-emerged stronger than ever. From February 1930, liberals and socialists 
argued in favour of the formation of a new constitutional system based on universal 
suffrage and an active participation of the “Spanish people”, as the only way to heal the 
divisions originated by Primo's dictatorship. In December 1930, Spanish liberals, 
republicans, and socialists reached a political agreement with peripheral nationalists to 
establish a secular, democratic and decentralised republic.
The primorriverista ideological legacy to the Right was rich and complex. 
Throughout the Second Republic, the Social Catholics of Accion Popular adopted the 
primorriverista sacred anti-democratic concept of Spain, together with its symbolic 
elements and liturgy, as a central part of the conservative discourse. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the Social Catholics and the Catalan monarchists returned to their pre-1923 
regionalist postulates as soon as Primo fell illustrates how unpopular the primorriverista 
centralist policies had become. Only marginal parties in the extreme right, Renovacion 
Espanola and Falange Espahola y  de las J.O.N.S., stridently opposed all forms of 
regionalism and defended the centralist policies of the dictatorship. Yet electoral 
oblivion did not mean political insignificance. The generals who revolted against the 
Second Republic in July 1936 were highly influenced by the National Catholic 
postulates elaborated during Primo's dictatorship. In fact, the military rebels declared 
they sought to achieve what Primo could not: “to nationalise and to de-intoxicate the 
masses, to create a new state and to reorganise society”.^
This second attempt of mass nationalisation was to be much more radical and 
brutal. The Francoist regime differed from the primorriverista in two main aspects. 
First, as in 1923, the 1936 military coup was welcomed by most of conservative groups, 
but this time the democratic experience of the early 1930s had frightened many on the 
Right who had become much more extreme in their determination to halt social change 
and political reform. All this took place within the context of an ‘European Civil War’ 
in which the struggle between Right and Left had been exacerbated during the 1930s by 
the Great Depression and the advance of fascism. Second, Francoism emerged from a 
civil war, unlike the bloodless coup that brought Primo to power. Franco’s refusal to 
recognise the defeated after the war and his determination to established a reign of terror
 ^The words o f Jorge Vigôn in Juan Carlos Losada Malvârez, Ideologia del ejército franquista (1939- 
7P5P [Madrid: 1990], 132.
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with large-scale executions and mass imprisonments made the political conditions of the 
1940s very different from the primorriverista era. Yet, for all these differences, it is 
important to note that the ideological principles behind both Primo and Franco’s bid to 
regenerate Spain and nationalise the masses bore a close resemblance. This was not only 
owing to the fact that the former ideologues of the primorriverista regime played a 
leading role in the merging of different conservative groups in the F.E.T. and were soon 
integrated into the Francoist government during the Civil War. It was also that many 
ideological postulates, myths, ceremonies and ‘traditions’ invented and/or consolidated 
during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera became part of the Francoist regime from its 
conception. The organic concept of the nation as a supreme and sacred political value, 
the idea of Spain as conterminous with Catholicism, Hispanismo, the corporative state, 
the idealisation of the military leader as the saviour of the fatherland and the myth of the 
Anti-Spain were all essential elements in a Francoist discourse soaked in religious and 
medical vocabulary, whose ultimate goals were the nationalisation of the masses in 
authoritarian and militarist values and the creation of a ‘New State’. In many respects, 
Francoist National Catholicism was ideologically bom during the dictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera.
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